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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate efforts to transform global environmental 
change research through co-design and co-production (involving non-academic actors 
in research governance and conduct). Social scientific work to date on this topic has 
largely taken an evaluative perspective, outlining challenges of and guidelines for co-
production on the ground. By contrast, there is little work on how co-production is 
conceptualised and put into practice through (international) research governance. Yet 
institutions aiming to govern research are significant arbiters of meaning and power; 
their efforts to change research are worthy of investigation. 
 
The thesis is based on a qualitative case study of Future Earth, a major international 
research initiative on global environmental change (GEC) and sustainability. Future 
Earth is unique in its ambition to internationally coordinate and co-design/co-produce 
new GEC/sustainability research at a global scale. The study is grounded in co-
productionist, interpretive science and technology studies, drawing on ideas about 
political imaginaries of science and experimental approaches to engagement. It is 
based on thematic analysis of data from documents, interviews, focus groups and 
observation of Future Earth’s emergence and development between 2010 and 2015. 
 
The analysis suggests that visions of Future Earth were ambitious, diverse and 
sometimes ambiguous, evoking two potential institutional forms: a unified, cohesive 
‘flagship’, or a ‘rich tapestry’ of varied initiatives. Ambiguity persisted in how co-
production and related concepts were understood, with varying definitions motivated 
by different rationales for increased (or limited) involvement of non-academic 
stakeholders, from ensuring relevance to democratising expertise to preserving the 
objectivity or independence of science. These notions of appropriate engagement were 
underpinned by disparate conceptions of the value of research (as a service to society, 
site of democratic deliberation, or public good), reproducing (and challenging) 
established models of science and democracy.   
 
The thesis argues that, from an experimental perspective, this ambiguity in visions of 
(co-production in) Future Earth can be seen to enable flexibility and allow differences 
to co-exist. This might require new, perhaps radical, thinking about how to organise, 
conduct and value research and its outcomes, with an increased emphasis on fostering, 
appreciating and productively working with diversity and institutional indeterminacy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Co-design and co-production have increasingly been advocated as methods or 
frameworks for involving non-academic actors in research and governance in the UK 
and internationally. Proponents argue that when addressing grand challenges, such as 
climate change and biodiversity loss, co-produced research will better engage with 
societal needs and concerns. The aim of this thesis is to investigate efforts to 
transform global environmental change research through frameworks of co-design 
and co-production. The thesis is therefore situated at the intersection of two 
transnational developments: global environmental change on the one hand, and 
changing research and policy cultures on the other.  
 
Processes of change in environments and in research and policy cultures can be 
considered to be occurring across multiple geographical and temporal scales and 
across national, political and sectoral boundaries. From the late 1980s, global 
warming and climate change began to be more widely discussed as global problems 
of science and politics requiring global solutions, against the backdrop of 
longstanding debates about environmental issues (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Jaspal 
& Nerlich, 2014). The transboundary nature of environmental phenomena has led to 
new configurations of politics and research along international lines, while research 
tools, concepts and representations have enabled environmental problems to be 
conceptualised as international and/or global (Miller & Edwards, 2001; Jasanoff & 
Wynne, 1998).  
 
Some have argued that societal concern about problems such as environmental 
pollution and climate change has led to new ways (and sites) of producing 
knowledge, in which these concerns are permitted to shape research agendas and 
practice, increasingly outside of academic settings (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et 
al., 2001). Others have suggested that the ‘wicked’ or ‘post-normal’ nature of 
contemporary environmental challenges necessitates new approaches to science and 
politics. These problems are deemed to be ‘wicked’, as ‘they have no definitive 
formulation, and can be considered symptoms of yet other problems’ such that ‘a 
solution to one aspect of a wicked problem often reveals or creates other, even more 
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complex, problems demanding further solutions’ (Hulme, 2009: 334); or ‘post-
normal’ because both decision stakes and uncertainties are high, requiring a more 
pluralistic approach than Kuhnian ‘normal’ science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). 
 
Since the 1980s and 1990s, shifts have occurred in science governance and conduct 
in the UK, other countries in Europe and beyond, and internationally. Concepts and 
approaches such as multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity, public and stakeholder 
engagement in research (governance), and responsible research and innovation have 
been increasingly proposed by (social) scientists, research funders and policy makers. 
This is part of a wider trend towards initiatives of openness, transparency, 
accountability and participation in science and policy (Felt & Wynne, 2007; Irwin, 
2006; Pallett, 2015b). These terms have gained currency in both research and broader 
public policy contexts, and are seen as key, in particular, to responding to grand 
societal challenges such as global environmental change, sustainability, health, 
poverty, and food security, among others.  
 
In this context of changing research systems and increasing initiatives of open 
science and open policy making (in the UK and beyond), co-design and co-
production have been advocated as approaches or frameworks for establishing and 
promoting relationships between research or policy and diverse actors, objects and 
concerns.  The existing literature on co-production of knowledge (the involvement of 
non-academic actors in research) has largely taken an evaluative perspective, 
outlining challenges of and developing guidelines for co-production on the ground in 
local, national or regional contexts (e.g. Lemos & Morehouse, 2005; Bergmann et al., 
2012). There is also a significant body of literature on the latent processes of co-
production in the sense of co-constitution of science and social order in a range of 
local, national and international contexts (Jasanoff, 2004c; Hilgartner et al., 2015). 
By contrast, there is little work on how co-production is conceptualised and put into 
practice in and through research governance, particularly at the international level, 
and how this might or might not co- or re-constitute research governance itself.  
 
This is the gap that this thesis intends to fill. It explores the adoption of co-design and 
co-production as principles or strategies for research governance and conduct, 
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through a case study of Future Earth. Future Earth is particularly suited to exploring 
the issues indicated above for a variety of reasons. Future Earth is a major 
international research initiative on global environmental change (GEC) and 
sustainability, merging several existing international GEC research programmes into 
one initiative. This reorganisation is accompanied (and in part motivated) by 
ambitions for a ‘new type of science’ (Future Earth, 2014c: 5) and ‘a new “social 
contract” between science and society’ (Future Earth, 2013b: 11). To achieve these 
aims, Future Earth is unique in its intention to internationally coordinate and co-
design/co-produce new research on GEC and sustainability at a global scale. Future 
Earth thus exemplifies calls for transformations in research systems, institutions, 
cultures, practices and knowledge-making communities, towards engagement with 
non-academic stakeholders. This push for change takes place in the context of Future 
Earth’s research focus on GEC and sustainability, that is, transboundary, contested 
topics conceived of as global in nature and importance. 
 
The following sections present a more detailed overview of the emergence of 
environmental change as a global matter of science and politics (1.1), and changes in 
research institutions and cultures as an emerging trend (1.2). The rationale for the 
research and the significance of this topic are then outlined (1.3), followed by a brief 
introduction to the case of Future Earth (1.4), a summary of the research questions, 
approach and scope (1.5), and an overview of the thesis structure (1.6). 
 
1.1 Changing climates: environmental change as a global issue of science and 
politics 
 
Environmental issues have been a matter of public concern and action since at least 
the 1960s, with the advent of environmental social movements within and across 
many nations. The centrality of science and technology in both causing 
environmental degradation (with unequal social impacts) and in identifying and 
defining these problems is apparent, for example in Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
(1962), a biologist’s critique of synthetic pesticide use in the US, widely credited for 
spurring the international environmental movement, in combination with other 
factors and catalysts (Jasanoff, 2001; McManus, 2009: 551). More than other social 
movements, the green movement and the politics of environmentalism have relied on 
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scientific authority as a basis for their claims about the problems confronting society 
(Yearley, 1995). 
 
Although environmental movements and environmental policies in nation states 
developed differently in different countries (Yearley, 1995), the convergence of a 
range of cultural, political and technoscientific shifts between the 1960s and the 
1980s led to the emergence of an international or global environmentalism, and the 
conceptualisation of climate change and related environmental problems as global 
issues of science and politics (Jasanoff, 2001; Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Miller & 
Edwards, 2001). For the most part politicians responded to this public concern with 
calls for more research, resulting in international efforts and investment in science, 
scientific monitoring and assessments (such as the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988) with a view to ascertaining the 
best basis for policy responses to deal with ozone depletion, pollution, climate 
change, biodiversity loss and, more recently, extreme weather events; and the 
establishment of international institutions of environmental governance, such as the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Yearley, 2008).  
 
While international policy and science institutions were built to address these 
concerns – and continue to be built, for example, the Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystems Services (IPBES), established in 
2012 (Turnhout et al., 2012) – one of the most significant contributions of the social 
studies of science and technology, henceforth science and technology studies (STS), 
is to highlight how the political cultures and commitments of these institutions in turn 
shape the framings of the problems and the (type of) knowledge that is produced, 
therefore shaping how these phenomena are conceived and can be acted on (S. Beck 
et al., 2017). As traced by many STS scholars (including but not limited to Miller & 
Edwards, 2001; Edwards, 2010; Yearley, 1996; S. Beck et al., 2017), science, 
technology, and also political institutions thus have played a key role in articulating 
environmental issues and their publics as global in nature and significance.  
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This has entailed the globalisation – or internationalisation1 – of research systems 
and agendas, whereby context specific, locally situated mechanisms of knowledge 
production (and knowledge itself), are standardised and harmonised in line with 
particular ways of defining and investigating the objects of research: 
 
Scientific internationalism is not simply a matter of cooperation across 
existing research agendas; in the context of climate change, there has been a 
reorientation of perspectives so as to reposition work in national investigative 
contexts as part of an emerging Earth systems science. Scientific practices in 
various countries are actively redesigned and linked together to define, in 
effect, problems and conceptual frameworks at what is construed as the 
international research front. Alternative concepts and approaches are thereby 
partially foreclosed as these alternatives also have to be marshalled and 
expressed at a fully international level.  
   
   (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998: 48-49; original emphasis) 
 
The development of Earth system science therefore led to a transformation in 
research systems: the adoption of common approaches across disciplinary and 
national boundaries in order to model various “spheres” of major Earth systems, such 
as the atmosphere, the biosphere and the geosphere and the ways in which they 
interact (in which climate change is one particular phenomenon whose dynamics are 
to be investigated in relation to others across diverse systems, e.g. ecosystems, 
oceans, land use) (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998). The multidisciplinary field of ‘global 
environmental change’ or ‘global change’ research also emerged in this context in the 
1980s and early 1990s, aiming to examine ‘anthropogenic impacts on the 
atmosphere, biosphere, cryosphere, hydrosphere and lithosphere’, to ‘describe, 
explain and predict these impacts at the planetary or regional scales, taking account 
of spatial-temporal variations and focusing on linkages between spheres’, as well as 
investigating ‘human dimensions’ including responses (Castree, 2016: 329; Turner et 
al., 1990).  
 
                                                 
1 The distinction between globalisation and internationalisation is not always clarified in the literature. 
Jasanoff and Wynne (1998) use both terms – seemingly interchangeably – in relation to scientific 
systems, arguably with the implication that ‘globalisation’ refers to attempts to shift towards unitary 
cultures and systems through standardisation and homogenisation across – and despite – national 
boundaries, whereas ‘internationalisation’ refers to a process in which the significance of the nation 
state as a basic unit is preserved while activities become increasingly coordinated at a global level and 
communications and collaboration between states increases. 
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Recent policy developments have been heralded as landmarks in addressing climate 
change, for example, the Paris Agreement adopted by 195 parties to the UNFCCC in 
December 2015, which sets out a global action plan to limit global warming to below 
2°C and entered into force in 2016 (European Commission, n.d.; UNFCCC, n.d.); 
and in linking environmental concerns with development and equity, for example in 
the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2015 (UN, n.d.). However, 
despite – or perhaps in part because – the discourse around these issues retains a 
sense of urgency and catastrophism (Hulme, 2009), there remains a perceived inertia 
in environmental politics and action, broadly attributed to a lack of public support for 
such policies and action rooted in ignorance or lack of understanding of science 
(Pearce et al., 2017), or to a lack of power or willingness on the part of state actors 
given corporate interests, among other reasons.  
 
In this context, the field of GEC research has recently seen calls for a greater 
influence on policy and action, driven by a concern that existing efforts to mitigate or 
adapt to GEC have been ‘woefully inadequate’ (Castree, 2016: 328). Future Earth 
can be seen as a significant example of this push towards solutions-oriented, policy 
relevant research, refocusing GEC or Earth system science towards global 
sustainability, in order to support timely responses to planetary change and enable 
‘people to thrive in sustainable and equitable world’ (Future Earth, 2014c: 5). Co-
production is a key aspect of this intended shift in research. The following section 
explores broader changes in science-society relations and the rise to prominence of 
co-production. 
 
1.2 Changing science-society relations: co-production as a research and policy 
trend 
 
Since the 1980s and 1990s the academic literature of research policy and STS has 
explored changes in research systems, institutions, cultures and practices that 
collectively appear to signal a new relationship between – or co-production of – 
science and society. The various conceptualisations of transformations in the 
dynamics between research and wider society include finalisation in science (Böhme 
et al., 1983), post-normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993), Mode 2 knowledge 
production (Gibbons et al., 1994) and post-academic science (Ziman, 2000), among 
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many others. While such concepts are diverse, they all describe, theorise or advocate 
a shift from the disciplinary organisation of research within the academy towards a 
greater recognition of socio-economic priorities and involvement of broader 
communities – particularly non-academic actors2 – in the governance and conduct of 
research (or sometimes, more specifically, the natural sciences), whether at a local, 
national, regional or global level (Hessels & van Lente, 2008). These ideas and 
accounts of transformations in science-society relations are not uncontested, but 
some of them have also taken on a performative role, both suggesting that a new 
organisation of knowledge production is taking place or should take place, and 
simultaneously participating in its realisation (Godin, 1998).  
 
These changes potentially challenge existing arrangements, ‘calling into question the 
adequacy of familiar knowledge producing institutions, whether universities, 
government research establishments, or corporate laboratories’ (Gibbons et al., 1994: 
1). For the most part, these ideas suggest that what were once considered to be 
distinct boundaries between different social institutions and actors (policy, 
science/research, civil society, public and private) are becoming increasingly blurred 
and intertwined. While STS has demonstrated that these boundaries were perhaps 
always permeable, contingent, contextually situated and socially constructed (Gieryn, 
1995; Latour, 1987), recent years have seen shifts in the active configuration of 
research, politics and publics alongside changes in the perceived authority of science 
and the nation state. This has entailed movement towards more decentred 
assemblages of knowledge, politics and economics, with increased influence of the 
private sector, increasingly ‘internationalised’ or ‘globalised’ forms of governance – 
or governmentality, and increasing significance of localism (Jasanoff, 2005; Irwin & 
Michael, 2003; Irwin, 2016). 
 
In response to (perceived) crises in the legitimacy of science, in the adequacy of 
existing governance and research arrangements, and the seemingly impenetrable 
complexity of challenges facing contemporary societies, there have been increasing 
calls within national and international research (funding) communities for multi-, 
                                                 
2 Such as “users” of research, “decision makers”, “policy makers”, “business”, “industry”, “civil 
society”, “local communities”, “the public”, or other “stakeholders”. 
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inter- and transdisciplinarity, public and stakeholder engagement, and responsible 
research and innovation (RRI).  
 
These initiatives can be considered to be part of a broader trend of efforts (or 
gestures) towards openness, transparency, accountability and public/stakeholder 
participation in research and broader governance and policy contexts in the UK, 
Europe and perhaps beyond (Felt & Wynne, 2007; Irwin, 2006; Pallett, 2015b). In 
the context of this trend, co-design and co-production have been advocated as 
research and/or governance approaches, for example, in the UK by research councils 
and academics (H. Campbell & Vanderhoven, 2016) and in public policy contexts 
(Durose & Richardson, 2015). Co-production has not only been advocated from the 
top down: researchers working on environment and sustainability, health, community 
and development studies, public policy, and the arts and humanities have adopted co-
production and related approaches in projects in a range of contexts and at a range of 
geographical scales (Lemos & Morehouse, 2005; Wehrens, 2013; Gillard et al., 
2012; Beebeejaun et al., 2014; Durose et al., n.d.; RCUK, n.d.-a). 
 
However, while initiatives of co-production, transdisciplinarity, engagement and RRI 
aim to move beyond the traditional disciplinary organisation of research and open up 
research and policy processes to a wider range of actors, the concepts underpinning 
them retain a high degree of interpretive flexibility (Ribeiro et al., 2017). They also 
sometimes serve as ‘buzzwords’ that mobilise people and resources (Bensaude 
Vincent, 2014), or as ‘boundary objects’ that enable diverse parties with different 
perspectives to work together (Star & Griesemer, 1989). In particular, co-production 
and related concepts such as co-design and transdisciplinarity have various meanings 
in different theory and practice contexts.  
 
In practice, broadly, co-production refers – beyond the everyday meaning of multiple 
financers in film, television, theatre or other arts production (OED, n.d.-a) – to the 
participation or collaboration of non-academic actors in research (whether defining 
questions, gathering or analysing data, or engagement in other aspects of the research 
process) (e.g. Pohl et al., 2010), or the involvement of communities and/or other non-
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governmental actors in policy processes or public service provision (Bovaird, 2007) 
(Nerlich, 2015 usefully explores these two strands).  
 
‘Co-design’ has similar meanings, sometimes with a greater focus on the earlier 
(design) stages of a research or policy/service provision process, but is also used in a 
range of other contexts, for example the collaborative design of products or built 
environments for user-friendliness (e.g. computer programmes, household items) and 
better fit with human needs and behaviours (e.g. urban development plans, 
architecture) (Moser, 2016).  
 
‘Transdisciplinarity’ can mean the involvement of non-academic actors in research 
and/or the integration of academic and non-academic knowledge and expertise, 
particularly in sustainability science contexts (Popa et al., 2015; Klein, 2004), but 
also can be understood as solutions-oriented research spanning disciplinary expertise 
with a view to solving societal problems (e.g. Masterman, 2017).  
 
Further satellite concepts circulate around these terms, for example, ‘co-creation’, 
‘co-dissemination’, and ‘co-delivery’, as explored in relation to public policy by 
Koskela-Huotari et al. (2013) in the brilliantly titled paper ‘Jungle of “Co”’.  
 
Co-production is also adopted in various theoretical contexts from which some of the 
practice meanings above originate. For example, in governance and economics 
research, Elinor Ostrom used the term to describe the reliance of professional (state) 
service providers on the activities of service ‘users’ (Ostrom et al., 1978) or ‘the 
process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by 
individuals who are not “in” the same organization’ (Ostrom, 1996: 1073), so that 
divides between public and private or state and civil society become blurred; this was 
later interpreted in more instrumental participatory terms in policy and service 
provision practice contexts as noted above. In STS, co-production is used by Sheila 
Jasanoff (2004b) and other scholars as an analytical idiom to explore the latent co-
constitution of science (knowledge) and social (political) order, and the multiple 
descriptive and normative uses of the term in this field have been noted by Lövbrand 
(2011), among others. 
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While the language of STS and cognate fields (e.g. ‘dialogue’, ‘engagement’, ‘co-
production’, ‘RRI’) is adopted in research governance, practice and broader policy 
contexts, the motivations for using these approaches in these contexts do not always 
follow the original logics espoused by scholars, and implementing the concepts can 
be challenging (Irwin, 2006; Stirling, 2008). The reasons for proposing and adopting 
these approaches to reconfiguring epistemic practices, knowledge domains, and 
science-society relations are as – if not more – diverse than the range of 
interpretations of the concepts themselves. STS researchers continue to argue for 
social agency, for opening up or democratising science and governance, and ensuring 
accountability of science/scientists and policy-makers to broader society. But they 
also suggest that, despite the proliferation of the language of STS, deficit and linear 
models persist that assume one-way relationships between experts and other 
stakeholders, and between knowledge and socially beneficial outcomes via policy, 
failing to acknowledge the uncertainties and limits of knowledge and governance 
(Irwin, 2006; Stirling, 2008; Jasanoff, 2003). 
 
Overall then, for the purposes of this study, co-production has, as Jon Turney pointed 
out in a blog post for Future Earth, ‘a range of meanings - under two main headings, 
an organizational one and a more social-philosophical one’; or as Sheila Jasanoff 
pointed out in an interview quoted in that piece, co-production can be seen either ‘as 
a strategic move to get a robust result’ or as ‘something that is going on in the world, 
like it or not’ (Turney, 2014).  
 
The existing academic literature in research policy studies and STS on co-production 
can therefore, for the most part, be separated into two strands that focus on 
intentional co-production and on analytical co-production. The former comprises 
papers by researchers doing co-production (and/or co-design, transdisciplinarity, etc.) 
themselves and/or studying those doing co-production, where co-design and co-
production are methods or frameworks for collaboration across disciplines and 
sectors, involving non-academic actors in research conduct. These papers tend to 
focus on individual projects and organisations and/or comparisons between more 
than one project or organisation, usually in local, national or regional contexts, and 
for the most part they focus on research conduct on the ground and/or propose 
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forward-looking frameworks for those wishing to undertake co-production (e.g. 
Lemos & Morehouse, 2005; Pohl et al., 2010).  
 
The latter, analytical co-production strand comprises papers by researchers 
employing co-production as a theoretical, conceptual or analytical idiom, tool, 
framework or lens to explore, characterise and describe processes of co-constitution 
of science/knowledge and social/political order. This strand focuses on cases of the 
intertwining of epistemic and political order in a range of contexts, for example, 
exploring how notions of objective or relevant knowledge were integral to the 
constitution or performance of a strengthened and integrated Europe in the case of 
the European Environment Agency (Waterton & Wynne, 2004).  
 
1.3 Rationale for the thesis: the significance of international science governance 
and co-production  
 
Having briefly reviewed some of the literatures on co-production in STS and cognate 
disciplines above, it becomes clear that there is little work on how co-production is 
conceptualised and put into practice in and through research governance, particularly 
at the international level, nor on the relationship between co-production as analytical 
concept and its translation into a notion or practice of knowing actors. Institutions 
aiming to govern research play a significant role as sites of co-production understood 
as the co-constitution of science/knowledge and social/political order; the latent 
intertwining of the epistemic (ways of knowing the world) and the normative (ways 
of living in it). They are therefore important creators, mediators and arbiters of 
meaning, action, participation, and, consequently, power.  
 
As noted in section 1.1, the significance of international research institutions and 
programmes in defining, framing, and addressing environmental and sustainability 
issues and concerns at a global level has been explored in the STS literature, for 
example, through analyses of the role of iconic images (such as photographs of Earth 
from space) in giving rise to global environmentalist movements (Jasanoff, 2001), or 
of scientific and economic systems modelling in framing environmental risks 
(Cutcliffe, 2000: 5). On the other hand, STS has examined the internationalisation of 
research and political systems, arguing that the scale and complexity of phenomena 
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such as climate change has led to the organisation of research (and politics) beyond 
disciplinary and national boundaries (for example, around concepts such as ‘global 
warming’, ‘the Earth system’, or more recently ‘the Anthropocene’) (Jasanoff & 
Wynne, 1998; Lövbrand et al., 2015). These types of interrelations between research 
and society, where knowledge creates or shapes – and is shaped by – ways of living, 
can be considered to be constitutive or interactional co-production of science and 
social order, in the sense developed in STS (Jasanoff, 2004b, 2005; Hilgartner et al., 
2015). 
 
International science programmes, aiming to govern and coordinate new research 
(and in some cases synthesise existing research) are considered to be of particular 
interest as sites of this type of co-production. In the international relations literature, 
for the most part international institutions3 ‘are not depicted as purposive actors with 
an autonomy, power or culture of their own’ (Elzinga, 2001: 13635) and are 
‘ordinarily seen as agents whose primary purpose is to compensate for the lack of 
evenness on the playing fields of multilateral action’ whose main contributions 
include facilitating negotiation and disseminating knowledge (Jasanoff & Wynne, 
1998: 53-54).  
 
However, according to more constructivist international relations literature, and the 
co-productionist STS approach, international institutions should be considered to take 
on a much more active role in generating knowledge and ways of living:  
 
They […] should be seen as additional sites for the production of new forms 
of knowledge, beliefs, and political action – not merely as cognitively passive 
agents that facilitate convergence toward some independently ordained, 
optimal end-point of international bargaining. [Their power] flows […] from 
their ability to reframe problems for collective solution, and to redefine the 
boundaries and parameters of relevant knowledge (and thus of imaginable 
policy action), and to determine the rules of participation in knowledge 
creation.  
      (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998: 54)  
                                                 
3 ‘Institution’ and ‘organisation’ are often used interchangeably in the literature. In both cases I 
understand the term to mean an entity, structure, asssemblage or collectivity to varying extents 
‘established for a particular purpose’ and to a lesser extent ‘governed by rules, with clear authority 
relations, a division of labour and firm boundaries’ (Bruce & Yearley, 2006: 221). Section 1.5 below 
discusses the boundedness (or otherwise) of institutions. I use ‘social institution’ to refer to the broader 
sociological concept of established aspects of society (as opposed to an institution in the sense of 
organisation) (J. Scott & Marshall, 2009). 
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This power in articulating problems, shaping (what counts as relevant) knowledge, 
and determining who counts as legitimate epistemic and political participants, 
suggests that such organisations can be considered to ‘take on a life of their own’:  
 
New actors are seen to be created, responsibilities specified, and authority 
delineated, defining and binding the roles of both old and new actors, giving 
them meaning and normative values. In this model, culture, imagery, and 
rhetoric are held to be forceful ingredients in the life of international 
organizations, especially in the way these play out their roles in constructing 
social worlds with a global reach […].  
       (Elzinga, 2001: 13636) 
 
Institutions that aim to govern research (e.g. through agenda setting, co-ordination, 
funding schemes, capacity building) thus have consequences for how science (and 
also politics) are framed, who can participate, in which ways; their cultures, 
imageries and rhetoric are powerful in constructing and representing social and 
natural worlds. Jasanoff (2004b) argues that, alongside identities, discourses and 
representations, institutions are one of the four most common instruments of 
constitutive and interactional co-production, operating at the nexus of social and 
natural order and stabilising what we know and how we know it:  
 
[…] co-production could hardly be conceived in the absence of institutions, 
partaking of their resilience as well as their plasticity. When environmental 
knowledge changes, for example, new institutions emerge to provide the web 
of social and normative understandings within which such characterisations 
of nature – whether climate change, endangered elephants or agricultural 
science […] – can be recognised and given political effect. In other policy 
settings, institutions are required to interpret evidence, make law, standardise 
methods, disseminate knowledge or ratify new identities.  
 
(Jasanoff, 2004b: 40)  
 
Such institutions and their initiatives of science governance (particularly those 
aiming to effect change in scientific cultures or systems) can be considered to be 
reflective, indicative, symptomatic (Irwin, 2006) and constitutive of broader trends in 
research, politics and science-society relations. 
 
So how does this latent constitutive or interactional co-production relate to the 
intentional co-design and co-production of knowledge or policy as introduced in the 
previous section, in which non-academic actors are involved in research, or non-
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governmental actors are involved in policy and service provision? As suggested by 
Jason Chilvers and colleagues in a panel abstract for the Royal Geographical Society 
2014 Annual International Conference: Geographies of Co-Production, the notion of 
co-production as collaboratively ‘making things together’ might be usefully informed 
by the ‘reflexive-relational’ co-production elaborated in STS: 
 
This drive to do ‘coproduction’ can eschew the alternative more reflexive-
relational meaning of coproduction championed in science and technology 
studies (STS) and cognate disciplines, which emphasises the mutual 
constitution of epistemic, social and political orders and draws attention to 
how “the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and 
society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” 
(Jasanoff, 2004: 2). This perspective forces us to consider how the emergent 
practices, technologies and spaces for doing ‘coproduction’ are themselves 
relationally shaped by – and recursively produce/perform – forms of 
epistemic, social and political order.  
       (Chilvers et al., 2014) 
 
From this perspective, as also argued by Irwin (2006), investigations into empirical 
examples of ‘doing co-production’ need not take an evaluative or dismissive stance, 
calling out failings against pre-determined democratic ideals, but rather could explore 
the ways in which co-production (and its practices, technologies, and spaces, for 
example) are understood, constructed, performed – and how they in turn are shaped 
by, shape and perform particular social orders, such as forms of democracy – in 
particular contexts. This is the spirit in which this thesis investigates an empirical 
example of co-production in the context of global environmental change and 
sustainability research, as further outlined below. 
 
1.4 Co-producing Future Earth?  
 
This thesis aims to contribute towards filling the gap in literature on how co-
production is conceptualised and put into practice in and through research 
governance, particularly at the international level. It intends to do so by adopting an 
approach informed by ideas about co-constitution outlined above, in a qualitative 
empirical study of Future Earth, a major international research initiative on global 
environmental change and sustainability.  
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As noted in the previous section, international scientific institutions have played a 
key role in formulating conceptual and cognitive categories, around which particular 
types of research have been organised and particular framings of global problems 
have arisen. Between the late 1980s and 2010, the internationalisation and 
harmonisation of research on global environmental change and the field of Earth 
system science was facilitated by the international networks of four research 
programmes and their Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP):  
 
• the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP); 
• the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP); 
• the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental 
Change Programme (IHDP); and  
• DIVERSITAS, an international programme of biodiversity science. 
 
Between 2006 and 2009 the co-sponsors of these international programmes reviewed 
the programmes and decided to merge them into one: Future Earth (ICSU, 2009).4 
 
Future Earth is a 10-year international initiative on GEC and sustainability, 
announced in 2012 by an Alliance of the co-sponsors of the existing programmes 
(comprising international science councils, United Nations agencies and the Belmont 
Forum group of global change research funders) (Future Earth, n.d.-d). Features 
planned for the fully operational phase of Future Earth (2015 onwards) included  
 
• producing integrated research across disciplines spanning natural and social 
science, the humanities and engineering;  
• the co-design and co-production of research with stakeholder groups 
including funders, policy makers, civil society, business, and the media;  
• a global scope, encompassing all regions but also “bottom up” input from the 
research community and beyond;  
• the accelerated delivery of solutions-oriented, policy-relevant research. 
(Future Earth, 2013b; ICSU, n.d.) 
                                                 
4 Further background on the emergence of Future Earth is provided in Chapter 4. At the time of 
writing (September 2017), IGBP, IHDP and DIVERSITAS have closed, while WCRP retains its status 
as an independent programme contributing to Future Earth (Future Earth, 2014b). 
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The co-design and co-production of relevant knowledge in particular were billed as 
‘one of the most innovative aspects’ of the initiative (Future Earth, n.d.-e). Future 
Earth therefore exemplifies calls for transformations in research systems and 
knowledge-making communities towards engagement with non-academic 
stakeholders. Its mission as expressed today (2017) is based on the need for 
‘contributions from a new type of science link[ing] disciplines, knowledge systems 
and societal partners to support a more agile global innovation system’ (Future Earth, 
n.d.-g).  
 
Future Earth aims to provide a global framework for and international coordination 
of new research on GEC and sustainability. This is different from the large-scale 
synthesis of existing research in assessments undertaken by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES); both of which have been the focus 
of STS literature in recent years (Hulme & Mahony, 2010; Turnhout et al., 2012; 
Montana, 2017). Future Earth intends to feed into these assessments, as well as 
undertaking smaller scale ad hoc syntheses of its own (Future Earth, 2014c).  
 
The thesis explores visions for the identity and remit of the new initiative as it 
emerged, and how co-design and co-production were imagined, practiced and 
institutionalised in this context between 2010 and early 2015. While there is a 
growing body of literature around Future Earth5 (van der Hel, 2016; Lahsen, 2016; 
Lövbrand et al., 2015; Castree, 2016; De Pryck & Wanneau, 2017) and emerging 
from it (Moser, 2016 among others), this literature has either focused specifically on 
the challenges of involving social sciences given the existing framings (Lahsen, 
2016; Lövbrand et al., 2015), or on the actual practice of co-design on the ground in 
affiliated projects (Moser, 2016). One study has explored the institutionalisation of 
co-production in Future Earth (van der Hel, 2016), taking a more evaluative approach 
to the tensions between different understandings of the concept. However, none of 
these studies have explored the broader implications of co-design and co-production 
for research governance and organisation, nor how this relates to the translation of 
                                                 
5 While I have been writing the thesis and presenting initial findings at conferences and seminars, 
interest in this topic has been increasing. In Chapter 2, I explore in more detail how these studies 
overlap with and differ from mine. 
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co-production as an analytical STS concept into a notion or practice of knowing 
actors.  
 
Aside from Future Earth, there have been few (if any) attempts to adopt co-design 
and co-production as principles or strategies for the governance and production of 
new research at global scale; Future Earth can therefore be seen as an experiment in 
doing so (this view on Future Earth is explored in more detail in section 1.5). Hence, 
Future Earth presents a unique opportunity to study this process, as well as the 
relationship between co-production as analytical or normative concept originating in 
academia (specifically STS) and its translation into a practice or policy. This study 
takes up this opportunity by exploring how co-design and co-production are 
understood, imagined, and implemented in Future Earth, including how they relate to 
broader questions of institutional identity and function, and to broader social and 
natural orders.  
 
This interest is also fuelled by my professional experience in this context: between 
2010 and 2012 I worked as a project manager for the International Social Science 
Council (ISSC), which was a co-sponsor of the International Human Dimensions 
Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP; one of the existing GEC 
programmes). During that time, the ISSC co-led (with the International Council for 
Science) a Visioning Process that developed the initial research agenda and proposals 
for Future Earth, and it also joined the Alliance that championed the development of 
Future Earth (and eventually formed its Governing Council). I thus participated in 
several activities that fed into the early development of the initiative.  
 
Furthermore, my work contributed to the development of a GEC agenda for the 
social sciences, comprising a framework ‘The Transformative Cornerstones of Social 
Science Research for Global Change’ (Hackmann & St Clair, 2012), a design for a 
social science research funding programme that would contribute to Future Earth (the 
Transformations to Sustainability Programme), and the initial work towards the 
World Social Science Report 2013: Changing Global Environments. This alerted me 
to the changes occurring in this international context, including an increased focus on 
disciplinary and institutional integration and co-production with non-academic 
30 
 
stakeholders. I also became aware of the existing knowledge hierarchies at play in 
these settings, where it was necessary to assert the importance of social science in 
addressing issues traditionally defined by the natural sciences, and where the role of 
the arts and humanities was often an afterthought. 
 
With an academic background in English literature and several years’ professional 
experience in the arts and subsequently in sustainable development, this was not a 
shock, but it sparked a range of questions to which I could not see easy answers. I 
wondered why and how certain types, forms or aspects of knowledge, research, 
experience and skills (for example, formally validated natural science) had come to 
be valued over others (for example, social science or informal experiential 
knowledge and expertise). How is it justifiable that a small number of people are able 
to determine the framing of issues that could or should be of collective or common 
concern, while others are unaware that these discussions are even happening? But 
also, what is the alternative? With increasing talk of integration and co-design/co-
production, I wondered what the implications of these approaches would be for such 
knowledge hierarchies and power relations; how might these approaches challenge 
existing ideas about how to do and value research?  
 
Even the briefest dip into the literature of STS provides answers to some of the 
questions above, and much of that literature can be seen to be motivated by a similar 
normative bent or ‘democratic impulse’ (Edge, 1995). However, it also reveals the 
complexity of contemporary knowledge politics (the naivety of the perspective 
above) and throws up many more difficult, recursive questions about the nature of 
knowledge, science and democracy. This thesis represents my initial, clumsy steps in 
understanding and navigating these troubling questions.  
 
1.5 Research questions, approach and scope 
 
Given this interest in knowledge hierarchies and the ways in which research and 
other types of knowledge and experience are valued (as outlined above), this thesis is 
conceptually grounded in co-productionist, interpretive science and technology 
studies, drawing on ideas about political imaginaries of science and experiments in 
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science and democracy. The ‘experimental’ approach is outlined in more detail 
below.  
 
Methodologically, the case study comprises thematic and interpretive analysis of data 
from documents, interviews, focus groups and participant observation in and around 
the emergence and development of Future Earth between 2010 and early 2015. 
 
Using these conceptual and methodological lenses, the following aim and research 
questions will be addressed: 
 
Thesis aim: To investigate attempts to transform global environmental 
change (GEC) research systems, practices and cultures through the adoption 
and institutionalisation of co-design and co-production, using a major new 
international research initiative, Future Earth, as a case study.  
 
Research questions: 
 
1. What is Future Earth? What are the visions of its identity and remit? 
2. What do co-design and co-production mean in the context of Future 
Earth? Why are they advocated and adopted; what are the rationales 
underpinning these concepts? 
3. Who is imagined or expected to be involved in co-design and co-
production? What are the underlying models or imaginaries of science and 
society? 
4. How are these ideas being – and how will they be – implemented in 
practice to govern, coordinate and conduct research?  
5. So what? How can findings from this case contribute to the literatures on 
co-production and international research governance, on experiments in 
science and democracy, and what are the implications for research 
governance in practice?  
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These questions will be addressed using an approach that foregrounds 
experimentality, as outlined in the following section. 
 
The ‘experimental’ approach 
 
As noted above, Future Earth can be seen as an experiment in adopting co-design and 
co-production as principles or strategies for the governance and production of new 
research at global scale (and more broadly as an experiment in institutional 
transformation). Co-production within Future Earth can also be seen as an 
experiment (or series of experiments) in itself. Experimentation can therefore be seen 
to characterise the empirical context that is being studied. 
 
Experimentality is also adopted in this thesis as a heuristic or analytical lens. The 
conceptual and analytical approach adopted in this thesis draws on previous work 
calling for less dismissive and evaluative accounts of experiments in science 
governance and public participation (Irwin, 2006; Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016a), 
shifting focus from whether initiatives succeed or fail against pre-determined ideals 
(e.g. democratic norms), but rather exploring the ways in which initiatives constitute 
and are constitutive of such ideals and norms. From this perspective, the actors, 
objects and concerns of science governance – and broader social and political orders 
– are emergent from science governance practice, rather than pre-existing entities. 
 
This approach enables an analytically generous stance towards an emerging initiative 
such as Future Earth and co-production within it, calling attention to its generative, 
performative and productive capacities, exploring what co-production means and 
opens up in this context, rather than its impacts or whether or not it is successful in 
particular ways. The ‘experimental’ approach also emphasises the ontological 
variability or indeterminacy of such settings (Marres, 2012, 2013).  
 
This analytical perspective is based on an understanding of democracy, science and 
their institutions as fluid, unbounded (Pallett & Chilvers, 2015), intertwined and co-
produced (Jasanoff, 2004c; Pallett & Chilvers, 2015). The notion of ‘ecologies of 
participation’ usefully characterises diverse, distributed participatory experiments as 
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co-constitutive of broader political and epistemic cultures and regimes (Chilvers & 
Kearnes, 2016b). 
 
Scope and boundaries of the study 
 
Future Earth’s development was in its early stages at the time of this study: although 
the notion of a new, overarching framework, programme or initiative for GEC 
research dates back to at least 2008 (ICSU, 2009), and much activity towards its 
formation occurred in the intervening period, according to official Future Earth 
sources the initiative did not become “fully operational” until the end of 2015 when 
the permanent Secretariat was in place (Future Earth, n.d.-d). The data collection for 
this thesis for the most part took place between late 2013 and early 2015, with the 
bulk of the fieldwork (interviews and meeting observation/focus groups) conducted 
between March and July 2014 – that is, during what could be considered to be Future 
Earth’s formative period. This provides significant advantages in terms of studying 
the meanings and practices of co-production (and indeed processes of co-
constitution) as they emerged and before any type of (temporary) stabilisation was 
achieved: 
[…] supranational science programs present distinctive sites for observing the 
coproduction of scientific and political order because their authority is still 
emergent and the processes through which order is being created are less 
thoroughly naturalized or socialized than in most national programs.  
       
      (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998: 48)  
 
However, it also posed challenges, particularly in terms of the complexity and 
indeterminacy of the ‘object’ of study, and, concomitantly, the breadth and nature of 
the data collected (although, of course, this is arguably the case in any empirical 
research into ongoing situations or phenomena). For this reason, and owing to more 
mundane constraints (financial, temporal and personal capacity), the study focuses in 
particular on the activity and discourse around Future Earth’s emergence, design and 
development as undertaken within and around its co-sponsoring organisations and the 
teams and committees working on its design, development and implementation 
before and during the period of study (comprising, for example, the Transition Team 
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that designed it, the Science Committee, Interim Engagement Committee, Interim 
Secretariat, etc.).  
 
For the most part, this is activity at the ‘global’ or ‘central’ level around what could, 
from one perspective, be considered to be the main locus of Future Earth decision 
making. However, it should be noted that, even during the study, Future Earth 
comprised much broader networks of actors, objects and practices, including (but not 
limited to) the existing GEC programmes and projects, new Future Earth Fast-Track 
Initiatives, staff of the international co-sponsors and other organisations who 
supported or contributed to Future Earth’s development and operations, as well as 
broader environmental research and policy communities, organisations and actors.  
 
Therefore, the focus of this study is, broadly speaking, on the governance of Future 
Earth, and relatedly, on the governance and institutionalisation of co-production. The 
term ‘governance’ can be seen as problematic, given its interpretive flexibility or 
imprecision, the potentially limitless scope of what might be included, and its 
associations with obfuscation of state responsibility (via ‘globalisation’ or 
devolution/outsourcing to non-state or non-governmental actors) (Irwin, 2008). In 
this thesis, governance is used in a dual way. On the one hand, when used to refer to 
the institutional or organisational structure and apparatus of Future Earth, it mirrors 
(many of) the actors’ use of the term, to suggest the (supposed) central coordinating 
and decision-making authority of these structures. On the other hand, analytically I 
subscribe to a distributed, decentred view on governance (and indeed on science, 
politics and other social institutions more broadly). As outlined by Irwin (2008) in 
summary of STS understandings of this term, this view suggests that the 
development and control of science and technology includes the activities of a range 
of actors beyond the state (e.g. industry, scientific organisations, public and pressure 
groups, consumers, the market, etc.): 
“Governance” encompasses the range of organizational mechanisms, 
operational assumptions, modes of thought, and consequential activities 
involved in governing a particular area of social action— in this case, relating 
to the development and control of science and technology. Viewed in this 
way, governance is not simply about a defined set of bureaucratic and 
scientific institutions but also the wider activities of governing and, indeed, 
self-governing (Barry, 2001; Dean, 1999). The implication is that national 
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governments no longer have the ability to direct society toward specific goals. 
Instead, they must play a part within de-centered networks and shifting 
assemblages of power.  
       (Irwin, 2008: 584) 
However, this is accompanied by a further point that potentially challenges the focus 
of this study: 
The key point about “scientific governance” therefore is that it cannot be 
squeezed into a single institutional or processual definition. […] the study of 
scientific governance is broadly concerned with the relationship between 
science, technology, and political power— with special emphasis on 
democratic engagement, the relationship between “scientific” and wider 
social concerns, and the resolution of political conflict and controversy.  
       (Irwin, 2008: 584) 
 
The risk in undertaking a single organisational ‘case study’ is the reification of that 
institution and the assumption that it forms a central, rational, bounded locus of 
power (Pallett & Chilvers, 2015). I have attempted to avoid this danger in my 
analysis by focusing on the ways in which Future Earth’s identity as an institution is 
constructed, multiple and open to interpretation (in Chapter 4), and how co-
production and governance are constructed, understood, practiced and 
institutionalised in and by Future Earth (in Chapters 5-7). The aim is to explore 
Future Earth – in its role as an international institution – as an important creator and 
arbiter of meaning, knowledge, participation and problem-framing (as outlined in 
section 1.3 above), while at the same time acknowledging that Future Earth 
constitutes and is constituted by wider networks, assemblages and social orders (e.g. 
‘ecologies of participation’ (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016a)). This is attempted by 
exploring how visions in Future Earth reproduce, challenge or perform existing 
models of science and democracy, and how particular understandings, tools or 
mechanisms of co-production (or participation) are adopted in this context. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
While some of the literature relevant to this thesis has been reviewed in this 
introduction, Chapter 2 reviews in more detail five important strands of academic 
literature in which the thesis is situated and on which the analysis in the data chapters 
is based.  
• Firstly, STS approaches to scientific governance and the social organisation 
of science, transformations in research systems, the performativity of these 
accounts, and the translation of STS ideas into science policy.  
• Secondly, literature on the governance and organisation of GEC research, 
locating the existing GEC programmes in the global and disciplinary 
landscape, and reviewing existing work on Future Earth.  
• Thirdly, literature on co-production, which can broadly be categorised into 
two strands: on the one hand, work employing co-production as an analytical 
idiom to signify the co-constitution of science or knowledge and social order; 
and on the other hand, work on co-production as a method for research design 
and process. This comprises studies of co-production in practice, or 
guidelines for future research of this type.  
• Fourthly, an overview of the notion of political imaginaries of science which 
is key to co-production and which encapsulates the performativity of visions 
of science-society relations. 
• Finally, literature relating to the concepts of experiment and the experimental 
as relevant to the study of the relationship between science, technology, 
democracy, publics, and environment, covering the multiple facets and uses 
of ‘experiment’ in the STS and related literature.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the research design, methods and process, beginning with an 
outline of the study’s epistemological grounding in co-productionist, interpretive 
STS, and its ‘experimental stance’. It describes the research process, including data 
collection and generation, ethics and access, an outline of each method adopted 
(document analysis, interviews, ethnographic observation and focus groups) and 
thematic analysis. It concludes with a reflexive consideration of the role of the 
researcher.  
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Chapters 4 to 7 address research questions 1-4 respectively, and Chapter 8 concludes 
the thesis by addressing question 5. 
Chapter 4 addresses the question of what Future Earth is (supposed to be) by 
presenting background on the emergence of Future Earth, and an analysis of its 
imagined identity and remit. It describes the institutional landscape and context in 
which efforts on the part of both funding and research communities to create a new 
programme aligned, and it highlights the significance of two related goals in Future 
Earth: integration and co-design (of both institutions and knowledge). This forms the 
background for a detailed thematic analysis of visions of Future Earth’s institutional 
identity and remit, suggesting that some visions align with a ‘flagship’ model and 
others with a ‘rich tapestry’ model. The chapter then outlines several ambiguities, 
dilemmas or tensions in different visions or goals for Future Earth, some of which 
echo the flagship model, and others evoke the rich tapestry one. 
Chapter 5 begins to explore what co-production and related concepts mean in Future 
Earth, and what the rationales for adopting these approaches seem to be. Given the 
wide range of actors involved and large scale of ambition, it is unsurprising that co-
production and related terms are multiple, ambiguous and contested. The chapter 
argues that although the discussions and activities around co-production were messy 
in the sense that there was little consensus on co-production and related terms, it is 
possible to identify common themes and features that coalesce around particular 
views on what co-production is about. Three understandings of the “co-’s”6 are 
outlined.  
Chapter 6 explores who is supposed to be involved in co-production (and in Future 
Earth more broadly) according to the documents and actors leading on its 
development. Although involving societal stakeholders is key to all understandings 
of the co-’s in Future Earth, who these stakeholders might be is not always clear, and 
what this might mean in practice is not often expounded. This chapter presents an 
analysis of who is (imagined/supposed to be) involved in Future Earth, focusing on 
constructions of society, stakeholders, the public and other potential partners, and 
                                                 
6 “Co-’s” is adopted as a catch-all term to refer to the various “co-” words in Future Earth, 
predominantly co-design and co-production but also related concepts such as co-delivery, co-
dissemination, co-creation, co-implementation, co-intervention, etc. Sometimes these words are used 
interchangeably by the actors. The thesis attempts to disentangle some of these meanings.  
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thereby elucidating the underlying science-society imaginaries and models (e.g. of 
democracy) that inform the different views of co-production explored in the previous 
chapter.  
Chapter 7 looks at how the implementation of co-production in Future Earth is 
imagined and undertaken. It outlines several emergent themes significant to co-
production: temporality and institutional levels; organisational structure and process; 
principles and practice; scale and substance; and evaluation and learning. These 
elements comprise key questions that are (or will need to be) negotiated in the 
implementation of co-’s in Future Earth: when co-design/co-production might 
happen; in which institutional configuration; at which institutional, geographical and 
communicative scales and levels; and around and through which processes, 
principles, practices and problems. It argues that these interlinked elements are 
underpinned and shaped by the models of co-production identified in Chapters 5 and 
6, and thus the broader tensions in Future Earth’s remit identified in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 8 pulls together the findings from the preceding four chapters to consider the 
broader implications for the existing research, and for the governance of co-
production in practice. It argues that while Future Earth actors do occasionally 
conceptualise co-’s or Future Earth more broadly as an experiment, or experimental, 
this view is not always foregrounded. However, this is a potentially productive way 
of considering the initiative and co-production within it. From this perspective, 
tensions and ambiguities are not necessarily problematic, as ambiguity can make 
space for openness, flexibility and ontological variability. The implications of these 
arguments for the literature are then outlined, followed by the implications for 
governance and practice of co-production, and some tentative suggestions are 
proposed for Future Earth. The chapter concludes by acknowledging the limitations 
of the study and proposing avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
To conceptualise the study of Future Earth, this chapter reviews relevant strands of 
the STS and broader social scientific literature relating to scientific governance and 
the social organisation of research (2.1); the governance and organisation of global 
environmental change research (2.2); co-production (2.3); political imaginaries of 
science (2.4); and experimentality (2.5). These literatures cover the landscape in 
which the thesis is situated, namely scientific governance. They also deal with the 
specific domain that it concerns (GEC), the specific topic of interest (co-production), 
and the concepts and approaches adopted in this work (co-production; political 
imaginaries of science; experimentality). The chapter reviews existing trends and 
debates, and identifies gaps in this literature, with a view to locating the contribution 
of this thesis. 
 
Section 2.1 builds on the scene-setting in Chapter 1 by outlining STS approaches to 
scientific governance and the social organisation of science, transformations in 
research systems, the performativity of these accounts, and the translation of STS 
ideas into science policy.  
 
Section 2.2 looks more specifically at the governance and organisation of GEC 
research. It builds on the literature presented in Chapter 1, locating the existing GEC 
programmes in the global and disciplinary landscape, and reviewing existing work on 
Future Earth.  
 
Section 2.3 reviews literature on co-production, and informs the epistemological 
underpinnings of the research. The literature can be categorised into two strands: on 
the one hand, work employing co-production as an analytical idiom to signify the co-
constitution of science or knowledge and social order; on the other hand, work on co-
production as a method for research design and process. This comprises studies of 
co-production in practice and guidelines for future research of this type.  
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Section 2.4 outlines the notion of political imaginaries of science which is key to co-
production and which encapsulates the performativity of visions of science-society 
relations. This concept structures the analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
 
Finally, the analytical stance of this research foregrounds ‘experimentality’, so 
section 2.5 reviews literature relating to the concepts of experiment and the 
experimental as relevant to the study of the relationship between science, technology, 
democracy, publics, and environment, covering the multiple facets and uses of 
‘experiment’ in the STS and related literature. This includes work on experiments as 
scientific methodology and instrument of democracy; on experiments in 
participation; on technology as social experiment; and on policy experiments and 
experimental governance.  
 
Section 2.6 concludes the chapter by briefly summarising the key gaps in literature 
and debates to which this thesis intends to contribute. 
 
2.1 Scientific governance, the organisation of science, and STS in policy  
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, scientific governance and the social organisation of 
science – the relationship and boundaries between science and politics, and between 
science and its organisation and control – have been, and continue to be, core 
concerns of STS (Irwin, 2008; Hackett et al., 2017). Whether thinking specifically 
about science (advice) in policy making (Jasanoff, 1990; Hilgartner, 2000; Wilsdon 
& Doubleday, 2013), policy for directing and regulating science and technology 
(Jasanoff, 2003; Stirling, 2008; Macnaghten & Chilvers, 2014; Garforth & 
Stöckelová, 2011), or more broadly about the relationship between science and 
democracy (Irwin & Michael, 2003; Latour, 2004; Jasanoff, 2004c; Brown, 2009; 
Hilgartner et al., 2015), STS has developed a wealth of empirical investigations and 
conceptual contributions.  
 
A diverse range of complementary concepts has been established to account for the 
socio-technical formations of knowledge and power, and the interrelations between 
the scientific and the political. To name just a few, such ideas include actor-network 
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theory (Latour, 1987) and associated concepts such as sociotechnical networks 
(Wetmore, 2004) and ethno-epistemic assemblages (Irwin & Michael, 2003); 
boundary work7 (Gieryn, 1995); epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina, 1999); epistemic 
communities (Haas, 1992); civic epistemologies (Jasanoff, 2005); and the co-
production of science and social order (Jasanoff, 2004c). While each of these terms 
does its own conceptual work, broadly they all explore the ways in which the 
scientific and the political (and the social and the natural, the cognitive and the 
material) are not essential categories, but rather are socially negotiated, contextually 
contingent and mutually produced through various configurations of social and 
natural actors (whether individuals, institutions, non-humans, artefacts, 
environments, etc.). 
 
In addition to investigating these diverse relations, STS has frequently taken a 
particular normative angle on these issues, advocating the ‘democratisation’ of 
science, technology, expertise and their relationship to policy and governance 
(Liberatore & Funtowicz, 2003; Edge, 1995). This work seeks to acknowledge the 
limitations of technocratic, scientistic approaches to governance, and open up 
political and knowledge making processes to those that would not normally have 
access to them, and/or to a broader range of expertise (Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 2003; 
Stirling, 2008; Stilgoe et al., 2014). This work has itself limitations, some of which 
are discussed below in section 2.5.2. 
 
STS has also explored modes of social and epistemic organisation of science. These 
can be seen to span patterns of aggregation across scales (e.g. from individual 
researchers, teams, laboratories, disciplines, to the institution/community of science, 
through arrangements such as thought collectives, paradigms and big science); 
specialisation (e.g. in disciplines, fields and specialities with particular practices, 
instruments, resources, questions, and thought styles); and integration (e.g. through 
multi-, inter-, transdisciplinarity and synthesis towards holistic explanations) 
(Hackett et al., 2017). The political implications of the organisation of science are 
apparent when considering its purpose and its relationship to other societal sectors 
                                                 
7 Also the related concepts of boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) and boundary organisations 
(Guston, 1999). 
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(Hackett et al., 2017), for example, in the literature on changing science-society 
relations (discussed in Chapter 1).  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, since at least the 1980s, the academic literature of research 
policy studies and STS has considered changes in the organisation of research (or 
‘research systems’), including institutional and economic configurations, the contexts 
and processes of knowledge practices, the types of problems considered and 
knowledge generated, the stakeholders involved and the dynamics between them. In 
addition to notions of finalisation in science, post-normal science, Mode 2 knowledge 
production and post-academic science (Chapter 1), other concepts aiming to 
characterise these changes include strategic research (Irvine & Martin, 1984), 
innovation systems (Edquist, 1997), academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), 
the “Triple Helix” model of industry, university and government (Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 1998), and the commercialisation of university research (Jacob & 
Hellström, 2000). These accounts call into question notions of “pure” or “ivory 
tower” research through their explorations and theorisations of the increasing 
engagement and complex partnerships between research (or in some cases, more 
specifically, the natural sciences) and non-academic actors or organisations. 
 
The New Production of Knowledge (NPK) is among the most influential of these 
accounts, in which Gibbons et al. (1994) describe a shift from autonomous, 
homogenous, discipline-based research systems – ‘Mode 1’ knowledge production – 
to an increasing prevalence of ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production. Mode 2 is 
heterogeneous in its participants, practices and organisations, producing knowledge 
in the ‘context of application’ through transdisciplinary collaborations with a much 
greater degree of reflexivity and social accountability, taking into account a broader 
range of values and interests, and utilising new forms of quality control beyond 
traditional academic peer review. Gibbons et al. (1994) explicitly frame knowledge 
production as a problem-solving endeavour: Mode 1 is occupied with finding 
solutions to intellectual, academic problems defined within a disciplinary context; 
Mode 2 tries to solve problems of concern to broader society. These ideas are 
elaborated by Nowotny et al. (2001) in Re-Thinking Science, which argues that, 
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given contemporary conditions of uncertainty and complexity, science should be 
more embedded in its social contexts, leading to more ‘socially robust knowledge’. 
 
While these concepts have been influential, they are not without critique. Hessels & 
van Lente (2008) suggest that in the case of NPK, this in part stems from uncertainty 
as to whether it should be read as a descriptive account of current transformations or 
a prescriptive or normative call to bring such changes about. Those that read it as a 
‘descriptive theory’ suggest that ‘there is a lack of empirical evidence for the rising 
importance of attributes of Mode 2’ and that ‘the claims lack a theoretical 
underpinning and references to sociological theory’ (Hessels & van Lente, 2008: 
755-6).8 On the other hand, those that read it as a ‘normative programme’ either 
disagree with the supposed normative stance, or accept the normative stance whilst 
questioning the possibility of its implementation (Hessels & van Lente, 2008: 754). 
 
In a review of NPK for Social Studies of Science, Godin (1998: 480) argues that the 
model ‘has all the characteristics of a performative discourse’; ‘suggesting a new 
organisation of knowledge and [simultaneously] participating in its realisation’ 
(1998: 465). Hessels & van Lente conclude that the NPK model has been ‘successful 
as a manifesto’: ‘with its broad scope and evocative claims it has raised considerable 
attention in the area of science policy’ (2008: 758). Indeed, the language of Mode 1 
and Mode 2 was used in the context of the Visioning Process from which Future 
Earth emerged.9 Similarly, the notion of ‘a new “social contract” between science 
and society’ was key to the formulation of Future Earth (Future Earth, 2013b: 11). 
While attributed in that context to Lubchenco (1998), this notion also evokes 
Gibbons’s (1999) Nature article ‘Science’s new social contract with society’ which 
outlines the ideas of NPK and Re-Thinking Science. (Castree (2016) describes the 
history of this phrase and its use in global change research in more detail.)  
 
So, conceptualisations, descriptions or visions of (transformations in) research 
systems, such as NPK, inform, shape and perform research cultures, practice and 
                                                 
8 Related critiques include that these changes apply only to a particular section of science (that is, 
policy-related fields) and that Mode 2 does not add anything beyond earlier characterisations of shifts 
in science systems, such as that of “finalization” (Weingart, 1997). 
9 Personal observation, 3rd Visioning Meeting, 10-11 February, 2011. 
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policy. More broadly, work in sociology and STS on the performativity of social 
science has explored the constitutive or reality-making effects of social science 
concepts and methods, collapsing the distinction between knowledge making 
practices and a reality that they reflect or represent (e.g. Law & Urry, 2004).  
 
Focusing on scientific governance in particular, STS literature has considered ways 
in which STS ideas (e.g. public engagement with science, dialogue, and RRI) – many 
associated with the normative project of democratisation – have informed policy and 
practice (Irwin, 2006; Stilgoe et al., 2014; de Saille, 2015b). This literature finds that 
while aspects of STS concepts (e.g. from ‘deficit to dialogue’) make their way into 
policy contexts, the underlying pathologies of deficit model assumptions, and 
technocratic, linear model notions of the relationship between science, technology 
and socially beneficial outcomes via policy, both remain deeply entrenched.  
 
Others see hopeful avenues for actively influencing policy and practice and/or 
continuing to try (Webster, 2007; Felt et al., 2013; Downey & Zuiderent-Jerak, 
2017). Noting Irwin’s (2006: 299) finding that science policy currently rests on ‘an 
uneasy blend of “old” and “new” assumptions’, Stilgoe (2012: 203) argues that the 
uncertainty resulting from the lack of clearly defined alternatives to conventional 
science policy assumptions ‘has opened up a space in which new forms of 
experiment have become legitimate.’ Section 2.5 further explores notions of 
experiment, and how they might be mobilised or investigated through research on the 
‘broader project of dialogic governance’ (Stilgoe et al., 2014: 6). Section 2.4 explores 
one significant conceptualisation of performative ways of thinking about science and 
society: the notion of ‘political imaginaries’ of science. In the meantime, the 
following section reviews a select set of literature on the organisation and governance 
of GEC research. 
 
2.2 The governance and organisation of global environmental change research 
 
Having explored scientific governance in general, I now move on to consider 
literature on the organisation and governance of GEC research, and an emerging 
literature on Future Earth.  
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The domains of environmental change and sustainability research can be seen as 
exemplary in terms of the types of transformation in science-society relations 
discussed in the previous section and Chapter 1. Nowotny et al. (2001: 132-134) 
suggest that the environmental sciences show evidence of ‘strong contextualisation’, 
for example in the ‘“integration” of research and public debate’ in arenas such as 
international conferences on climate change and sustainability (e.g. the 1992 UN 
Conference on the Environment and Development and subsequent UN conferences), 
where ‘government scientists mingle with other policy-makers, university scientists 
and representatives from non-governmental organisations’. Societal concerns about 
environmental challenges are seen by scientists as legitimate and are therefore 
allowed to ‘enter into the research that is being undertaken’, ‘propel[ling] another 
kind of research agenda: one that seeks to integrate also the natural and social world 
and explore how the two might live together – sustainably’ (Nowotny et al., 2001: 
133-134). Similarly, the notion of post-normal science was originally developed in 
relation to issues of environmental risk, where both uncertainty and decision stakes 
are high (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). 
 
As explored in Chapter 1, STS has considered the ways in which global 
environmental concerns, knowledge and international institutions are co-constituted 
(e.g. Miller & Edwards, 2001). International research organisations and programmes 
have played a significant role in the internationalisation or globalisation of research 
fields through standardisation and cognitive harmonisation. This means that locally 
produced, contingent scientific knowledge can be stabilised, transported and 
reproduced across different times and places, and hence attains a sort of ‘pragmatic 
universalism’ (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998: 20). It also brings about harmonisation of 
‘the ways in which the objects of research are defined, as well as the choice and 
detailed implementation of preferred methodologies, basic models, and concepts’ 
(Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998: 47).  
 
Particularly in relation to Earth system science, international scientific organisations 
have played a key role in formulating conceptual and cognitive categories, around 
which particular types of research have been organised and particular framings of 
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global problems have arisen. As introduced in Chapter 1, the harmonisation of the 
field of Earth system science and global (environmental) change research has been 
facilitated by the international networks of four research programmes and their Earth 
System Science Partnership (ESSP): the International Geosphere-Biosphere 
Programme (IGBP), the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), the 
International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change 
(IHDP), and DIVERSITAS, an international programme of biodiversity science.  
 
Miller (2001) considers a range of international institutions, including research 
programmes such as the IGBP, to be ‘boundary organisations’, in that they mix 
elements of science and politics through processes of ‘hybrid management’, as part 
of a broader climate regime10 (illustrated in Figure 1 below). As noted in Chapter 1, a 
broad range of literature has explored the ways in which these institutions have 
power in the framing of and responses to environmental and societal challenges; they 
are important creators of meaning and knowledge, arbiters of inclusion and 
deliberation, rather than simply mechanisms for knowledge dissemination, 
facilitators of multilateral collaboration, etc. A significant challenge faced by these 
institutions is the need to balance the credibility, legitimacy and relevance/salience of 
their knowledge and knowledge making processes, often portrayed as a trade-off 
between each imperative (Cash et al., 2003). While this is seen as a complicated task, 
Miller (2007: 238) paints a hopeful picture, imagining international knowledge 
institutions (e.g. the IPCC, but presumably also the likes of IGBP and others) as 
holding the potential to be ‘proto-democratic experiments in international 
governance’ through their processes of setting international knowledge standards, 
making global kinds, and constructing new deliberative spaces (and thus also in their 
ability to constrain the exercise of coercive power in world affairs). However, others 
have argued that the democratic implications of such institutions need to be made 
more transparent and open to governance (S. Beck & Forsyth, 2015).  
 
                                                 
10 Climate regime being ‘the suite of social, political, scientific, and economic networks and 
institutions (both formal and informal) that have emerged in response to human threats to the earth’s 
climate system’ (Miller, 2001: 497, note 3). 
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Figure 1: The institutional landscape of the climate regime11 (Miller, 2001: 485)12  
 
Others still have more specifically explored the ways in which programmes of the 
ESSP (particularly the IGBP and IHDP) have constituted particular problematisations 
of the Earth system and global change (Uhrqvist & Lövbrand, 2014; Uhrqvist, 2014; 
Lövbrand et al., 2009). 
 
A significant body of literature has developed around the politics of the knowledge-
making processes of the IPCC, IPBES, and other international assessment 
institutions, which I will not explore in detail here. While many of the debates are 
relevant to Future Earth and its precursors, it is important to note that Future Earth 
faces similar but also different challenges, in that it intends to organise and co-
                                                 
11 NCAR=National Center for Atmospheric Research; WMO=World Meteorological 
Organization; UNEP=UN Environment Programme; IPCC= Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change; IGBP=International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme; 
SBSTA=UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice. 
12 Miller, C., Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 26, No. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 478-500, 
copyright © 2001 by Sage Publications. Reprinted by Permission of SAGE Publications, Inc. 
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ordinate new research in addition to the synthesis of existing research, as typically 
undertaken by the assessment bodies. 
 
Key arguments emerging from that literature (and broader literature on global 
environmental knowledge and governance) include a concern about ‘how the term 
global might contain assumptions about what is considered universal’, which social 
orders are enforced by global knowledge and which might be excluded (Beck & 
Forsyth, 2015: 113), how globalising knowledge might (through aggregation and 
universalism) erase peculiarities of place and context, cultural diversity and 
differentiation, and plural representations of Earth’s present and futures, leading to 
reductive conceptualisations of the ‘problem’ and the (ease of finding) potential 
‘solutions’ (Hulme, 2010; Castree et al., 2014).  
 
This literature is particularly concerned with carving out adequate space for the 
(interpretive) social sciences and humanities to respond to the calls for increased 
involvement of their disciplines. However, many scholars suggest that the existing 
problem and knowledge framings (often universalist, reductionist and 
undifferentiated) are not conducive to this type of knowledge, and that ambitions 
towards ‘integration’ pose significant challenges, whether political or 
epistemological (Rayner & Malone, 1998). These concerns are raised in relation to 
Future Earth by scholars including Lovbrand et al. (2015); Lahsen (2015); Castree 
(2016); De Pryck and Wanneau (2017). Other work on Future Earth has primarily 
comprised forward looking considerations from those involved in the existing 
projects and programmes (e.g. Mauser et al., 2013; Suni et al., 2016; Leemans, 
2016). Section 2.3 includes an overview of existing work on co-production in Future 
Earth in particular. 
 
Further concerns in relation to these global knowledges include the excess of 
phenomena and elements tied into all-encompassing concepts such as ‘climate 
change’, ‘global environmental change’ and ‘Earth system’, and the alarmist 
language commonly deployed to conceive of these problems as ‘mega-challenges’ 
(Hulme, 2009). The semantic field has become very crowded, and in the meantime 
these phenomena and their associated challenges have turned into ‘wicked problems’ 
49 
 
in that ‘they have no definitive formulation, and can be considered symptoms of yet 
other problems’, with the result that ‘a solution to one aspect of a wicked problem 
often reveals or creates other, even more complex, problems demanding further 
solutions’ (Hulme, 2009: 334).  
 
Hulme, and others including Rayner (2012), suggest that the adoption of ‘clumsy 
solutions’ and pursuing contradictory goals are a better way of addressing ‘wicked 
problems’ than insisting on singular definitions (Hulme, 2009: 338). Hulme also 
proposes an alternative: rather than framing climate change as a problem requiring 
solutions, we could consider the idea of climate change as an opportunity in its 
capacity as an ‘imaginative resource’ and mobiliser of diverse myths (2009: 340), 
enabling a reflexive consideration of our ‘social goals about how and why we live on 
this planet’ (2009: 361).  
 
This echoes the optimistic arguments of Jasanoff (2001) and Sarewitz (1996) around 
the notion of “sustainability”, whether a ‘globally articulated ethical concept’ 
embodied in the iconic image of the Earth seen from space (Jasanoff, 2001: 334), or 
‘an alternative framework – a new mythology – for evaluating the contribution of 
science and technology to human development and welfare’ (Sarewitz, 1996: 194). 
These hopeful analyses highlight the significance and potency of collective 
imaginations and shared cultural meanings. However, a tension is also revealed in 
relation to their capacity to allow space for heterogeneity, plurality and diversity 
(perhaps beyond the standardised meta-narratives of economic and scientific 
globalisation): when these imaginations and meanings, concepts and myths 
themselves become articulated – and mobilised – at a global level, how can 
heterogeneity be maintained?  
 
Yet, if, as argued by STS scholars including Gibbons et al. (1994) and Nowotny et 
al. (2001), research systems are becoming heterogeneous and science is beginning to 
make more space for local and contingent narratives even within international and 
globalised systems, perhaps there is space for the development of overarching 
imaginaries and myths that may still permit a multitude of meanings to flourish. How 
this might be achieved in practice and whether research policy and international 
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institutions might have a role in doing so requires further investigation, building on 
existing explorations of these challenges and their (temporary) resolution (e.g. 
Montana, 2017). 
 
2.3 Co-production: ‘theory’ and practice 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the notion of ‘co-production’ and related concepts such as 
‘co-design’ and ‘transdisciplinarity’ have multiple meanings in different theoretical 
and practice contexts. This section provides an overview of understandings of co-
production in STS (touching on co-production in other fields), beginning with 
Jasanoff’s (2004; 2005) articulation of the concept, then exploring its uses in 
practice. 
 
2.3.1 Co-production of science and social order 
 
The premise of Jasanoff’s (2004a: 2) conceptualisation of co-production is that ‘the 
ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are 
inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it’ so that ‘knowledge and 
its material embodiments are at once products of social work and constitutive of 
forms of social life.’ Knowledge (science) and social orders (or worlds) are produced 
together. In order for a particular (aspect of) reality to be thought of, spoken about, 
acted on, or governed we need to have the knowledge that makes it thinkable, 
sayable, doable, or governable, and this knowledge – and related material artefacts – 
are embedded with particular normative visions of how the world ‘ought to be’ in 
addition to how it ‘is’. Hence, Jasanoff argues, we need to understand how different 
actors make sense of and engage with apparently universal scientific/natural (e.g. the 
gene) and political/social entities (e.g. the state).  
 
Pre-empting the criticism that co-production has the same unifying or totalising 
ambitions of natural scientific theories, Jasanoff considers it to be an idiom rather 
than a theory, extolling its interpretive and ‘explanatory power’ rather than its 
consistency or predictive ability (2004a: 2). Through an examination of the 
‘intertwining of the cognitive, material, social and normative’, co-production makes 
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sense of the complex interactions between knowledge and social order (2004a: 6). 
This allows STS analyses to move beyond binaries of science and politics, nature and 
culture, objective and subjective, that lead to social or natural determinism (including 
the black-boxing of concepts within social and natural science), and beyond standard 
linear models of the research-society interface: ‘our methods of understanding and 
manipulating the world curve back and reorder our collective experience along 
unforeseen pathways’ (2004b: 13). Importantly, it does not make artificial 
distinctions between “micro” and “macro”, but rather enables the analysis of the 
(re)making of national or global constitutional order through localised engagements 
(‘without [which] perpetual reperformance they might as well cease to exist’) 
(2004b: 43). Four instruments, or pathways, of coproduction are outlined: making 
identities; making institutions; making discourses; making representations (Jasanoff, 
2004b). 
 
Jasanoff (2004b) traces the origins of the analytical idiom of co-production to two 
precursory strands in STS and broader social science literature: a constitutive strand 
and an interactionist strand. The former theorised how stability is created and 
maintained in the emergence of new socio-technical formations and systems of 
thought (through the translation of experiences into a “reality” that is seen as 
immutable); the latter strand focused on conflicts within existing socio-technical 
formations, asking how people organise and reorganise their ideas about reality, 
particularly when the accepted demarcations between what counts as nature/science 
or social/cultural are challenged (2004b: 18-19).  
 
The work of Bruno Latour is cited as key within the constitutive strand – Latour 
(1993) being the first to introduce the term ‘co-production’ – although Jasanoff 
argues that actor-network theory’s focus on the place of the non-human and material 
in accounts of power is at the detriment of analyses of human agency, values, beliefs, 
imagination, and political conflicts, failing to account for ‘significant economic, 
technological and social disparities in the practices of world-making’ (2004b: 28).  
 
This understanding of co-production has been empirically applied to make sense of 
the IPCC (Miller, 2004) and the European Environment Agency (Waterton & 
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Wynne, 2004), among many other institutions, representations, discourses, and 
identities. It has taken root as a central analytical concept or ontological/ 
epistemological framing in STS literature and beyond, with studies across a broad 
range of fields adopting the term to signal processes of co-constitution, mutual 
production and entanglement (e.g. Cutts et al., 2011; Pickersgill, 2012; Muñoz-
Erickson, 2014). The extent to which all of these are true to the interpretation 
proposed by Jasanoff and her colleagues is questionable: it is a very useful shorthand 
for dynamic and processual interrelations of domains usually (traditionally) 
considered distinct, but the broader project of identifying the world-making/-
maintaining, state-making/-maintaining, constitutional effects of co-production 
perhaps receives less attention in some strands of the literature. 
 
2.3.2 Co- (joint) production of knowledge 
 
Lövbrand (2011) distinguishes between two uses of co-production in the STS 
literature: the descriptive dimension of the co-production idiom (as explored in the 
previous section), and ‘prescriptive interpretations of the term that have gained 
ground in the science studies literature in recent years’ in which co-production 
becomes a ‘normative framework for engaging non-scientists as active partners in the 
funding, making and use of such knowledge’ (Lövbrand, 2011: 226-227).  
 
Among the first (if not the first) to use the term in this way is Callon (1999). Here co-
production is used to label a model of knowledge production in which lay people are 
actively involved in the creation of knowledge concerning them. This could be 
considered as a precursor to the strand of literature on co-production as active, 
deliberate collaboration, though it is rarely cited there. Earlier models arising in the 
social sciences (and other fields) that have much in common with these collaborative, 
normative and instrumental versions of co-production include the multiple variations 
of action research, originating in feminist social studies of the 1970s (Levin & 
Greenwood, 2011: 70), participatory methods in health, development and agricultural 
studies, and the project of ‘engaged’ or ‘interactive’ social science:  
 
a style of activity where researchers, funding agencies and “user groups” 
interact throughout the entire research process, including the definition of the 
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research agenda, project selection, project execution and the application of 
research insights.  
 
(A. Scott et al., 1999; quoted in Caswill & Shove, 2000: 154) 
 
The prescriptive or normative strand of co-production in STS as identified by 
Lövbrand (2011) can be further divided into two types, to categorise which Lövbrand 
draws on Barry et al.’s (2008) logics of ontology and accountability. The first is 
interested in effecting ontological change, in that ‘knowledge co-produced with non-
scientists holds the promise of more open-ended and inclusive deliberations over 
questions of common purpose’ (as well as the nature of the objects, phenomena, etc. 
at hand), as part of a broader reflexive and emancipatory agenda (Lövbrand, 2011: 
227). 
 
The second is utilitarian and follows a ‘logic of accountability’: rather than seeking 
to transform existing ways of thinking, it hopes to adjust research agendas to allow 
for a knowledge supply more appropriate to societal demand, assuming that 
involvement of non-academic stakeholders in research governance and practice ‘will 
both compel scientists to justify the social benefits of their research and empower 
diverse publics to shape research portfolios in accordance with their needs’ 
(Lövbrand, 2011: 227).  
 
Lövbrand mobilises these different understandings of co-production in her 
examination of ‘how knowledge-making practices are incorporated into European 
climate policy-making, and more importantly, how EU climate policy has shaped the 
funding, making and interpretation of useful European climate policy research’ 
through a case study of the FP6-funded research project ADAM (Adaptation and 
Mitigation Strategies; Supporting European Climate Policy) (Lövbrand, 2011: 225). 
She finds that although the project aspired to both types of normative co-production, 
it could not deliver reflexive policy appraisals because the policy-framings had been 
so fully adopted that it was not possible to reconsider their ontological assumptions. 
However, the project was more successful in delivering “useful” knowledge: 
although the researchers had to adapt their agenda to the needs of the policy-makers, 
the knowledge produced contributed to the discourse of international climate policy. 
Lövbrand (2011: 234) argues that this latter observation reveals a process of co-
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production in the descriptive sense, but that the overall picture ‘paints a less rosy 
picture’ for prescriptive co-production, since the requests for outputs adhering to the 
policy community’s interpretations of useful knowledge did not allow space for 
policy re-examination. Lövbrand (2011) suggests that this might have been different 
if the ADAM research project had taken place at an earlier point in the policy 
process, if a broader spectrum of actors had been involved in the research, or if the 
project had been more careful about its promises to deliver “useful” knowledge; 
perhaps in some cases “usefulness” is not an appropriate standard of success.  
 
Other empirical papers on “co-production” tend to cite Jasanoff (2004c) while 
outlining the research background, but present retrospective and/or comparative 
analyses of local or national-level research projects involving non-academic actors – 
or present forward-looking frameworks or guidelines for conducting co-production – 
without linking the observations closely to the (descriptive) idiom of co-production 
as summarised above (e.g. Pohl et al., 2010; Robinson & Tansey, 2006; Kemp & 
Rotmans, 2009; Edelenbos et al., 2011; Polk, 2015). These papers consider a range of 
conceptual and practical issues and challenges that arise in relation to these local 
processes of the co-production of research (through collaboration). In a paper 
presenting an assessment framework for analysing the merits and limitations of co-
produced projects, Hegger et al. (2012: 54) prefer to use the term ‘joint knowledge 
production’, meaning ‘direct collaboration between scientists, policymakers and 
other societal actors in specific projects’, arguing that ‘knowledge co-production’ in 
Jasanoff’s sense is hard to discern precisely because of its indirect and latent 
character (woven into – and weaving – social and natural orders). 
 
The literature on transdisciplinarity and co-design follows a very similar pattern to 
that of co-production, primarily either enumerating the challenges involved or 
providing frameworks and guidelines for those wishing to adopt such approaches 
(see Moser, 2016 for a useful review). These papers do not tend to foreground 
broader issues of knowledge politics and the relationship of these practices to 
scientific governance. Exceptions include Klenk and Meehan (2015) who explore the 
limitations and exclusions imposed by stipulating ‘integration’ as a necessary 
element of co-production, and Polk (2014) who critically interrogates the assumption 
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that transdiciplinary, co-produced research inherently leads to beneficial social 
solutions and outcomes (among others such as Felt et al. (2016) and Daly (2016)). 
 
Two significant publications have explored co-design and co-production in Future 
Earth. Firstly, van der Hel (2016) has explored the institutionalisation of co-
production in Future Earth, taking an evaluative approach to the tensions between 
different understandings of the concept. Drawing on Barry et al. (2008), van der Hel 
identifies three distinct rationales for co-production: it is seen as ‘a way to enhance 
scientific accountability to society (“logic of accountability”), to ensure the 
implementation of scientific knowledge in society (“logic of impact”), and to include 
the knowledge, perspectives and experiences of extra-scientific actors in scientific 
knowledge production (“logic of humility”)’ (2016: 165). As we shall see, similar 
(and additional) rationales were identified in the present study and will be discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
 
Secondly, the contributions to the special issue of Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability edited by Moser (2016) consider how co-design played out on the 
ground in the research projects affiliated with the Transformations to Sustainability 
programme, which contributes to Future Earth.  
 
However, none of these studies have explored in detail the broader implications of 
co-design and co-production (and associated political imaginaries, see section 2.4 
below) for research governance and organisation, nor how this relates to the 
translation of co-production as an analytical STS concept into a notion or practice of 
knowing actors. 
 
In summary, the existing STS and science policy literature on co-production for the 
most part can be separated into two strands that focus respectively on analytical or 
descriptive co-production and on intentional co-production. The former (analytical 
co-production strand) comprises papers by researchers employing co-production as a 
theoretical, conceptual or analytical idiom, tool or framework to explore processes of 
co-constitution of science/knowledge and social/political order in cases in local, 
national, and international contexts. The latter (intentional co-production strand) 
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comprises papers by researchers doing co-production (and/or co-design, 
transdisciplinarity, etc.) themselves and/or studying those doing co-production, 
and/or wishing to create forward-looking frameworks for co-production, where co-
production means involving non-academic actors in research governance and 
conduct. These papers tend to focus on individual projects and organisations and/or 
comparisons between more than one project or organisation, usually in local, national 
or regional contexts, and for the most part they focus on research production rather 
than research governance. Few studies have examined the adoption of co-design and 
co-production as principles or strategies for the governance and production of new 
research at global scale, and the relationship between co-production as analytical 
concept and its translation into research policy and governance. 
 
While co-production broadly informs the epistemological and analytical approach of 
this study, and also acts as the ‘object’ or subject of the research, the following 
section turns to a specific concept used to frame the analysis: that of political 
imaginaries of science. 
 
2.4 Political imaginaries of science 
 
The notion of ‘imaginaries’ has roots in sociology, STS, political theory, human 
geography and related fields, with iterations including technoscientific imaginaries 
(Marcus, 1994), social imaginaries (Taylor, 2004), sociotechnical imaginaries 
(Jasanoff & Kim, 2009), genetic or biomedical imaginaries (Franklin, 2000; Waldby, 
2000), political imaginaries (Ezrahi, 2012), (institutional) imaginaries of publics 
(Stephens et al., 2013; I. Welsh & Wynne, 2013), and spatial imaginaries (Watkins, 
2015). Although diverse, these concepts broadly share two features: imaginaries are 
visions, myths or stories that are collectively held by social groups (whether 
scientific communities, whole societies, nation states or other powerful institutions 
such as foundations, corporations, expert bodies, professional societies, or social 
movements), and they are considered to be performative in that they not only 
conceive of these visions but also enact, enable and produce the social, technical, 
material and spatial relations, worlds and futures envisioned therein (whether that be 
particular configurations of the social and the political, the social and the 
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technoscientific, or the social and the materio-spatial). In STS the term is considered 
to have particular value due to its ability to account for the visions of the social that 
are embedded in particular technoscientific regimes or developments (McNeil et al., 
2017); thus imaginaries (particularly sociotechnical imaginaries) are considered to be 
instruments of the co-production of science and social order (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). 
 
In an argument that mobilises Ezrahi’s (2012) notion of ‘political imaginaries’ 
(which suggests that democracy and other political regimes must be collectively 
imagined and performed in order to exist), Nowotny (2014: 17) asserts that STS work 
on public understanding of science has failed to consider political institutions, policy-
makers and politicians as part of the public sphere and thus to acknowledge and 
research how changes in politics and modes of governance impact on public 
engagement and science-society relations.   
 
Given the power that policy-makers have to distribute or redirect funding, articulate 
policies, and build organisational structures and procedures, Nowotny calls for 
attention to be paid to the political imaginaries which shape and emerge from policy-
makers’ understanding of and engagement with science, in which citizens are 
invoked as ‘ultimate and fictitious beneficiaries of all scientific and technological 
activities undertaken in the public and private sphere’ (Nowotny, 2014: 17). 
According to Nowotny, such ‘necessary fictions’ have causative and performative 
power, shaping individual and collective minds and institutions.  
 
Three such political imaginaries are outlined in Nowotny’s account. The first is tied 
to notions of economic competitiveness, and is seen as manifest in the current 
fixation on short-term impact of every unit of scientific activity. Public-private 
partnerships pervade this imaginary, where citizens are abstract or individualised 
voters and consumers, beneficiaries of greater efficiency in knowledge production, 
maximum research impact, innovation and job creation. Any gaps between benefits 
and risks of technologies are plugged with promises of further innovation. 
 
The second is a counter-imaginary – ‘dear to scientists’ – that sees science as ‘a 
public good which is non-rivalrous in use’ and which calls for autonomous space and 
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funding (2014: 18). Key to this imaginary is the idea of great societal transformation 
brought about by unpredictable advances in science and technology, requiring the 
suspension of belief in immediate use, impact or returns; therefore science is 
incompatible with the aims of the private sector, and must take place in the public 
sector.  
 
If the first imaginary is most closely associated with a neoliberal political economy, 
the notion of autonomy in the second perhaps reflects norms encapsulated in 
Polanyi’s Republic of Science (1962), in which Polanyi compares the workings of 
science to economic markets, arguing that science operates best as a republic in 
which individual scientists all contribute to the advancement of knowledge by being 
free to work independently towards this shared endeavour without centralised 
(governmental), hierarchical coordination; in this way scientific discoveries are 
maximised. He argues that guiding science towards socially beneficial channels is 
impossible due to the unpredictability of scientific progress and the incidental nature 
of practical benefits. While their conception of the public interest in science is 
different, this imaginary is perhaps also reminiscent of Vannevar Bush’s Science: 
The Endless Frontier (1945), in which Bush advocates the role of basic research, 
funded by the US government but independent of its political control, essential to 
national progress and public good (through innovations such as penicillin, radar etc., 
which will follow if basic research is supported). 
 
Finally, Nowotny identifies one further political imaginary, this time within STS, 
motivated by a desire to pursue Enlightenment ideals through participation and 
inclusiveness. This imaginary comprises the aim to improve outcomes of scientific 
and technological activity by incorporating diverse views, but perhaps was flawed in 
its assumption that ‘an all-inclusive participation was possible, unquestioned and 
unquestionable’ (2014: 18) (as also argued by Raman (2015) in considering an 
alternative mode of inclusion). Nowotny notes that Mode 2 was informed by this 
imaginary rather than one rooted in neoliberal ideology. 
 
These imaginaries entail diverse conceptualisations of the public value of science: 
value for individual tax payers’/consumers’ money; unquantifiable, non-rivalrous 
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public good; object – and more importantly, site – of democratic deliberation. They 
can also entail conceptualisations of social, geopolitical orders that may have 
consequences for which publics are envisaged as – and engaged with as – 
‘beneficiaries’: for example, Nowotny contrasts science as an international public 
good (which could be imagined to be of benefit to all publics across national 
boundaries) with science as a source of national economic competitiveness (perhaps 
benefiting only citizens of the nation states concerned). 
 
This conceptualisation of ‘political imaginaries of science’ and the three particular 
imaginaries outlined above are used as a heuristic to structure the analysis in Chapter 
6. The following section explores another aspect of the analytical toolkit of the thesis: 
the notion of ‘experimentality’. 
 
2.5 Experimentality 
 
The following sections explore the concepts of experiment and the experimental as 
relevant to the study of the relationship between science, technology, democracy, 
publics, and environment. I first briefly introduce the multiple facets and uses of 
‘experiment’ in the STS and related literature (2.5.1), before presenting a more 
detailed overview of the relevant strands of the STS literature on experiments (2.5.2):  
experiments as scientific methodology and instrument of democracy; experiments in 
participation; technology as social experiment; policy experiments and experimental 
governance. The final section (2.5.3) focuses on key aspects and qualities of 
experiments, with a view to informing a notion of experiment or experimentality13 
for the purposes of this study. These themes and approaches are picked up again in 
Chapter 3, which outlines how the concept of experiment informs the analytical 
stance of the present study. 
 
 
                                                 
13 ‘Experimentality’ here is intended in the sense of ‘the quality of being experimental’(Wiktionary, 
n.d.-a). ‘Experimentality’ was the name of a year-long collaborative programme of events in 2009-
2010 initiated by the University of Lancaster exploring ideas and practices of experimentation in 
science and technology, the arts, commerce, politics, popular culture, everyday life, and the natural 
world (University of Lancaster, n.d.). 
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2.5.1 Experiment as multifaceted concept 
 
There has been a recent proliferation of work in STS and other fields (including 
human geography, environmental social science and humanities, etc.) featuring 
experiments or the experimental. This section introduces the multiple facets of these 
terms in the literature. 
 
While the study of experiments was formative for STS as a discipline in the late 
1970s and 1980s, there has been a recent increase in interest in experiments and ‘the 
experimental’ in STS and cognate fields, whether as an object of research, analytical 
lens, method and/or normative approach. This more recent work builds on the STS 
tradition of studying the (scientific) experiment as methodology but also as integral 
to democracy and political culture, first in natural science (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985; 
Ezrahi, 1990), subsequently in social science (Gross & Krohn, 2005) and, more 
recently, in more broadly conceived experiments, for example, domestic experiments 
in ways of living (Marres, 2012).  
 
A growing body of work on ‘experiments in participation’ explores the relationships 
between science, technology, democracy and publics (also, environment, non-/more-
than-humans, the material, etc.), both by studying such experiments as ‘objects’ of 
research, but also by proposing or adopting experiment as a method, resource or 
device for participation or other intervention or action in (scientific) governance, 
public engagement in technoscience and democracy, and STS (Lezaun et al., 2017; 
Horst, 2011). In addition, the language (or ‘vocabulary’) of experiment has been 
increasingly used as a heuristic, analytical or theoretical lens to ‘account for political 
actions and practices’ and to explore processes of democratic ordering around public 
participation, social activism, public administration (Laurent, 2016: 773) and 
material/object-oriented participation in science and democracy (Latour, 2004; 
Marres, 2012, 2013). 
 
In addition to (and in some cases informing) this work on experiments in 
participation, another strand of work has explored the blurring of boundaries between 
(particularly technological) experiment and society (Krohn & Weyer, 1994), and the 
ambiguity of where/when experiments end (Davies, 2010), suggesting that 
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experimentalism is an inherent aspect, quality or condition of contemporary societies 
(U. Beck, 1992). Building on notions that the whole world has become a laboratory 
(U. Beck, 2009; Latour, 1998, 2004), increasing acknowledgement of the limits of 
technoscientific prediction and control, and awareness of the (often unevenly 
distributed) detrimental environmental and social impacts of human activity (more 
recently conceptualised in terms of the ‘Anthropocene’ (Lövbrand et al., 2015)), 
experimentation has also been proposed as a normative approach to – or mode of – 
governance (of technoscience and more broadly). These approaches frequently take 
their inspiration from John Dewey’s pragmatist political philosophy in which policy- 
and state-making is seen as an ongoing experimental process of trial, error and 
revision (and democracy as participatory) (Dewey, 1991 [1927]). This can be seen in 
calls for shifts from a regime of “technoscientific promises” to one of “collective 
experimentation”, where development and governance of emerging technologies is 
distributed between many participants and direction is ascertained collectively in the 
process of development (e.g. open source software development) (Felt & Wynne, 
2007; Stilgoe, 2015), or in proposals for and conduct of experimental approaches to 
environmental science and governance at various scales (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 
2013; Klenk & Meehan, 2015; Kivimaa et al., 2017).  
 
However, as noted by Stilgoe (2015: 41) with reference to experiments in 
geoengineering, the term ‘experiment’ itself has (the potential to) become somewhat 
of a buzzword used to sell new activities while not being ‘completely sure about the 
outcome’ (Stilgoe, 2015: 41). Although this suggests the term may be employed 
strategically to garner interest and capital without unduly raising expectations about 
particular results, the use of this concept by scholars of science and technology is 
interesting in its ambiguity (Lorimer & Driessen, 2014), ambivalence (Laurent, 2009) 
or multivalence (Lezaun et al., 2017). Of particular interest is its flexibility to operate 
both (and often simultaneously) as, on the one hand, an analytical lens or object of 
research (i.e. studying experiments, whether framed as such by actors and/or 
analysts, in order to acquire knowledge about the natural and/or social world), and, 
on the other, as an opening, instrument or ‘resource’ for reflexive actors to intervene 
in and change the world (Lezaun et al., 2017: 201; Chilvers and Kearnes, 2016).  
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The following section will explore the STS literature on experiments in more detail, 
with a view to ascertaining different understandings and uses of the term. 
 
2.5.2 Experiments in the STS literature (and beyond) 
 
History of science and STS have considered experiments in various ways (as usefully 
summarised by Stilgoe (2015, ch. 2), Marres (2012, ch. 5), and Lezaun et al. (2017), 
among others). This work can be broadly categorised into four themes: 1) the 
emergence and significance of experiments as scientific methodology and instrument 
of democracy; 2) experiments in participation; 3) technology as social experiment; 
and 4) policy experiments and experimental governance. Each of these strands of 
literature is examined below.  
 
Experiments as scientific methodology and instrument of democracy 
 
The conventional understanding of a scientific experiment in the sense associated 
with natural science and positivist social science is as a means or method of 
discovering, testing and demonstrating truths or facts about the world: ‘an action or 
operation undertaken in order to discover something unknown, to test a hypothesis, 
or establish or illustrate some known truth’, rather than the more general 
understanding of ‘a tentative procedure; a method, system of things, or course of 
action, adopted in uncertainty whether it will answer the purpose’ (OED, n.d.-c). As 
noted by Stilgoe (2015: 42), an experiment in the formal scientific sense might 
involve ‘the deliberate use or observation of a system in which certain things are 
controlled in order to measure effects.’ This requires various materials and 
technologies of experiment, such as protocols, record keeping, equipment, artefacts 
and inscription devices, and relies on notions of the experimental system as bounded, 
ordered, secluded and subject to control (Latour, 1987; Rheinberger, 1997; Marres, 
2012).  
 
However, as noted by Lorimer and Driessen (2014: 170), the modern idea of 
‘Experiment’ in the sense above (as a formalised part of scientific enquiry) is an 
(albeit strongly held) ideal, or ‘a theoretical caricature; a powerful rhetorical device’ 
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that does not exist in practice. Building on Rheinberger’s work on the ‘experimental 
systems’ of laboratories (1997), Lorimer and Driessen argue that ‘a multitude of 
laboratory ethnographies have demonstrated that labs are much like field sites 
comprising experiments that are tentative, local and uncertain’ (2013: 170). 
 
Rheinberger’s (1997) work is also useful for its conceptualisation of experiments as 
designed to generate surprises and to generate and detect difference rather than 
confirming what is known. This generative and interventionist view – along with the 
idea that experiments are a particular instance of formalised intervention in the world 
rather than (solely) representation of the world (Hacking, 1983) – is adopted and 
further developed in various strands of STS and environmental social 
science/humanities (e.g. Lane et al., 2011; Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016b). 
 
Social and historical studies of science and technology have a long tradition of 
exploring the role of experiments in both science and democracy. Shapin and 
Schaffer’s (1985) canonical historical study examines the emergence and 
institutionalisation of experiment as the preferred means of generating scientific 
knowledge in the seventeenth century. Through an analysis of the disputes arising 
from Hobbes’ scepticism (rooted in his natural philosophy) towards Boyle’s 
experimentalism, this study provides several key insights that have been carried 
forward in STS work. One such is the significance of the authority or credibility of 
the experimenter to the establishment of the authority or credibility of (experimental) 
knowledge, and the role of the experiment itself in performing reliability and 
credibility (Dear, 2004). Experiments are not only about knowledge production. As 
argued by Jasanoff (2004b), Shapin and Schaffer’s exploration of how this 
controversy over the credibility of different forms of knowledge related to the 
broader political conflicts of the era is a key early example of co-productionist study: 
it found that ‘the problem of generating and protecting knowledge is a problem of 
politics, and, conversely, that the problem of political order always involves solutions 
to the problem of knowledge’ (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985: 21).  
 
Building on this aspect of Shapin and Schaffer’s work, Ezrahi (1990) considers how 
it is possible – in the context of the rise of liberalism – to justify the rule by the few, 
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highlighting the significance of the public experiment as a template for the 
development of modern liberal democracy. As Jasanoff summarises:  
 
Politics after the scientific revolution became, [Ezrahi] argues, an extended 
“experimental space”, in which the modern, liberal state could use science 
and technology for instrumental ends to gain the assent of its witnessing 
(“attestive”) publics.  
(Jasanoff, 2004: 32)  
 
From this perspective, public experiments are ‘a defining genre or literary form of 
public politics in liberal democracies’ (Marres, 2012: 85-86), and the central role 
accorded to science, and particularly the empirical (for example, in notions of 
political transparency as suggested above, and in the preference for making decisions 
on the basis of facts), in contemporary Euro-American political culture can be traced 
back to this co-development of experimental science, political cultures, and the role 
of publics in relation to them.  
 
These ideas have been taken up in co-productionist work on the relationship between 
science and democracy (Jasanoff, 2004c; Hilgartner et al., 2015), which has recently 
branched into the study of public participation, whether exploring participation as co-
produced, emergent and experimental (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2016; Laurent, 2016), 
or in efforts to foreground and conceptualise the material aspects of participation 
initiatives (Marres, 2012). These works draw on the earlier analyses of the enrolment 
of publics as witnesses of public experiments and democratic transparency (Shapin 
and Schaffer, 1985; Ezrahi, 1990) to explore the constitutive effects of public 
participation endeavours, and the relationship between the ontological, the empirical 
and the performative therein. The following section explores this literature on 
experiments in participation in more detail. 
 
Experiments in participation 
 
Recent STS work on the relationship between science, publics and democracy has 
suggested that it may be productive to consider (public) participation in science and 
democracy as experimental or as an experiment (Irwin, 2006; Laurent, 2011, 2016; 
Marres, 2012; Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016b; Lezaun et al., 2017). This work adopts a 
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broad understanding of experiment, as argued by Laurent (2016: 774), ‘not limiting it 
to tests of pre-given hypotheses in controlled conditions, but allowing it to apply to 
situations where tentative practices are undertaken before potential extension or 
replication’. In these contexts, the experimental implies this tentativeness and the 
potential for variability in outcomes of participatory interventions; ‘it is not possible 
to predetermine or prejudge the productions or qualities of participation’ (Chilvers 
and Kearnes, 2016: 37). Emphasis is shifted from ‘considering experimentation as a 
procedural activity in which actors take part to exploring how the condition of 
experimentality enables the enactment of actors and their relationships in specific 
ways’ (Lezaun et al., 2017: 204); participation is experimental in the sense that 
situations, actors, objects and issues are emergent, (re)configured and co-constituted 
in the process. 
 
This approach is driven by three related arguments. First, there is a sense among 
some scholars that existing work on public engagement has tended to focus too 
heavily on (and/or over-determine) the procedural aspects of participatory activities, 
developing frameworks to evaluate whether such tools are democratic or not and/or 
to enable more democratic tools. Second, it has been argued that the democratic 
ideals of STS/Public Engagement with Science could perhaps be better grounded and 
interrogated more thoroughly. Finally, some suggest that while great effort has been 
invested in exploring the construction of science and technology, there is a need for a 
symmetrical investigation of how ‘participation’ is constructed, including how 
notions of democratic legitimacy emerge through participatory processes, and the 
significant role of the technical and material in shaping these activities. This has led 
to proposals for a reinvigorated study of the politics of engagement in science and 
democracy, and specifically the emergent and co-constitutive nature of ‘experiments’ 
in participation and engagement. The three aforementioned arguments (procedural 
focus and overdetermination; ‘ready-made’ ideals; and the need for symmetrical co-
productionist accounts) are outlined in more detail below, followed by a 
consideration of experiment as theoretical concept and experimental traditions. 
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Procedural focus and overdetermination 
 
Some scholars advocating and adopting this shift towards a symmetrical or co-
productionist approach to the study of participation (e.g. Chilvers and Kearnes, 2016; 
Marres, 2012) have suggested that much of the literature on public engagement either 
adopts an evaluative stance in which engagement practices are critiqued for failing to 
adhere to normative ideals, such as particular notions of (deliberative) democracy, or 
attempts to categorise particular devices or approaches as democratic or not (e.g. 
Fiorino, 1990; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Marres (2012: 130) describes this as the 
‘investment of social and political theory in fixing and over-determining participation 
in terms of its necessary or sufficient features’, going on to suggest that 
indetermination (Gomart, 2002) is a valuable feature of experiments in participation 
(Marres, 2013: 436). 
 
The proposal to view participation as experimental and to study such efforts in a 
symmetrical way dates back to at least 2006. Irwin (2006) explores the adoption of 
the language of STS (e.g. dialogue and transparency) in governance settings, 
suggesting that this ‘new’ approach to scientific governance actually replicates and 
blends with many of the problems of the ‘old’ model (based on the deficit theory, 
according to which lay ‘publics’ are empty vessels waiting to be filled with 
knowledge, upon receipt of which they will unquestioningly support science and 
technology). However, he suggests that, even if this is the case, these attempts are 
still significant and worthy of study ‘in an open, empirical and symmetrical fashion’, 
considering them ‘as social experiments in themselves’ (Irwin, 2006: 317).  
 
Since that paper was published many studies of public participation have explored 
the ways in which publics and participation are imagined, convened, constituted, 
constructed, created, and emergent (e.g. Mohr et al., 2013; Mahony et al., 2010; I. 
Welsh & Wynne, 2013). However, Chilvers and Kearnes (2016) argue that there 
remains a ‘residual realist’ approach in two strands of the literature: ‘affirmative’ 
literature that focuses on methodologies of participation with a view to improving 
practice (Fiorino, 1990; Renn et al., 1995; Rowe & Frewer, 2000; Fung & Wright, 
2001), and ‘critical’ literature rooted in cultural theories of hegemony, focusing on 
the exclusive, disempowering and oppressive potential of participation (e.g. Cooke & 
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Kothari, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2005; Mouffe, 2005). Chilvers and Kearnes suggest 
that these literatures still make (realist, externalist) assumptions about the pre-
existence of publics and of democracy, with the former literature subscribing to a 
deliberative model of democracy and the latter to an agonistic one.  
 
The notion of democracy as ‘ready-made’ which, according to Chilvers and Kearnes 
(2016), still pervades both models, speaks to another, related critique of existing 
work on participation. 
 
’Ready-made’ ideals 
 
A tension between deliberative and agonistic models within ideals of democracy in 
STS has been highlighted by Lövbrand et al. (2011). Using Felt and Wynne’s (2007) 
European Commission report as a key illustrative example, they argue that while STS 
has pursued a normative commitment to deliberative democratisation of science and 
technology, its emphasis on diversity and dissensus is more in line with an agonistic 
model (rather than political theories of deliberative democracy that rest on rational 
communication to arrive at consensus and truths of the common good). This leads the 
authors to question on what basis the legitimacy of calls for deliberative democracy 
is established (if not on deliberative political theory, then empirically, or in another 
theory of democracy?).  
 
This chimes with Marres’ (2012) suggestion that STS work has ‘relied on ‘off-the-
shelf’ ideals of public participation, derived mainly from deliberative and post-
Marxist political theory’ (ix) and has ‘tended to uphold participation and democracy 
as theoretical ideals, while leaving these ideals themselves relatively un-interrogated’ 
(154) (but see Jasanoff, 2003, 2005). Both Marres’ (2012) and Lövbrand et al.’s 
(2011) critiques suggest that (the basis and articulation of) normative ambitions in 
STS around democratisation and deliberation require further thought. Together with 
Chilvers and Kearnes (2016), Marres (2012) also aims to re-think the theoretical 
conceptualisation of democracy and participation from static and pre-determined to 
co-constitutive and deeply intertwined with objects, environments, science and 
technology, etc.  
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A symmetrical, co-productionist approach 
 
Some of those using experimentality as an analytical frame are prompted by a sense 
that, while STS has investigated the construction of science and technology, 
criticised failures in science and technology to meet the standards of democracy, and 
called for the democratisation of science and technology, this has not been 
accompanied by an equivalent and simultaneous exploration of the construction of 
‘participation’ and ‘democracy’ themselves. According to these scholars, STS is 
lacking ‘a sustained attempt to utilise the tools of symmetrical and co-productionist 
analysis […] to understand how ‘participation’ itself is also actively constructed and 
in the making’ (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2016: xiv).  
 
To counter the residual realism described above, Chilvers and Kearnes propose the 
adoption of a co-productionist approach to the study of participation. Imagining 
engagement exercises as emergent social experiments implies that rather than (or as 
well as) aiming for a fixed ideal form of intervention or participation, the intervention 
itself is constitutive of such norms. This approach views these initiatives and their 
objects, publics and practices as emergent and co-produced with particular social 
orders and notions of democracy (including notions of democratic legitimacy): 
‘Questions and judgements of democratic legitimacy, in this sense, emerge within the 
practices and projects of democratization and participation’ (25) across a range of 
scales, from individual experiments, through spaces and technologies of 
participation, to broader political and epistemic regimes and cultures.  
 
Experiment as heuristic, analytical or theoretical concept 
 
It is worth noting that in the work described above, ‘experiments’ in participation are 
often framed as such both by the actors involved in undertaking the intervention, and 
the analysts involved in studying it. For example, Laurent (2011) explores how three 
participatory endeavours in France were framed in the language of – and with 
features of – experiments by those establishing them, and Mohr (2011) further 
describes similar experiments in the UK.  
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Beyond this use of the terminology, devices, and/or technologies of experiment 
(whether for interventionist or analytical purposes – or both – as far as it is possible 
to distinguish), scholars in STS have also adopted experimentality as a theoretical 
concept to characterise the changing relationships between objects and actors through 
science and democracy. Latour (2004) conceives of ‘collective experimentation’ as a 
process by which new actors are admitted into the collective (for example, the 
introduction of the genome). Building on this, Marres (2012) develops a notion of 
‘experimental ontology’, in which public demonstrations and experiments perform 
ontological and normative variability. 
 
Experimental traditions 
 
In addition to these key strands of literature, taking cue from Marres (2012), it is also 
worth considering certain experimental traditions, whether scientific, technical, 
moral, political or aesthetic. This draws attention to conceptualisations and practices 
of experiment beyond those associated with natural science. Examples comprise 
experiments in social science such as Garfinkel’s (1967) ‘breaching’ experiments in 
which social conventions were intentionally violated in everyday settings in order to 
expose the tacit, shared norms in those contexts; and ‘experiments in living’ as 
proposed by Mill (2002 [1859]) (explored below in ‘Policy experiments and 
experimental governance’), and carried forward by natural philosophers such as 
Thoreau (2008 [1854]) retreating to live alone in ‘wild’ or ‘natural’ settings in the 
19th century.  
 
Another important source or locale of experimentation is the arts. For example, the 
Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms defines ‘experimentalism’ as ‘the commitment 
to exploring new concepts and representations of the world through methods that go 
beyond the established conventions of literary tradition’ (Oxford Dictionary of 
Literary Terms, 2015). These elements of novelty, creativity, and moving beyond 
existing frameworks, points of reference or convention often play a part in – and can 
usefully inform notions of – experiment as seen in and applied to other domains, for 
example art-science as collective experimentation and public experiment (Gabrys & 
Yusoff, 2012; Born & Barry, 2010). 
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Technology as social experiment 
 
Another strand of literature in STS has explored technology as a social experiment. 
Much of this work draws on earlier social theory and STS ideas about the blurring of 
scientific and social spaces, the overspill of ‘the laboratory’ into broader society (U. 
Beck, 1992: 69; Krohn & Weyer, 1994), and the notion that the whole world has 
become a laboratory (or always was because experiments were never as bounded or 
controlled as the experimenters would claim) (U. Beck, 2009: 36; Latour, 1999: 43). 
These works suggest that risk in sociotechnical systems (such as those that comprise 
nuclear power plants) is impossible to determine due to the complexity of those 
systems. This systemic complexity (along with the interdependence of elements of 
the system) is a factor in the inevitability and unpredictability of ‘normal accidents’ 
(Perrow, 1984), in which the interaction of multiple failures in a sociotechnical 
system deemed to be “safe” leads to a catastrophic accident, such as that of Three 
Mile Island, Chernobyl or Fukushima.  
 
Given this modern condition of ‘existential experimentalism’ (U. Beck 2009: 5) in 
which humankind’s uncertainty and ignorance about the potential harmful impacts of 
new technologies is ever present (but perhaps not sufficiently acknowledged – 
although increasingly so in recent times), the lens of ‘technology as social 
experiment’ has been adopted by some researchers in order to shift governance and 
scholarly focus from risk (and associated assumptions about the possibility of 
prediction and control) to ‘the conditions for legitimate experimentation’ (Stilgoe, 
2015: 45) and ‘the conditions under which such experiments are morally justified’ 
(Doorn et al., 2016: 607).  
 
Policy experiments and experimental governance 
 
Beyond the literatures outlined above (but in many cases inspired by the conditions 
theorised/characterised therein), there has recently been a proliferation of literature 
proposing and exploring experimental approaches to policy and governance, across a 
range of areas, including education (Stoker & John, 2009), health and social care 
(Ettelt et al., 2015), and – of particular interest for the purposes of this study – 
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environmental and sustainability governance challenges such as climate change 
(Kivimaa et al., 2017).  
 
The idea of thinking about policy and governance in experimental terms is not new: a 
tradition of policy experiments from the 1960s onwards has attempted to import the 
concepts and techniques of natural scientific and psychological experiments into the 
practice of policy making and governance in order to test, evaluate and improve 
policy; though the lack of control over variables has led to the framing of such efforts 
as ‘quasi-experimental’ (D. T. Campbell, 1969: 410), and their effectiveness in 
influencing policy direction has been questioned (D. T. Campbell, 1969; Greenberg 
& Robins, 1986).  
 
In the UK this approach to policy has in recent years taken the form of increased calls 
for and use of randomised control trials in public policy contexts (Haynes et al., 
2012). This trend has faced criticism from STS and policy scholars, who argue that 
RCTs are often presented hegemonically as the gold standard method for generating 
‘neutral’ and unsituated (‘context free’) evidence of what policy interventions work 
(Pearce & Raman, 2014), and that ‘policy experiments [have] aimed at demonstrating 
the effectiveness of policies rather than investigating whether they “worked”’ (Ettelt 
et al., 2015: 294). 
 
Beyond these conceptualisations of policy experiment that retain (at least some 
elements of) a scientific, positivist conceptualisation of experiment, another strand of 
literature has viewed society itself as an experiment, and therefore the best way to 
advance policy and other social action is through experimentation in the sense of 
trying things out and valuation in practice (Gross and Krohn, 2005; Mill, 2002 
[1859]). Exploring how the work of early American sociologists of the Chicago 
School understood society as undergoing a process of self-experimentation in order 
to cope with the insecurity and uncertainty of the modern world, Gross and Krohn 
(2005: 79) note that this perspective is informed by ‘the observation that in modern 
societies, social practices increasingly present themselves as experiments via a 
willingness to remain open to new forms of experience’. Similarly, Marres (2012) 
considers John Stuart Mill as the original proponent of ‘experiments in living’ as 
72 
 
moral experimentation, i.e. a way of valuating different modes of living by trying 
them out: ‘the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when 
any one thinks fit to try them’ (Mill, 2002 (1859): 58, cited in Marres, 2012: 90).  
 
This chimes with more recent calls for experimentation as a response to the 
challenges of climate change. For example, Clark (2010) argues, on the basis that 
predictive models may have underestimated the extremity and abruptness of future 
climate change (see also Wynne, 2010), we should adapt as our ancestors did through 
flexibility and improvisation, to avoid responding to anticipated catastrophes in 
catastrophic ways. This argument suggests that an experimental approach is 
necessary for survival; prediction and control are not adequate or even possible in 
‘conditions of inherent uncertainty’. This aligns well with STS normative ambitions 
regarding the acknowledgement of uncertainty and pursuit of alternative modes of 
knowing and being beyond prediction and control (whether for survival or for less 
urgent but still important goals). 
 
This understanding of experimentality is also adopted in the notion of ‘experimental 
goverance’ or ‘experimentalist governance’ in relation to EU (or other collaborative) 
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty in policy areas such as climate 
change, forestry and urban water management policy (e.g. Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 
2012). As argued by Ettelt et al. (2015), ‘these studies approach experimentation as 
an issue of the power and governance structures that emerge and shift in the process 
of collaborative policy development’ (Ettelt et al., 2015: 294). Experimentation in the 
governance of climate change and other complex environmental problems is 
increasingly advocated and adopted (Kivimaa et al., 2017), whether as a means to 
facilitate quick adaptive responses to surprises, the testing of competing approaches, 
and the building of experiential knowledge (Klenk and Meehan, 2015), or in order to 
‘challenge the status quo and enable the exploration of governance innovations, 
technologies and services in a temporary space’, for example in the field of 
sustainability transitions, where experiments are ‘often seen as a way of establishing 
niches, i.e. fringe spaces for emerging technologies or alternatives to current methods 
of governance’ (Kivimaa et al., 2017: 1).  
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Finally, building on Latour’s (1998, 2004) concept of ‘collective experimentation’ 
(as mentioned above) there have been calls for collective experimentation as a mode 
of governance to open up deliberation around scientific and technological 
development to a broader range of actors, as opposed to a ‘regime of technoscientific 
promises’ (Felt & Wynne, 2007: 24). In the alternative ‘regime of collective 
experimentation’ (of which the authors see several emerging examples, such as open 
source software development or patient associations), experimentation is 
conceptualised as happening when ‘situations emerge or are created which allow to 
try out things and to learn from them [sic]’ (27). Such experimentation centres 
around emergent ‘matters of concern’, bringing together selective and concerned 
groups (not “the public”) (sometimes working independently of each other) to 
achieve collective goals (Felt & Wynne, 2007: 27-28). 
 
This normative approach to governance of science and emerging technologies has 
been broadly adopted by scholars working in STS and cognate fields (e.g. Pallett, 
2015a; Stilgoe, 2015; Felt et al., 2016), and informs more distributed notions of 
governance, democracy and their relation to science and technology, such as Chilvers 
and Kearnes (2016) ‘ecologies of participation’. 
 
2.5.3 Key aspects and qualities of experiments  
 
From the literature reviewed above, it is clear that experiment can indeed be 
interpreted in a broad range of ways, incorporating a variety of concepts, actors, 
objects and practices. In this section I outline some of the key aspects, elements, 
qualities and features of experiment or experimentality for the purposes of this study.  
 
In this context, experiment refers primarily to ‘a tentative procedure; a method, 
system of things, or course of action, adopted in uncertainty whether it will answer 
the purpose’, rather than ‘an action or operation undertaken in order to discover 
something unknown, to test a hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth’ 
(OED, n.d.-c; my emphasis). It is perhaps usefully elaborated in relation to the 
concept of improvisation:  
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The action or fact of doing anything spontaneously, without preparation, or 
on the spur of the moment; the action of responding to circumstances or 
making do with what is available; an instance of this. Also: the result of this; 
something produced or created in this manner.  
(OED, n.d.-d)  
 
Responding to circumstances is the more relevant aspect of improvisation in 
institutional cases such as Future Earth, rather than spontaneity or lack of 
preparation, although responsiveness and flexibility might demand spontaneity and 
quick thinking particularly when circumstances have not allowed preparation. 
 
The definition above blurs the distinction between process and result in a way that 
might enable a view of experimentation – and indeed of co-design and co-production 
– whereby the process is valuable in itself, not only in its capacity to produce results 
or outputs. This sits well with the constructivist lens adopted in the studies of 
experiments in participation outlined above, in which what might – from a realist 
perspective – be considered to be the pre-existing inputs of participation exercises 
(participants, interests, etc.) instead are seen as constructed, constituted and/or shaped 
by/during such experimentation, whose ‘outputs’ are also not fully-formed or stable, 
but instead contingent, emergent and changeable. Instead of a linear model with 
inputs, process and outputs, it is possible to reimagine such endeavours and their 
components as constantly ‘in the making’ (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2016). 
 
The key elements of experimentality for the purposes of this study, then, might 
comprise: the tentative pursuit of a course of action; the ambition to learn from this 
endeavour (in this sense it may adopt some features of the latter OED definition – ‘to 
discover something unknown, to test a hypothesis’ (OED, n.d.-c) – for example, the 
use of protocols and record keeping); some element of adaptability or responsiveness 
to circumstances; a condition of uncertainty in the context of the experiment and/or 
as to its potential outcomes; a sense that some aspect of the situation or course of 
action is novel and/or an openness to new experience; the opportunity for ontological 
indeterminacy or variability (sometimes through disruption), and, linked to that, the 
opportunity for normative intervention and performativity/generativity. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
Having presented an overview of the diverse literatures on scientific governance, the 
governance and organisation of GEC research, co-production, political imaginaries, 
and experimentality, I now conclude by briefly summarising the key gaps and 
debates the thesis aims to fill and participate in with a view to situating the 
contribution of the thesis. 
 
First, the thesis contributes to literatures on the (international) governance of GEC 
research and intentional co-production, filling a gap on the meanings and 
implementation of co-production in that context, and the ways in which ideas 
(possibly) originating in STS are adopted and translated there.  
 
Second, the thesis responds to Nowotny’s (2014) call to consider the political 
imaginaries of science: it does so by exploring the political imaginaries of science 
shared by those responsible for governing and organising science through Future 
Earth. 
 
Finally, the thesis extends the approach developed in the literature on experiments in 
participation. I argue that this approach could be broadened beyond ‘participation’ (in 
all its various interpretations and permutations) towards a broader range of epistemic 
and political activities. While Chilvers and Kearnes offer a co-productionist account 
of public participation linked to their ongoing work on ‘Critical Public Engagement’, 
building on the ‘Public Understanding of Science’ and ‘Public Engagement’ 
literatures (Pallett, 2012), this lens can also usefully be applied to other forms of 
engagement and science-society interaction (for example, initiatives at the science-
policy interface). Indeed, the co-productionist idiom adopted by Chilvers and 
Kearnes was originally developed in relation to science, democracy, and broader 
public reason (in the sense of civic epistemologies14 and other aspects of reasoning 
in, by, for, and with public(s) and/or in the name of the public good) (Jasanoff, 2004; 
Jasanoff, 2005; Jasanoff, 2012: 5). 
                                                 
14 ‘[T]he social and institutional practices by which political communities construct, review, validate, 
and deliberate politically relevant knowledge. […] includ[ing] the styles of reasoning, modes of 
argumentation, standards of evidence, and norms of expertise that characterize public deliberation and 
political institutions.’ (Miller, 2008: 1896). 
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The following chapter explores the ways in which these ideas, concepts and 
approaches are operationalised in this study through the research design and methods. 
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Chapter 3: Research design and methods 
 
This chapter discusses how the approaches and ideas identified in the literatures 
reviewed in Chapter 2 were operationalised in the research design, methods and 
process. Section 3.1 begins with an overview of how the project developed, an 
outline of the co-productionist, interpretive epistemological underpinnings, and the 
experimental analytical stance. Section 3.2 describes the research process, including 
data collection and generation, ethics and access, and an outline of each method 
adopted: document analysis, interviews, ethnographic observation and focus groups. 
Section 3.3 concludes with a reflexive consideration of the role of the researcher. It 
should be noted that – as with any writing – decisions have been made about which 
details to foreground and which to omit. 
 
3.1 Development and methodology of the research 
 
The doctoral studentship and associated PhD project on which this thesis is based 
were part of a larger research programme funded by the Leverhulme Trust, ‘Making 
Science Public: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2012-2017), which explored the 
changing relationships between science, politics and publics (MSciP, n.d.). 
  
From very early on it was clear that meanings of co-production are broad and 
sometimes contentious, as illustrated during a Making Science Public 
multidisciplinary team meeting at which each participant introduced concepts central 
to their interests or field. I presented Jasanoff’s idiom of co-production (2004b), 
which led to an animated discussion on what the idiom of co-production achieves 
that other constructivist approaches do not (for example, avoiding the black-boxing 
of both natural and social concepts), how it relates to more instrumental 
understandings of the term, and whether, in characterising constitutive processes as 
‘co-’ something, it might unintentionally reinforce the very dichotomies it is 
attempting to challenge (e.g. science and society, social and natural, epistemic and 
political, cognitive and material, etc.) (Nerlich, 2012). Given this focus on meaning, 
and the study’s roots in STS, a qualitative, interpretive methodology was adopted, 
based on a constructivist, co-productionist epistemology. 
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Constructivism, originating in the sociology of knowledge, suggests that social 
properties and our understandings of the world (meanings and knowledge) are 
constructed through social interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1967); there is no 
unmediated access to an essential reality, or God’s eye view (Haraway, 1988). In 
examining how science and technology are constructed, STS has focused on the 
specificities of particular contexts and practices of knowledge production, showing 
the ways in which knowledge (and its artefacts) are shaped by the political, moral, 
social and institutional cultures, assumptions, and commitments of those making it, 
and reciprocally, how societies are shaped by and through science and technology 
(Jasanoff, 2004c). The field has thus predominantly used the conceptual and 
methodological tools of the interpretive social sciences and humanities, with their 
emphasis on understanding meanings as opposed to explaining causes; indeed, it is 
founded in the deconstruction and critique of the universalising and predictive 
aspirations of natural science and positivist social science (Benton & Craib, 2011).  
 
As Sismondo (2010: 200) suggests, ‘much of the success of the field [of STS] has 
stemmed from an insistent localism and materialism, seeing macro-level structures as 
constituted by and having their effects in micro-level actions’. For this reason, case 
studies are central to STS, to the extent that (at least in 2007) ‘the guidelines to 
reviewers provided by Science, Technology, & Human Values, […] more or less 
imply that case studies are the expected form of contribution’ (Wyatt & Balmer, 
2007: 626, footnote 2).  
 
While there is no single definition of ‘case study’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011) and research 
across a range of traditions (including positivism (Yin, 2009)) adopts some version of 
this method, the possibility for ‘more detail, richness, completeness, and variance – 
that is, depth’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 301) afforded by a focused study of one particular 
‘unit’ or context (or comparison between several ‘units’ or contexts) seems 
particularly suited to a constructivist epistemology, given its emphasis on the 
contextually situated, socially constructed nature of meaning and knowledge. As 
argued by Beaulieu et al. (2007), case studies have been particularly useful to STS in 
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illustrating the diversity and disunity of science and technology, thereby ‘de-
essentialis[ing]’ them (675). 
 
However, the prevalence of case studies in STS has also been seen as problematic, 
linked to a broader issue of a perceived gap in STS scholarship between grand 
theories (e.g. ANT or social construction of technology – to the extent that they can 
be characterised as theories) and detailed, descriptive case studies, sometimes 
prompting difficult questions about what such case studies can contribute to the 
progression of STS knowledge (Wyatt & Balmer, 2007). Adopting a case study 
approach entails (epistemological and therefore also political) decisions and claims 
about what the subject of a particular study is a case of, and where the boundary lies 
between case and context (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 301) or between ‘action (to be analyzed) 
and scenery (to be black-boxed)’ (Wyatt & Balmer, 2007: 623). As I have already 
discussed in Chapter 1 (section 5), all research places artificial boundaries around its 
subject of study; I have attempted to account for (some of) the ways I have done that 
in this study there. 
 
Related to the question of ‘a case of what?’, case studies raise the problem of the 
extent to which they are generalisable. In some ways, Future Earth could be seen to 
be an ‘extreme/unique’ (Yin, 2009: 47) or ‘intrinsic’ (Stake, 1995: 3) case, in that it 
is unlike any preceding initiative, and it is of interest in itself without the need to 
generalise to other cases: it is the first international initiative to attempt the explicit 
institutionalisation of co-design and co-production of GEC research (at least as far as 
I am aware). However, antithetically, it could also be seen as an ‘exemplifying’ case 
(Bryman, 2012: 70), in that it calls for changes in research cultures, practices and 
communities, and increased impact, so could be seen to be emblematic of broader 
efforts or gestures towards open science and open policymaking, increased policy-
relevance and solutions-orientation. Following Irwin (2006), I would suggest that 
Future Earth’s efforts are ‘symptomatic’ of broader science-society relations, and in 
line with an STS epistemology/ontology, I would argue that they are also constitutive 
of them. Therefore, this study aims to explore Future Earth’s constitutive and 
generative effects in relation to broader epistemic and political regimes or cultures. It 
thus can potentially tell us something about broader trends and other initiatives that 
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might share some similar features; however, any such claims should be couched in 
acknowledgement of the significance of context-specificity and contingency.  
 
Qualitative research is broadly associated with constructivist and interpretive 
traditions and could be considered to be the most appropriate method for considering 
questions of meaning and process, given the richness and detail of data it provides 
and generates (Bryman, 2012). Qualitative analysis can be seen to bring together and 
constitute multiple perspectives and meanings, considering actors’ meanings – and 
meanings co-produced between researcher and actors – through the lens of the 
concepts and theories used to shape the study. Rather than adhering to the positivist 
norms and criteria of objectivity, replicability, generalisability, and validity, its 
quality or credibility can be considered in relation to characteristics such as 
trustworthiness, authenticity, reflexivity, transparency, and participant validation 
(Bryman, 2012; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). This chapter aims to meet some of these 
criteria (and demonstrate how others were met) by accounting for the research 
process, including key details on what was done and reflections on the role of the 
researcher.  
 
3.1.1 Analytical stance 
 
Building on the STS literature on experimentality reviewed in Chapter 2, I now turn 
to how this concept informs the analytical stance of the present study. Studying an 
emerging initiative such as Future Earth poses a range of challenges, amongst which 
balancing a critical outlook with humility and generosity towards the actors, 
organisation and work studied, is of particular importance. As explored in Chapter 2 
Chilvers and Kearnes (2016), and, before them, Irwin (2006), argue that it is 
necessary to move beyond the evaluative approach of some STS work on 
participation initiatives (e.g. Fiorino, 1990; Rowe & Frewer, 2000), and the 
associated idea that public participation practices can and should be judged against 
pre-established democratic norms and ideals (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016). Instead, 
such initiatives can be viewed as emergent, open-ended social experiments. This 
shifts the question from ‘is this democratic?’ to ‘what notions or forms of democracy 
are enacted here?’. Similarly, rather than asking ‘is Future Earth co-producing?’ or 
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‘has Future Earth succeeded in co-producing?’, the question is ‘what does co-
production mean in this context?’.  
 
In forgoing the presumption that a central, coordinating agency (the state or 
institutions such as Future Earth) is the (only) locus of power and capability 
(Chilvers & Kearnes 2016: 34; Irwin, 2008), what might otherwise be considered to 
be institutional, collective or individual failings against a pre-ordained ideal 
interaction or activity can be (re-)interpreted as negotiations with more readily 
acknowledged challenges, constraints and conditions forming part of an assemblage 
in which particular forms and visions of democracy – and science – are enacted. 
What might – from a realist perspective – be considered to be the pre-existing inputs 
of participation and governance exercises (participants, interests, etc.) instead are 
seen as constructed and/or shaped by/during such experimentation – and they in turn 
shape the governance or participation experiment.  
 
Chilvers and Kearnes’ (2016) co-productionist approach to understanding public 
participation suggests that actors, objects/issues of concern, practices, and broader 
social/political orders – including democratic (or other) norms – are co-constituted 
emergent aspects, properties and/or qualities of ongoing interactions, configurations 
and collectives. In their view, such interactions might include routine and 
institutionalised participation practices, as well as more organic, ad hoc, and 
ephemeral forms of engagement and ‘entanglement’. This lens can also usefully be 
applied to the form of science-society engagement represented by Future Earth.  
 
Future Earth may not strictly be an experiment in ‘public participation’ in the sense 
implied by Chilvers and Kearnes (2016), Laurent (2016), or Irwin (2006; 2013) – in 
that it does not explicitly intend to engage ‘the public’ and is not directly an 
instrument of (particular) nation state(s) or their mechanisms for framing, mediating 
and governing public issues. However, it is perhaps all the more interesting for this: 
convened by the ‘scientific community’ and science funders and policy makers at the 
international level, it represents an attempt to effect change in existing social and 
epistemic orders of science at multiple scales, whether through participatory means 
or in other ways. 
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The approach taken in this thesis thus aims to a) explore how Future Earth and/or co-
production in Future Earth are framed by those involved as (an) experiment(s), b) 
view Future Earth through the analytical lens of ‘experimentality’ to consider the 
ways in which Future Earth is ontologically variable and generative; for example, by 
exploring how ‘co-production’, ‘participation’, ‘democracy’ and Future Earth itself 
are constructed and emerge from (experimental) activities and discourse around 
(what some label as) Future Earth. This second step potentially opens the path for c), 
a normative or interventionist re-thinking or ‘re-making’ of Future Earth and its 
concepts (or an opening for others to do this) (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016). 
 
3.2 Research design and process 
 
Having explored the broad project development and methodological, epistemological 
and analytical stance of the work, I now move on to discuss specific decisions about 
the research design and execution and an account of how the research was 
undertaken. 
 
3.2.1 Data collection and generation 
 
While the decision to use qualitative methods was in some ways pre-determined by 
the type of questions and issues I was interested in and the field of study in which I 
intended to situate myself and my work (STS), the range of particular methods was 
more open. The existing STS literature on co-production and international 
governance of research tends to (chronologically) trace the development of particular 
institutions, programmes, projects, or processes through a combination of qualitative 
research methods, including document analysis, interviews with key stakeholders, 
and ethnographic observation of meetings and events (or participant observation and 
reflexive auto-analysis in the case of research projects employing joint knowledge 
production in which the author(s) was/were directly involved) (e.g. Pohl et al., 2010; 
Lövbrand, 2011; Robinson & Tansey, 2006). For example, Granjou et al. argue that: 
 
retracing the different projects and hopes in which the institutionalisation 
process is anchored at its early stage can enable us not to be fooled by the 
83 
 
mainstream narrative which is being constructed by leading actors and could 
quickly become the sole official foundation narrative of this institution.  
 
(Granjou et al., 2013: 23)  
 
Although this highlights the significance of gathering various perspectives before 
official narratives have stabilised, it perhaps also makes an unfounded assumption 
that there will in fact be one overarching official narrative at some stage in the 
institution’s emergence. However, it does prompt a consideration of the best sources 
of official and unofficial discourses, and the rhetorical work they may intend to 
perform. 
 
For example, Shove and Rip (2000) turn to four sources to ascertain how “users” of 
research are rhetorically or symbolically constructed and how research “use” works 
in practice. They analyse the “official” narratives of ESRC annual reports, the (less 
official) descriptions of potential research users and use in research funding 
applications submitted to ESRC calls for proposals, and material generated from 
interviews with supposed research “users” and with researchers on their experience 
of research “use”. A key point to arise from this analysis (which is not fully 
addressed in the article) is what type of access to “practice”, actual use, or “reality”, 
interviews can give. While Shove and Rip (2000) acknowledge the rhetorical work 
undertaken by the ESRC documents and application forms, they take a less nuanced 
approach to the interview material, seemingly assuming that the accounts relayed 
during interview offer a straightforward or direct representation of actual research 
use.  
 
Hammersley (1992: 53) suggests that there are two sorts of interest we can take in 
interview accounts: on the one hand we can treat them as social phenomena that we 
are seeking to explain and/or as an indication of the cultural perspectives of those 
producing them. On the other hand, we can see them as a source of information about 
phenomena to which they refer. Although I do not believe that interviews can offer 
unproblematic access to actual practice or a “reality” exterior to the conversation, 
according to a constructivist epistemology interviews allow narratives, meanings and 
representations to be jointly produced – or co-produced – between the interviewer 
(researcher) and interviewee (participant) (Harding, 2006). The meanings co-
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produced can be considered to be relational and constitutive of reality/ies (Denzin, 
2001).  
 
Finally, ethnographic (participant) observation equally does not provide 
unproblematic access to the “reality” of research and research policy practices, given 
the subjective and situated nature of observation, and the ethical issues that can arise 
(see below for a consideration of ethics across the research methods in this project). 
However, given that this is the case for all methods, observation offers some 
advantages, such as the possibility of gaining valuable insights into interactions, 
negotiations and processes unavailable through other methods (Bryman, 2012). 
 
Given these considerations, the decision was made to analyse publicly available 
Future Earth documents (web pages, reports, etc.), particularly to learn about 
‘official’ meanings. Documents internal to the organisation would be analysed if 
access could be obtained. Secondly, I would try to undertake interviews with key 
Future Earth actors, adopting a dual approach to the interview data generated: firstly 
analysing how the interviewees use and construct significant concepts such as co-
production, given that this talk is constitutive or performative; secondly using the 
interviews as one source of information about (the implementation of) Future Earth, 
given that the interviewees may produce relational interpretations or representations 
of practice. Finally, in order to gain an insight into the challenges and opportunities 
encountered during the establishment of Future Earth, the observation of negotiations 
during committee and other agenda-setting meetings could provide invaluable 
insights about processes or discussion of co-production unavailable through other 
methods. 
 
3.2.2 Ethics and access 
 
The research was approved by the Research Ethics Officer of the School of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham. Key considerations within 
the framework of the formal ethics approval process comprised:  
• ensuring that interview participants would receive full information on the 
project (via an information sheet; see Appendix 2) and give their informed 
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consent to participate (see consent form in Appendix 3), including the option 
to withdraw at any stage of the research; 
• ensuring that participants in any meetings observed would be aware of my 
presence and have access to further details of the study via an information 
sheet circulated in advance, and that, at the time of observation, I would be 
introduced or my presence would be made known by the meeting chair(s); 
• protecting the anonymity of interview participants to the extent that is 
possible given that some occupy unique positions within the initiative.  
 
In relation to this last point, the ethics framework and consent form of the School 
adopts an ‘anonymity by default’ position (Saunders et al., 2014: 618), in line with 
the majority of national ethical guidelines for social research (e.g. Social Research 
Foundation, 2003; British Sociological Association, 2002). However, the ability to 
truly guarantee anonymity, particularly between ‘insiders’ of a particular group or 
organisation, has been questioned (Tolich, 2004). Therefore, the standard consent 
form template provided by the School was adapted (Appendix 3) to note that every 
effort would be made to maximise the anonymity of participants, but that in some 
cases the participant may be identifiable to Future Earth colleagues (or others) from 
the use of quotes or descriptors in publications or reports. This was discussed with all 
research participants, none of whom expressed concern about being identified, and 
many of whom suggested that they would be happy to be identified by name. For 
consistency, I have attempted to anonymise all participants as far as possible, as 
further discussed below.  
 
Efforts towards anonymisation tread a line between the imperative to protect 
participants’ identities to avoid intrusion and harm, while maintaining the richness 
and integrity of the data (provided by contextual details, for example) (Saunders et 
al., 2014). In this case, anonymising the data has led to the loss of some analytically 
significant details (e.g. as indicated in footnote 45, p. 237). In retrospect, I would 
have taken a more flexible approach to anonymisation, offering anonymity as an 
option rather than as the default position (The Research Ethics Guidebook, n.d.). 
Participants may have felt less free to openly discuss politically sensitive aspects of 
Future Earth’s development, but as this was not the major focus of the research, this 
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would have been unlikely to significantly influence the quality of the data. Since 
‘elite’ research actors (those in senior, expert and influential positions) are for the 
most part very familiar with (social) research processes and ethics protocols, the 
chances of harm as a result of identification could be seen to be minimal (Future 
Earth as an initiative or institution could be considered to be more at stake than the 
individuals involved). However, power and vulnerability of research participants, 
including so-called ‘elite’ actors, is fluid, dynamic and relational, therefore any 
approach taken would need to engage in ongoing reflexivity and sensitivity 
(Lancaster, 2017).  
 
My existing contacts were key to facilitating access, (I believe) lending me 
legitimacy with other actors involved, and offering advice on the best approach. 
Having provided a document outlining my proposed project to the Future Earth 
Executive Group (EG) (comprising the Chair and Co-Vice Chairs of the Science 
Committee and the Interim Director), I was informed that I was one of several PhD 
students interested in studying different aspects of the initiative, so the EG would 
consult the rest of the Science Committee and the Interim Engagement Committee 
(once it had been appointed) on the issue of access. The response to this consultation 
was reported to be generally positive and the value of research on Future Earth was 
appreciated, but some concerns were raised about access to sensitive meetings and 
minutes. The committees therefore developed a ‘Research on Future Earth’ policy 
and accompanying formal approval process in order to ensure that the research would 
not be disruptive; i.e. that it would respect people’s time and that it would not 
conflict with the goals of Future Earth.  
 
I submitted the required documents for this second approval process and agreed with 
the conditions outlined in the policy. Further reflection on this aspect of my 
interaction with Future Earth is provided in section 3.3 below. Once Future Earth had 
approved my project, I was granted access to internal documents (including meeting 
minutes, papers, etc.) and recordings of committee and projects teleconferences, with 
some limitations (for example, funding bids were not shared due to concerns about 
confidentiality). I was also granted access to the June 2014 joint meetings of the 
Science Committee and Interim Engagement Committee in Beijing.  
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Given this unique and privileged access, in consultation with my supervisors and my 
contacts at Future Earth, the decision was made to undertake some focus groups 
during these meetings. This would enable me to see what sort of interaction might 
happen around co-production, and to maximise the number of participants’ 
perspectives contributed to the study while respecting their time. Formal ethics 
approval was again granted by the School, and approval was also granted by Future 
Earth. Rather than a standalone, formal event at the beginning of the fieldwork 
period, obtaining access was an ongoing interaction and negotiation with the Interim 
Secretariat and Executive Group, who were extremely generous in offering their 
support, time and resources. 
 
3.2.3 Document analysis 
 
Alongside the process of obtaining ethical and Future Earth approval for the project, I 
conducted an initial analysis of Future Earth documents in the public domain. For 
many actors outside of Future Earth and its broader networks, its websites and 
documents might be the first point of contact with the initiative; rather than seeing 
these sources as representations of Future Earth, they can be considered to constitute 
Future Earth. Starting with the Future Earth section of the ICSU website, and 
subsequently the Future Earth website once it was established (in mid-2013), I 
collected all meeting reports, position papers and other documents available to 
download, as well as the web pages themselves. These documents dated back to 2010 
until early 2014 for the initial analysis (and up to early 2015 for the subsequent 
analysis) (see Appendix 1 for a summary of the documents collected). Once access 
was provided to internal documents (in February 2014 onwards) these were added to 
the dataset.  
 
The primary functions of the external documents seem to be a) to record the activities 
and decisions of the ICSU-ISSC Visioning Process and subsequent work of the 
Transition Team that designed the new initiative, then of the (Interim) Secretariat, 
Science Committee and (Interim) Engagement Committee, and b) to communicate 
this activity and the identity, vision and research agenda of Future Earth to the 
existing global environmental change research community (those involved in the 
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existing programmes and sub-projects) as well as a broader interested (and new) 
audience, including potential funders of the initiative. As such, the documents are 
performative in the sense that they argue for the need for a new initiative, and 
elaborate what this might comprise. They are also points of reference that inform and 
contribute (among other factors) to shaping the performance of actions by Future 
Earth actors (and beyond), including setting up institutional structures, inclusion and 
exclusion of other actors, research agendas and so on. 
 
The documents (and the subsequent interview, focus group and observation data) 
were analysed thematically. Thematic analysis is used widely in social science 
research, although it is not well demarcated and its protocols are not strictly codified 
(as opposed to, for example, conversation analysis or particular types of discourse 
analysis) (Bryman, 2012; Braun & Clarke, 2006). However, as a method for 
identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (i.e. themes) within data, it offers the 
opportunity to present a ‘rich and detailed, yet complex, account of data’ (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006: 78).  
 
Due to the volume of data collected, I decided to use NVivo for the initial analysis 
(to facilitate a faster analysis process (Bryman, 2012)), coding the documents in 
relation to broad questions on the nature, purpose and meanings of Future Earth and 
co-production within it. I then explored the content in detail and began to categorise 
the data into more nuanced codes or themes. For example, within ‘why establish 
Future Earth’, the themes of ‘convergence of thinking between research and funding 
communities’ and ‘addressing and responding to societal needs’ recurred and seemed 
to be significant. 
 
This analysis shaped my view of potential areas of interest (feeding into the design of 
the interview schedule, as discussed below), and was subsequently continued 
manually at a later stage in the process once the fieldwork data had been collected. A 
combination of electronic and manual data analysis can be considered to compensate 
for some of the limitations of each method, such as the potential for electronic 
techniques to lead to excessive multiplication of codes lacking in subtlety or 
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meaning, or the inability to quickly search for key terms or phrases across large 
datasets if only hard copies are used (E. Welsh, 2002; Basit, 2003).   
 
3.2.4 Interviews 
 
The interviews, observation and focus groups were conducted between March and 
July 2014, after the Science Committee’s first face-to-face meeting (in South Africa, 
December 2013) and the Interim Engagement Committee’s first face-to-face meeting 
(in the US, January 2014), in the run up to, during and after their first joint face-to-
face meeting in Beijing, June 2014. At this stage, Future Earth was operating with an 
Interim Secretariat (hosted at the International Council for Science (ICSU)’s offices 
in Paris). In its capacity as institutional co-sponsor in partnership with the other 
Alliance members (the ISSC, the Belmont Forum, UNESCO, UNEP, UNU, WMO), 
ICSU was still playing an active role in the appointment of the committees and the 
selection of the permanent Secretariat. 
 
Sampling 
 
Before fieldwork began, a long list of potential interview participants was drawn up 
including: 
• Members of the Transition Team that worked on the initial design of the 
initiative (which comprised 31 researchers, research policy makers, 
representatives of international intergovernmental organisations, 
representatives of the four GEC research programmes and other stakeholder 
institutions); 
• Members of the Science Committee (which comprised 18 researchers across 
natural and social science and the humanities), Interim Engagement 
Committee (which comprised seven members ‘from a range of stakeholder 
groups’ (Future Earth, n.d.-b)) including people working at the science-policy 
interface, local/national government, the UN, private foundations, NGOs and 
the media), and Interim Secretariat (which comprised an Interim Director, two 
Science Officers, a Communications Coordinator, an Administrative Officer, 
and one Science and Engagement Officer); 
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• Members of the Alliance (which comprised representatives of ICSU, the 
ISSC, the Belmont Forum, UNEP, UNESCO, UNU, and WMO); 
• People involved in the existing GEC programmes and projects; 
• People not formally affiliated with, but aware of and interested in, Future 
Earth and/or whose work is relevant to transdisciplinary GEC research. 
 
Based on this initial list, participants were sampled purposively and opportunistically 
(Bryman, 2012), with a view to achieving maximum variety across and within the 
categories above, with consideration of disciplinary, sectoral and institutional 
affiliation, geographical location, and gender. 
 
Once the project had been formally approved by Future Earth, I began to approach 
potential participants by email to request interviews, attaching an information sheet 
outlining the project and what participation would involve (Appendix 2). 15 people 
were approached for individual interviews, all of whom responded. Ten suggested a 
potential date and were interviewed. Five suggested resuming contact at a later date 
due to being particularly busy at that time; three of these were later approached to 
participate in focus groups and accepted. 
 
The ten one-on-one interview participants comprised three Alliance members, three 
Science Committee members, one Interim Engagement Committee member, one 
Interim Secretariat member, one person engaged to work freelance for Future Earth, 
and one person uninvolved but aware of Future Earth. Of these participants, three had 
participated in the Transition Team. Most had engaged in interdisciplinary work or 
had worked across several disciplines through their careers, so there are different 
ways to describe their disciplinary affiliations. Indeed, many of their day-to-day roles 
(beyond Future Earth) could be considered to span sectors, including research and 
policy for example. Broadly, five had backgrounds in or were currently engaged in 
natural science research; six had backgrounds in or were currently engaged in social 
science/humanities research. One described themselves as being one of the few non-
scientists/non-researchers involved. Three were working as research 
administrators/managers in a funding or policy making capacity. Three worked for 
NGOs, one for a national research funding agency. The gender split was eight male 
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and two female. Eight were based in Europe, one in North America and one in Asia-
Pacific. 
 
While in some ways the participants were extremely diverse (in terms of day-to-day 
roles, disciplinary backgrounds, institutional affiliations, and extent/duration/nature 
of involvement in Future Earth), the male and European weighting was a result of 
several factors. The sampling and recruitment strategy started from the assumption 
that face-to-face interviews were preferable to Skype or telephone interviews (a 
common norm in qualitative research (Deakin & Wakefield, 2014)), meaning that 
initial interviews were scheduled with those within reasonable travelling distance of 
Nottingham or who happened to be attending the same events as me. Two of those 
that were unable to participate during the requested period (suggesting resuming 
contact at a later date) were female, and two of them were based in Africa. This 
imbalance was addressed to some extent in the sampling for the focus groups 
(discussed further below), although balancing all of the potential characteristics to be 
taken into account there proved challenging, and the primary aim for those groups 
was to ensure diversity within the group, followed secondarily by a consideration of 
diversity across all participants in the study.  
 
Another attempt to increase the diversity of participants was made in undertaking six 
short on-the-spot unrecorded interviews with participants in the joint meetings of the 
Science Committee and Interim Engagement Committee in June 2014 (although there 
was an overall gender imbalance in participants at the meetings, given that the full 
Engagement Committee had not yet been appointed; also it should be noted that 
several committee members had recently relocated from developing countries to 
Europe, which indicates that using country of work/residence is perhaps too reductive 
an indicator when considering diversity). These were conducted opportunistically 
with five female and two male participants based in Latin America, Africa, and 
Europe (Science Committee and Interim Secretariat members). My notes taken 
during and after those discussions have been included in the material analysed. 
Furthermore, I was also given access to six video interviews with committee 
members about co-design and co-production, conducted and recorded by Interim 
Secretariat members in the context of the Beijing meeting. The video interview 
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participants comprise two women, four men – one Interim Engagement Committee 
member and five Science Committee members – based in Latin America, Africa, 
Europe and North America. The focus group, observation and video data is discussed 
in more detail below. 
 
Interview process and treatment of the data 
 
Of the one-on-one interviews, six were conducted in advance of the Beijing meetings 
(four face-to-face, comprising two in the participant’s office, one in a café and one in 
a seminar room at a conference; and two by Skype). One of the interviews conducted 
by Skype was cut short by an interruption on the side of the participant, so it was 
resumed a fortnight later; for the purposes of analysis I have counted this as one 
interview as it represents one participant’s (albeit changing and co-constituted, 
interactional) perspective. Three interviews were conducted in the context of the joint 
meetings in Beijing (two pre-arranged and one ad hoc) in the conference hotel 
restaurant, on the terrace, and in a side room off the main meeting room. One was 
conducted by Skype after the meetings. Several of the interviews over Skype began 
with both parties using video, but due to the instability of the connection, video was 
turned off early in the conversations (before recording began).  
 
While Skype interviews have several perceived deficiencies as opposed to face-to-
face interviews, such as absence of visual cues, loss of non-verbal and contextual 
(ethnographic) data, and difficulty in establishing rapport (Novick, 2008; Deakin & 
Wakefield, 2014), I did not find that Skype interviewing detracted from the quality of 
the data. The loss of certain contextual details was, in my opinion, compensated for 
by the requirement to listen carefully and take turns in speaking with a heightened 
sensitivity that is not always possible face-to-face due to excessive sensory input or 
stimuli.   
 
At the beginning of every exchange, I thanked the participants for their time, checked 
how long they would be available, and talked through the information sheet and 
consent form (Appendices 2 and 3). Once I was confident that they were satisfied 
with the project and interview arrangements, and they had signed the consent form 
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(or, in the case of Skype interviews, given their verbal consent by confirming each of 
the statements read out from the form, and agreeing to sign and return the consent 
form electronically following the interview), with their permission I started recording 
the conversation. Recordings of in person interviews were made with a digital 
recording device and Skype interviews were recorded (audio only) using the software 
package ‘ecamm Call Recorder for Skype’.  
 
The interview recordings range in length from 30 minutes to 59 minutes (though the 
combined recordings of the interview conducted over two dates total 72 minutes), 
with a mean duration of 41 minutes (if the combined recordings are counted 
separately) or 46 minutes (if they are counted as one). 
 
The interviews took a semi-structured format, with a prepared list of questions 
(example provided in Appendix 4; this was adapted according to each participant’s 
role or involvement in Future Earth), which was not adhered to rigidly. This allowed 
me to pursue interesting avenues that arose in the conversation, while ensuring that 
questions from each section were covered. The sections broadly comprised: 
• The participant’s background, current role and involvement in Future Earth 
(to break the ice and consider their positionality and relationship to Future 
Earth); 
• What they consider Future Earth to be, what its aims are; 
• Who was (expected) to be involved and how; what Future Earth’s activities 
were/would be; 
• What the impacts of Future Earth might be and how it was playing out so far; 
• What challenges and opportunities might be encountered; 
• What co-production means (if this had not already arisen earlier in the 
conversation). 
 
An effort was made not to explicitly mention co-design, co-production and 
transdisciplinarity initially in the majority of the interviews, to see the ways in which 
the participant would raise and frame these concepts. However, it is worth noting that 
the information sheet included the project’s focus on these concepts, so this already 
framed the interaction to some degree.  
94 
 
 
I transcribed the six interviews conducted in advance of the Beijing meetings (except 
the second half of the interview conducted over two dates) immediately after the 
interview or within a few days. Given personal challenges faced after the meetings, 
the remaining interviews and focus groups were transcribed by a professional 
transcriber (who signed a confidentiality agreement, securely stored, password 
protected and subsequently destroyed her copies of the data). No particular 
transcription convention was followed, given that the analysis does not rely on a high 
level of interactional detail (length of pauses etc.) as in conversation or some types of 
discourse analysis (Bryman, 2012). I listened back to the recordings – or segments of 
them – at various stages in the analysis to ascertain further meaning from tone of 
voice, pace, etc. and to check details in the transcripts. 
 
In the thesis, to increase the chances of anonymity, verbal tics and potentially 
distinguishing linguistic features have been removed, interview numbers have been 
assigned in a different order to the sequence in which they were conducted, gendered 
pronouns have been removed, interview participants have been labelled ‘I[number]’ 
(or ‘Interview [number]’) and focus group participants have been labelled 
‘FGP[number]’. For the purposes of analysis and argument, phrases pertinent to the 
themes have been italicised. In quotes from documents, original emphasis is 
indicated; other emphasis is mine. 
 
The interview data was analysed together with the focus group and observation data, 
as discussed in section 3.2.7 below. 
 
3.2.5 Ethnographic (participant) observation 
 
As outlined above, the decision to observe the joint meeting of the SC and IEC was 
made to gain an insight into the decision making, negotiation and framing processes 
of Future Earth in its early stages. This particular meeting was the first that occurred 
following approval of my project by Future Earth. The meetings comprised a one-day 
symposium organised by the Chinese National Committee for Future Earth as a 
showcase of Chinese GEC research, attended by some SC, IEC and Interim 
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Secretariat members, the CNC-FE, other Chinese researchers and professionals, and 
Chinese press covering the event. This was followed by three days of SC and IEC 
meetings, mostly joint, with one session where the SC and IEC met separately. Some 
members of the Alliance were present for parts of the meetings (and held their own 
meeting, which I did not observe, the day after the SC/IEC meetings concluded). 
 
The observation and focus groups were deeply intertwined (along with the document 
analysis and interviews conducted beforehand, during and afterwards), but for the 
purposes of clarity I here deal with them in turn. In terms of observation, my role was 
as a ‘partially participating observer’ or ‘minimally participating observer’ (Bryman, 
2012: 443), that is, I did not participate in the group’s activities as a core member, 
but took part in some aspects in a peripheral manner. For example, I joined some 
breakout discussions and offered my views when asked, but did not contribute to 
plenary discussions apart from to introduce myself at the beginning of the meeting. 
On the other hand, my participation was active in that I organised focus groups in 
that context, conducted formal and informal/ad hoc interviews, and shared meals and 
tourist activities with participants. 
 
During the meetings I took copious notes on the discussions and interactional 
dynamics as they unfolded, either using my laptop during formal plenary discussions 
and some breakouts, or a notebook during other breakouts and informal 
conversations. At some points notes were taken immediately afterwards if it would 
be too intrusive to do so at the time (for example, during informal chats over lunch 
and dinner), and at the end of each day I noted reflections and potential plans/foci for 
the following day. These notes were all included with the material analysed, in 
addition to the notes made by the Interim Secretariat members for reporting purposes. 
 
While I was invited to participate in/observe at the subsequent joint meeting of the 
SC and the newly appointed EC in Argentina in December, 2014, in consultation 
with my supervisors I decided against doing so given the volume of data I had 
already generated, given that co-production was expected to take a less prominent 
role on the agenda than at the Beijing meeting, and given the financial, 
environmental and potential personal cost of another intensive international trip.  
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3.2.6 Focus groups 
 
As noted above, focus groups have several advantages over one-on-one interviews: if 
well-facilitated they have the potential to incorporate a wider range of perspectives in 
a more time-efficient manner, but they also provide an occasion to explore the 
processes of collectively constructing – or contesting – meanings around a particular 
theme or topic (Barbour, 2007). In convening the focus groups I aimed: 
• To explore the ways in which meanings of co-production and related concepts 
would be constructed, considered and contested by Future Earth actors, 
gaining an insight into interactive meanings and visions of co-production in a 
group context;  
• To facilitate reflexivity of participants on this topic;  
• To subsequently reflect on the researcher’s own role in co-production. 
 
The Interim Secretariat and Executive Group generously provided me with two 
dedicated slots in the agenda at the end of the first and second meeting days. I 
initially contacted fourteen potential participants, to be split into two groups of seven, 
judged to be the largest possible group allowing space for all to participate over a 
duration of an hour (Barbour, 2007; M. Bloor et al., 2001). I paid careful attention to 
the group composition, wanting to achieve a balance firstly within, and secondly 
across each group between: 
• SC and IEC members (and those assuming leadership positions on the 
committees and those not) 
• Those with backgrounds in and affiliations to natural science and social 
science (or to realist/positivist traditions and constructivist/interpretive 
traditions) 
• Female and male 
• Those who speak English as a first language and those to whom English is a 
second, third or fourth language 
• Geographical base (and nationality where known) 
• Extent of previous involvement in Future Earth (e.g. Transition Team, 
programmes, projects) 
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Of the fourteen I originally contacted, one declined, three did not respond, and the 
rest agreed (some provisionally dependent on other commitments during the 
meetings). I then contacted a further three, who also agreed (two provisionally).   
 
The final group compositions comprised: 
• Focus group 1, total six participants: one IEC member, five SC members, 
three women, three men, three natural scientists, three social scientists, two 
based in North America, one based in Latin America, two based in Europe, 
one based in Asia-Pacific.  
• Focus group 2, total four participants: two IEC members, two SC members, 
two social scientists, two men, two women, two based in North America, two 
based in Europe.  
 
Both groups included one (different in each group) member who had also been 
interviewed one-on-one. Two provisional participants in group 2 (natural scientists, 
one based in Asia-Pacific, one based in Africa, one female, one male) were unable to 
attend, and one participant (natural scientist based in Asia-Pacific) who had agreed to 
participate by email decided to withdraw beforehand during the meetings, stating that 
they were not familiar with or expert in the topic of co-production. I checked that the 
participant understood that expertise was not a pre-requisite, while also reiterating 
that they were free to withdraw either at that moment or subsequently, and they 
maintained that they would prefer not to participate. 
 
I outlined the main purposes of the focus group (encouraging participants to 
respectfully disagree or raise new points), and summarised the main points on the 
ethical consent form at the outset. The primary difference between the individual and 
focus group consent form was the adoption of the ‘Chatham House Rule’ in the focus 
groups (Chatham House, n.d.). All participants (including myself) agreed to the 
condition that what was discussed during the focus group could be shared outside of 
the focus group but that quotes or information should remain anonymous (i.e. not be 
attributed to particular individuals). On confirmation of verbal permission from all 
present I began recording using two digital recording devices (to increase the chance 
of all voices being picked up). 
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I aimed to facilitate the groups by asking two guiding questions: What co-production 
(and related terms such as co-design and transdisciplinarity) mean, and how they 
might be implemented in Future Earth. These questions were used as a ‘focusing 
exercise’ to ‘concentrate the group’s attention and interaction on a particular topic’, 
rather than as a means to gather information (Barbour, 2007: 42-43). The participants 
contributed actively and engaged wholeheartedly in the discussions, which ranged 
very freely. My main facilitation effort was to encourage quieter participants to speak 
(usually those for whom English is a second, third or fourth language). I drew the 
discussions to a close after an hour, and participants signed the consent forms (this 
was considered too disruptive to undertake beforehand given the number of 
participants; consent was acquired verbally at that stage). 
 
The focus group recordings were transcribed by the professional transcriber and have 
been presented in the thesis in the same way as the one-on-one interview data 
(detailed above). 
 
3.2.7 Analysis of interview, focus group and observation data 
 
The interview, focus group and observation data were also analysed thematically (see 
above for further discussion of this approach). The analysis was primarily conducted 
manually, although other approaches were explored, including NVivo and an Excel 
spreadsheet. In the end, the pen-and-paper approach allowed for the closest 
relationship to the data, and more flexibility in terms of rethinking codes and themes. 
 
Once some initial themes had been identified, the analysis was combined with that of 
the documents to consider similarities and differences, and some overarching themes 
were developed. At various points it occurred to me that these themes aligned with 
concepts from the existing literature, such as the political imaginaries sketched by 
Nowotny (2014) and the institutional models proposed by Barron (1994; in Jasanoff 
& Wynne, 1998), which I tested further by looking across the data for examples that 
might confirm or contradict these hunches. The concepts were used as heuristic 
lenses in assisting and framing the interpretation of the data, rather than as theories to 
be proven or falsified. 
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While I did not broadly consult all participants on the emerging findings, there were 
some opportunities to receive thoughts and feedback from Future Earth, which could 
be seen as some form of triangulation or participant validation (Bryman, 2012; 
Morse, 2018). Firstly, in early 2016 I wrote a book chapter for an edited volume of 
work from the MSciP programme, which I sent to the Future Earth Secretariat and 
Science Committee in mid-2016 for their comment and approval (material from the 
chapter has been further developed and included in several sections of the thesis). I 
received two small sets of comments back: the work was considered to be an 
interesting and valuable account of some of the tensions and dilemmas Future Earth 
was dealing with and would continue to face, and my permission was sought for it to 
be used to frame some of the discussions at the next SC/EC meeting. I incorporated 
suggestions to better specify the period of study and bring out the significance of the 
Belmont Forum (and other Alliance members) in Future Earth’s institutional 
development.  
 
Secondly, I was invited to give a seminar on my work at the School of Environmental 
Sciences, University of East Anglia in May 2017, which, at the time, hosted the 
Future Earth Europe office. The talk was attended by several people currently or 
formerly involved in Future Earth’s development (not participants in this study), who 
expressed interest in the findings, agreeing with some aspects (for example, the 
presence of multiple, sometimes conflicting, ideas of what co-production means) and 
raising further challenging and interesting questions, such as in what ways Future 
Earth can be considered to be having an impact (on science or policy). These 
comments and feedback played a significant role in shaping my thoughts as I 
finalised the thesis. 
 
Finally, I shared the draft thesis abstract, introduction and conclusion with two 
members of the Future Earth Science Committee in the month before submission. I 
received feedback from one of them, who felt that the conclusions presented a 
balanced appraisal with many insights, and sought my permission to share the work 
with the Secretariat.  
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While these opportunities clearly do not represent a thorough attempt at participant 
validation or feedback, they suggest that the conclusions reached are not 
outrageously out of line with the experience of (at least a few) of the people involved.  
 
3.3 Reflexivity 
 
Scholars in STS have grappled with the complexities of establishing the legitimacy 
and validity of their own knowledge claims while analysing, deconstructing and 
critiquing the processes of legitimation and validation of the knowledge claims of 
others (e.g. D. Bloor, 1991; Lynch, 2000; Weinburg, 2009). This type of enquiry 
requires an active and continued reflexive engagement with its own ontological, 
epistemological, methodological and normative stance. Rather than undertaking a 
radically reflexive (Lynch, 2000) deconstruction of my own knowledge-making 
practices and knowledge claims (fun though that seems to be (e.g. Ashmore et al., 
1995; Ashmore, 1989)), here I will briefly reflect on two aspects of the project: the 
implications of my existing connections with the empirical context, and my role in 
(co-production in) Future Earth. 
 
Firstly, while no researcher brings a completely ‘blank slate’ to the research process, 
my existing connections to the International Social Science Council – and to Future 
Earth (as outlined in section 1.4) – were significant in initiating and building the 
study. This was an advantage in many ways (e.g. facilitating access, awareness of 
some aspects of the institutional history, familiarity with some of the actors’ 
language); in others it proved to be a challenge. Having been immersed in the culture 
of that context for two years prior to starting the PhD, I brought certain assumptions 
and took some things for granted that perhaps someone with stronger ‘outsider’ status 
might not (Merriam et al., 2001). For example, in analysing the data I came to realise 
that I had been conceptualising institutional levels as equivalent to or associated with 
geographical/spatial levels, so the planned SC and EC would operate at the ‘global’ 
level and the research projects would operate at the ‘local’ level. This way of 
conceiving of the institutional and spatial arrangements of Future Earth is not 
uncommon (as I will argue in Chapter 7), but it is just one of many ways of thinking 
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about these elements, and perhaps stands in the way of a full account of all forms of 
governance and spatiality.  
 
In an attempt to avoid ethical ambiguity, I took care to address issues of ethics and 
consent with my existing contacts before they entered into formal participation (as 
with all participants), and did not use prior conversations as data (although of course 
they shaped the study in various ways). However, I did not fully take into account the 
differences I might experience in my own role when moving from the (protected and 
in some ways more usual and legitimate) role of employee to the role of 
‘independent’ researcher. I found the power differentials involved very difficult to 
manage: I am a junior researcher still to be formally validated or qualified by the 
academy at doctoral level, but also have – or was perceived to potentially have – the 
power to have a detrimental effect on Future Earth, whether in terms of 
inconveniencing those involved or more seriously abusing the trust given, damaging 
the initiative’s reputation, or producing an unconstructively critical account. Without 
wanting to exaggerate the potential influence I believed I could have, the way I 
experienced and perceived this simultaneous lack of formalised legitimacy and 
weight of responsibility was challenging and at times hampered the process, 
particularly during the second phase of data analysis, after the fieldwork concluded. 
This was perhaps worsened by the challenges in finding a point (or points) from 
which I could position my analysis (given that the initiative is (still) constantly 
evolving), and also by the particular complexities of Future Earth’s history, 
development, scope and ambition. The analytical stance detailed above is one 
strategy to deal with these challenges in a constructive manner, and the bounding of 
the study as outlined in Chapter 1 is another. 
 
Secondly, I have already characterised the interviews as a form of co-production 
(indeed the same could be said for the focus groups) and I will now further consider 
my role in (co-producing) Future Earth. All methods involve some form of 
intervention in the world, and from a constructivist perspective none can be 
considered to be completely passive or neutral. However inactive my participation at 
the committee meetings, my presence was visible and had thus had effects. From an 
interpretive, constructivist perspective that is not a problem, but it is worth 
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considering the ways in which my participation and the research may have shaped – 
and indeed constituted – Future Earth (Irwin et al., 2013).  
 
My project was for the most part welcomed by many members of the governing 
committees, who shared a commitment – at least in principle – to ongoing reflection 
on Future Earth and their work. Following one of the focus groups, participants 
expressed gratitude for having had a less structured and formal space to discuss co-
production in more depth, and during the plenary the next day two participants 
referred back to the discussion while suggesting that it would be necessary to think 
more about these concepts and find some shared ground on what they might mean for 
Future Earth. After the close of the meetings on the final day, I approached a group 
of SC and Interim Secretariat members to thank them for their cooperation; they told 
me they had just been discussing how valuable my presence had been in encouraging 
committee members to think reflexively about their own experiences of co-
production. Again, without wishing to overstate this impact, this indicates that at the 
very least, some participants were prompted to consider co-production in new ways. 
It is impossible to say whether this had any enduring effects.  
 
However, this enthusiasm for my participation was accompanied by a range of 
expectations – some serious, others less so – regarding my role and the work that my 
research could do. For example, one participant suggested that my work could feed 
into testing hypotheses of engagement to be formulated in a White Paper. During one 
breakout session, several committee members joked that it would be very useful to 
see the results of my project there and then. During another breakout, part of a 
research agenda setting exercise, how Future Earth does and should do co-design and 
co-production were added to a long list of potential research questions, at which point 
the members of the group again joked with me about the enormity of that task and 
their expectations of my project. 
 
Others were less receptive. For example, during the separate meeting of the IEC, 
which I had been invited to join, one member (who had previously declined to 
participate in a focus group) suggested that I should be asked to leave the room 
during a sensitive discussion; of course, more than within her/his rights according to 
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all ethical standards and the Future Earth policy by which I had agreed to abide. This 
request was raised by addressing the group to query whether everyone was 
comfortable with the presence of an observer, rather than addressing me directly; 
perhaps due to embarrassment, or to not feeling that it was necessary or possible to 
engage with me as an equal. I was invited to re-join the meeting once the sensitive 
portion of the discussion had concluded. 
 
These differing responses and relations formed part of the web of connections and 
ideas constituting the meetings, meaning that in some ways I contributed to the co-
production of Future Earth, and certainly the participants contributed integrally to the 
co-production of (the meanings (re)presented and constituted in) this research.15 
 
 
  
                                                 
15 Moving forward, I have been invited to present a Future Earth webinar on my work, and I will also 
develop an executive summary of the thesis for the Future Earth community. 
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Chapter 4: Future Earth’s background and 
identity 
 
Future Earth emerged from a complex institutional landscape of existing global 
environmental change research programmes, its development driven by ambitions for 
a unified framework for GEC research and an increased impact in policy and 
practice. This chapter presents some background on the emergence of Future Earth 
and an interpretive, thematic analysis of tensions in the initiative’s identity, remit and 
function. The chapter thus aims to contextualise the study and begins to explore the 
questions ‘what is Future Earth?’ (or rather, what visions and interpretations of what 
Future Earth ‘is’ emerge from an analysis of text and talk about – and constitutive of 
– Future Earth) and ‘what are the visions of its identity and remit?’. 
 
Section 4.1 introduces the background to Future Earth’s institutional emergence, and 
section 4.2 briefly explores some of the narratives of actors involved. Section 4.3 
presents analysis framed by two previously mooted institutional models for global 
environmental change programmes in order to explore whether Future Earth is 
intended to be more of a central, unified and cohesive “flagship” or a “rich tapestry” 
of varied initiatives. Section 4.4 outlines the wide and varied range of ambitions for 
Future Earth’s function and remit, noting that both internal and external actors raised 
concerns about lack of clarity in its mandate. Section 4.5 identifies some key tensions 
between particular visions for Future Earth, some of which align with the flagship 
model and others with the rich tapestry model. Section 4.6 discusses the extent to 
which these ambiguities and indeterminacies are an artefact of the early stage in 
Future Earth’s development, and considers an example of (temporary) stabilisation in 
the form of infrastructural architecture. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter, noting the 
significance of integration and co-design/co-production (of both institutions and 
knowledge) as two of the key principles proposed for Future Earth to address the 
perceived deficiencies of the existing programmes (or the GEC research field more 
generally), and considering the extent to which Future Earth might be considered to 
be a flagship or a rich tapestry.  
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4.1 Future Earth background  
 
Future Earth, a major international research initiative on global environmental 
change (GEC) for sustainability, was officially announced by the Science and 
Technology Alliance for Global Sustainability16 in June 2012 during the UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). Its unique ambition is to provide 
a global framework for and international coordination of new research on GEC and 
sustainability. It aims to become ‘a major international research platform providing 
the knowledge and support to accelerate transformations to a sustainable world’ and 
‘a platform for international engagement to ensure that knowledge is generated in 
partnership with society and users of science’, merging several existing international 
GEC research programmes (Future Earth, n.d.-i).  
 
These programmes – all established and co-sponsored by the International Council 
for Science (ICSU) together with other international partners – aimed to plan, 
coordinate and promote international interdisciplinary research and collaboration on 
GEC, set research agendas, and make links between research and policy (Future 
Earth, 2013b: 13). They comprised:  
• the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP); established 1980, still 
operating and contributing to Future Earth as of September 2017 (WCRP, 
n.d.);  
• the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP); established 1987, 
closed December 2015 (IGBP, n.d.-a);  
• the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental 
Change (IHDP); established 1990 as the Human Dimensions Programme 
(HDP), relaunched 1996 as IHDP, closed June 2014 (IHDP, n.d.);  
• DIVERSITAS, an international programme of biodiversity science; 
established 1991, closed December 2014 (DIVERSITAS, 2015);  
                                                 
16 The Alliance (formed in 2010) comprises the International Council for Science (ICSU), the 
International Social Science Council (ISSC), the Belmont Forum of global change research funders, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations University (UNU), and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) (The Science & Technology Alliance for Global Sustainability, 
n.d.). 
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• and their umbrella partnership, the Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP); 
established 2001, closed December 2012 (Leemans et al., 2009; ESSP, n.d.).  
 
The programmes, governed by Scientific Committees and supported by Secretariats 
and Advisory Councils, sponsored a range of their own ‘core’ projects 
(approximately 30 projects in total; e.g. Global Land Project (GLP); Surface Ocean – 
Lower Atmosphere Study (SOLAS); Earth System Governance (ESG), etc.) as well 
as several joint projects (e.g. the Global Carbon Project (GCP), Global 
Environmental Change and Human Health (GECHH), the Global Water System 
Project (GWSP), etc.), most of which were also governed and supported by their own 
Scientific Steering Committees and International Project Offices. Several global 
change committees were also established at national and regional level, whether 
overall global change national committees (e.g. Swedish Secretariat for 
Environmental Earth System Sciences, n.d.), individual national committees for each 
international programme (IGBP, n.d.-b; British Ecological Society, 2011), or regional 
networks of national committees (e.g. European Alliance of Global Change Research 
Committees, n.d.). In 2013, these programmes and projects were estimated to have 
included at least 50,000 researchers (Future Earth, 2013a). 
 
Between 2006 and 2009, the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the other 
co-sponsors of the existing programmes reviewed IHDP, ESSP, IGBP and WCRP, 
concluding that there was a ‘need to implement a single strategic framework for 
Earth system research in the near future’ because the research landscape was 
‘complex, confusing, and often [led] to inefficient use of human, institutional, and 
financial resources’ (ICSU, 2009: 2). ICSU also noted that ‘this concern [was] shared 
by the major agencies funding Earth system research’ (2009: 2). The various 
rationales for this institutional change, merging the existing programmes into one 
initiative, are discussed further below. At the 2008 ICSU General Assembly, the 
decision was made to ‘organize a consultation, including a high-level meeting, with 
relevant partners to outline options for an overall framework for global 
environmental change research and its policy relevance, once the reviews of IGBP 
and WCRP are completed’ (ICSU, 2009: 5).  
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In order to address this, ICSU and its counterpart for the social sciences, the 
International Social Science Council (ISSC), undertook a ‘Visioning Process’ 
between 2009 and 2011 to work towards the institutional and thematic reorganisation 
of the existing programmes into one initiative, initially resulting in the development 
of a document outlining five Grand Challenges of GEC research (ICSU, 2010). This 
agenda-setting and institutional reconfiguration project converged with another: the 
development of the ‘Belmont Challenge’, a funders’ vision ‘to deliver knowledge 
needed for action to avoid and adapt to detrimental environmental change including 
extreme hazardous events’ (Belmont Forum, 2011). The Belmont Forum, a group of 
(mostly national) funders of the existing GEC programmes (and global change 
research in general) posed this challenge to refocus global and regional 
environmental change research towards action.17  
 
In 2010, ICSU, the ISSC, the Belmont Forum, and eventually several of the other co-
sponsors of the existing programmes (UNESCO, UNEP, UNU, WMO), formed the 
Alliance, with a view to taking the new initiative forward. The Alliance established a 
‘Transition Team’ to design the new 10-year initiative to succeed the existing 
programmes; the result of their work was the Future Earth Initial Design report 
(2013), a 98-page document outlining Future Earth’s purpose, research themes, 
governance structure and other aspects of institutional design. The Alliance now 
serves as Future Earth’s Governing Council, together with two additional 
international bodies (the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, and the 
Science and Technology in Society forum) (Future Earth, n.d.-c). 
 
Future Earth was officially announced at the Planet Under Pressure conference 
(March 2012) and launched in June 2012 in the context of the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20).18 Its Science Committee, Interim Secretariat and 
Interim Engagement Committee were appointed in mid- to late 2013, and its full 
Engagement Committee was announced in November 2014. In April 2015 the 
Interim Secretariat handed over to the permanent Secretariat, distributed across five 
                                                 
17 The Belmont Challenge has subsequently been used as a framework for a series of Collaborative 
Research Action funding calls issued by the Belmont Forum and its partners. 
18 This was initially framed as Future Earth’s ‘launch’, but has subsequently been rewritten as Future 
Earth’s ‘announcement’, its launch occurring in 2015 once the permanent Secretariat was in place 
(Future Earth, n.d.-d). 
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‘global hubs’ (in Montreal, Paris, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Colorado). It became fully 
operational at the end of 2015, and its architecture now also comprises several 
regional centres and national committees, projects of the former GEC programmes, 
several Fast Track Initiatives and Cluster Activities funded from 2014, as well as a 
range of further activities and initiatives (see Figure 3 below for a visualisation of 
Future Earth produced in 2016, after the data collection period of this study was 
complete). A schematic of Future Earth’s governance structure as designed by the 
Transition Team can be seen in Figure 2 below.  
 
Key features planned for the fully operational phase of FE included: 
• an emphasis on integrated research across disciplines spanning natural and 
social science, the humanities and engineering; 
• the co-design and co-production of research with stakeholder groups 
including funders, policy-makers, civil society and business; 
• the initiative’s global scope, encompassing all regions and bottom-up input 
from the research community and other stakeholders; 
• the accelerated delivery of solutions-oriented, policy relevant research (Future 
Earth, 2013b; ICSU, n.d.). 
The co-design and co-production of relevant knowledge in particular are billed on the 
Future Earth website as ‘one of the most innovative aspects’ of the initiative (Future 
Earth, n.d.-e) – and in the Design Report as ‘one of the most innovative and 
challenging aspects’ (Future Earth, 2013b: 22; my emphasis). Future Earth thus 
exemplifies calls for transformations in research systems and knowledge-making 
communities towards engagement with non-academic stakeholders. 
 
As per Figure 2 below, Future Earth research was initially envisaged as being 
organised around three overarching themes: Dynamic Planet; Global Development; 
and Transformations towards Sustainability: 
These themes […] respond to the needs to: 1) understand how the Earth 
system is changing, 2) provide knowledge to support human development 
priorities, and 3) implement transformations that move us towards 
sustainability.  
      (Future Earth, 2013b: 28) 
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The themes structured the shape of subsequent outputs, for example, the questions of 
the Strategic Research Agenda published in 2014 are organised under these three 
overarching themes (Future Earth, 2014c), and they are still mentioned on the ‘Our 
Vision’ page of the Future Earth website (Future Earth, n.d.-g). However, the ‘focal 
challenges’ of the 2025 vision (Future Earth, 2014a) have subsequently taken a 
greater role in structuring Future Earth research, forming the basis for Knowledge-
Action Networks established in 2016, after the period of data collection for this study 
had concluded (Future Earth, n.d.-f). The Knowledge-Action Networks comprise 
Water-Energy-Food Nexus, Ocean, Transformations, Natural Assets, Sustainable 
Development Goals, Urban Health, Finance & Economics, and Systems of 
Sustainable Consumption and Production (Future Earth, n.d.-f). 
 
Figure 2: Schematic of the organisational structure of Future Earth19  
 
       (Future Earth, 2013b: 14) 
 
                                                 
19 Rather than feeding into a separate Governing Council, the Alliance – together with two additional 
international bodies (the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, and the Science and 
Technology in Society forum) – now serves as Future Earth’s Governing Council (Future Earth, n.d.-
c). 
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Figure 3: Future Earth in numbers (Future Earth, 2016a) 
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4.2 Narratives of Future Earth’s emergence 
 
Having presented one purified, descriptive version of the emergence of Future Earth, 
I now move on to briefly explore the Future Earth emergence narratives of some of 
those involved. These narratives touch on (by no means comprehensively) some of 
the political and epistemic considerations in Future Earth’s development.  
 
As noted above, the sponsors of the existing GEC programmes felt that the 
institutional landscape was too complex and the programmes were not having enough 
impact in policy and practice. Two participants in this study (not directly affiliated 
with Future Earth, but peripherally involved) suggested that the shift to Future Earth 
was a branding or badging exercise to reduce complexity and increase the attention 
received by the science produced: 
 
It’s partly a branding exercise, I assume. I was not party to any of the 
discussions before the thing popped up but I assume that some of the 
proprietors of some of these enormous Earth system science research 
programmes thought that they weren’t getting enough informed attention 
because they all have terrible acronymic names and I mean they have more 
sophisticated communications operations but y’know […] there’s all this 
science that tells us things and nobody’s paying enough attention. We have 
the IPCC to review, still doesn’t seem to have had much effect. But it’s partly 
that and bringing them together under a heading or at least it will have a name 
that people understand.  
(Interview 1) 
 
A clear institutional identity or brand is seen as important in increasing visibility and 
impact. Another participant discussed this in terms of greater connectivity between 
the programmes and authority in interacting with stakeholders (particularly given the 
sense that the existing programmes had not had sufficient impact): 
 
So at one level I would see Future Earth as an initiative to… provide greater 
connectivity between the four big Earth system science programmes and 
through that stronger connectivity to provide a site, a forum, an institution 
which carries greater authority when speaking with and interacting with - 
let’s call them stakeholders for now.  
(Interview 6) 
 
In the global change arena people have been under pressure to do stakeholder 
involvement or do engagement for at least twenty years but we need to do that 
at a different level now… partly because the global programmes have been 
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seen to be only partially successful, and partly because we think that that is 
actually a better way of doing science. You do more excellent science in this 
field when you do also engage with stakeholders I’m convinced by that too.  
 
(Interview 8) 
 
The notion that engagement leads to better or more excellent (ways of doing) science 
ran across several of the participants’ accounts, as further explored in Chapter 5. 
Some participants’ narratives highlighted that the drive for change to make more of a 
difference was on the part of both the funders and the research community, also 
stressing the need for different scientific approaches: 
 
[…] the Belmont Forum was created in part because I think some of the 
funders who are a member of IGFA [the International Group of Funding 
Agencies for Global Change Research20] did not feel that… they thought that 
IGFA has done great work over the years but there wasn’t now enough joint 
action to make a difference and I think we felt that in the area of 
environmental change and sustainability we really had to work together more.  
And so that was the reason for creating that and creating part of the drive 
through the Belmont White Paper for something like Future Earth. I think on 
the ICSU side, through sets of programme reviews and then the visioning 
exercise, there was a recognition that if we were going to make the steps 
forward, we needed some different scientific approaches and the attempts 
with ESSP had not… had made progress but not sufficient and so we were 
going to have to be more deliberate to create the conditions for integrated co-
designed programme.  
(Interview 3) 
 
Some expressed this need for change in terms of shifting from a warning function to 
a solutions function, resulting in a need for interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity 
given the complexity of the questions and the intended solutions-orientation: 
 
[…] we both feel as research funders [Belmont Forum] or as research 
communities [ICSU and ISSC] that we have to change the international 
programmes to… to respond to the bigger… much more complex question on 
the environment so basically global change programmes in ’80s, ’90s, have 
mainly a warning or an alert of function. So basically we look at the activities 
of human affect the climate, affects ozone, affect different part of the 
environment, biodiversities and so on. But now this warning from the 
scientists to societies have been well received and now the question of society 
to science is not just sending alert or warning, it is help us to make some 
solution, to be more resilient to be more sustainable, to remedy problems.  
But this kind of question is much more complex […] how environmental 
                                                 
20 From which the Belmont Forum emerged and which it has now replaced. 
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science could help better solution in the real life [and] that pushes the need for 
environmental science to have better dialogue with development issues, so 
meaning also the behaviour of people, the economics, the technology issues, 
so that [calls for] for interdisciplinar[ity] and transdisciplinar[ity] […].  
 
(Interview 4) 
 
However, these changes were seen by some to also be motivated by a sense on the 
part of the funders that existing efforts were too fragmented, requesting funding often 
and independently: 
 
[…] what was really important for me about the Belmont Forum is that it was 
the funders saying we’re tired of fragmented effort and having four 
international global change programmes plus the ESSP so in effect five major 
international initiatives that were all knocking on the same doors for support, 
at a time when the donors were recognising that you know effective responses 
from the science community to the challenges we face required joint efforts, 
and that they were you know all running around dealing with requests, small 
requests for essentially disciplinary based efforts but that put a huge pressure 
on the kind of architectural re-design and at some point it just became clear 
that the Belmont Forum was in effect saying we need a single conceptual 
approach, we need a single architectural landscape design, institutional 
arrangements and that the Visioning Process really reaffirmed that.   
 
This unified approach was perceived as a way of overcoming fragmentation and 
leading to solutions, as the participant continued to explain: 
 
The Visioning Process of course started out not so much with a focus on the 
institutional design but more on what are the priorities, you know?  What is 
the agenda in the coming ten years?  Where are the key issues that we should 
be focusing on?  But essentially those two processes dovetailed and I think 
the harsh realities of funders saying we’re tired of this fragmented world, 
where we see no action, we see good science but we don’t see many solutions 
coming from that.  But that drove the thinking around setting up a single 
platform or programme.  
(Interview 5) 
 
These narratives reveal a focus on connectivity or integration to better address 
environmental problems and themes because they are complex, and connectivity or 
integration to better link the existing programmes and efforts because they were 
fragmented. The desire for greater impact, making a difference and developing 
solutions is also apparent. These considerations of course fed into and shaped the 
development of Future Earth: what it would be, the form it would take, its identity, 
function and remit. The following section explores the multiple visions of Future 
Earth’s identity and form. 
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4.3 Future Earth’s identity and form: flagship or rich tapestry? 
 
Despite the alignment of the institutional efforts and interests outlined above, the 
emergence of the new initiative – Future Earth – has not been straightforward. 
During the period of study, visions of Future Earth’s identity and purpose (what it 
was supposed to be and what roles and functions it was supposed to have) were 
diverse, ambitious and, sometimes, ambiguous. In official and internal documents 
during its development (since 2009) and since its initial launch in 2012, as well as in 
the interviews, focus groups and observation conducted in 2014 for this thesis, Future 
Earth was conceptualised in a range of ways, sometimes evoking two potential 
institutional models envisaged in the 1990s for one of the existing global 
environmental change programmes: the flagship and the rich tapestry.  
 
Jasanoff & Wynne (1998: 58–9) note that two potential avenues for development 
were mooted for one of Future Earth’s precursors, the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme (IGBP), in the mid-1990s. In a commentary for the IGBP’s 
‘Global Change Newsletter’, Barron (1994) outlines, firstly, the ‘rich tapestry’ 
model, in which diverse (sometimes pre-existing) national and individual 
contributions or initiatives would be grouped under the broad umbrella of the IGBP. 
Here, argues Barron, IGBP’s role would be to facilitate communication and 
collaboration but its identity, visibility and ability to attract funding may be 
weakened. Barron’s second proposed model was that of the ‘flagship’, where effort 
would be focused on ‘task-oriented activity’ (such as major field experiments or 
modelling activities) with closer integration, greater harmonisation and stricter 
dirigisme, reinforcing IGBP’s status as an autonomous international programme at 
the cost of its inclusivity and diversity.  
 
Future Earth faces similar dilemmas in relation to its structure, identity and role. 
Might it become – or is it best viewed as – an inclusive tapestry or network of diverse 
but not necessarily cohesive efforts? Or is it better viewed as a monolithic structure 
composed of many individuals governed by one centralised agency aiming to 
coordinate, prescribe, direct, harmonise and standardise knowledge production, 
potentially to the detriment or exclusion of some voices? Or is it both – or neither?  
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Flagship 
 
On the one hand, some visions of Future Earth evoke the ‘flagship’ model. For 
example: ‘governed under one unified framework […] aiming at strategically 
integrating the GEC Programmes and ESSP and other needed capabilities/skills into 
a consolidated and comprehensive effort, a flagship initiative on Earth System 
Research for Global Sustainability’ (ICSU, 2011); ‘the global research platform 
providing the knowledge and support to accelerate our transformations to a 
sustainable world’ (Future Earth, n.d.-i)21.  
 
The early documents (through to the second Transition Team meeting summary, 16 
January 2012) frequently refer to the Visioning Process as determining options for 
and concluding that there is a need for a ‘holistic strategy on Earth system research’, 
‘a holistic strategy for global sustainability research’ or ‘an overall framework for 
Earth system research’ (ICSU, 2010: n.p., 19). This is often accompanied by and 
linked to visions of a single organisational structure or entity:  
 
[The Grand Challenges document] also emphasized the need for a single, new 
overarching structure, which would bring together researchers, funders, 
service providers and users, and allow for more integration of existing Global 
Environmental Change (GEC) programmes, the Earth System Science 
Partnership (ESSP) and other activities.  
(Doc 8)22 
 
This integration under a single overarching structure or framework is not only 
imagined in terms of institutions but also themes: the second Transition Team 
meeting summary states that ‘structurally, Future Earth will represent one 
overarching framework, with a set of integrated grand themes’ (Doc 14). While an 
overarching framework could be seen as a means to inclusion, the singular nature of 
such a proposition is linked to notions of integration, and (less explicitly) 
harmonisation, and could imply stricter dirigisme.  
 
The concept of integration is key, seemingly ranging from a type of research akin to 
interdisciplinarity (i.e. thematic, knowledge integration), through to the institutional 
                                                 
21 This has since been changed on the website to ‘a major international research platform’ – perhaps 
as an acknowledgement that there may be other such platforms. 
22 Documents labelled ‘Doc [#]’ can be found in the document list in Appendix 1. 
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merging of the existing GEC programmes around a joint framework, strategy or 
structure as above. This institutional integration and streamlining of the programmes 
is bolstered by the partnership of their co-sponsors in the Alliance and the similarities 
in diagnosis and prescription in the Grand Challenges report and the Belmont 
Forum’s White Paper.  
 
Rich tapestry 
 
On the other hand, some designations are more suggestive of a ‘rich tapestry’, in 
which diverse (sometimes pre-existing) contributions or initiatives would be grouped 
under the broad ‘umbrella’ of Future Earth (to use yet another pervasive metaphor). 
For example, some of the frequently (and often interchangeably used) metaphors 
include: an umbrella (e.g. I7); tent (e.g. I8); hub (Future Earth, n.d.-a); federation (‘at 
its core a “federation” of projects and other initiatives related to Global 
Environmental Change’ (Future Earth, n.d.-h)); network  (‘an innovative 10-year 
Initiative on Earth System Research for Global Sustainability, structured as a cutting-
edge global research network, and which is highly integrative, flexible and 
responsive’ (doc 8)); and arena (‘I think we’re an arena so, the point about an arena is 
that there’s debate and dialogue and argument and dispute’ (I8)). Other definitions 
still might fall into either, both or neither category of the flagship or the rich tapestry: 
e.g. ‘first and foremost a community’ (Future Earth, n.d.-a); part of a global 
innovation system (I9); amongst others. 
 
These different visions reflect the diversity of views on and interpretations of what 
Future Earth “is”. While the flagship implies cohesion, a unitary entity, perhaps of a 
leading, pioneering, high profile or exemplar nature, the tapestry implies bringing 
together diverse, not necessarily coherent, efforts and perhaps a greater degree of 
freedom in terms of their framing, approaches, methodologies, etc. Already one of 
the key tensions in the development of Future Earth is apparent: between singularity 
and multiplicity, the extent to which it is a cohesive and integrated effort as opposed 
to a collection of varied endeavours.  
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Combining the models? 
 
Perhaps it is possible for the eventual initiative to achieve both facets expressed in 
these various designations; indeed, one participant’s vision seemingly blended the 
two models, suggesting that Future Earth’s role would be to integrate diverse 
specialist knowledge into a singular rich tapestry that would make sense of the 
current state of global environmental change and sustainability: 
 
[…] one of the things we need to do is understand how we will actually 
monitor progress globally on sustainable development – how the current 
different strands of science will be brought together […] there’s so many 
scientific programmes going on out there which cover off so many fields but 
[…] people [are] getting more and more specific and being specialists on 
discrete topics but there doesn’t seem to be a place that it all comes back 
together to give you this sort of rich tapestry of what is the state of the planet 
and sustainable development and I think that’s something Future Earth could 
do very well: picking up these different programmes, these different strands 
of scientific research and finding a way to weave them back together. It’s a 
bunch of loose threads at the moment and if we could do that […] it would 
give us such a deeper, richer understanding of what’s really going on in the 
world and therefore what needs to be done to a) rectify the problems or b) to 
really identify what are good practices or best practices.  
         (Interview 10) 
 
This extract presents a particular view of the type of knowledge that is considered (at 
least by some in Future Earth) to be necessary in order to address the problems of 
sustainable development and/or global environmental change: a comprehensive, 
integrated overview of the current state of the planet. Indeed, this type of discourse 
runs throughout the documents, where Future Earth is primarily positioned as an 
integrative effort to provide richer and deeper knowledge on the state of the planet in 
order to solve problems and identify best practices.  
 
However, it could be argued that the assumption that it is even possible to achieve 
integrated knowledge of this sort is problematic in itself (Klenk & Meehan, 2015), 
and, beyond this, the belief that more, better, or a particular type of knowledge is 
needed in order to identify ‘what needs to be done’ to solve problems and discover 
best practices is also potentially flawed. The leap from ‘understanding’ to ‘what 
needs to be done’ is not necessarily straightforward. For example transdisciplinary 
research does not necessarily lead directly to societal problem solving (Polk, 2014), 
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more scientific knowledge does not necessarily reduce uncertainty or automatically 
resolve value conflicts (S. Beck, 2011), and further quantifying the extent of 
(agreement on) global environmental change does not provide policy options to 
respond (Pearce et al., 2017). The tension between singularity and multiplicity has 
been discussed elsewhere in relation to making and governing global knowledge 
(Hulme, 2010) and notions of the new social contract for science (Castree, 2016) and 
the anthropocene (Lövbrand et al., 2015) in the context of Future Earth. This work 
suggests that ambitions for a global ‘overview’ assume the possibility of a view from 
nowhere, erasing the differentiated and context-specific manifestations of and 
possible responses to issues of environmental change and sustainability. 
 
Despite the potentially problematic nature of these aspirations, the range of terms 
used to describe Future Earth signifies the range of hopes and visions circulating 
during its early days and development. This diversity – or uncertainty – around and 
over exactly what Future Earth is potentially leaves plenty of space for 
(experimenting with) alternative pathways of development. 
  
Having discussed Future Earth’s identity (i.e. what it is or might be), the following 
section moves on to explore (visions of and aspirations for) its function and remit. 
 
4.4 Future Earth’s function and remit: ambition and lack of clarity 
 
Future Earth’s different definitions and designations are accompanied and informed 
by a diverse range of imagined roles and functions for the initiative, often 
characterised in terms of transforming or bringing about change in existing research 
systems, institutions, communities, practices and cultures. As we have already started 
to see in section 4.1, these roles and functions include (but are not limited to):  
• integrating the existing GEC programmes; creating interdisciplinary, 
integrated, authoritative knowledge on the key challenges of GEC and 
sustainability; 
• informing policy, decision-making and action in the UN system (such as the 
Sustainable Development Goals, the IPCC and the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change), and at other levels;  
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• mobilising, raising, redirecting and coordinating research funds, activity and 
capacity;  
• bringing about a change in the culture or practice of scientific research, and 
how useful and relevant its results are (leading to greater use of research in 
decision making etc.);  
• involving existing and new communities of researchers, particularly from the 
social sciences, and engaging stakeholders;  
• bringing together GEC and sustainability research communities and 
refocusing GEC/Earth system science research on sustainability challenges23;  
amongst others, at a range of scales often spanning international, regional, national, 
and/or local levels. 
 
This wide-ranging diversity in defining what Future Earth is and what its remit 
entails is acknowledged in passing in two early Q&A posts on the Future Earth blog. 
In posing questions to the Chair of the Future Earth Science Committee and to the 
Interim Director of Future Earth, ICSU communications staff noted respectively that 
‘Future Earth seems to mean different things to different people’ (Mengel, 2013) and 
‘Future Earth may seem like all things to all people’ (Young, 2013). These 
statements reflect the roots of Future Earth’s plural definitions and purposes: on the 
one hand, many people have been involved (and have a stake) in its development, 
giving rise to a wide range of visions and interpretations; and on the other, the 
ambitions for its remit and scope are extremely broad even within single narratives of 
the initiative, incorporating a wide range of actors, knowledges, practices, 
phenomena, objects, and scales. 
 
Although diverse understandings of what Future Earth is and might do emerged from 
the interviews, there were varying degrees of awareness of and concern about these 
                                                 
23 Since the data collection concluded, this ambition has been expressed on the ‘Our vision’ section of 
the Future Earth website as ‘the evolution of a new type of science – Global Sustainability Science – 
that links disciplines, knowledge systems and societal partners to support a more agile global 
innovation system’ (Future Earth, n.d.-g). An interesting avenue for future research would be to 
explore the constitutive power (or otherwise) of Future Earth and its networks in bringing into being 
the new field of ‘Global Sustainability Science’ (beyond the more established fields of Earth system 
science and sustainability science) – in conjunction with other efforts, for example, the recently 
established journal Global Sustainability, edited by the co-chair of the Future Earth Transition Team, 
Johan Rockström (Global Sustainability, n.d.). 
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differences, with some participants retaining a strong sense of Future Earth’s purpose 
(from their perspective), and others viewing a lack of clarity around its identity, 
objectives and activities as potentially problematic. Unsurprisingly, those that had 
been involved with the initiative for longer, or those in leadership positions, 
expressed a higher degree of certainty around what Future Earth should or could be 
(though some also highlighted the broad potential scope beyond their own specific 
visions, and the possibility of disagreement with their views). For example, one 
participant outlined the two objectives of Future Earth as she/he saw them: 
 
Well, there are two great objectives of Future Earth and why Future Earth is 
the shape it is. One is to do with greater integration within science, and that’s 
to do with de-silo-ing you know the scientific domains that have been looking 
at climate change and biodiversity and so on and getting them to collaborate 
more strongly because these are global and connected problems and because 
they need to do that and make advances in science.  
 
The rationale that integrated knowledge is required because the problems are 
interconnected and global is one that runs throughout the documents and interviews. 
The participant moved on to outline the second key role of Future Earth in their view: 
 
But the second is to really re-think the way that we do science that is useful. 
The reason that we’re interested in climate change or food security or 
biodiversity loss is partly because they’re interesting problems but mainly 
because we have a role to play as science in addressing – understanding and 
addressing these problems. And we understand that the kinds of questions we 
should be asking and the kinds of knowledge claims we make or tools we 
develop have to be addressed in the end to societal… partners and in order to 
do that kind of science we need to work closely with them in the co-creation 
of research agendas, sometimes in the doing of science itself, and certainly in 
trying to make effective the role of science and scientific knowledge and 
claims and data and so on in choices and understandings and framings and 
decisions that are made by people in society; so I think it’s really 
transforming the way we do science itself.   
(Interview 8) 
 
This clarity of vision regarding Future Earth’s role in integrating science in order to 
address global and interconnected problems, and co-designing and collaborating with 
societal partners in order to transform the way science is done towards making it 
more useful (i.e., in this case, effective in choices, framings, decisions) is present 
throughout the documents, and was echoed by some other Future Earth actors (as 
discussed further in Chapter 5).  
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However, despite instances of certainty such as this, others were more concerned 
about the ambiguities around what Future Earth is and would do. In mid-May 2014, 
one Interim Engagement Committee member argued for more specificity about 
Future Earth’s intended achievements, stating that ‘Future Earth needs to really, 
really improve the definition of who and what it is and what its exact purpose is; I 
still think it’s a bit too vague. It’s this 10-year online platform to bring together 
different strands of science, to do science policy, that’s quite vague’ (I10). 
 
Lack of clarity or focus in Future Earth’s mandate was also flagged as problematic by 
external stakeholders. In late May 2014 Ian Thornton, Deputy Director of the UK 
Collaborative on Development Sciences, blogged about Future Earth, having 
attended an ICSU workshop. He suggested that despite considerable awareness of 
Future Earth among UK stakeholders, there is confusion about ‘what Future Earth 
will do, its value-add, and whether UK funders should engage more closely’ 
(Thornton, 2014). He attributed this confusion to the challenges inherent in 
articulating what coordination of research can achieve, particularly in the context of 
an evolving organisational mandate, arguing that Future Earth should pare back its 
goals and clarify what the Secretariat will do: ‘Is it mainly coordination? Or, 
evidence synthesis and policy influence? Or being a hub for debate?’ (Thornton, 
2014). Indeed, during the period of study, Future Earth documents and actors 
suggested that the initiative (if not specifically the Secretariat24) is intended to take 
all three roles identified by Thornton, and more.  
 
Although the functions of the Secretariat were narrowed down and specified by the 
incoming permanent Secretariat in 2015 and 2016, these doubts still circulated 
around the initiative in 2016, as can be seen in this Nature Editorial: 
 
But governments and grant-giving agencies have not yet firmly committed to 
funding Future Earth as a whole. The reluctance comes from uncertainty over 
what the scheme might be able to deliver. The closure of successful 
programmes in favour of something fashionable but conceptually unproven 
has earned Future Earth sceptical glances. But then, it was launched in 
                                                 
24 See footnote 44 (p. 212) for further discussion of elision of or ambiguity between Future Earth 
taken to mean the Secretariat (and/or organisational structure including governing committees) and 
Future Earth taken to mean the broader institution or network. 
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response to complaints that previous programmes were not sufficiently linked 
and that the knowledge they produced was scarcely picked up in practice.  
 
(Nature, 2016; my emphasis) 
 
To the credit of those involved in Future Earth, these challenges were already 
acknowledged in the ‘Design Report’ produced by the Transition Team (appointed to 
propose an initial institutional and strategic design for Future Earth): ‘stakeholders 
outside an “inner circle” of the GEC community have no concept of how they might 
engage with or be engaged by Future Earth, or use or contribute to Future Earth’s 
research.’ (2013b: 55). During the study, the Science Committee, Interim 
Engagement Committee and Interim Secretariat were working both to raise the 
visibility and status of the initiative and to resolve some of these questions, for 
example in two formative documents: Future Earth’s 2025 Vision (Future Earth, 
2014a), and its Strategic Research Agenda (Future Earth, 2014c) (among other policy 
documents). 
 
It should be noted that during the study, Future Earth was very much an organisation 
in-the-making; many aspects of its design and implementation were still ambiguous 
and to be determined. Data collection for this study was concluded before the 
transition from the interim to the permanent Secretariat in 2015; Future Earth has 
since evolved. While some aspects of the initiative may have found or still find some 
sort of stability following this institutional development, Future Earth will continue 
to evolve for its duration (as would any organisation, particularly if seen as an 
unbounded and fluid assemblage, rather than a bounded, rational entity (Pallett & 
Chilvers, 2015)). 
 
4.5 Tensions in Future Earth’s identity, function and remit 
 
Overall, the analysis of the data collected and generated for this study suggests (at 
least) six linked points of tension or dilemma between different visions and ambitions 
for Future Earth, at times echoing the flagship and rich tapestry models. These 
comprise whether Future Earth should: be a hub or arena for debate as opposed to a 
platform to deliver solutions-oriented knowledge; focus on consensus and integration 
as opposed to plurality and multiplicity; promote new ways of doing science as 
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opposed to maintaining authority of existing ways; be inclusive as opposed to setting 
standards and limits; be directive as opposed to responsive; focus on demand-driven 
science as opposed to curiosity-driven science. These tensions and their relationship 
to the flagship and rich tapestry models are summarised in Table 1 below. 
 
Firstly, related to Thornton’s point above, there is a potential conflict between visions 
of Future Earth as a hub or arena for debate, dialogue and deliberation, and that of 
Future Earth as a platform to deliver solutions-oriented, policy-relevant knowledge 
and innovation outputs. The ability to achieve both within the same institutional and 
conceptual framework has been questioned by scholars outside the initiative 
(Lövbrand et al., 2015). However, many within the initiative would argue that these 
are not mutually exclusive ambitions. 
 
This is closely linked to the second and third tensions. The second is between 
consensus and plurality, or between the desire to integrate knowledge (and also to 
create an integrated, authoritative, singular organisation, programme, or brand) and 
the inevitable multiplicity of a multi-scalar, multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholder 
international initiative and its forms of knowledge (Klenk & Meehan, 2015). The 
third tension is between the ambition to bring about new ways of doing science while 
also promoting and ensuring continued authority for existing ways.  
 
Here we might loosely align debate and plurality with the rich tapestry model, and 
solutions and singularity with flagship; the rich tapestry by definition draws together 
plural approaches, and therefore perhaps also enables space for debate, while the 
flagship values cohesion, integration and task-oriented, targeted action.  
 
However, the new versus existing ways do not align as neatly with the models. 
Perhaps a rich tapestry is more amenable to innovation or novelty, given that there is 
potentially greater space for diversity and therefore space for new or risk-taking 
approaches; while the (authority of the) status quo may be more easily maintained 
and elevated by a flagship, given the potential for a stronger identity, visibility and 
ability to attract funding (although funding is also needed to provide the space to 
pursue alternative approaches, of course). The tension between pinning things down 
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and leaving things open is a key governance challenge for any research initiative, as 
discussed further in the thesis conclusion. 
 
One participant discussed Future Earth’s role as a forum for debate, highlighting 
tensions between new and old: 
 
To me, what’s exciting about Future Earth is that it is pioneering a new 
approach to thinking about and doing science, which is integrated, 
interdisciplinary, co-produced, and it also should be a forum for encouraging 
debate and encouraging this approach but in a critically reflective way […]. 
But I do think it faces real tensions because at the same time it’s trying to 
give more prominence to some fairly standard ways of doing science […]. 
The participant then identified a challenge: 
But the threat is that integrating everything becomes a kind of lowest 
common denominator and you lose, as it were, the cutting edge nature of 
that science – and I think both can happen there but I think we need to work 
very actively with those tensions and be aware of them and push on both 
fronts.  
(Interview 7) 
 
Integrated, co-produced research is seen as a new approach, potentially at risk of 
losing the excellence (cutting edge) that has been seen to characterise existing modes 
of doing science, and, by implication, also at risk of diminishing the prominence or 
authority of that science. Two participants suggested that a greater diversity of 
research might have to come at the cost of narrowing climate models down by 
another decimal place. The tension between singularity and multiplicity is perhaps 
heightened by the authority-building and fundraising aspirations for the initiative, 
particularly for those imagining its place in the UN system. One participant (I8) 
suggested that Future Earth is ‘not trying to be totalising’, but that the ambition is to 
be ‘the main place’ and ‘the natural platform’ with which the UN, the European 
Commission and other international organisations wish to partner. A cohesive and 
singular brand might be necessary to achieve that type of visibility and authority. 
 
Relating to authority-building, there is a fourth tension between Future Earth’s 
ambition to be inclusive (of both existing and new research and stakeholder 
communities), versus upholding standards and setting limits on what counts as Future 
Earth knowledge or approaches. On the one hand, participants spoke about working 
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towards making Future Earth ‘a growing tangible concern that people understand and 
that they want to be part of’ (I8), and opening up Future Earth not only to the core 
projects of the existing GEC programmes but also to other science communities, 
including ‘the mass of environmental social science across the world that by 
definition until now has been excluded from this dominant global environmental 
change community’ (I7). However, they also spoke about the need to ‘regulate the 
arena’ (e.g. through peer review, critique and allowing the most robust claims to 
survive), whether because scholars and/or stakeholders are not ‘fully aligned’ with 
Future Earth, or ‘committed enough to the codes’, or might ‘clutter up the arena with 
false claims or with unfounded claims’ (further explored in Chapter 6). 
 
Processes for affiliation with Future Earth and ways of including other communities 
were being discussed and designed by the committees during the period these 
interviews were conducted, with varying ideas about the appropriate level of 
bureaucracy, who should be included and how:  
 
what’s proving slower than I would like and quite challenging is to work out 
how to kind of create an endorsement process whereby– but it’s happening I 
mean we had an initial discussion in South Africa and there is now a sort of 
form on the way, which enables activities, whether it’s conferences or 
summer schools or fairly large research projects or centres to affiliate to 
Future Earth, to come under the umbrella, which will then create openings for 
interaction with the core projects, for recognition, for participation, for access 
to funding and so on.  
(Interview 7)  
 
This vision seems to echo a rich tapestry model, in which diverse activities can fall 
under the banner of Future Earth, whose role is not only to facilitate interaction, but 
notably also to bolster recognition and provide (or facilitate access to) funding. These 
latter elements challenge the flagship-tapestry dichotomy, suggesting that it may be 
possible to achieve a high profile and attract funding while still welcoming a range of 
diverse initiatives into the fold. 
 
Linked to this ambiguity around openness to participation or affiliation, there is a 
fifth tension between the directive action of establishing an initiative from the top 
(global and centralised) level down and the ambition to be responsive to the needs of 
society and to include bottom up input from the scientific community. One 
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participant (I3) argued that Future Earth is ‘a directive programme’ and is not 
intended to do ‘purely responsive science’, that it needs to set ‘broad strategic 
directions through the [strategic research agenda] process’, but that there should be 
‘wide engagement’ in putting those agendas together and the research community 
should be given ‘wide freedoms’ to design research to meet them, without it being ‘a 
completely blue skies programme’. 
 
However, elsewhere responsiveness seems to be fairly integral to visions of Future 
Earth. The Transition Team’s Design Report suggests that Future Earth itself is ‘the 
response to calls for international, integrated collaborative and solutions-oriented 
research to respond to the urgent challenges of global environmental change and 
sustainable development’ (Future Earth 2013b; my emphasis), identifying the sources 
of such calls as the Rio+20 “The Future We Want” declaration (UN, 2012), the 
ICSU/ISSC Visioning Process and Belmont Forum White Paper, the Planet Under 
Pressure conference declaration, and the report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-
Level Panel of Global Sustainability (2012). This is key to framing Future Earth as 
justified and needed: performing Future Earth’s legitimacy.  
 
Future Earth is also imagined to play a key role in providing research that is 
‘responsive’ to the needs of partners, stakeholders or society:  
 
In the next phase Future Earth will develop a model of communications and 
engagement that is: suitable to its character, a complex, global 
interdisciplinary programme; and, that allows it to be not only truly 
responsive to the needs of its partners and stakeholders, but also to bring them 
into the processes of the programme itself.  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 55) 
 
Here, responsiveness is decoupled from the involvement of stakeholders in the 
programme, although elsewhere responsiveness is considered to be increased through 
stakeholder engagement. For example, Future Earth will: 
 
pay particular attention to engaging the users of research early in the 
development of research programmes, for example by including stakeholders 
in advisory committees, and also seek to ramp up the research community’s 
understanding and practices of working with business, governments, non 
profit organizations and communities to identify research priorities and seek 
solutions to global environmental challenges. This responsiveness is 
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increasingly demanded of and by the funders of research including taxpayers, 
foundations, and the private sector.  
(Doc 15)  
 
As acknowledged here, responsive research has gained currency in research policy 
and funding frameworks, including at the national level, but it is not a 
straightforward concept (Raman, 2014). For example, whose needs (and whose good) 
are served by responsive research, how are these defined, and is Future Earth able to 
set up appropriate mechanisms to enable this? 
 
The dilemmas between strategy/directiveness versus responsiveness and between 
blue-sky research versus useful research, link to a sixth tension, which itself links 
back to new versus existing ways of doing science. This is the tension between a 
utilitarian focus on demand-driven science and the more traditional, curiosity-driven 
model:  
 
In [building on the heritage of global environmental change research and 
focusing on finding and closing knowledge gaps], scientists involved in 
Future Earth can provide an invaluable service to society. And researchers in 
niche disciplines — palaeoclimatology or behavioural science, say — who 
work to fill those gaps will get a welcome chance to put their work into a 
broader context. Future Earth might also become a showcase for linking 
natural and social sciences — a real necessity given that human activity is 
altering the planet at worrying speed. But sustainability research must not 
become tied in the straitjacket of conceptualism and utilitarianism. Scientists 
are not merely service providers. As in any other field of science, 
sustainability research must remain at its core a curiosity-driven affair.  
 
(Nature, 2016: 8) 
 
With a view to the institutional models, again, we might loosely align inclusivity and 
responsiveness with the rich tapestry model, and setting standards and strategy or 
direction with that of the flagship. But, similar to the tension between new versus 
existing modes of science, utility versus demand and curiosity versus supply do not 
map neatly onto the models. 
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Table 1: Potential institutional models and roles for Future Earth 
Flagship: effort focused on ‘task-oriented 
activity’ (e.g. major modelling activities) 
with closer integration, greater 
harmonisation, stricter dirigisme. 
Programme’s status reinforced, maybe at 
the cost of its inclusivity and diversity. 
(Barron, 1994) 
Rich tapestry: diverse contributions 
grouped under the umbrella of the 
programme. Programme facilitates 
communication and collaboration. Its 
identity, visibility and ability to attract 
funding may be weakened. 
(Barron, 1994) 
Platform to deliver solutions-oriented 
knowledge  
Hub or arena for debate 
Consensus and integration Plurality and multiplicity 
Setting standards and limits (exclusivity) Inclusivity 
Directive Responsive 
Giving prominence to existing ways of 
doing science? (Authority) 
Promoting new ways of doing science? 
(Experimentation) 
Demand-driven science? Curiosity-driven science? 
 
Table 1 tentatively maps the ambiguities and dilemmas discussed above onto the two 
institutional models envisaged for research programmes. However, while thinking in 
terms of ambiguities or dilemmas might suggest mutual exclusivity, these tensions 
are not necessarily dichotomous, and should be treated with caution, particularly as 
STS (and broader social and critical theory) has alerted us to the reductionism of 
binaries.25 For example, a directive overall strategy may enable responsiveness in 
other areas of the initiative, and authority might be required to create space for 
experimentation (e.g. in raising funds, establishing legitimacy and buy in). Similarly, 
while delivering solutions-oriented knowledge seems to align with a demand-driven 
model, if the flagship is more able to achieve authority through its cohesion, perhaps 
curiosity-driven science (often seen as the more ‘traditional’ model) can more easily 
be carried out in that model. However, it could also be argued that an institutional 
form aiming for harmonisation and unification might stifle curiosity. 
 
4.6 Institutional stabilisation 
 
As noted above, these dilemmas are not necessarily dichotomous, and some of the 
subtleties of these tensions might be lost in treating them as such. However, they are 
                                                 
25 Including in relation to distinctions between pure and applied, curiosity- and demand-driven 
research (Hackett et al., 2017). 
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issues that those involved in Future Earth were negotiating and navigating at the time 
of this study (as confirmed by one participant in her/his feedback by email on an 
earlier draft of this chapter26), and will likely continue to face as the initiative further 
develops. While this type of ambiguity can perhaps be expected in the early stages of 
a new initiative as its identity and remit are still in flux, it could be argued that some 
stabilisation may occur through the establishment of social order through the 
initiative’s practices, structures and identities as they become more familiar and 
routine (prioritising some institutional identities and functions over others). The 
multiple roles and functions imagined for Future Earth inform design decisions made 
about its governance, operations, and activities, and thus in some ways solidify into 
particular social and technical orders. 
 
For example, certain aspects may find some sort of stability in Future Earth’s 
organisational structure or its infrastructural architecture. In March 2016 the headline 
of the ‘Get Involved’ page on the Future Earth website was changed from ‘Future 
Earth is first and foremost a community’ to ‘Future Earth is first and foremost an 
open network committed to global sustainability’. 27 The latter wording intentionally 
stresses the openness – and therefore inclusivity – of Future Earth; perhaps seen to be 
important given potential tensions around who is or is not included in the Future 
Earth community (as highlighted by the quote above about the exclusion of social 
science from the GEC community, for example, or the Design Report’s 
acknowledgement that few outside an “inner circle” knew how to get involved). It 
could be argued that a network is primarily defined by its connections (an 
interconnected group of individual actors linked by associations) (OED, n.d.-e), 
whereas a community is primarily defined by its shared attributes, qualities or 
interests, perhaps more easily seen as a closed, unitary or cohesive body or group 
(OED, n.d.-b). This change to the website text was implemented in conjunction with 
the launch of the Future Earth ‘Open Network’, an online networking tool to which 
anyone can sign up: (potentially) a concrete mechanism of openness and bottom up 
input, facilitating and shaping (new) social and epistemic orders. (Of course, the 
                                                 
26 Published as Hadley Kershaw (2018). 
27 It should be noted that these developments were at least partly driven by personnel changes 
between the interim and permanent Secretariat in 2015 and the associated shifts in perspectives and 
approaches.  
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extent to which such mechanisms will be used or will enable collaboration on equal 
footing remains to be seen.) This infrastructural architecture and its associated social 
orders could be seen to be more in line with a ‘rich tapestry’ of multiple diverse 
connections, rather than a unitary, cohesive ‘flagship’.  
 
Despite these points of (temporary) stabilisation, as Future Earth further develops and 
is rolled out and taken up at regional and national levels (whether through its regional 
hubs or centres and national committees, and/or by other initiatives affiliating, or in 
multiple other possible ways), the same and further ambiguities are bound to emerge. 
As the Future Earth network extends and becomes more complex, the Future Earth 
model is also extended, adapted and interpreted in a diverse range of contexts. This 
could already be seen during the June 2014 committee meetings in Beijing, as 
discussed in Chapter 7. Beyond the ambiguity and polysemy of Future Earth in itself 
and its remit, ambiguity also emerged around co-production and transdisciplinarity 
within it. 
 
While the range of visions of and aspirations for Future Earth was broad, integration 
and co-design/co-production of both institutions and knowledge emerged as two of 
the key strands in visions for Future Earth, in order to address the perceived 
deficiencies of the existing programmes. Institutional integration was seen as a means 
to reduce the complexity of the landscape and create a clearer, more authoritative 
identity or brand. Disciplinary integration was seen as a way to produce knowledge 
that addresses the complex problems of GEC and sustainability. As further discussed 
in Chapter 5, ambitions for institutional and knowledge co-design and co-production 
were driven by a range of rationales, which included strengthening the legitimacy, 
authority, relevance and impact of the initiative and the knowledge it produces. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented a (limited and necessarily partial) overview of Future 
Earth’s background and emergence (what it is and wants to be), the setting in which 
its ambitions (including those of co-design and co-production) developed, as well as 
its institutional identity and remit. Future Earth emerged from an existing 
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institutional landscape that was considered to be too complex, inefficient and 
ineffective in impacting on policy and practice. Integration and co-design (of both 
institutions and knowledge) were proposed as key principles of Future Earth to 
address some of these issues. However, aspirations for Future Earth’s identity, remit 
and scope were very ambitious and multifarious, leading to ambiguity and potentially 
giving rise to tensions that at times echo a flagship institutional model (for example, 
Future Earth as a platform to deliver solutions-oriented knowledge, with a focus on 
consensus and integration, setting standards and limits on participation, taking a 
directive approach), and other times echo a tapestry model (for example, Future Earth 
as a hub or arena for debate, focusing on plurality and multiplicity, being inclusive 
and responsive).  
 
Tensions and ambiguities are perhaps inevitable in the early stages of a new initiative 
or new institutional arrangement, and we might expect that some points of 
stabilisation (in institutional structure or infrastructural architecture) may develop in 
due course, even if these are temporary. Despite these points of stabilisation, as the 
Future Earth network is further developed and extends, the Future Earth model is also 
extended, adapted and interpreted in a diverse range of contexts (such as in Future 
Earth’s national committees and regional centres); there the same and further 
tensions and ambiguities may emerge.  
 
Future Earth can therefore be seen as an experiment (or a series of ongoing 
experiments) in transforming research and its institutions. These ambiguities, 
tensions and uncertainties enable ontological variability: Future Earth may now and 
yet be a flagship, a tapestry or both (or indeed something completely different). This 
is potentially also the case for its formative principles or strategies, such as co-
production; indeed, as already seen in Chapter 2, co-production and related concepts 
are prone to multiple interpretations. Given this inevitable multiplicity, perhaps a 
rigid subscription to the flagship model cannot capture the diversity necessary in an 
initiative such as Future Earth. Therefore, maybe it is best considered to be a 
tapestry, in which a broad range of diverse efforts and initiatives are grouped under 
its symbolic institutional umbrella without the requirement of conceptual or 
epistemological harmonisation or integration. This formation might be more 
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conducive to flexibility and experimentation. The idea of Future Earth as an 
experiment is explored further in the next chapter, following an analysis of what co-
production and related terms mean in Future Earth, and the rationales for adopting 
them.  
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Chapter 5: What does co-production mean in 
Future Earth and why do it? 
 
Having explored the emergence of Future Earth and some of the visions of its 
identity, remit, as well as the tensions therein, I now focus more specifically on co-
production in Future Earth. While co-production is a key principle or strategy of 
Future Earth, linked to a range of broader ambitions for the initiative (as we have 
begun to see in the previous chapter), what it might mean in this context is not 
straightforward. As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, co-production and related terms 
such as co-design and transdisciplinarity have diverse meanings within and between 
different contexts, and this is no less the case in Future Earth, particularly given its 
broad range of actors and large scale of ambition. This chapter explores the questions 
‘what do co-design and co-production mean in Future Earth?’, and ‘why are they 
advocated and adopted?’ or, more specifically, ‘what are the rationales that underpin 
co-design and co-production in Future Earth?’.  
 
As further detailed in Chapter 3, the meanings and rationales presented here were 
derived from looking at patterns and themes within the data. These understandings 
and their underpinning rationales are for the most part anticipatory and performative: 
they emerge from discourse planning and imagining what Future Earth will be, and 
bringing it into being. In these contexts, co-production is used together with a 
number of other “co-” words, such as co-design, co-creation, co-dissemination, co-
implementation (here referred to collectively as the “co-’s”), which are also analysed 
here.  
 
The chapter argues that during the time of this study, just as Future Earth was 
imagined in diverse ways, the meanings of the co-’s were similarly multiple, 
ambiguous and contested; this was (at least partly) driven by varying rationales for 
advocating the co-’s and differing levels of subscription to the idea that they should 
be required elements of Future Earth research. The discussions and activity around 
the co-’s was messy in the sense that there was little consensus on these terms. 
However, it is possible to identify common themes and features that coalesce around 
particular views on what these terms are about. I outline these different views and 
134 
 
understandings in this chapter. While one dominant (not entirely unambiguous) view 
emerged (co-’s as participation of stakeholders for relevance, acceptance and utility), 
a minority understanding was also present (co-’s as reflexivity for democratisation). 
A third view of co-’s also arose, often formulated in response or resistance to the first 
two views: the idea that the co-’s might be a threat.  
 
Section 5.1 explores the predominant understanding of and rationale for the co-’s:  
co-’s as engagement or participation of stakeholders for relevance, acceptability and 
use. Section 5.2 describes the minority alternative view: co-’s as reflexivity for 
democratisation. Section 5.3 outlines the third view: co-’s as a threat. A typology is 
developed to summarise the three different understandings of co-production. Section 
5.4 briefly discusses an approach to resolving the contestation between these views, 
and explores the experimental nature of co-production in Future Earth. The chapter 
concludes in section 5.5 by noting that an experimental approach to co-production in 
practice might enable ways of navigating these multiple meanings. 
 
5.1 Core meaning and rationale: co-’s as participation for utility 
 
This section explores the predominant conceptualisation of co-design, co-production 
and related concepts in Future Earth. A core model or understanding of and rationale 
for these terms emerges in Future Earth documents published between 2010 and 2015 
that are or have been in the public domain (comprising reports, meeting summaries, 
and website pages) and internal documents, and is carried forward by key actors 
(from a range of different disciplinary and sectoral backgrounds) in the initiative, as 
seen during meeting observation/focus groups and interviews conducted for this 
study.  
 
As the results of the following analysis will show, the key meaning of co-design and 
co-production to emerge is that of engagement (whether participation, involvement, 
integration, dialogue and/or collaboration) of non-academic actors (with academic 
actors of multiple disciplines) in research and its governance. This is based on the 
rationale that it would lead to research or knowledge that has use and impact in the 
world beyond the academic/research sector, oriented towards solutions and 
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(policy) relevance (rather than deliberation or other goals, although deliberation may 
be a means to this end). This is embedded in a broader narrative of an urgent need for 
societal transformations towards sustainability, for which knowledge is required for 
decisions to be made and for solutions to be found. Co-design and co-production are 
imagined to generate knowledge that is more relevant for these purposes (in 
comparison to other approaches) because the questions have been defined in 
collaboration with the eventual ‘users’ of that knowledge (societal partners to whom 
the knowledge claims made or tools developed are eventually addressed, as one 
participant put it), and the research has a higher chance of being taken seriously, 
accepted and used (‘properly’) in policy and practice because users have ownership 
and access by being involved in the research process. 
 
However, although this broad understanding of the co-’s runs throughout the data, 
there are also glimpses of the complexities and challenges of these concepts: 
sometimes, even within single documents or narratives, minimal or potentially 
conflicting detail is given on their meanings and how they might work in Future 
Earth. For example, there are tensions between ambitions for two-way dialogue and 
an emphasis on the acceptability of results (discussed below in section 5.1.1), within 
particular spatial metaphors for these interactions (5.1.2 and 5.1.3), and between 
ambitions for engagement to be continuous and active throughout the research 
process and indications that differing extents of involvement are preferred at different 
stages (5.1.4). These tensions are in part fuelled by an uncertainty around how co-
design and co-production might work in this context, which is explicitly 
acknowledged at times. 
 
5.1.1 Dialogue versus acceptance  
 
As the following analysis will demonstrate, the core conceptualisation of the co-’s is 
the engagement, participation, involvement, integration and/or collaboration of non-
academic stakeholders (together with researchers from different disciplines) in 
research and its governance. This is based on a rationale of providing useful, relevant 
and acceptable knowledge and solutions needed by stakeholders, decision makers or 
society.  
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If we turn to the (rare) explicit definitions of the co-’s and related concepts, the 
earliest document in the dataset to touch on this (emerging from the Visioning 
Process28) does not refer to co-design or co-production, but discusses the need for 
transdisciplinary research, i.e. ‘greater involvement of external stakeholders in the 
research process’, and ‘co-creation of knowledge with a broad range of stakeholders 
through participatory practices’ (ICSU, 2010: 6). Transdisciplinary research – often 
used synonymously in Future Earth discourse with co-designed and co-produced 
research29 – is defined as: 
 
Research that both integrates academic researchers from different unrelated 
disciplines and non-academic participants, such as policymakers and the 
public, to research a common goal and create new knowledge and theory.  
 
(ICSU, 2010: 20) 
 
Here, the implication is that different parties create something by working together.30 
This definition is reproduced (with the amendment from ‘policy makers and the 
public’ to ‘policy-makers, civil society groups and business representatives’, as 
discussed further in Chapter 6) in the glossary of the 2013 Design Report (the 
primary output of the Transition Team). That glossary also includes the following 
definitions of co-design and co-production: 
 
Co-design: The research community and other stakeholders jointly identifying 
and defining research agendas and priority research questions. 
Co-production: The research community and other stakeholders working 
together to jointly frame, design, and execute research and its applications.  
 
(Future Earth, 2013b: 69)  
 
The understanding of transdisciplinarity or co-’s as the involvement, participation 
and/or collaboration of non-academic stakeholders to define research questions and 
priorities, create knowledge and design and execute research (and its use) together 
                                                 
28 See Chapter 4 for more information on the Visioning Process. 
29 ‘Co-designed and co-produced research is also sometimes referred to as ‘transdisciplinary’ […].’ 
(Future Earth, 2013b: 23). This is also the case in sustainability science (Lang et al., 2012). 
30 Throughout the documents and interviews, ‘integration’ more commonly refers to involving a range 
of disciplines, fields and/or research programmes or institutions (sometimes being used 
interchangeably with interdisciplinarity). Integration or interdisciplinarity is often seen as a first 
important step in or aim of Future Earth’s work, with transdisciplinarity or co-design/co-production 
forming the second step or aim. 
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with researchers runs throughout Future Earth discourse. Some type of participation 
of non-academic stakeholders is present in (almost) all understandings of these 
concepts, not only this core understanding. The core understanding can be 
distinguished (in part) by its underpinning rationale: the most prevalent reason given 
for transdisciplinarity and the co-’s is that they will increase the relevance, use, 
acceptability and uptake of results (in and by ‘society’, ‘decision makers’ and/or 
‘users’):  
 
Research will often be most useful, and the results most readily accepted by 
users, if priorities are shaped with the active involvement of potential users of 
research results and if the research is carried out in the context of a bi-
directional flow of information between scientists and users.  
(ICSU, 2010: 6; my emphasis31) 
 
The main selection and implementation criteria for any project, priority action 
(or new research theme) relate to […]  (3) implementing an appropriate co-
design between the scientists and the users to ensure that proposed and 
established solutions are acceptable in actual societal contexts […]  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 51) 
 
Dialogue with stakeholders and their participation in the co-design and 
production of Future Earth research will help the delivery of better attuned, 
relevant and useful insights to those who will use Future Earth research.  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 53) 
 
However, there is a potential tension between calls for reciprocal or ‘bi-directional’ 
processes of joint agenda-setting, knowledge creation, etc., and the idea that results 
should be accepted by users and/or wider society.32 Despite gestures towards the 
‘dialogue’ model of engagement in which information flows between scientists and 
users (as opposed to the deficit model in which information supposedly flows only 
from knowledgeable scientists to less knowledgeable users), the non-academic 
stakeholders are positioned primarily as knowledge-users to be convinced by and 
accepting of research results; here scientists retain the prime position as 
knowledgeable actors. Co-production is imagined as the exchange and combination 
of discrete pre-held information or knowledge, as opposed to mutual co-construction 
of knowledge during the process, for example. 
                                                 
31 Phrases pertinent to the themes are italicised throughout for ease of reading. Henceforth, where 
emphasis is in original, this is indicated. 
32 The implications of the word ‘user’ are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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The potentially problematic nature of this type of framing is noted by Future Earth 
actors themselves in an internal document produced in 2014 (a draft Green Paper on 
engagement), which suggests that ‘acceptability’ might be a naïve goal: 
 
[T]he role of science is frequently contested when it comes to be applied in 
society – because there are conflicting values and interests. We need to be 
careful not to give the impression of an ‘informed technocratic’ decision 
model, that through engagement we can somehow avoid the inevitable 
conflicts inherent in bringing new knowledge to bear on old and highly-
structured problem configurations.  
(Doc 79) 
 
Despite the presence of this perspective in one of the documents, the tension between 
dialogue and acceptance is embedded throughout the Future Earth documents and in 
the discourse of many of the key actors (and indeed in society more broadly: Felt & 
Fochler, 2010: 221; Irwin, 2006).  
 
5.1.2 Closing the research-policy gap  
 
In Future Earth the tension between dialogue and acceptance as described above is 
linked to a broader narrative of a gap between research and policy and/or practice: 
 
Future Earth aims to close the gap between environmental research and 
current policies and practices. Future Earth invites the broad community of 
researchers working within the natural and social sciences, engineering and 
the humanities to engage in developing knowledge that is co-designed with 
those who use research in governments, business, and civil society. Such co-
design means that the overarching research questions are articulated through 
deliberative dialogues among researchers and other stakeholder groups to 
enhance the utility, transparency, and saliency of the research. This approach 
embraces the concept of a new ‘social contract’ between science and society 
(Lubchenco 1998).  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 21) 
 
Increasing the utility, transparency and saliency of research through co-design is seen 
as a means to close this gap between research and policy (although how such 
deliberative dialogues might work and the means or mechanisms by which they 
might lead to greater utility, transparency or saliency are not explicated). This 
narrative is about matching and linking knowledge provision to user/societal need, 
often expressed in terms of the dual ambition to work together with stakeholders to 
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find out what challenges they are (or broader society is) facing but also to ensure that 
the knowledge produced is taken up in practice, as demonstrated in this interview 
extract: 
 
‘Co-designed’ to me means that if we are working in a mission led 
programme which is there to respond to a set of societal challenges, then we 
need to find some societal stakeholders to work with to establish that a) we 
understand the challenges correctly, b) we correctly identify what the research 
priorities are that are going to meet those challenges and c) find ways of 
working together during the research process, to increase the chance a) that 
we deliver the necessary knowledge but b) that it is taken up in to practice.   
         
(Interview 3) 
 
Further detail on this rationale was provided by another participant when discussing 
when co-production might be necessary: 
 
There are [research issues, questions, challenges, such as the sort of complex 
intersectoral societal issues that we’re currently facing with global 
environmental change] where if you don’t have that sort of engagement well 
you’re probably either not going to answer quite the right question because it 
wasn’t very well specified in the first place and it’s actually the process of 
doing the research, you know co-production mode is actually how you clarify 
what the real question is and home in on what sort of options or answers 
there might be for it – or alternatively it’s a sort of area where actually if some 
of the potential users of the research aren’t involved in and don’t feel a sense 
of ownership then they won’t take any notice of it anyway. 
         (Interview 9) 
 
The co-’s are seen as engagement of and collaboration between researchers and 
stakeholders to ensure that the ‘right’ or ‘real’ (research) questions are asked and 
therefore relevant or useful knowledge (and/or options, answers, solutions) will be 
produced, and will be more likely to be used and have impact as stakeholders/users 
have access and ownership through being involved in its production. Co-design and 
co-production are seen as a process of bringing users into proximity with the research 
so that knowledge produced is aligned with societal challenges and needs, and 
stakeholders are not only aware of it but also invested in it.  
 
This utilitarian view corresponds to the logic of accountability discussed in section 
2.3: redirecting research portfolios towards societal need (Lövbrand, 2011: 227, 
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following Barry et al., 2008), with an additional emphasis on impact of research by 
ensuring the research is accessible and credible to users. References to a ‘new “social 
contract”’ (as in the Design Report extract above) in particular suggest an implicit 
narrative about science fulfilling its societal responsibilities or obligations, and 
therefore being accountable (Castree, 2016).  
 
In this view, two-way dialogue is often imagined as an integral aspect of co-design 
and/or co-production linked to the idea of getting the questions right so stakeholders’ 
needs can be met. This is based on a particular notion of what each party might be 
able to offer in this exchange: 
 
[…] co-design to me is getting a genuine two-way discussion about what the 
issues are that a decision maker […] [is] facing but not just them just telling 
the researchers that actually we want x, because actually there’s a two-way 
conversation there as to what is researchable, whether it’s likely that research 
can produce a useful answer to the sorts of questions that are being asked or 
indeed whether the questions can be asked in slightly different ways which 
still answer the decision making needs or the understanding of options or 
whatever it is that the decision maker’s after, but which are then more 
researcher robust. […] [T]he research community […] has had a lot of money 
spent on it to be able to think about certain sorts of things and think about 
evidence and so on, whereas often we are not very good at thinking about 
these sort of resolution of complex social issues that policy makers have to 
think about for example.  
         (Interview 9) 
 
According to this view, scientists have a particular expertise (e.g. thinking about 
evidence) but lack the skills to think about the resolution of complex social issues; 
the latter is the domain of the societal stakeholder. This echoes the narrative of the 
Design Report both in terms of the type of input that might be provided through 
involving stakeholders in these processes (e.g. on social issues, norms, values), and 
in terms of the type of output that might be expected (e.g. answering needs, providing 
solutions, understanding options): 
 
Integrating global environmental change issues with development and 
sustainability issues involves many complexities and uncertainties and must 
incorporate understanding of societal norms, values and perspectives (Kates 
2011). Under such conditions, science has up-to-now tended to provide 
mainly understanding but not answers or comprehensive solutions (e.g. 
Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990, Klein 2004b). Co-design is one way to address 
141 
 
this, and it has already shown its value and utility in fields where science and 
policy meet.  
 
(Future Earth, 2013b: 23) 
 
This extract draws explicitly on STS and science policy literature to suggest that co-
design is a means to both incorporate understanding of norms, values and 
perspectives into research, and to generate answers and solutions. However, what this 
incorporation might mean – and how it is linked to providing answers and solutions – 
is elusive. Does this refer to an academic/scientific understanding of societal norms, 
values and perspectives (e.g. social science knowledge) or general awareness of and 
sensitivity to social convention or “public preference”? Is this understanding intended 
to inform what types of solutions might be workable? Or perhaps – less likely – the 
intention is to incorporate an acknowledgement of how norms, values and 
perspectives are already implicit in scientific research? Is this an attempt to push 
beyond the tendency to treat social and ethical matters ‘as spatially, temporally and 
substantively separate from technical ones’ (Raman, 2015: 117)?  
 
Read in the context of the predominant meanings and rationales, it would seem that 
the intended interpretation of the above is that science will be more likely to provide 
(acceptable) solutions if research is framed and designed taking broader societal 
norms, values and perspectives into account, and the way to achieve this is to involve 
societal (non-academic) stakeholders in designing (and perhaps producing) research. 
However, underlying this rationale are several implicit (and perhaps problematic) 
assumptions and expectations regarding the kind of research or knowledge that is 
needed: new or synthesised, relevant, solutions-oriented research (or ‘a new type of 
science that links disciplines, knowledge systems and societal partners to support a 
more agile global innovation system’ (Future Earth, 2014c: 5)) is assumed to be 
necessary in order to address sustainability issues and for action to be taken (cf. 
Lövbrand et al., 2015)33; involving stakeholders in research design and production is 
                                                 
33 As Future Earth is a research programme, its focus on the primacy and importance of research in 
addressing global environmental change and sustainability issues is unsurprising and inevitable, 
particularly as the early stages of Future Earth entailed simultaneously justifying the initiative’s 
creation and the institutional reconfiguration it is championing. However, in performing this need and 
constructing Future Earth and a particular kind of research or knowledge (e.g. solutions oriented, 
relevant, integrated, etc.) as the response to this need, other potential framings, challenges and types of 
research or knowledge are potentially side-lined. 
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expected to lead unproblematically to more relevant research results as well as the 
uptake or application of those results (cf. Polk, 2014); and, finally, lack of uptake of 
research in policy or action contexts is assumed to be caused by a gap between 
research and policy.  
 
As suggested by the earlier image of the gap between research and policy/practice, 
this is tied to a narrative of research that has so far been unsuccessful (or not as 
successful as would be desirable) in addressing socially relevant issues or questions, 
providing options and solutions, and/or ensuring that the research and solutions reach 
and influence policy, practice, decision making, etc.: 
 
[…] where we are trying to get more nimble about creating a global 
innovation system that’s really enabling nations and the global community to 
act on the sorts of challenges that we’re facing more quickly, then I think 
there’s a strong case for more co-design than we’ve managed to do in the 
past, less of the “here look there’s a problem with climate” and chucking it 
across the fence and assuming someone will act on it but actually engaging 
with “so we can see there’s a problem with climate but what does that 
actually mean in terms of what might one do, how might you decarbonise the 
economy” and all those sorts of issues. […] 
        (Interview 9) 
 
Language such as ‘nimble’ (above) and ‘agile’ (in the preceding paragraph) suggests 
the extent to which this view is fuelled by a perceived need to accelerate responses to 
GEC as an urgent issue. While the questions listed above clearly entail normative 
dimensions, for the most part this view of co-’s maintains that the researcher’s role 
should be to provide policy options, rather than to be prescriptive or pursue particular 
normative agendas:  
 
[…] as a general principle, Future Earth should aim to be policy relevant 
rather than policy prescriptive and use tools such as evidence-based scenario 
setting to support informed policy development.  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 50) 
 
This echoes the IPCC’s stance on the assessments it produces, but could be seen to be 
problematic. As argued by Turnhout et al. (2016), packaging knowledge in categories 
relevant to policy making is inherently a normative process, though rarely 
acknowledged as such.  
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5.1.3 Science and society as separate 
 
In this dominant narrative of the meaning and rationale for co-design and related 
concepts, researchers and other societal groups are imagined as currently occupying 
separate spaces, and for the most part co-’s are imagined to mean stakeholders 
entering (participating in, getting involved in, engaging in, etc.) the ‘space’ (i.e. 
processes) of science. There is an underlying contradiction in this framing of co-
design and co-production: the ‘co-’ (and indeed notions of ‘two-way dialogue’) 
would seem to imply shared involvement and responsibility, and equal collaboration 
between those involved, whilst the ‘participatory’ or ‘engagement’ framing could be 
seen to assume a pre-existing activity or entity into which participation or 
engagement might be enrolled, so science/research is the pre-established frame or 
context and others entering into that must adapt. These different understandings have 
different implications for the division of labour, responsibility, power, or ownership 
experienced by the various parties involved: participation in science versus more 
equal-footed collaboration between scientists and others. However, the co-’s 
consistently fall within Future Earth’s ‘Engagement’ activities (in meeting agendas, 
documents, discourse), suggesting that they are not truly considered to be science 
either, rather some sort of add-on to existing scientific processes or frameworks 
(despite an overall framing of bringing about a change in science-society relations 
(Future Earth, 2013b: 11) and a new type of science (Future Earth, 2014c: 5)). 
Furthermore, the depth and intensity of this engagement is at stake: as one IEC 
member asked, ‘does “co-” mean collaboration, consultation, or conversation?’ 
 
There are alternative views of the spatiality of the co-’s, but these still imagine some 
form of (current) separation between science and the rest of society to be bridged; 
one participant described the new approach inherent in co-design and co-production 
in terms of not ‘simply about a communications strategy which is one-way’ but 
rather ‘an attempt to involve ourselves in societal arenas as well’ and ‘to see the 
academies active in in societal arenas’ (I8) (as further discussed in Chapter 6). Here 
scientists are envisaged as entering the space of society, which implies a vision of 
scientists usually operating outside of society. An internal document (the draft Green 
Paper on engagement) provides a more detailed view on the potential spaces of 
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engagement, again conceptualised as spatial ‘arenas’ or even a ‘ring’, as in fighting 
ring: 
 
- Broadly speaking, engagement with stakeholders will occur as part of 
knowledge production convened by science (internal arenas), or as part of 
assessments and decision-making processes convened by societal partners 
(external arenas) - in the former, researchers ‘hold the ring’, in the latter, 
researchers are ‘invited into the ring’. 
- These different contexts call for different engagement approaches. In 
internal arenas the terms of engagement will be defined as part of the 
research process (structured as a process of co-creation and co-
production), while in external arenas researchers will tend to be 
responsive to the framings, processes and timelines/cycles of other parties 
and interests. In general, external arenas are more complex and resource-
intensive for research to service than internal arenas, but provide greater 
opportunities for impact. 
   (Doc 79) 
 
Future Earth itself is often characterised as an arena (as discussed in Chapter 4), and 
the ‘Impact’ section of the Future Earth website includes a figure from and a link to 
Cornell et al. (2013) in which the relationship between knowledge and action is 
imagined spatially in terms of an arena, drawing on Nowotny et al.’s (2001: 203) 
concept of the ‘agora’, ‘a new public space where science and society, the market and 
politics, co-mingle’. In the extract above, co-creation and co-production are seen as a 
form of research process including engagement, in which researchers ‘hold the ring’ 
and therefore presumably take the lead or at least hold greater power or control in 
overseeing and defining the terms of engagement (while the ‘agora’ could be seen as 
a space of peaceful gathering, ‘arena’ and ‘ring’ are more evocative of combative, 
gladiatorial spaces (Wiktionary, n.d.-b)). Assessments and decision-making 
processes convened by societal partners are not deemed to be knowledge producing 
processes (and co-’s do not play a role, given that these terms are here closely 
affiliated with the research/knowledge production process).34  
 
                                                 
34 This dual framing of engagement persists in the Engagement Principles and Practice document 
published in 2016 after data collection for this study was complete: ‘Participation of societal partners 
in co-design and/or co-production of research activities will help deliver better attuned insights, which 
accelerate the emergence of scientifically robust, socially implementable solutions. Participation of 
researchers in stakeholder analysis and decision-making processes, with the aim of providing sound 
scientific evidence, can build a clear voice and direction for sustainability, offering solution-based 
answers.’ (Future Earth, 2016b). 
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This raises the question of the extent to which societal stakeholders are imagined as 
having knowledge to offer in processes of co-design and co-production. Although in 
the predominant vision of the co-’s the focus for the most part is on getting 
stakeholders’ input on what the questions are and ensuring that they can access and 
accept the knowledge produced, there are also indications that they might have 
knowledge (or information) to offer in these processes: 
 
Co-design and co-production also recognises that researchers, information 
and models are now based in many different types of organisation and the 
great benefits from research collaborations between, for example, 
universities, NGOs, and the private sector.  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 23) 
 
This point on the distributed nature of ‘researchers, information and models’ reflects 
ideas in research policy literature (e.g. Gibbons et al., 1994), and suggests that the 
academic research community is not the only sector to hold relevant expertise and 
knowledge, implying that others may have a role in actively contributing expertise 
and knowledge. This is echoed elsewhere, or at least that their existing knowledge 
and experience should be respected:  
 
The Global Development theme will have the principle of co-design at its 
core with extensive discussions with international development organizations 
as well as regional and local groups to ensure a research agenda that is 
focused and solution oriented and that respects the knowledge that already 
exists in these communities. Cooperation with development agencies and 
communities can bring benefits to Future Earth that include international 
networks of field research and practitioners and experience with participatory 
approaches, vulnerable populations, local innovation, and project evaluation.  
 
(Future Earth, 2013b: 36) 
 
This is particularly the case in the later documents; as might be expected, there are 
slight shifts in the language between the Design Report (produced by the Transition 
Team) and subsequent official documents, produced by the newly appointed Science 
Committee, (Interim) Engagement Committee and Interim Secretariat.35 For 
                                                 
35 And there have subsequently been shifts since the appointment of the permanent Secretariat and 
changes to the committees (as there will continue to be, as Future Earth personnel and collectives 
evolve and change). 
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example, the draft engagement Green Paper explicitly highlights the contribution of 
stakeholders in terms of knowledge and experience: 
 
[…] Stakeholders must be fully engaged in all phases of Future Earth, i.e. in 
the co-design of the program to ensure the right questions are being 
addressed, co-production of the projects to ensure the full range of knowledge 
and experiences are considered, and co-dissemination and use of the findings 
for informed decision-making.   
(Doc 79)  
 
In a key external document outlining the Strategic Research Agenda (2014), the 
research priorities are prefaced with a short statement on the importance of ‘co-
producing knowledge with society’: 
 
The co-design and co-production of new knowledge, created by researchers 
working in collaboration with their societal partners, is critical to developing 
scientific insights, data and tools that can contribute to addressing the most 
pressing global sustainability challenges. Across all the priorities presented 
here, researchers and research funders are urged to work with societal 
partners in developing and implementing their plans. In this way science will 
be contributing to understanding the problems that matter to society and 
developing the solutions that are needed.  
(Future Earth, 2014c: 9) 
 
Although this reproduces the narrative that co-design and co-production inherently 
lead to relevant research, the vision of the role of science is less hubristic with the 
addition of the words ‘contribute to’, and ‘in collaboration with’. Impact and 
responsiveness are still foregrounded, with additional focus on the need to monitor 
the effectiveness of these new approaches to research:  
 
Key approaches for focus are: 
1. Conducting fundamental and applied research in ways that engage with 
diverse societal partners across all regions of the world to maximise 
impact and responsiveness to society’s needs, and monitoring the 
effectiveness of these new approaches to research.  
(Future Earth, 2014c: 7) 
 
However, this continued ambition to conduct both fundamental and applied research 
might pose challenges in terms of the tensions identified in Chapter 4 between 
curiosity-driven, blue sky research (which is not usually targeted towards addressing 
particular challenges), and demand-driven or responsive research that considers or 
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produces solutions. During the committee meetings, the suggestion to frame the 
fundamental research within Future Earth as ‘use-inspired basic research’ was 
proposed. The extent to which challenge-focus and fundamental research, and 
therefore by implication, co-production and fundamental research are compatible is a 
matter for debate. Some might consider that co-production in fundamental research is 
possible (for example, in the form of citizen science), but that the findings would 
need only be relevant to science as it is impossible to predict in what guise they will 
become relevant to wider society. The ways in which the committee members 
discussed the challenge of co-production to fundamental research is discussed further 
in section 5.3. 
 
In terms of the development of notions of engagement and co-production through the 
documents as time progressed, the draft engagement White Paper and Green Paper 
developed by a sub-group of SC and IEC members expresses a more nuanced view, 
distinguishing between meeting needs and providing socially robust knowledge, and 
further characterising these processes in terms of bringing together different types of 
knowledge (including non-academic knowledge) and perspectives, rather than solely 
scientific knowledge being informed by the priorities of societal stakeholders. 
 
5.1.4 Extent of engagement  
 
While the overall understanding of co-’s as engagement of non-academic 
stakeholders to increase relevance, acceptability and use (and therefore impact) runs 
throughout the data, tensions and ambiguities are also present, such as between 
dialogue and acceptance, as described above. In addition, there is a lack of clarity 
around the extent of engagement at different stages during the process, and the 
distinction between co-design and co-production. As the following analysis 
demonstrates, this is the result of the initiative still ‘feeling its way’ (as participant 9 
put it) forward between the programmatic and the doable and between the different 
visions of those involved. Although not (often) articulated as an ‘experiment’, the 
whole process of implementing and institutionalising the co-’s is experimental and 
therefore by nature tentative and uncertain. 
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While the Design Report (much of the text of which was also used in the “Impact” 
section of the Future Earth website, which held a prominent position as one of the 
homepage tabs until mid-2016) reasserts the significance of co-design and co-
production as ‘one of the most innovative and challenging aspects’ of the initiative, it 
leaves many questions about these concepts unresolved (Future Earth, 2013b: 22). 
On the one hand, it is suggested that co-design and co-production ‘requires an active 
involvement of researchers and stakeholders during the entire research process’, 
‘continuous engagement’ (Future Earth, 2013b: 22-23) and ‘an understanding that 
co-design commences at the outset and stakeholders are partners in knowledge 
production throughout’ (Future Earth, 2013: 54); but on the other, it seems that less 
active involvement of stakeholders may be preferred at some stages:  
 
Co-design and co-production of knowledge include various steps where both 
researchers and other stakeholders are involved but to different extents and 
with different responsibilities […]. Whilst researchers are responsible for the 
scientific methodologies, the definition of the research questions and the 
dissemination of results are done jointly.  
       (Future Earth, 2013b: 23) 
 
 
If researchers are responsible for the ‘scientific methodologies’, it is not clear what 
the (reduced) stakeholder involvement might entail in the ‘co-production’ step of the 
research process: would they be invited to participate in data collection and/or 
analysis36, under the supervision of the researchers whose role is seen as 
safeguarding the methodologies? Or provide feedback on interim results? Or suggest 
amendments to the research focus? Although it could be argued that some types of 
science (for example, complex mathematical modelling) might not be conducive to 
non-academic involvement beyond defining the questions, this approach has been 
undertaken in relation to flood modelling in the UK (Landström et al., 2013; 
Whatmore & Landström, 2011). 
 
The text continues by highlighting the challenging nature of these interactions: 
 
                                                 
36 E.g. citizen science is mentioned in the ‘Education’ section of the report, framed as a method of 
informal science education rather than explicitly identified as a method of co-production (Future 
Earth, 2013b: 57). 
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One of the main challenges is how to build trust among all stakeholders, and 
to ensure continuous engagement. The challenges of co-design and 
particularly co-production are not underestimated by the Transition Team, 
and it is recognised that the programme will need to support the research 
community and stakeholders to develop and share the necessary skills. It is 
also recognised that the focus for this way of working should be on where the 
research and stakeholder community feel that it will bring the greatest 
benefits.  
 
(Future Earth, 2013b: 23) 
 
This does not address questions about how to reconcile continuous engagement with 
the described division of responsibilities, nor how it should be decided where co-
design/co-production brings the greatest benefits (and to whom). Furthermore, it is 
not clear here why co-production is seen as particularly challenging (though, as 
explored later, the internal documents, interview and observation data suggest that 
this might be attributed to concerns within the research community about maintaining 
the objectivity, independence and credibility of science, particularly the scientific 
method). With little detail on how non-researchers would participate in the research 
process, these concerns are not explicitly addressed in the Design Report, despite the 
acknowledgement of challenges and (implicit) recognition that the research and 
stakeholder community might not always feel that it does bring benefits.  
 
In addition to the ambiguities around the extent of engagement envisaged in the  
co-’s, there is also ambiguity around the distinction between co-design and co-
production; this ambiguity occurs in relation to both the institutional and temporal 
aspects of these terms (as discussed further in Chapter 7). As can be seen in the 
glossary definitions at the start of section 5.1.1, sometimes co-design refers to 
involvement of stakeholders in aspects of research governance such as agenda-
setting, overarching research question definition and prioritisation (and, as seen 
below, sometimes in the institutional design of Future Earth itself), while co-
production refers to the work of individual research projects (also including question 
definition and research design). However, the distinction between co-design and co-
production is also often imagined in terms of steps in the research process (at project 
level), where co-design refers to the earlier stages of the research process (question 
definition and research design), co-production refers to the middle stages signifying 
the resultant or subsequent research work (data collection, analysis, etc.), and co-
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dissemination and other similar terms to the later stages. Co-production as a form of 
collaboration or iterative dialogue during the research process is also sometimes seen 
as a way of further developing and refining the research questions (as seen above in 
section 5.1.2). 
 
The early documents refer as much to the co-design and co-production of the 
initiative itself by the different stakeholders represented by the Alliance partners 
(characterised as scientific community, research funders, users, and 
knowledge/service providers37), as to co-design and co-production of research or 
knowledge. The Transition Team is considered to be ‘selected in the spirit of co-
design of a new research agenda, and thus included researchers, funders and private 
and public sector stakeholders from many different countries and disciplines’ (Future 
Earth, 2013b: 5). Here, co-design refers to the joint development of a new research 
initiative/associated research agenda between the different groups (whether sectoral, 
national or disciplinary) represented by the Alliance partners and Transition Team 
members: a sort of institutional or administrative co-design, often linked to 
establishing the authority or legitimacy of Future Earth (i.e., given that Future Earth 
is championed by a multi-sectoral, high level Alliance, and designed by a broad 
range of scientists and stakeholders, the sense that this initiative is justified, needed, 
and authoritative should increase). This type of institutional or administrative co-
design/co-production can be seen again in the Design Report: Future Earth’s 
governance structure ‘embraces the concepts of co-design and co-production’ (Future 
Earth, 2013b: 14).  
 
This type of co-design also arises in the internal documents, observation and 
interview data, where some participants consider Future Earth’s commitment to 
engagement, co-design and co-production to be demonstrated by and embodied in its 
adoption of not only a Science Committee (as in the existing programmes), but also 
an Engagement Committee. This interpretation of co-design/co-production rests on a 
model of collaboration between committee or team members representing various 
stakeholder groups or positions (different disciplines, funding, policy making, etc.). 
                                                 
37 Other potential (rather than existing) partner categories are also mentioned, including development 
assistance agencies, business sector representatives, representatives of global observation programmes. 
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However, this view faces significant complexities in terms of defining what this sort 
of representation or representativeness might mean, as explored further in Chapter 6.  
 
5.1.5 Summary of core meaning and rationale 
 
In summary, the core conceptualisation to emerge from the data (primarily in the 
external documents, interviews/focus groups and meetings observation, voiced by 
actors from a range of disciplinary and sectoral backgrounds) is the co-’s as the 
engagement, involvement, participation, integration and/or collaboration of non-
academic stakeholders (together with researchers from different disciplines) in 
research and its governance. This is based on a rationale of providing useful, relevant 
and acceptable knowledge and solutions needed by stakeholders, decision makers or 
society.  
 
Stakeholders, primarily imagined as users/decision makers, policy makers, societal 
partners and/or representatives of particular groups, also have knowledge and 
expertise to offer, but this is primarily to ensure that the ‘right’ questions are asked 
and that all relevant knowledge is considered, with the goal of ensuring that the 
knowledge produced is relevant and used, that it reaches the places it is needed, 
bridging the ‘gap’ between research and policy/practice.  
 
The relation and interaction between researchers and other stakeholder groups or 
sectors is sometimes imagined spatially, as though currently science and society are 
spatially separate and this is something Future Earth will address by encouraging 
scientists to enter societal arenas and society to enter scientific arenas, or by creating 
an arena for them to come together. The role of research and/or the researcher might 
be to provide policy options and policy relevant (not policy prescriptive) knowledge 
and syntheses, etc.  
 
However, this understanding of co-’s is not without its ambiguities: little detail is 
provided on how this should work in practice, and there are inconsistencies around 
the extent to which there should be (intensive) involvement throughout the process. 
These ambiguities in part manifest in the varying distinctions between co-design and 
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co-production (as further explored in Chapter 7), sometimes referring to a 
hierarchical split between co-’s at governance (co-design) and research levels (co-
production), and sometimes referring (often temporally) to the type of activity that 
may occur at governance or research level or both (co-design as setting the questions 
whether at strategic level or project level or both; co-production as undertaking the 
subsequent governance/research work at either/both level(s)). There are also tensions 
between calls for dialogue and two-way interaction, and the view that these processes 
will increase the acceptance or acceptability of research results. These tensions are in 
part fuelled by an uncertainty around how co-design and co-production might work 
in this context, which is explicitly acknowledged at times. 
 
Having outlined this core understanding of and rationale for the co-’s and some of its 
tensions and ambiguities, I will now explore an alternative understanding of these 
terms in Future Earth. 
 
5.2 Alternative meaning and rationale: co-’s as reflexivity for democratisation  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the predominant vision of co-design and co-
production in Future Earth is that engagement or collaboration between researchers 
and stakeholders will ensure that the ‘right’ research questions are asked and 
therefore relevant or useful knowledge (and solutions) will be produced, and will be 
more likely to have impact as users have been involved in its production. However, 
as the following analysis will show, a minority view is also present in the internal 
documents, blog posts, interviews and focus groups (it is unsurprising that it should 
emerge in these contexts, where there is perhaps more freedom to imagine something 
less conventional), primarily voiced by those with a background in or affiliation to 
social science or humanities.  
 
Much of the previous model is brought forward in this alternative vision (for 
example, co-’s are seen as iterative and sustained processes, bringing together 
different types of knowledge, and aiming to move from understanding to impact). 
This view is also about collaboration between researchers (of different disciplines) 
and other stakeholders, but with a greater emphasis on plurality, reflexivity, humility, 
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and acknowledging that all perspectives are partial. Participants expressing this view 
saw co-design and co-production as deliberative or reflexive processes in which 
multiple perspectives, commitments and knowledges are brought together, discussed 
and socially constructed: 
 
I would see the sort of co-construction agenda as about people, all these 
people, whether they’re users, whether they’re different scientists from 
different disciplines, coming to a situation bringing their own social 
commitments and drivers and understandings and assumptions about the 
world and bringing those together and reflecting on them reflexively, realising 
that everybody’s got a set of partial perspectives so those need to be 
deliberated on and debated out throughout the process, throughout the design, 
throughout the doing, throughout the communication.  
(Interview 7) 
As can be seen here, this view is based on the notion that participants in co-design 
and co-production (both non-academics and researchers) bring particular worldviews 
and (normative) positions to that process and that these positionalities should be 
made explicit and debated during the process. This ambition was shared by another 
participant: 
 
FGP2: But I wonder how we could even introduce that reflexivity in to it […] 
that you actually brought in that transparency that this is co-design with a 
special interest group, that you actually raise those questions of whose view 
isn’t here? […] 
 
[…] 
 
FGP2: […] and I think that is one of the challenges of integrating the social 
science and natural sciences and across disciplines and things, that you bring 
in that reflexivity to say - and make it more transparent - what’s included and 
what’s not included in this research, because if we just pretend that it’s all 
neutral and apolitical and all good in the name of sustainability… 
         
(Focus group 2) 
 
This participant is calling for greater transparency on the normative, political 
dimensions of research, through an explicit discussion and acknowledgement of the 
decisions that have been made regarding what has and has not – and whose views 
have and have not – been included; here this is specifically linked to disciplinary 
integration across social and natural science and the notion of co-designing with 
particular interest groups.  
 
154 
 
This view could be seen to align with a logic of ontology (Lövbrand, 2011; following 
Barry et al., 2008) in which dominant frameworks and worldviews can be challenged 
and ontological questions  – including questions of common purpose – asked (such as 
how the ‘objects’ of research and matters at stake are defined). That is not to say that 
participants voicing these opinions were not interested in finding solutions, having 
impact or ‘making a difference’. However, this was more closely associated with 
extending agency and the rights of knowledge production or governance to non-
academic actors, valuing their perspectives and knowledge, and democratising 
expertise: 
 
[Co-production] is to recognise that scientific knowledge or scientists are not 
the only people who hold relevant knowledge. That knowledge of 
practitioners, decision-makers, local communities, etcetera, is valid 
knowledge. […] That is why I like to call them knowledge partners because 
they are not just providers of additional data, they are not witnesses, they are 
active knowledge partners, their knowledge counts.  
(Interview 5) 
 
An integral part of this agenda is not only respecting the knowledge of non-academic 
stakeholders, but allowing it to hold equal weight in the process, rather than scientific 
knowledge retaining the sole position of authority; this is seen to require humility on 
the part of those involved.  
 
Another key element of this view is the notion that the choices made in the process of 
knowledge production are inherently political – things could be otherwise – so 
democratising that choice and/or acknowledging what has not been included (as also 
seen in the focus group extract above) are both important aspects: 
 
So, integrated co-produced science is not about being monolithic, it is 
actually about recognising that there is a plurality of sets of questions that 
one might ask, lines of investigation that one might pursue, and actively 
democratising those, or at least if you’re going to pursue a dominant, 
powerful line, then you need to be very clear that that’s what you’re doing 
and why. And make clear what is being excluded in the process. 
(Interview 7) 
 
This view is voiced by those with backgrounds in social science and the humanities, 
and is grounded in and informed by ideas about knowledge politics from those fields, 
including STS ideas such as Jasanoff’s interpretation of co-production, as explicitly 
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acknowledged by some participants. One participant referred to Jasanoff while 
describing a situation in her/his previous research in which a clash occurred between 
‘two co-produced sets of knowledge and practice’: 
 
we had a very strong co-production of [an expert/policy discourse] and a set 
of policies and a social ordering that repressed local practices, and at the same 
time there was another kind of co-production going on which was around the 
social relations and livelihood commitments and local knowledges of people 
who’d been living in those environments […] 
        (Interview 7)  
 
In Future Earth, the co-’s are primarily about ‘making things together’ (Chilvers et 
al., 2014), where “co-” signifies the multiple parties involved in research governance, 
design or production. The object that is co-designed or co-produced (the “what”) 
seems to be a less significant or more variable part of the definition than “by whom”; 
each view on co-production outlined in this chapter considers co-’s to be a process in 
which academic and non-academic stakeholders come together. Perhaps this is due to 
instilled research cultures: the design and production of knowledge is not seen to be 
new; what is considered to be new here is the “co-”, and the “co-” signifies some sort 
of togetherness of different (from the usual, and from each other) actors, and implies 
the process of them producing or making something together. This contrasts with co-
production as a concept to describe co-constitution, where “co-” primarily signifies 
not only multiple subjects (people) but also objects, norms, identities, discourses, 
social orders, knowledges, etc. Here “what” is co-produced “with what” is more 
important (and it may not be possible to ask “by whom”, as intentional agency is not 
necessarily a driving force of this relational process, at least not in the ways intended 
by actors). The “co-” is the interaction, reciprocation and mutual embeddedness of 
the constitutive elements, not (necessarily) of the actors involved. Although this 
understanding underpins the alternative view of co-’s in Future Earth outlined in this 
section, that view still imagines collaboration as the core aspect of these terms in the 
context of Future Earth. 
 
The extent to which ideas about co-constitution filtered into the broader Future Earth 
discourse was quite limited at the time the fieldwork was conducted. For example, an 
early draft internal document on engagement produced in November 2013 comprises 
a nuanced view of these concepts, noting potential ‘caricatured’ mental models that 
156 
 
those involved might associate with engagement (e.g. ‘Link with end‐users so they 
help us prioritise the research that we then go off and do’), acknowledging the limits 
of the pipeline or linear model of science-society relations, and drawing on STS 
literature to suggest alternative interpretations. Later versions of this document 
(which evolved into a draft engagement White Paper, then draft engagement Green 
Paper) build on some aspects of the earlier note, but the explicitly constructivist 
material on co-production as reflexivity and knowledge/interests as constructed 
through the process has been edited out. The critique of the linear model remains; 
here it is reconceptualised as a science-policy-society/stakeholders triangle interface, 
with collaboration at the centre (somewhat missing the point of the critique: that 
‘science’, ‘society/stakeholders’ and ‘policy’ are not tightly bounded, independent 
domains or groups). 
 
Despite this, aspects of this alternative view of the co-’s are still present in the 
documents to some extent and certainly carried forward by some committee 
members, as seen during Focus Group 1, as further explored in section 7.1. This view 
builds on STS and social science ideas as it is also about acknowledging the 
normative aspects of knowledge, the normative role of researchers, the knowledge 
politics at play, and using/redirecting these (e.g. to change stakeholder processes and 
contexts such as the IPCC and similar processes; to offer stakeholders a seat at the 
table, etc.). 
 
According to this view, the role of the researcher (particularly social scientists) might 
be to facilitate, catalyse or enable this reflexivity, ensure the acknowledgement and 
inclusion of marginalised viewpoints, or to be an activist or advocate for particular 
trajectories:  
 
FGP2: […] I think a lot of us are frustrated activists and co-design is an 
outlet for it.  In other words we have greater access to people of power and it 
is sort of an increasingly legitimised form of activism for people who are 
officially not allowed to be activists. Um y’know [as]- 
 
[…]  
 
FGP2: […] I wonder how much of that is not in that desire to be somehow 
impactful in the world? 
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FGP5: That’s right. FGP4: Oh I agree.  
 
[…] 
 
FGP2: But so you know if we take the extreme view of that and say it is 
pretty much all just interest politics I mean how- what’s then the difference 
between having a co-production process versus just going in to a political 
square and hitting each other over the head and one wins, what is the 
difference between that type of sort of political process versus the sort of 
more science centred […] process of working out where we move forward? 
         
(Focus group 1) 
 
Again, echoing the spatial and pugilistic metaphors of the arena and the ring as 
explored in section 5.1, conflict is central to this evocative image of people ‘hitting 
each other over the head’ in a ‘political square’. FGP2 raises an important question 
about how the boundary can be drawn or the distinction made between science and 
political process if we acknowledge that all research is in some way shaped by the 
position of the researcher, and the researcher’s desire to have impact (or, indeed, the 
requirement to have impact stipulated by the broader incentive system of research). 
 
Later during the same focus group, the discussion turned to the embodied nature of 
collaboration, as one natural scientist spoke of her/his experiences of working 
together with non-academic stakeholders:  
 
FGP4: I want to add an aspect to this sort of activism. For once I agree 
because I think that for the natural scientist to be part of the co-design/co-
production strategy, take us from the comfort zone because we are not any 
more objective scientists with numbers because we have to be in a table and 
we have to confront with others and we cannot do that without our emotions, 
our will… I like that at least as you put it… I think you are right, we are 
persons that we bring all of us to that discussion […] 
 
The identity of the researcher as a scientist is at stake as much as the social 
relationship between researchers and others (though the extent to which this identity 
might also be inextricably entwined with social, embodied relations between 
researchers – and others – during standard research practice is not considered here).  
 
FGP2 picked up this theme again later, noting the significance of embodied social 
relations to what might be considered legitimate knowledge or a legitimate process, 
158 
 
suggesting that co-design or co-production is about more than identifying what the 
important questions or issues are: 
 
FGP2: See I think what you’re pointing to is actually goes beyond identifying 
what’s important, […] these processes of co-anything, are designed to find 
that sweet spot that identifies what’s important, what’s salient, what’s most 
credible and what’s legitimate,  
 
FGP3: [yeah] 
 
FGP2: what’s a legitimate process to have all the concerns heard, all of the 
different positions and what not, so I think that is a really important balancing 
act that occurs in that process but I think it hinges on – I guess ever since the 
beginning of the Enlightenment – a prioritising of information, of knowledge 
of a particular kind over all else and I think we… we need not forget that you 
know it doesn’t exist by itself, I think that the process component, the 
relationship component of knowledge is so huge, you know to me it is not just 
identifying what’s important, it’s like “I know you now  
 
FGP3: [exactly] 
 
FGP2: [and] because of that I cannot bash what you’re saying because you 
and I are just friends now” or whatever,  
 
[…] 
 
FGP2: Right and so knowledge becomes embodied in relationships, in social 
relations 
 
FGP3: [yeah, absolutely] 
 
FGP5: [yeah] 
 
FGP2:  and contractual relationships and I think that we need not forget that 
in our definition of co-design/co-production. 
 
Process and relationship as integral to knowledge is foregrounded here, though the 
word ‘bash’ suggests that this may be based in conflict rather than consensus. FGP2’s 
argument could be read to suggest that the knowledge prioritised since the 
Enlightenment – i.e. scientific knowledge – achieved that elevated or legitimate 
status through its embodiment in social relations, in that ‘it doesn’t exist by itself’; 
through particular social processes and relationships it becomes considered to be 
legitimate, credible or authoritative. The social element of knowledge, FGP2 argues, 
needs to be considered in relation to co-design and co-production. 
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The view of researchers as activists or advocates was discussed again later during the 
same focus group – this again links up with issues about scientific identity and 
possible threats to that identity: 
 
FGP3: […] I’m sure you know, that knowledge, whatever we produce is a 
necessary condition for informed decision making.  But it is not sufficient, 
there is lots of other factors 
 
FGP4: [yeah] 
 
FGP3: go in to every decision and that is why too many scientists get totally 
frustrated because they are not willing to recognise there’s a bigger game 
basically. […] you’ve got vested interests, you have ideologies, all a part of 
the decision making process. [laughs] 
 
FGP5: [Yeah. Yeah.] Which does raise a question about where the 
responsibility of scientists stops, I mean you get some people like Roger 
Pielke who says all scientists can be at best is honest brokers38, they can 
provide the knowledge which says… and it may be knowledge that comes 
from the co-design process but they provide knowledge that says OK here are 
the choices that you’ve got and then you hand it over to the political process 
at which under all these other factors and vested interests begin to intervene… 
 
FGP6: But… 
 
FGP5: I have always wondered if that is actually right, if we should stop 
there and taking forward that argument that actually as scientists we are 
already partly running on normative agendas on politicised agendas because 
of who we are, because of why we are curious in the first place.  I think 
there’s a responsibility of scientists to follow it through, a couple of stages 
further  
 
FGP2: [Yeah.] 
 
FGP3: [Yeah, I agree.] 
 
FGP5: [and to] to act a little bit more like activists, 
 
FGP3: [right]  
 
FGP5: [to act] as advocates for particular positions, while being very 
conscious of what they’re doing and [appreciating that you can’t necessarily] 
run it all the way. Yeah. 
 
FGP2: [Just do it explicitly.] 
                                                 
38 An honest broker being a scientist that offers options but does not advocate a particular option over 
any other (Pielke Jr, 2007). 
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However, the participants considered that particular skills would need to be 
developed on the part of researchers to engage in this type of activism or political 
process: 
 
FGP5: […] It does raise some furthers questions about capacity and the 
capacity of scientists to know how to… as it were play these politics  
 
FGP3: [oh] 
 
FGP5: […] in a way it’s kind of learning how as a scientist one can begin to 
influence and operate within these political processes in an effective way. 
[Yeah, yeah.] 
 
FGP2: [That was] my point earlier about the responsibility  
 
FGP5 and FGP 3: [yeah] 
 
FGP2: [because] if you’re sort of stepping half way in and then you know you 
also bash the process or whatever, you can do humongous [damage] you 
know and people are actually often blind to the responsibility or the 
implication of what they say and it is… I mean it is deeply destructive to all 
the trust that is being built 
 
FGP3: [absolutely] FGP5: [yeah] 
 
FGP2: [so] I mean the skills that needs to be built to do this  
 
FGP5: [exactly] 
 
FGP2: [are] really outside the typical training of a [graduate student]. 
 
Engaging with political processes is seen as a delicate and fragile undertaking, 
holding the potential for harm as well as good. To engage in co-production, on the 
part of scientists, is difficult, as it threatens identity and ideals, requires new skills 
and training and requires a lot of thinking about the relation between science and 
politics, which might be quite a novel thing to do for some researchers. The issue of 
the co-’s as ‘threat’ (rather than opportunity) will be explored further in section 5.3. 
 
5.2.1 Summary of alternative meaning and rationale 
 
In summary, in this understanding of co-’s, much of the core understanding is 
brought forward (e.g. co-’s are seen as iterative and sustained processes, bringing 
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together different types of knowledge, moving from understanding to impact). 
Furthermore, although these broad modes or types allow us to distinguish between 
differing definitions and goals of co-design and co-production, they are not totally 
distinct, and some participants draw on each vision. For example participant 9 
couched the rationale for co-design and co-production in terms of ensuring decision 
makers feel ownership and take notice of the knowledge created, but the participant’s 
definition of co-production entailed bringing together different knowledge systems; 
the challenge to those involved posed by incommensurability – or at least 
incompatibility – of ideas between epistemologies; and awareness and discussion of 
these issues (i.e. reflexivity) as a key aspect of co-production. 
 
In common with the core understanding, the alternative understanding explored in 
this section is also about collaboration or participation, but with a greater emphasis 
on plurality, reflexivity, and acknowledging that perspectives are partial; its 
underpinning rationale is around the democratisation of knowledge and the extension 
of rights of knowledge production to non-academic actors. This is grounded 
in/informed by social science/STS ideas (including Jasanoff) but the extent to which 
ideas about co-constitution filter into the broader Future Earth discourse/discussion is 
quite limited at this stage. However, this view of the co-’s builds on those ideas as it 
is about acknowledging the normative aspects of knowledge, the normative role of 
researchers, the knowledge politics at play, and democratising/redirecting these. The 
role of the researcher is to facilitate this reflexivity and the inclusion of marginalised 
viewpoints (on the part of social scientists) and/or to be an activist or advocate for 
particular trajectories. However, co-’s also hold the potential to do harm; the socially 
embodied nature of knowledge should be acknowledged (including the significance 
of trust, respect, etc.).  
 
The following section explores a further view of the co-’s, often formulated in 
response or opposition to the core and alternative understandings outlined above: the 
view that co-’s might be a threat to existing and valued scientific identities and 
processes. 
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5.3 Contestation: co-’s as threat 
 
The two conceptualisations of what co-design/co-production is and the rationales for 
doing it outlined above (participation for utility and reflexivity for democratisation) 
are (for the most part) articulated in the context of advocating or promoting this as an 
approach to research. However, as I will explore in this section, another view of the 
co-’s emerges in the internal documents, and during meeting observation, focus 
groups and interviews: a view of co-’s as threatening, disruptive or dangerous to 
existing (and valued) ways of doing research, or even to human life. While the 
majority of actors involved, particularly in the global committees, were on board with 
the co-’s, some were less keen, seeing it as a potential threat to scientific objectivity, 
independence and academic freedom (this is particularly the case when co-’s are 
imagined to mean stakeholders both contributing funding and participating in the 
research process). In this view, co-’s are imagined in opposition to basic or 
fundamental research. The tension between this vision and co-’s as reflexivity (in 
particular) is sometimes seen as a tension between natural science and social science. 
 
These tensions drove some of the uncertainties around the co-’s in Future Earth. The 
extent and nature of involvement/engagement entailed in co-’s, and whether this 
should be a required feature of Future Earth work, remained ambiguous at the time of 
the fieldwork; the observation and focus groups featured debate around whether these 
concepts should imply shared responsibility (collaboration) versus co-’s as 
consultation, and whether these concepts are set in stone as features of Future Earth 
research, as further explored in this section. 
 
While co-production is mostly seen as an opportunity, it can also be perceived as a 
threat to scientists or science in a variety of ways. Many participants referred to the 
ideal of objective, pure science; either expressing concern about how to preserve it or 
noting that others in Future Earth feel that it is challenged by co-design and/or co-
production. Some of the most significant contestation arose around adherence or 
otherwise to this ideal, as well as around the notions of scientific independence and 
academic freedom. One participant suggested that the involvement of private sector 
organisations (e.g. oil companies) in research could be dangerous, considering the 
elimination of conflicts of interest to be ‘the hallmark of science’: 
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[…] almost all [of the criticisms of co-design and co-production] in one way 
or another revolve around the issues of conflicts of interest, the potential for 
that to influence the outcome or the objectivity of the research and its 
interpretation and then the potential of suppression of the information when it 
doesn’t support one’s point of view.  The strongest proponents of co-design in 
Future Earth right now […] are very quick to dismiss these concerns on two 
grounds, one ground is that these criticisms can be easily managed but usually 
there is no clear way of how they are going to managed. […] I think those 
concerns are very legitimate and there has been some research examples 
where agendas by oil companies that have helped co-design research, agendas 
by pharmaceutical companies that have helped research, agendas by tobacco 
companies that have helped research have crept in to the active production of 
the knowledge and then its dissemination where they actually twisted things, 
mis-represented things and sometimes to the death of people as the result of 
this.        
(Interview 2) 
 
For this reason the participant argued for a ‘complete separation’ between 
stakeholders and the middle of the research process (generating and analysing data). 
However, this participant was not totally against the co-design of research questions 
and priorities, as long as there was still support for curiosity-driven science beyond 
Future Earth. Other participants felt that perceived risks of bias or conflict of interest 
associated with involving societal stakeholders were legitimate but manageable 
concerns. For example, one participant suggested that accountability could be built 
into the research process by stipulating that projects address questions of inequality 
when co-designing and/or co-producing with business or other powerful actors; 
another proposed that political co-option could be avoided by ensuring that the 
academic peer review process would be undertaken by rigorous and sceptical ‘top-
rate’ scientists (as discussed further in Chapter 7). 
 
The view of co-’s as a threat is particularly apparent in the notes generated as part of 
a meeting of the existing GEC projects in January 2014 (doc 100). Sessions were 
held to discuss the opportunities and challenges of co-design and co-production, 
giving rise to discussion of many threats, risks and fears. One participant suggested 
that within Future Earth there was ‘strong bias towards co-design whereas there are 
substantial scientific issues to address still’, and others suggested that ‘reaching out 
and engaging is not a bad thing, but setting up a program with co-design as a key 
element is dangerous’ and ‘engagement is more palatable – co-design can be toxic to 
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the community’. A huge range of specific risks were mentioned, including 
compromising the legitimacy, independence and objectivity of science, the 
challenges of identifying stakeholders and balancing their needs and interests, and the 
time, resources and communication skills such interaction might require. Conflict of 
interest was considered to be particularly problematic in relation to involvement of 
the private sector, and co-’s were considered to threaten curiosity-driven science and 
basic research, with the risk that ‘Future Earth becomes a consulting firm’ or 
scientists become consultants. 
 
These views were echoed by some participants during the observed committee 
meetings. The degree of shared responsibility and agreement between parties implied 
by the ‘co-’ was seen as problematic by one participant: 
 
FGP3: […] I have mixed feelings about the idea of co-production and I’ll 
give you some of the positives and some of the negatives.  I understand from 
co-production that you actually… […] you have a research project, and you 
design it together which means you agree… both on the structure, the 
questions, how you take it forward, the implementation of it.  If you’re 
producing it together and you are responsible for the end product, for the 
outcomes.  
 
The participant went on to contrast this with the consultation of stakeholders, which 
was seen as beneficial (as opposed to scientists being consultants, as above): 
 
And it’s different from consultation with stakeholders, so as far as 
consultation is concerned, I suppose you’re talking about with NGOs in 
whose field site you’re working or with policy makers, I think consultation I 
see as a real plus/plus because it enriches your potential questions, it doesn’t 
hold you responsible for actually taking… you consult but you don’t 
necessarily agree with that, you don’t have to take it in to account but it 
certainly broadens and deepens your research space.  The co-production 
requires something else which is an agreement on the aims and objectives and 
I see there are difficulties here because… especially if talking to policy 
makers because they could be differences in perspectives, the differences in 
expertise, the methodologies, […]  A lot of the times policy makers are 
actually resistant to the set of ideas you’re promoting.  So going all the way 
and saying we’re co-producing it seems to me is a real stretch.   
 
The participant’s concern is the degree to which co-production commits the 
researcher to taking into consideration the stakeholders’ perspectives, and what might 
happen when stakeholders are not supportive of the approach or ideas the researcher 
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wants to use or promote; i.e. the independence or freedom of research is 
compromised. The participant went on to raise another issue, relating to the 
limitations of a demand-driven model: 
 
The other negative is that there are leaps of ideas that you make which are 
not incremental and which are not demand driven and I think a lot of good 
research in science or social science is not demand driven, it’s not like 
industry coming or a farmer coming to you and saying “look I have a real 
problem with rust in wheat and can you give me a solution”?  It’s really 
Borlaug sitting in Summit and saying “OK I am going to produce a new 
hybrid variety of wheat” and there is a leap in the idea. […] So I think 
research can’t be limited to the notion that you have to co-produce and co-
design because there can be both limitations and conflicts as well. 
         
(Focus group 2) 
 
Linked to the projects’ concerns about research as consultancy above, this participant 
considers a demand-led approach to stifle the ‘leaps of ideas’ that have led to 
particular (social) scientific or technological developments and innovations. 
 
Awareness of these concerns about solutions-orientation and co-design/co-production 
threatening basic, fundamental and curiosity-driven research was apparent in the 
video interviews conducted by Interim Secretariat members with committee members 
during the Beijing meetings: two participants framed their responses to questions 
about co-design, co-production and solutions-oriented science in Future Earth in 
terms of defending the influence that these new approaches might have on the 
excellence of the science undertaken, and highlighting the important role of 
fundamental and cutting edge research in Future Earth. One Science Committee 
member suggested that ‘Future Earth, rather than being something “fundamental 
science doesn’t have a place in it”, Future Earth should be a magnet for scientists 
interested in research which is fundamentally new within the context of socially 
relevant questions.’ Another suggested that, rather than stopping people from doing 
‘basic blue sky research’, ‘we hope that Future Earth will bring with it a shift to more 
basic use-oriented, use-inspired research’. From this perspective, rather than 
threatening fundamental science, the approaches to research advocated in Future 
Earth lead to better, more excellent, reinvigorated research: ‘Future Earth is not going 
to make our science more superficial, less interesting, less sharp – quite to the 
contrary.’ 
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Further contestation arose around the co-’s in the context of a plenary discussion on 
engagement during the committee meetings, where the extent to which committee 
members were not on the same page about whether co-’s should be a core feature of 
all Future Earth research became apparent. There were signs that the tensions 
between different ideas about what the “co-” concepts mean were rooted in 
disciplinary or epistemological differences, particularly between those that saw co-’s 
as a threat (predominantly natural scientists and positivist social scientists) and those 
that saw it as an opportunity for reflexivity (predominantly from interpretive social 
science and humanities backgrounds). One participant suggested that the language of 
an internal presentation on Future Earth’s approach to engagement felt like ‘the 
revenge of social scientists on natural scientists’.  
 
5.3.1 Summary of the three views on co-’s 
 
Table 2 below summarises the three views on co-’s presented thus far: co-’s as 
participation for utility, co-’s as reflexivity for democratisation, and co-’s as threat. 
 
These different views also echo some of the tensions in Future Earth’s identity and 
remit explored in Chapter 4 (Table 1): for example, co-’s as reflexivity for 
democratisation emphasises multiplicity, diversity and debate, while co-’s as 
participation for relevance, acceptance and utility might suggest a greater focus on 
consensus, integration and solutions; finally, co-’s are seen by some as a threat to 
curiosity driven research by shifting the focus to demand.  
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Table 2: Three views on co-’s 
Type Co-design/co-production as participation for 
acceptability, relevance, utility and impact 
Co-design/co-production as reflexivity and 
deliberation for democratisation  
Co-design/co-production as a threat 
Definition Societal stakeholders participate in two-way 
dialogues and collaborate with researchers from 
different disciplines in order to jointly:  
• frame, define, design research strategies, 
priorities, agendas, projects, Future Earth 
itself [co-design, co-creation] 
• produce knowledge, implement research 
projects [co-production, co-creation] 
• disseminate and implement 
research/knowledge results, outputs, 
solutions [co-dissemination, co-delivery] 
Societal stakeholders come together with 
researchers from different disciplines 
throughout the research process to: 
• reflexively debate, deliberate and make 
explicit everyone’s partial perspectives, 
worldviews, assumptions; 
• acknowledge who/what is included and 
excluded, acknowledge alternatives and 
the normative dimensions of research; 
• include a range of perspectives; 
• democratise questions and lines of 
investigation, bring about epistemic 
equality and cognitive justice. 
Co-design/co-production in which 
stakeholders are involved in science/research 
(whether through participation and/or 
deliberation) poses a threat to the 
objectivity, independence and autonomy of 
science/research. Co-design/co-production 
may be acceptable in Future Earth but not at 
all stages of the research process, and/or not 
with all types of stakeholder, and there must 
still be space for fundamental, basic research 
within and/or outside of Future Earth. 
What is co- 
produced? 
Solutions oriented, relevant (not prescriptive) 
research questions, knowledge, solutions, 
information, policy options, insights, data, tools 
Socially embodied knowledge and solutions; 
science/research and social order, norms and 
worldviews 
Co-design of research questions is more 
acceptable than involvement of stakeholders 
in data generation, analysis & dissemination 
Rationale 
 
Instrumental, utilitarian, logic of accountability: 
knowledge will be more relevant and 
efficacious, because: 
• the “right” research questions are asked; 
• it is co-owned by people who will use it so 
gains visibility, credibility and legitimacy;  
• answers & solutions are more likely to be 
suitable for/accepted by those they are 
intended for, and used properly by them, 
and therefore have impact;  
• higher quality research will be produced; 
• legitimacy & authority of Future Earth is 
increased through institutional co-design. 
Political, emancipatory, logic of ontology: the 
co-design/co-production process will allow 
questions of common purpose and framing to 
be asked, assumptions questioned, and 
alternative options considered, which is 
important because: 
• all knowledge & perspectives are partial;  
• acknowledging this & taking stakeholder 
knowledge/experience seriously enables 
democratisation of knowledge production 
and decision making;  
• this enables research to make a difference 
in terms of social justice/power relations. 
Epistemological, political, logic of 
autonomy: science produces independent, 
objective, reliable knowledge by: 
• avoiding conflict of interest; 
• independently pursuing its own agenda. 
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(Non-
academic) 
participants 
Users; representatives of different sectors or 
stakeholder groups (e.g. policy makers, funders, 
civil society, private sector): 
• have knowledge needs; 
• have information to exchange (or to input 
into ‘flows’), particularly on what 
challenges society is/decision makers are 
facing; 
• might have existing knowledge and 
experience to be considered and respected. 
Cognitive, epistemic participants (whether 
scientists, policy makers, practitioners, 
decision-makers, local communities, others): 
• have valid knowledge and experience to 
offer; 
• have agency; 
• all have normative commitments and 
assumptions (including scientists). 
 
Private sector and policy stakeholders: 
• have interests and biases that might 
threaten the objectivity of the research; 
• might prevent the researcher from 
pursuing particular lines of enquiry; 
• may twist the research results or 
misrepresent them. 
Role of 
research and 
researchers 
Lead and guide the co-production process; 
provide the knowledge (with input from all 
concerned); responsible for methodologies; 
provide policy options and policy-relevant (not 
prescriptive) knowledge (knowledge broker). 
Facilitate reflexivity; question own and others’ 
positionality and assumptions; draw out 
marginalised knowledges, perspectives so they 
can be recognised by all; pursue or advocate 
particular normative agendas (activist). 
Avoid conflict of interest and preserve 
objectivity and/or independence of research. 
Science-
society 
relation 
Science and society are separate but come 
together (or enter each other’s spaces) in the 
process of co-design/co-production. 
Science is part of society and the process of 
co-design and co-production enables the 
deliberation of worldviews and future visions. 
Science and society are separate and should 
remain so, particularly in the middle of the 
scientific process. 
Ontology/ 
epistemology 
Realist/positivist Constructivist Realist/positivist 
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In relation to the literature discussed in Chapter 2, both van der Hel (2016) and I, 
working separately but within the same timeframe, revealed a variety of rationales 
for co-production in Future Earth. Van der Hel’s logics of accountability and impact 
can be subsumed under the understanding of co-’s as participation for utility detailed 
above, and her logic of humility can be subsumed under the understanding of co-’s as 
reflexivity for democratisation. However, while van der Hel notes some of the 
tensions between these approaches and existing ways of valuing and doing research 
(e.g. notions of independent or autonomous science), she does not distinguish or 
delineate a separate view of co-’s to account for them. 
 
Regarding delineation, while for analytical purposes I am distinguishing between 
these broad understandings, views, “types” or modes, as noted above in section 5.2.1, 
in practice there are some overlaps, with some participants drawing on aspects of 
more than one view. Furthermore, I am not suggesting that the utility mode and the 
democratisation mode are in opposition. Deliberation can be a way of making things 
useful (of course, depending on how ‘usefulness’ is defined). And although the linear 
aspect of the utility model might be more closed to efforts towards democratisation, 
just having these conversations and inviting non-academics into these processes has 
the potential to create new dynamics (even if they do not result in the type of 
democratisation, epistemic justice etc. advocated by some). As discussed in Chapter 
4, some have argued that some of Future Earth’s ambitions are irreconcilable (for 
example, solutions orientation vs. deliberation and debate), and that the dirigistic 
ambition to integrate and harmonise across the programme will foreclose multiplicity 
(Lövbrand et al., 2015). But the presence of multiple understandings of the co-’s is 
itself a form of multiplicity; multiple models and practices can be productive, as 
further explored in the next section.  
 
5.4 Resolution? Co-’s as multiple and experimental 
 
Those advocating co-design and co-production within Future Earth for the most part 
seemed very aware of the challenges and contestation described above, particularly 
that many in the existing GEC research communities (and, indeed, some Future Earth 
committees members) were sceptical about – or threatened by – these approaches. 
They were also aware that multiple definitions of these terms abounded. Partly to 
171 
 
address the issues raised about co-’s by those that saw co-’s as a threat, and partly to 
deal with the ambiguities discussed in section 5.1.4 (between extent of co-design and 
co-production at different levels), several participants suggested that there is or 
would need to be a spectrum or continuum of co-’s, with different amounts of 
stakeholder involvement at different stages in the process for different problems 
(rather than having a standardised requirement for a particular type of co-production 
across the whole initiative). The extent to which it might be possible to devise shared 
meanings or principles is further explored in section 7.3. 
 
Some participants suggested that these concepts are always likely to mean something 
different in different contexts. One participant outlined the multiplicity of co-’s in 
terms of both meaning and practice, and the need for engagement to be adapted to 
different contexts:  
 
The problem with this debate at the moment is that we don’t yet have a 
common agreement on the terms and it’s very likely as well that even in the 
future when people use these terms they’ll mean very different things. I think 
what we’re stressing right now is that there are likely to be very diverse ways 
in which different communities all clustered around different problems do in 
practice co-creation of agenda-setting or co-production. […] obviously if 
you’re going to engage with the IPCC it’s totally different than if you’re 
gonna engage with the government of Malawi on a new strategy on 
ecosystems services, it’s just fundamentally different, you’ve got different 
actor-networks, different discourses, different power relationships… different 
confluences on both sides. 
 
This multiplicity leads the participant to suggest that co-’s are on a continuum – in 
that there is a procedural order (in which co-creation and co-production come first 
followed by co-implementation or co-intervention) and also different phases and 
configurations: 
 
I do see it as a continuum, so co-creation, co-production, and then whatever, 
co-implementation or co-intervention whatever you want to call it, it’s a 
partnership that will somehow have different phases and different 
configurations and possibly different people involved as well at different 
stages so… […]  we are currently within Future Earth having a debate about 
what these things ought to mean. I think we probably agree that it’s likely to 
mean many different things to different people, there is no correct way or one 
size fits all and so […] it’ll be a journey in part about learning from other 
areas where they’re further along than we are. 
        (Interview 8) 
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The metaphor of a ‘journey’ and the reference to learning suggests that developing 
co-production in Future Earth is seen as an ongoing process. Participants often 
stressed the novelty of trying to adopt these approaches in the GEC domain and at the 
‘global’ level, characterising this as ‘stepping into the unknown’ and ‘exploring new 
ground’. Several participants suggested that it would be necessary to learn from 
existing fields where this type of approach is more usual (albeit at ‘national’ or 
‘local’ levels): the most prominent examples being health, development and 
agricultural studies, but also to learn from the engagement experiences of the existing 
GEC programmes. Chapter 7 discusses the ways in which this ‘no one size fits all’ 
philosophy was operationalised and the emphasis on the importance of learning about 
other and Future Earth’s own attempts at the co-’s.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
During the time of this study, aspects of the tensions in Future Earth’s identity and 
remit explored in the previous chapter persisted in the form of ambiguity in how co-
design and co-production were imagined. The meanings of these terms were 
multiple, ambiguous and contested; this was (at least partly) driven by varying 
rationales for advocating the co-’s and differing levels of subscription to the idea that 
they should be required elements of Future Earth research. The discussions and 
activity around the co-’s was messy in the sense that there was little consensus on 
these terms (or indeed on many questions of Future Earth’s broader remit and 
activities). However, it is possible to identify common themes and features that 
coalesce around particular views on what these terms are about. While one dominant 
(not entirely unambiguous) view emerged (co-’s as participation of stakeholders for 
relevance, acceptance, and utility), a minority understanding was also present (co-’s 
as reflexivity for democratisation). A third view of co-’s also emerged, often 
formulated in response or resistance to the first two understandings: the idea that the 
co-’s might be a threat to the objectivity, independence or freedom of science.  
 
These different visions reveal different ideas about the relationship between science 
and society and the source and role of the normative in research. The core view 
suggests that involving stakeholders in research through co-design and co-production 
will make knowledge more relevant, acceptable, and therefore it will be used more 
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and have greater impact. Co-’s are seen as a means to close a gap between research 
and policy/practice, where science and society are seen as spatially separate, but 
would come together in the process of co-design and co-production. Values and the 
normative are the concerns or expertise of societal stakeholders, and (scientific) 
knowledge and skills are the expertise of researchers. The role of the researcher (or 
research more broadly) is that of the knowledge broker, offering policy options and 
scenarios but not being policy prescriptive (the notion that research might be 
normative in its framing etc. is rarely, if ever, acknowledged). The second view 
suggests that co-’s are a process of deliberation or reflexivity, enabling the (partial) 
knowledge and commitments of multiple parties to be debated, and democratised. It 
sees science as part of society; all parties, including scientists, are driven by social 
commitments and norms, and co-design and co-production is a means of making 
these explicit. The role of the researcher might come closer to that of an activist, not 
only identifying and making explicit the implicit normative aspects of research, but 
also taking steps to pursue particular normative agendas in policy or action. Finally, 
the third view sees science and society as separate and believes that they should 
remain separate, society having interests and biases that might contaminate or limit 
science/research in detrimental ways.  
 
To counter the resistance to co-’s expressed partly through the third view, and to deal 
with some of the ambiguities and challenges of the co-’s (not least the challenges 
posed by transposing these concepts/approaches into different contexts) Future Earth 
actors proposed that it might be necessary to develop a continuum or spectrum of  
co-’s, meaning different things (or at least different extents of engagement) in 
different contexts (not yet fully specified). Co-’s were seen as innovative and 
experimental, as they have not been attempted in this field at the global level before 
(although they are seen as common in other fields, such as medicine, agricultural and 
development studies), and Future Earth actors are ‘feeling their way’ to work out 
how to implement this. The concept of co-production potentially creates an 
experimental condition in Future Earth. 
 
To conclude, ambiguities in the meaning of co-production (and related terms) in 
Future Earth are underpinned by varying rationales for doing co-production (and 
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related practices) – and for limiting the way that it is done. In this context, the actors 
involved suggest that they are conducting some sort of experiment. This is not 
foregrounded in their accounts, but it could potentially be a very useful lens or 
approach: experimenting might be the only way to proceed given the differences in 
understanding of what co-’s are and what they are for.  
 
The following chapter further elucidates these different understandings by exploring 
who is imagined or expected to be involved, revealing in more detail the underlying 
political imaginaries of science and society and associated notions of the value of 
research.  
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Chapter 6: Who is involved in co-production? 
 
Although involving societal stakeholders is key to all understandings of the co-’s in 
Future Earth, who these stakeholders might be is not always clear, and what this 
might mean in practice is not often elucidated. This chapter presents an analysis of 
who is (imagined/supposed to be) involved in Future Earth, thereby drawing out the 
underlying science-society imaginaries and models (e.g. of democracy, and of the 
value of research) that inform the different (anticipatory, performative) views of co-
production explored in the previous chapter. These underlying imaginaries impact on 
how co-production can be performed, particularly through their expression in 
different participatory models.  
 
The previous chapter (Chapter 5) addressed research question 2, exploring meanings 
of and rationales for co-design and co-production in Future Earth. This chapter 
addresses research question 3: Who is imagined or expected to be involved in co-
design and co-production? What are the underlying models or imaginaries of science 
and society?  
 
Section 6.1 briefly discusses the implications different rationales for co-design and 
co-production have on visions of stakeholder engagement (such as who the 
stakeholders might be). Section 6.2 explores how stakeholders are constructed in 
Future Earth, and what challenges are faced by this emerging initiative in defining 
and engaging its stakeholders. Section 6.3 explores tensions between different visions 
of ‘appropriate’ stakeholders at appropriate stages of co-design/co-production, 
arguing that these tensions are fuelled by and reflect broader political imaginaries of 
science and associated notions of public value (linked to the different understanding 
of co-’s discussed in Chapter 5). The chapter draws on Nowotny’s (2014) conception 
of political imaginaries (itself inspired by Ezrahi, 2012): ‘necessary fictions that are 
causative’ (Nowotny, 2014: 17), that inform and guide the visions and views 
expressed (and related action) by key actors in Future Earth. This conceptual tool is a 
useful foil against which to tease out sources and implications of the tensions, 
particularly in relation to differing notions of public value of science, and opinions on 
which type of stakeholders are appropriate or legitimate.  
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As Future Earth gradually emerges and stabilises as an organisation, its collective 
political imaginary is still in flux. This means that there is not one singular shared 
vision of science and politics, nor how co-production fits in at the intersections of 
science, politics and stakeholders (nor might there ever be). This has implications for 
how stakeholders are imagined in the initiative.  
 
As explored in more depth in Chapter 2, imaginaries, whether political (Nowotny, 
2014), socio-technical (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009), technoscientific (Marcus, 1994), or 
social (Taylor, 2004), can be considered to be instruments of the co-production (or 
co-constitution) of science (or knowledge) and social order (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). 
Visions of scientific and technological futures draw on and are imbued with implicit 
(or sometimes explicit) visions of social order, including notions of identity, politics 
and the public good. In exploring the political imaginaries in Future Earth, I am 
taking steps to build a picture of the latent ‘reflexive-relational’ (Chilvers et al., 
2014) processes of co-production – or co-constitution – of science and social order 
occurring within and around the initiative and its deliberate agenda of co-design/co-
production of research.  
 
The following section briefly relates the core rationale for co-’s as explored in 
Chapter 5 to another rationale for co-’s discussed within the STS literature 
(increasing public trust in science), in order to clarify the different visions of 
stakeholder engagement entailed by each. 
 
6.1 Implications of rationales for co-’s on visions of stakeholder engagement 
 
The previous chapter outlined different meanings and rationales for co-design and 
co-production within Future Earth. These rationales have a bearing on the imagined 
or proposed stakeholders in co-design and co-production, whether policy makers, 
business, publics, or others (and the boundaries – imagined or otherwise – between 
them). For example, if co-’s are proposed as a governance option to address eroded 
public credibility of science/lack of public trust in science, publics may be envisaged 
as the predominant stakeholder; whereas if co-’s are seen as a means to increase the 
impact of research on policy making, policy makers may be envisaged as the 
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predominant stakeholder (though publics, citizens or society might still figure as the 
ultimate beneficiaries of science). In either of these cases, credibility can be seen as 
an end and/or a means of the governance exercise, though in whose esteem might 
differ.  
 
In a science governance literature review for a BIS/Sciencewise-ERC39 project on 
‘Science, Trust and Public Engagement’, Chilvers and Macnaghten (2011: 21) 
position co-design as a ‘route through which publics can have influence in shaping 
the nature and direction of emerging science and technology (including its priorities, 
objectives and strategies)’. They depict governance challenges in relation to climate 
science and policy in terms of ‘increasing public scrutiny and an erosion of public 
trust in climate science’ (27), suggesting that science governance responses in the 
UK and internationally in the wake of ‘Climategate’ and ‘Glaciergate’ might extend 
beyond science-centric calls for openness and transparency to achieve ‘restoration of 
trust in expert organisations’ through the ‘radical reframing and reconfiguration of 
the relationship between climate science, climate policy and societal change’ (28). 
This is motivated by an aim to acknowledge a multiplicity of perspectives and the 
role of value judgements in climate science and policy, and for knowledge to be 
scrutinised by a broader community of citizens in order to be validated. Chilvers and 
Macnaghten propose various governance options to achieve this, such as widening 
participation on expert committees, extended peer review, and ‘co-produced forms of 
knowledge with climate scientists working in collaboration with social scientists and 
non-scientists’ (28).  
 
This view of co-design and co-production seems to advocate literally finding a place 
for publics in and between climate science and politics, enabling them to interact 
directly with scientific and policy processes (although, of course, this might well be 
an artefact of the BIS/Sciencewise-ERC project’s focus on trust and public 
engagement rather than on other dimensions of science governance). In contrast, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, Future Earth’s core rationale for co-’s is motivated by an 
intention to increase the ‘impact’ of research by ensuring that knowledge is used by 
governments, business and civil society (which may or may not entail increasing 
                                                 
39 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills / Sciencewise – Expert Resource Centre (‘the UK’s 
national centre for public dialogue in policy making involving science and technology issues’).  
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legitimacy or credibility as means or end). This rationale favours the aforementioned 
societal groups as primary stakeholders, rather than ‘the public’ or publics as in 
Chilvers and Macnaghten’s review. Although lack of public trust in science is seen as 
a key issue (and reason to pursue governance options such as co-design/co-
production) by organisations such as Sciencewise, it is not raised explicitly within 
official Future Earth publications as a rationale for co-design/co-production; it was 
mentioned by just one participant within one of the focus groups (and there is it 
linked with public acceptability). With Future Earth’s emphasis on providing 
knowledge for policy and decision-making and its ambition to produce ‘solutions-
oriented’ knowledge, ‘the public’ is rarely mentioned as primary stakeholder – if at 
all.  
 
As explored extensively in the STS literature, ‘the public’ is a complicated term 
(Mohr et al., 2013; Wynne, 2007; Irwin, 2006; Welsh & Wynne, 2013; Felt & 
Wynne, 2007; Felt & Fochler, 2007). Rather than existing as a pre-established entity 
‘out there’ waiting to be engaged in science, politics or both, public(s) are ‘called into 
existence, they are convened’ (Barnett, 2008: 26; original emphasis) for various 
purposes by various actors in various situations. This literature explores how publics 
– plural to acknowledge the diversity and multiplicity of possible configurations – are 
imagined, constructed, deployed, to what ends, and, importantly, what – or whom – 
may be missing or excluded from these constructions.  
 
While much of the empirical literature on co-production in practice explores 
interactions between scientists and policy makers (for example, in environmental 
governance: Lemos and Morehouse, 2005; Dilling and Lemos, 2011; Lövbrand, 
2011), the STS literature on democratisation of science (including, of course, the 
public understanding of and public engagement with science literature) is framed 
with reference to publics. This analysis will therefore explore how publics, along 
with other stakeholders, are imagined in Future Earth.  
 
The following section will explore the construction of Future Earth stakeholders in 
more detail to give an overview of the imagined potential participants in/audiences of 
(co-production in) Future Earth, including how these conceptualisations link to the 
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particular understandings of engagement and co-design/co-production as outlined in 
Chapter 5. 
 
6.2 Visions of Future Earth’s stakeholders  
 
Those imagined to have a stake in Future Earth – stakeholders – are characterised in 
a range of ways, explored in this section. Section 6.2.1 explores the broadest framing 
of Future Earth’s potential stakeholder or beneficiary, that is, ‘society’, as well as 
Future Earth’s focus on ‘users’ and ‘partners’ and how these terms relate to the 
understandings of co-’s as discussed in the previous chapter. Section 6.2.2 looks 
more specifically at what the term ‘stakeholders’ means in Future Earth, what it 
might comprise, and the extent to which ‘the public’ or publics might be considered 
stakeholders in Future Earth. Section 6.2.3 explores the challenges of representation 
and representativeness that arise in relation to Future Earth’s stakeholders. 
 
6.2.1 Stakeholders as recipients? ‘Society’, ‘users’ and ‘partners’ 
 
Future Earth seeks to become ‘the global research platform providing the knowledge 
and support to accelerate our transformations to a sustainable world’ and ‘a platform 
for international engagement to ensure that knowledge is generated in partnership 
with society and users of science’ (Future Earth, 2014a). Its ambitions as articulated 
in official Future Earth documents include: to effect ‘a step change in international 
collaboration in the service of all people on our planet — a major new effort to […] 
identify transformations that create a better future for humankind’ (Future Earth, 
2013b: 5); and to ‘realise a new ‘social contract’ between science and society to 
accelerate the delivery of the knowledge that society needs to address pressing 
environmental changes’ (11). Throughout Future Earth discourse, science and society 
are positioned as separate and in need of a new, closer relationship, for the benefit of 
society. As seen in these extracts, society is positioned as requiring knowledge and 
solutions in order to address environmental change and achieve sustainability, which 
science can provide or contribute to providing. This framing seems to suggest a 
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‘transmission’ or ‘deficit’ model of communication/interaction rather than a dialogic 
one, and/or a ‘pipeline’ or ‘linear’ model of research, policy and innovation.40  
 
While ‘society’ is positioned as a general, abstract ‘ultimate beneficiary’ (Nowotny, 
2014: 16) of Future Earth research, other terms are used to specify which parties will 
be involved in the initiative.  
 
Future Earth’s focus on achieving impact through the use of the research it produces 
is apparent in references to ‘users’ (as seen in Chapter 5): 
 
Future Earth invites the broad community of researchers working within the 
natural and social sciences, engineering and the humanities to engage in 
developing knowledge that is co-designed with those who use research in 
governments, business, and civil society.  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 21) 
 
However, more recent documents reflect a shift in language from ‘users’ to 
‘partners’, as acknowledged by one participant: 
 
I think we qualitatively want to change the way in which we do agenda-
setting within science, […] how we do science itself, […] So that this isn’t 
simply about a communications strategy which is one-way and […] [it] is 
really an attempt to involve ourselves in societal arenas as well […]. So I 
think it’s actually through that qualitative change we will have a much more 
intensive engagement, so also changing the language we use, not talk about 
research users anymore but to talk about partners, […] to see the academies 
active in societal arenas and that’s terribly difficult and terribly… nerve-
wracking and we don’t have capacities on either side actually within science 
or within society to do this adequately yet, but I think if we look back in ten 
years’ time we’ll be doing something fundamentally different than what we 
do now […] 
(Interview 8)   
 
Here, this shift in language is seen as valuable in enacting a shift in the way that 
science is done, including a greater intensity of academic activity beyond the 
academy. This shift is both temporal and spatial in nature, disrupting the one-way 
communication model in which non-academic stakeholders are seen as end users 
rather than as viable participants at earlier stages of research processes; but also 
                                                 
40 The tension between this framing and Future Earth’s calls (throughout the documents and 
interviews) for collaboration, two-way dialogue, and the rejection of the linear model is discussed in 
more detail in the previous chapter. 
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encouraging academics to inhabit or enter the same space as those partners – societal 
arenas (as discussed in Chapter 5). It perhaps also suggests a shift in responsibility 
and level of investment; ‘partners’ taking an equal or greater role and interest in 
comparison with ‘users’. However, in common with all of the documents and many 
of the interviews, the science/society dichotomy is reinforced through the 
characterisation of these domains as distinct, consistent with the ‘participation for 
utility’ understanding of the co-’s.  
 
The temporal aspect of the shift in language is a view shared by other Future Earth 
actors. For example, one focus group participant argued that ‘we as a scientific entity 
need to hear from users of the information who will we will now call not just 
stakeholders but partners with us, what are the challenges they see out there for 
decision making’. This rationale for the shift in language relates to engaging 
stakeholders in determining research priorities and questions, but retains the 
assumption that the stakeholders are users or recipients of a service, rather than 
participants in deliberation with their own knowledge to contribute. This seems to be 
the dominant view across the documents and in some interviews, although, as 
explored in Chapter 5, some participants considered stakeholders to be active 
contributors of knowledge or expertise; as expressed here in relation to the terms 
‘user’ and ‘partner’:  
 
[…] that is why I like to call them [practitioners, decision makers, local 
communities etcetera] knowledge partners because they are not just providers 
of additional data, they are not witnesses, they are active knowledge partners, 
their knowledge counts. And for me that is what is different to the more sort 
of participatory research approaches that we know of the past where we bring 
on board users but they are there as users of knowledge rather than relevant 
producers of knowledge.  
(Interview 5) 
 
This conceptualisation of non-academic participants as producers of knowledge 
rather than solely users of knowledge relates to the reflexivity for democratisation 
understanding of co-’s discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
The tension between imagining stakeholders as users/recipients and stakeholders as 
active contributors, indeed ‘actors’, is apparent in this focus group extract, which 
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begins with one participant explaining why co-design is not the same as multi- or 
interdisciplinarity:  
 
FGP9: Because the actors, you have researchers, policy makers, you have 
civil society people, that’s the way they’ve framed it, so scientists, social 
scientist are co-designing, the policy makers, they are the users of what you 
do or with civil society are the users. It’s not researchers co-designing with 
each other, we’ve always been doing that, I mean that is no big deal, I don’t 
think that is what Future Earth is talking about. 
 
[…] 
 
FGP7: [...] It’s not science talking to science, it’s science talking to society. 
 
FGP10: [Co-design is the buyer] of the car saying ‘you know I would 
really like it to be like this’ meaning you know you design it for me. 
 
[…] 
 
FGP8: But it is also the farmer saying ‘I don’t want the average monthly 
forecast, I want when the rain arrives I want the amount that comes on this…’ 
and then you say ‘oh gosh can our models can do that’ and going back and so 
I think that you have described it really well with you know kind of bringing 
in the multiple perspectives to actually generate something new that hasn’t- 
 
FGP10: -[But] you brought in an even more important point, which is 
the point that [CNC-FE member] on the first day was stressing, the cultural… 
the insights of the cultural actor, meaning that the farmer has an immense 
amount of knowledge and knows the information that he or she needs and so 
the scientist just comes in and is looking at it from a purely technical 
scientific perspective but is not attuned to those… what the question really is 
and then really missing the boat so…’  
(Focus Group 2) 
 
Here, FGP10 firstly imagines the user in relation to a financial transaction (in which 
they are the ‘buyer of the car’, stipulating their preferences and requirements, which 
are then attended to by the researchers), before imagining them to hold knowledge 
and have insights that should shape the question/problem to be addressed by the 
researchers who would otherwise approach it purely from a technical perspective (cf. 
Wynne, 1996). FGP8 seems to be describing a similar service model in which the 
stakeholder defines their needs, to which scientists respond, but then moves beyond 
this in suggesting that the multiple perspectives generate something new (rather than 
just define the question). The extent to which stakeholders are explicitly imagined as 
having valuable knowledge beyond defining the ‘right’ questions in a service/utility 
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model of co-’s perhaps depends to some extent on whether the participant is 
discussing co-design or co-production; as seen in the previous chapter, in Future 
Earth, often co-design comprises problem or question definition, and co-production 
comprises the generation of knowledge. 
 
Again, here, the science/society dichotomy is reinforced with reference to ‘science 
talking to society’ and ‘the cultural actor’.  
 
In this section I have argued that Future Earth visions of ‘society’, ‘users’ and 
‘partners’ predominantly see these entities or groups as beneficiaries, recipients 
and/or aids to agenda-setting, whilst a minority see them as active participants in 
knowledge construction, although this may depend on whether co-design or co-
production is being considered. The next section will explore imagined 
‘stakeholders’ as societal groups and ‘publics’ in Future Earth. 
 
6.2.2 ‘Stakeholders’ as societal groups: ‘the public’ as absent 
 
While ‘society’ and ‘users’/‘partners’ are significant to the framing and rationales for 
Future Earth and its co-design/co-production, participants or concerned parties in 
Future Earth are predominantly referred to as ‘stakeholders’. An NVivo query search 
for ‘stakeholder’ finds 1017 references across the external and internal documents, 
515 references to ‘partner’, 505 references to ‘society’, 229 references to ‘user’, and 
just 38 references to ‘public’.41 This section examines how the seemingly broad 
category of ‘stakeholder’ is narrowed through more targeted (although often still 
ambiguous) wording, as well as exploring if, where and how ‘the public’ is or publics 
are imagined as a stakeholder in Future Earth. 
 
The Future Earth Design Report, a key document emerging from the early 
development of the initiative, suggests that Future Earth subscribes to the IPCC’s 
(2007) definition of stakeholders: ‘a person or an organisation that has a legitimate 
interest in a project or entity, or would be affected by a particular action or policy’; 
further elaborating that ‘Future Earth recognises its legitimate stakeholders as bodies 
                                                 
41 NVivo query for ‘stakeholder*’, ‘partner*’, ‘society’, ‘user*’, and ‘public* NOT publication*’. 
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or people that have a declared or conceivable interest in its work’ (Future Earth, 
2013b: 53). These definitions render the scope of potential Future Earth stakeholders 
extremely broad, constrained only by the use of the adjective ‘legitimate’. The 
documents do not specify who will make decisions about the legitimacy of potential 
stakeholders or how these decisions will be made and when asked this question in 
interview, participants acknowledged it as a difficult issue without giving a full 
response. However, the potential breadth of this definition of stakeholder is 
somewhat narrowed by the more targeted language throughout the documents (and to 
some extent the interviews), suggesting that some limits to legitimacy are already 
embedded into Future Earth’s documents and governance structure (the interviews 
and focus groups are more illuminating in relation to tensions around who is 
considered to be a legitimate stakeholder, as discussed below in section 6.2.3).  
 
In the documents, stakeholders are predominantly listed in terms of particular societal 
sectors, presumably to identify the potential scope of stakeholders: 
 
Future Earth will deliver science of the highest quality, integrating, as 
necessary, different disciplines from the natural and social sciences (including 
economic, legal and behavioural research), engineering and humanities. It 
will be co-designed and co-produced by academics, governments, business 
and civil society from all regions of the world, encompass bottom-up ideas 
from the wide scientific community, be solution-oriented, and inclusive of 
existing international Global Environmental Change projects and related 
research activities.  
(Future Earth 2013b: 10) 
 
Close collaboration is essential between the scientific community and 
stakeholders across the public, private and voluntary sectors to encourage 
scientific innovation and address policy needs.  
(Future Earth, 2013b: 11) 
 
This framing suggests that a representative model of participation is perhaps at the 
forefront of the official Future Earth imagination of its stakeholders. This is 
reinforced by the Design Report’s adoption of the term ‘major stakeholder groups’, 
reminiscent of UN terminology, listing the following categories: Academic research; 
Science-policy interface organisations; Research funders; Governments (national, 
regional and international); Development bodies; Business and industry; Civil 
society; and Media. Although the report acknowledges that it is ‘difficult to 
unambiguously classify [stakeholder communities] into distinct groups’ (24), little 
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attention is paid to stakeholders that might fall between or outside of the groups as 
defined in the document. For example, ‘civil society’ is defined as follows (to include 
NGOs and indigenous communities): 
 
These are groups organised independently from governments and 
governmental institutions. Civil society groups have organised themselves to 
represent their interests with governments or other influential actors. The 
NGOs have nowadays taken over some roles that traditionally have been the 
responsibility of local or national governments. NGOs have also been 
instrumental in national and international policy negotiations and in 
producing research reports. All these accomplishments increase the relevance 
of these actors to Future Earth. Civil society in this document includes 
indigenous communities, recognising the important knowledge that these 
groups can offer and the important role they can play in Future Earth.  
 
(Future Earth, 2013b: 25) 
 
From this definition, it is unclear whether there will be space in Future Earth for 
citizens who are not actively organised into or represented by NGOs or other sectoral 
groups that are invited to participate in the initiative, or for those that are organised 
into broader social movements that might not be considered to be acceptable 
stakeholders (e.g. ‘lay’, ‘disorganised’, ‘uninvited’ or ‘unruly’ publics (I. Welsh & 
Wynne, 2013; de Saille, 2015a)). However, there was consideration of this during the 
observed committee meetings, as further discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Explicit references to ‘the public’ or ‘publics’ are absent from the Design Report’s 
definitions of the major stakeholder groups, apart from that of research funders, 
described primarily in terms of their support for research but also considered to 
‘work with [researchers] to inspire young people and engage the wider public with 
research’. Governments are described as ‘responsible for managing and balancing the 
short and long-term well-being of their citizens, business, environments and 
resources’; development groups are considered to play a role in ‘amplifying the 
voices of the poorest people’ (Future Earth, 2013b: 24); and the media are not linked 
to the public in this text, although one participant suggested that representatives of 
the media are involved in Future Earth governance committees as a sort of proxy for 
the public. 
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While the Design Report (and other documents) imply that these named stakeholder 
groups will have an active role in the governance of Future Earth and the co-design 
and co-production of Future Earth research, ‘the public’ is for the most part framed 
as an audience of ‘outreach’, ‘education’, ‘communication’ and ‘data access’ rather 
than as a potential participant in research governance or production.  
 
Stakeholders that do not necessarily fall within the major stakeholder groups (e.g. 
‘spiritual and cultural leaders, and citizens who are re-evaluating their lifestyles and 
legacies for their descendants’ (Future Earth, 2013b: 40) are mentioned in the Design 
Report as necessary partners within particular research themes, suggesting that there 
may be space for engagement with more diverse publics and/or individuals at the 
research project level if not at the governance level.  
 
Documents from the early development of the initiative characterise ‘the public’ 
(along with policy makers) as needing to be informed by GEC science in order to 
respond effectively to global change challenges. The glossary entry for 
‘transdisciplinary’ in one early document suggests that ‘the public’ can also be a 
contributor to knowledge production: 
 
Transdisciplinary: Research that both integrates academic researchers from 
different unrelated disciplines and non-academic participants, such as 
policymakers and the public, to research a common goal and create new 
knowledge and theory.  
(ICSU, 2010: 20) 
 
This marginal framing is lost in the glossary of the more recently published Design 
Report, in which ‘civil society groups and business representatives’ replace ‘the 
public’ in the definition of transdisciplinarity (Future Earth, 2013b: 69). 
 
Another example of how stakeholder communities seem to be drawn broadly only to 
be narrowed by subsequent wording can be seen in the online ‘community 
consultation’ on Future Earth research priorities that was launched in April 2014, 
‘intended as an inclusive, multi-stakeholder consultation’, to ‘gain new ideas from 
global societal stakeholders of Future Earth’. However, the Future Earth website 
specified that the consultation was looking to develop ‘research priorities that will be 
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co-designed with stakeholders from the funding, business and policy communities’ 
(web 55).  
 
This section has explored the predominant categorisation of Future Earth 
stakeholders – societal sectors or organised groups – and whether/how ‘the public’ is 
imagined as a distinct stakeholder in the initiative, finding that ‘the public’ is 
predominantly imagined as an audience of communication/education or is subsumed 
into/represented by other societal groups. However, this is indicative of the 
challenges in defining stakeholders (particularly public(s)) on a global scale in the 
context of GEC as a global issue and Future Earth as a global organisation – or at all 
– as discussed further in the following section. 
 
6.2.3 Challenges: scale, representativeness and representation 
 
Ambiguities and difficulties in defining stakeholders, drawing boundaries around 
potential stakeholder communities and considering representativeness and 
representation were acknowledged explicitly or raised implicitly by several 
participants. At the time of the fieldwork, it was clear that many uncertainties were 
still to be resolved around who should be involved and how. These issues are not 
particular to this initiative; many of the challenges Future Earth faced (and may still 
face) in articulating its practices, stakeholders, and underlying visions or models of 
science and democracy have been discussed extensively in the STS literature. 
 
It was apparent in the interviews that although these issues were still to be (and 
perhaps may never be fully) settled at the institutional level, unsurprisingly many 
individual actors had their own ideas about how to define (and involve) stakeholders, 
usually rooted in the interviewees’ day-to-day practice. For example, one participant 
consistently referred to stakeholders as ‘decision makers’, and when asked what that 
means and whether other kinds of stakeholders are or might be involved in Future 
Earth, she/he responded by outlining the definition of stakeholder categories used by 
her/his institution, noting that there probably wouldn’t be agreement on that language 
within the Future Earth Science Committee. In the context of her/his institution, the 
category of ‘stakeholder’ comprises ‘anyone who would be affected by [the 
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institution’s] research’, split into the sub-groups of ‘people who are making decisions 
based on [the institution’s] research, and people who are affected by the decisions 
that are made as a result of taking note of that research’. Those categories are 
distinguished from that of ‘clients’: ‘people who would actually be prepared to pay 
for research’. The participant considered all of these categories to be relevant to 
Future Earth, but went on to identify limitations in using these definitions when 
operating on a global scale: 
 
I think the bigger – if you’re dealing with a single farmer they can potentially 
be all three of those, er, if you’re dealing with the entire globe [laughs] it’s 
obviously a bit hard to interact with every individual who might possibly be 
affected by some research…  
(Interview 9) 
 
The participant has identified one of the key flaws in arguments for greater 
inclusivity in terms of direct participation in the research process: they are inherently 
exclusive (Lövbrand et al., 2011). It could be argued that this is the case for all 
research participation, even if operating on a smaller geographical scale than the 
global. But if it is not possible to include all stakeholders, how are decisions made 
about whom to include? 
 
The participant does not specify how stakeholders are identified and reached, but 
after noting the potentially impossible scale of Future Earth’s stakeholder 
community, she/he moved on to discuss the varying extents to which co-design, co-
production might be desirable, suggesting that ‘co-dissemination’ is a way to ‘extend 
the results of that research’, by involving parts of the stakeholder community in 
considering how to deliver the research so that it can be used by those not directly 
involved in the project. The notion of scaling up through dissemination to achieve 
greater impact throughout stakeholder communities also arose during the first focus 
group, in which one participant suggested that capacity to undertake effective co-
design and co-production techniques could itself be extended to new communities by 
‘leveraging through networking’ and ‘drawing on theories of trusted messengers, two 
step conversation’.  
 
Another participant (an IEC member) also identified the potentially limitless scope of 
stakeholders as an issue (broadly in relation to sustainable development, in which 
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stakeholders include the yet to be born), suggesting that it is necessary to find a 
‘better operational definition of what you mean by stakeholders’. She/he suggested 
that Future Earth might adopt a definition close to that of her/his own organisation: 
 
For [my organisation] we try to rather than what you regard the general 
citizenry the populace of the world, we focus on more expert stakeholders, 
people who are more active in these fields or wish to be active in terms of 
these international processes. That’s how we do it, I think Future Earth needs 
to think about that a bit themselves. I think yes, their partial audience is the 
same expert stakeholders who can very much use the science or better science 
for trying to- actually get science in their hands to actually push for and 
advance sustainable development but then there’s the entire scientific 
community which has a clear stake in advancing sustainable development 
which maybe isn’t involved in these processes.  
(Interview 10) 
 
Here, the implication is that stakeholders are self-selecting: if they wish to participate 
in the Sustainable Development Goals process and other international environmental 
and development agenda-setting and policy-making activities, they can access Future 
Earth science as a tool in their advocacy or in their other work to further 
sustainability. However, engagement is also broadened to the scientific community 
(separate from the general populace) who are not yet involved in international 
political processes. So rather than imagining stakeholders engaging in science, this 
participant images both scientists and other ‘expert stakeholders’ engaging in 
international processes, using science as a tool for advocacy. 
 
Further limitations to the possibility of including (or imagining) a global public were 
identified by another participant, who considered technologies of participation and 
the enthusiasm and capacity of members of a ‘lay’ public:  
 
[…] in keeping with the ambition of the research programme it would have to 
be a global public. The internet is global with different coverage in different 
regions but I can’t really imagine how [Future Earth] would lay their hands 
on the resource you would need seriously to consult a global - even a global 
interested public on such a thing because it would be quite large. […] 
nobody’s heard of [Future Earth] at the moment, why would they care, […] 
what would their contribution be… […] you could have small group 
discussion with citizen type folks […] you’d have to constitute a public for the 
occasion, defined in certain ways […] But I mean you’d have to spend a lot of 
time explaining to them what the hell this was about, before you had the 
conversation. I don’t know if there’s any thought of doing that or if there’d be 
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any way of funding it. It’d be expensive labour intensive and delicate process 
to do.  
(Interview 1)  
 
The participant outlines several potential challenges in engaging a global public: first, 
the technology and resources required, then the incentive for participation on the part 
of those that haven’t heard of Future Earth, and the need to actively convene or 
constitute such a public and therefore define it in particular ways. While various 
attempts to define and consult global publics have been attempted, these are 
inevitably exclusive, limited in a range of ways (Blue & Medlock, 2014). 
 
Ideas about how particular stakeholders might be represented within processes of co-
design and co-production also arose during the second focus group. One participant 
argued that Future Earth should set some parameters and requirements for involving 
stakeholders, including the extent to which researchers should seek a ‘cross-section’ 
or ‘truly representative sample’ in terms of who to involve, and how far they should 
go to reach those that haven’t responded to calls for co-design and co-production. 
Later she/he also raised the issue that NGOs are often treated as representatives of 
particular constituencies (e.g. farmers, women, etc.) but that they have not been 
democratically elected, so to what extent can they be considered to represent those 
people’s interests? The significance of making decisions as to which stakeholders to 
work with was further elaborated by another participant in the same discussion: 
 
[…] who are you going to co-design with? It’s a big question, it is… let’s take 
the farmers thing because that is where the inequalities are most graphic. Are 
you going to co-design it with NGOs who work with poor farmers, are you 
going to co-design it with the NGOs who work with rich farmers? The sugar 
cane cooperatives with contract farming among the richest. As far as Future 
Earth’s mandate is concerned those- it would be fine… unless you are willing 
to take sides and you spell it out.  Both those projects would be value free, 
you’re co-designing with farmers but I would say unless you have a Rawlsian 
principle of some kind that underlies Future Earth you’re going to end up 
with a lot of projects which don’t ask questions about deprivation and 
inequality at all. So I think Future Earth hasn’t yet grappled with the practical 
underpinnings of the so-called mandate really.  
(FGP9)  
 
This participant outlines the implicit value judgement in selecting certain partners for 
co-design over others, particularly in the absence of independent principles (such as 
those offered by John Rawls) that might be used to inform the selection in a more 
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intentional way. These types of questions are largely absent from the official 
documents, and how they might play out in practice will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7.  
 
This section has outlined some of the challenges in defining and reaching Future 
Earth stakeholders. Altogether section 6.2 has shown that Future Earth’s documents, 
and to some extent its key actors, subscribe to the notion of stakeholders as separate 
from science, recipients or beneficiaries of knowledge generated by science, and 
members of – and represented in Future Earth by – particular societal sectors or 
organised groups, in line with the participation for utility view on co-’s. However, the 
interview and focus group data reveals a broader range of interpretations, with some 
participants expressing views closer to those aligned with the reflexivity for 
democratisation understanding of co-’s, in which stakeholders are active participants 
in the generation of knowledge (although how deliberation is to be achieved on a 
global scale is unclear); many participants acknowledged the challenges of global 
engagement and raised key questions in relation to defining and engaging 
stakeholders.  
 
In order to further explore tensions in how stakeholders are imagined in Future Earth, 
and how this is linked to particular conceptualisations of co-’s and broader visions of 
science-society relations, Nowotny’s (2014) conception of particular political 
imaginaries of science provides a useful template for analysis in the next section. 
This allows for a consideration of the implicit models and imaginaries that underpin 
the more explicit visions outlined above.  
 
 
6.3 Political imaginaries of science 
 
This section explores the ways in which the political imaginaries of science outlined 
by Nowotny (2014) can be identified in Future Earth, and if so, how they shape 
expectations and action. These comprise (as already outlined in more detail in 
Chapter 2): 1) the neoliberal (or near-term impact) imaginary, in which research and 
its value is conceptualised in terms of its immediate translatability into impact or 
profit, sometimes imagined in terms of value for individual tax payers’/consumers’ 
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money; 2) the ‘republic of science’ imaginary, in which research is valued as an 
unquantifiable, non-rivalrous public good, and science should be left to 
independently produce (unpredictable but certain) benefits to society without 
hierarchical governance; 3) the deliberative imaginary of STS, in which research is 
valued as an object – and more importantly, site – of democratic deliberation, 
through which ideals of inclusivity and participation can be pursued.  
 
In Future Earth, there are varying ideas about who should (or should not) be 
involved, and these views (including views on what co-’s mean more broadly, as 
seen in the previous chapter) are underpinned by and co-constitutive of these diverse 
political imaginaries of the ideal or proper roles and relationship between science, 
politics and their stakeholders. 
 
6.3.1 Political imaginaries in Future Earth 
 
Although Future Earth is a research initiative rather than a public policy organisation, 
its governance committee members can be considered to be policymakers in that they 
make decisions about and plans for Future Earth goals, principles, action, 
organisational structure and procedures.42 In response to Nowotny’s call to ‘follow 
the formation, circulation, transformations and continued shifting of collective 
political imagination that link science with democracy’ (2014: 19), the three political 
imaginaries of science in society that she outlines – to which I will refer as ‘near-
term impact’, ‘republic of science’, and ‘deliberative’ – provide a useful lens through 
which to consider imaginaries in the construction of Future Earth.  
 
Nowotny argues that all of the imaginaries described in her paper invoke citizens as 
the ultimate beneficiaries of science and technology, and this is certainly the case in 
Future Earth’s imaginaries: as discussed above, citizens – or, more often, ‘society’ – 
are consistently invoked as the ultimate beneficiaries of Future Earth, particularly in 
the official documents. For this reason, political imaginaries as conceptualised by 
Nowotny (2014) are particularly apt as an analytical tool in relation to this case.  
 
                                                 
42 Some of them can also be considered to be policymakers in their day-to-day roles. 
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In this section I explore whether and how the three archetypal imaginaries identified 
by Nowotny (outlined in detail in Chapter 2) appear in the context of Future Earth, 
drawing out tensions arising from conflicts between these imaginaries. 
 
While the Future Earth external documents are fairly consistent in their visions of the 
role and stakeholders of Future Earth, the internal documents, interviews, focus 
groups and observation reveal a broader range of views and visions. One participant 
described emerging divisions, which suggests that (aspects of) all three of Nowotny’s 
political imaginaries of science might be present within the initiative: 
 
If you take co-design back to its kind of roots it is about saying so who sets 
the questions. And… I think one view in Future Earth is that it should be 
policy stakeholders and publics setting the questions to which scientists 
respond and do their science to deliver the answers and perhaps to provide 
the evidence. Another view would be that science is enquiry driven and 
curiosity driven and needs to respond to what are seen to be objective Earth 
system processes and seek to understand them better. And uniting those views 
is quite hard. […] my view would be that it’s actually in the debate around 
what questions should we be asking that a lot of the interest in a more 
reflexive approach comes to comes to bear. So it’s not one or the other. It’s 
not the scientists or the stakeholders, and debating why they would frame 
their question in the particular way they’d frame it and to think about 
alternative framing and the consequences of putting them that way.  
 
(Interview 7) 
 
While broader notions of political economy are not explicitly mentioned, we might 
loosely map some elements of the neoliberal/near-term impact, republic of 
science, and deliberative imaginaries onto this narrative: a service/product delivery 
mode of science led by demand from societal stakeholders; a curiosity-driven mode 
of science led by scientists and the phenomena they investigate; and a deliberative-
reflexive mode of science in which all parties debate the (framing of the) questions to 
be addressed. The participant identifies tension between these views in Future Earth 
and positions her/his own – deliberative-reflexive – view as a minority. Linking these 
modes back to the understandings of co-production outlined in Table 2, the 
service/product delivery mode of science seems to align with the participation for 
utility understanding of co-production, the deliberative-reflexive mode seems to 
align with the reflexivity for democratisation understanding of co-production, and 
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the curiosity-driven mode of science aligns with the view of co-production as threat, 
in that co-production is seen as a threat to curiosity-driven research.  
 
I will now draw out implicit and explicit tensions between and within the different 
imaginaries of science and appropriate stakeholders in Future Earth in more detail. 
 
6.3.2 Imaginaries of near-term impact 
 
As seen in Chapter 5, the narrative of increasing the utility or efficacy of research, 
bolstered through involving societal stakeholders from the start, is most prevalent in 
the documents but also appears in many of the interviews and in the focus groups and 
observation. This narrative might perhaps be best aligned with Nowotny’s (2014) 
neoliberal imaginary. While it is not linked to a broader neoliberal ideology, notions 
of economic competitiveness, nor citizens as consumers, it is certainly preoccupied 
with the short-term or immediate impact of scientific activity and sees society as an 
abstract beneficiary of greater/more relevant knowledge production and innovation. 
This imaginary sees science as delivering the answers that society needs (to achieve 
transformations to sustainability).  
 
The lack of an explicit neoliberal ideology within the imaginary might be due to the 
lack of easily marketable “products” in the existing Earth system science base of the 
initiative (as opposed to, e.g. in synthetic biology), or due to the normative 
commitments of those involved in establishing and building the initiative (for the 
most part environmental scientists, or science bureaucrats, to whom considerations of 
economic growth might not arise at all or come second to raising awareness of, 
confidence in, and action in response to the scientific evidence that anthropogenic 
global environmental change is occurring). 
 
Appeals to this imaginary are often expressed in relation – or opposition – to the 
long-term view of the ‘republic of science’ imaginary, suggesting that the increasing 
rate of global environmental change requires faster and more targeted uptake of 
research results by stakeholders, particularly policy makers, also ‘at the grassroots’: 
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one SC member talked in terms of ‘mainlining science to decision making in local 
communities’.  
 
There are several assumptions inherent in this imaginary, including: that it is possible 
to know in advance which stakeholders to involve and to whom the research will be 
relevant; and that the value of knowledge is in its application/use outside of the 
research field to feed into policy making and/or solutions: 
 
But what is the point of having done [some science] if it doesn’t have any 
impact until it’s too late or years down the road?  I mean part of what we’re 
talking about is having resonance with decision making because […] what’s 
the point if it doesn’t really have an impact?  Or you’re not targeting a policy 
window or you don’t have a policy user as a receptive audience?  I mean what 
is then the point of science?  Are you doing science just for the sake of science 
or are you doing it to actually enact a change?  
(FGP7) 
 
Here, the point of science is seen as enacting change, and enacting change is 
associated purely with use of research in policy, while other means of enacting 
change through research – or other roles for research or ways of considering the 
value of research – are not considered.  
 
In general, in this imaginary the public value of science seems to be in its direct 
translatability into impact, action or change. One participant imagined science as 
delivering the knowledge that society needs within the framework of a ‘global 
innovation system’ (and this language was subsequently adopted in a range of Future 
Earth documents, e.g. Future Earth (2014c)) in which emphasis shifts from 
competition between national economies, towards global collaboration; here the 
public value of science is conceptualised as a non-rivalrous good, maintaining some 
aspects of the neoliberal imaginary (e.g. product/service-delivery model, aim to 
achieve impact) but decoupling the value-for-money/direct exchange conception of 
the public value of science. 
 
There is an increased role for policymakers and business/private sector as 
stakeholders in this imaginary in Future Earth, and while this is not imagined as 
related to growth or profit, in conjunction with the idea that science is “delivering” 
knowledge or a service (as per the financial transaction model mentioned in section 
196 
 
6.2.1, with reference to ‘the buyer of the car’), some participants expressed concerns 
about involving business, private sector or policy stakeholders; particularly where the 
donors, funders or ‘clients’ of the research are also the stakeholders with whom to 
co-design/co-produce. I will discuss some of these tensions in section 6.3.4, after first 
exploring imaginaries of deliberation. 
 
6.3.3 Imaginaries of deliberation 
 
Unsurprisingly, since the deliberative imaginary is rooted in ideas emerging from 
STS and broader social theory, it was voiced for the most part by social scientists 
(and was a minority view). Ideals of participation and inclusiveness through the 
incorporation – and deliberation – of diverse perspectives are a key part of this 
imaginary, as seen in Chapter 5. In contrast to the ideal of authoritative, objective, 
untainted scientific knowledge as explored in the next section, this imaginary 
acknowledges that both stakeholder and scientist perspectives are partial and 
informed by social commitments, and argues that these should be made explicit and 
debated: 
 
co-production is inherently a process of making explicit your partial 
perspectives and making explicit sort of social commitments they’re founded 
on and then getting together in ways that encourage all parties to be reflexive 
about those and have a deliberation and debate.  
        (Interview 7) 
 
This imaginary is very much tied to notions of social justice and research that ‘makes 
a difference’ in relation to that objective. In this respect, it is not dissimilar to the 
neoliberal/near-term impact imaginary, in that some form of impact is taken to be 
desirable. One participant described this view with reference to her/his own work:   
 
[…] I’ve seen the purpose of research not just as understanding the world but 
attempting to influence it for the better with a very strong emphasis on 
working to reduce poverty, to try and create conditions of social justice […] 
         
In the participant’s own research, stakeholders are local communities and policy 
makers, and social science’s role is to give grounds for alternative ways of governing 
based less on elite and technocratic narratives of policy/scientific knowledge, and 
more on the knowledges and practices of local communities: 
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[…] and part of that [social] justice […] has been about […] cognitive 
justice, about trying to uncover the ways that powerful policy discourses 
enrapt with certain kinds of science and knowledge production justify 
interventions which do things in people’s lives, often harmful things as well 
as good things, and about trying to uncover or trying to challenge those 
orthodoxies and point to alternatives, including those that emerge from the 
perspectives of people who are marginalised by those formal channels. Which 
either gives them a sense of cognitive justice in the process of creating 
knowledge and change, or allows us to take advantage of missed 
opportunities that would otherwise remain concealed when the world is seen 
in a particular way. 
(Interview 7) 
 
So while all versions of co-production have the aim of meeting societal need, the 
deliberative view enables questions about what this means, whose need is met, etc., 
whereas this might not always be specified or differentiated in the participation for 
utility/near-term impact view. The deliberative approach aims to extend the rights of 
knowledge production to those that would otherwise be marginalised. However, 
questions still remain about which stakeholders should – and can – be included in this 
deliberative way in Future Earth. 
 
6.3.4 Imaginaries of a republic of science 
 
The imaginary of science as independently governed and producing unpredictable 
(and therefore impossible to target) benefits to society arises throughout the interview 
data. A minority of participants seemed to subscribe to this imaginary themselves (to 
varying extents), while others discussed its endurance in the scientific communities 
of the existing GEC programmes. Several participants discussed the impossibility of 
predicting where important breakthroughs may occur: 
 
So that’s part of the tension in applied science and that is a lot of what we’re 
talking about here because science for sustainability is mission oriented but it 
may be the thing that’s over there in the dark corner that no-one’s thinking 
about, that actually would be the breakthrough that could be important and 
it’s a real… and there’s tension there always.  
(FGP10)  
 
This imaginary is also strongly tied to the idea of science being ‘curiosity-driven’ 
(I9) or ‘supply-driven’ (I10) (as opposed to demand-driven); in other words, 
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scientists ‘do[ing] some science because […] it’s plain interesting to them’ (I10) 
without external direction and achieving insights that are ‘over there in the dark 
corner that no-one’s thinking about’. Despite the acknowledgement of the role of 
scientists’ interest in science in this imaginary, other types of interest are resisted 
strongly. The imaginary is tied to notions of objective, disinterested, independent 
science, kept separate from – and ‘uncontaminated’ by – private (or other ‘societal’) 
interests and bias. One (social scientist) participant noted that it is not easy to discuss 
co-production theoretically with natural scientists because it ‘cuts at the heart of what 
scientists feel is the objective nature of what they do’. Many participants referred to 
the ideal of objective, pure science; usually either expressing concern about how to 
preserve it or noting that some within Future Earth feel that it is challenged by the  
co-’s. Some of the most significant loci of contestation within the committee 
meetings in June 2014 arose in relation to adherence or otherwise to this ideal, and 
the related notions of scientific independence and academic freedom, as already 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Concerns were raised about co-design/co-production with (societal) stakeholders that 
have interests and biases generally, and more specifically linked to involving private 
sector partners in research, with the tobacco industry cited most frequently as an 
illustrative example, and big oil/seed companies causing particular concern as 
imagined potential Future Earth stakeholders. As discussed in section 5.3, one 
participant suggested that the involvement of business such as oil companies could 
lead (and has led in the past) to fatalities, considering the elimination of conflicts of 
interest and the objectivity enabled by the scientific method to be ‘the hallmark of 
science’: 
 
For me in the middle [of the research process] there should be a complete 
separation, I do not believe that stakeholders should ever be involved in the 
process of generating data, interpreting data or peer reviewing data.  That to 
me provides egregious conflicts of interests that are going to… it will ruin the 
integrity of science for society in my opinion.  
        (Interview 2) 
  
The ‘integrity of science for society’ is seen to reside in the preservation of the 
scientific method as independent from stakeholder involvement.  
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As touched on in Chapter 5, other participants felt that the ‘risks’ of bias or conflict 
of interest associated with involving ‘societal stakeholders’ are legitimate but 
manageable concerns (and necessarily so because the initiative needs to secure 
external funding to support itself). Suggested means of managing these issues 
included building accountability into the research by requiring projects to address 
questions of distribution and inequality if co-designing/co-producing with business or 
policy actors (FGP9, as further explored in Chapter 7); or through the academic peer 
review process, undertaken by ‘top-rate scientists’ that are rigorous and sceptical: 
 
you don’t want the arena to be populated by people who have… clear… 
disruptive or other kinds of interested… who clutter up the arena with false 
claims or with unfounded claims, so there is there is a need to regulate the 
arena but again that’s normal in democracy, that’s normal in science as well, 
through peer review and so on, critique, there’s an attempt to allow in the end 
the most robust claims to survive, but it’s a complicated thing to do.  
 
(Interview 8) 
 
Here there is a distinction drawn between legitimate stakeholders and those that are 
‘disruptive’ or ‘interested’; although regulation of this distinction appears to occur in 
knowledge validation (by the academic community) rather than in terms of who is 
able to participate in general.  
 
This imaginary also informed the governance architecture of the initiative (as 
discussed further in Chapter 7), with the separate Science Committee and 
Engagement Committee established (as opposed to one combined committee) to 
achieve ‘inoculation’ against dominance of interest groups within the initiative. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that Future Earth actors draw on different political 
imaginaries in their conceptualisations of science and its public value, and what these 
imaginaries mean for who is considered an appropriate or legitimate stakeholder. 
Some espouse a near-term impact imaginary in which society and stakeholders are 
treated as beneficiaries, recipients and audiences of research whose impact is of 
primary interest. The public value of science in this case is either in its translation 
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into action or as a non-rivalrous, international public good. A minority of Future 
Earth actors adopt deliberative imaginaries in which all stakeholders, including 
scientists, hold partial perspectives and social/political commitments. The public 
value of science is in making a difference (in relation to social justice), and, linked to 
that, research as an object or site of democratic deliberation. Finally, others subscribe 
to a republic of science imaginary in which societal stakeholders – particularly 
private sector, and sometimes policy, stakeholders – are seen as holding interests that 
can endanger the ideal of objective, autonomous science and even endanger lives. 
The public value of science is seen as lying in its ability to produce objective, value-
free and/or independent knowledge, which is or gives rise to unpredictable public 
good(s).  
 
Many challenges are apparent in the definition and engagement of Future Earth’s 
stakeholders, not least conflicting ideas about the extent to which involvement is 
desirable at different stages of research, and whom should be involved, often fuelled 
by these different political imaginaries of science and its public value.  
 
On the basis of this analysis, the table distinguishing between different 
understandings or models of co-production developed in Chapter 5 is updated below 
in Table 3. It is clear that particular notions of the public value of science as 
summarised above in relation to the imaginaries – and their associated models of 
democracy or participation, whether deliberative or representative – can also be 
aligned with particular models of co-production: three further rows have been added 
to indicate ‘Imaginary’, ‘Public value of science’ and ‘Model of democracy’. The 
clearest overlap is between the deliberative imaginary and the reflexivity for 
democratisation model of co-production. The ‘exchange’/service concept and the 
‘non-rivalrous public good’ concept of public value within the neoliberal/near-term 
impact imaginary align with the understanding of co-production as participation for 
utility. The ‘republic of science’ imaginary aligns with the notion of co-production as 
threat, and its emphasis on the public value of objective, independent knowledge. 
 
This chapter, then, has demonstrated that there are varying ideas about who should 
(or should not) be involved in co-’s in Future Earth, and these views (including views 
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on what co-design and co-production mean more broadly, as outlined in the previous 
chapter) are underpinned by and co-constitutive of diverse conceptualisations 
(political imaginaries) of the ideal or proper roles and relationship between science, 
politics and their stakeholders. Particular notions of the public value of 
science/research – as a service, as an object/site of democratic deliberation, as a 
public good – are tied to different notions of legitimate scientific stakeholders and 
their appropriate representation and involvement in the initiative; reproducing, or co-
producing, established democratic models. 
 
These comprise, firstly, the representative-utilitarian model in which an epistemic 
deficit and/or gap between research and action on GEC/sustainability can be 
addressed by inviting societal stakeholders to help define research questions and 
participate in the research process and research governance. Society/stakeholders are 
imagined as recipients/beneficiaries of knowledge primarily produced by science, 
and as members of – and represented in Future Earth by – particular societal sectors 
or organised groups (e.g. business, government, civil society).  The value of science 
is as a public good or service/product to meet societal need (partially in line with a 
‘neoliberal’ political imaginary, in which short term impact and immediate 
translatability of research into action is of most value). 
 
Secondly, the deliberative-reflexive model in which a democratic deficit in science 
(and in society more broadly) is addressed by recognising all knowledge as partial, 
admitting plural perspectives into knowledge making processes, and reflecting on 
tacit assumptions embedded in existing framings. Stakeholders (including scientists) 
are imagined as active contributors to knowledge creation, with rights and 
social/political commitments. The value of science is in making a difference (in 
relation to e.g. social justice), and as a site/object of democratic deliberation. All 
versions of co-production have the aim of meeting societal need, but the deliberative 
view enables questions about what this means, whose need is met, etc., whereas this 
is not always specified or differentiated in the representative-utilitarian view. 
 
Thirdly, a more traditional (republic of science) model, in which co-production poses 
a threat to curiosity-driven research, academic freedom, and the scientific ideals of 
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objectivity and independence. Stakeholders (e.g. private companies, policy makers) 
are imagined as having interests and biases that endanger the public value of science 
in its ability to produce objective, independent, value-free knowledge.  
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Table 3: Three views on co-’s including imaginary, public value of science, and model of democracy 
Type Representative-utilitarian model 
Co-design/co-production as participation for 
acceptability, relevance, utility and impact 
Deliberative-reflexive model 
Co-design/co-production as reflexivity and 
deliberation for democratisation  
Republic of science model 
Co-design/co-production as a threat 
Definition Societal stakeholders participate in two-way 
dialogues and collaborate with researchers from 
different disciplines in order to jointly:  
• frame, define, design research strategies, 
priorities, agendas, projects, Future Earth 
itself [co-design, co-creation] 
• produce knowledge, implement research 
projects [co-production, co-creation] 
• disseminate and implement 
research/knowledge results, outputs, 
solutions [co-dissemination, co-delivery] 
Societal stakeholders come together with 
researchers from different disciplines throughout 
the research process to: 
• reflexively debate, deliberate and make explicit 
everyone’s partial perspectives, worldviews, 
assumptions; 
• acknowledge who/what is included and 
excluded, acknowledge alternatives and the 
normative dimensions of research; 
• include a range of perspectives; 
• democratise questions and lines of 
investigation, bring about epistemic equality 
and cognitive justice. 
Co-design/co-production in which stakeholders are 
involved in science/research (whether through 
participation and/or deliberation) poses a threat to 
the objectivity, independence and autonomy of 
science/research. Co-design/co-production may be 
acceptable in Future Earth but not at all stages of 
the research process, and/or not with all types of 
stakeholder, and there must still be space for 
fundamental, basic research within and/or outside 
of Future Earth. 
What is co- 
produced? 
Solutions oriented, relevant (not prescriptive) 
research questions, knowledge, solutions, 
information, policy options, insights, data, tools 
Socially embodied knowledge and solutions; 
science/research and social order, norms and 
worldviews 
Co-design of research questions is more acceptable 
than involvement of stakeholders in data 
generation, analysis & dissemination 
Rationale 
 
Instrumental, utilitarian, logic of accountability: 
knowledge will be more relevant and 
efficacious, because: 
• the “right” research questions are asked; 
• it is co-owned by people who will use it so 
gains visibility, credibility and legitimacy;  
• answers & solutions are more likely to be 
suitable for/accepted by those they are 
intended for, and used properly by them, 
and therefore have impact;  
• higher quality research will be produced; 
• legitimacy & authority of Future Earth is 
increased through institutional co-design. 
Political, emancipatory, logic of ontology: the co-
design/co-production process will allow questions 
of common purpose and framing to be asked, 
assumptions questioned, and alternative options 
considered, which is important because: 
• all knowledge & perspectives are partial;  
• acknowledging this & taking stakeholder 
knowledge/experience seriously enables 
democratisation of knowledge production and 
decision making;  
• this enables research to make a difference in 
terms of social justice/power relations. 
Epistemological, political, logic of autonomy: 
science produces independent, objective, reliable 
knowledge by: 
• avoiding conflict of interest; 
• independently pursuing its own agenda. 
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(Non-
academic) 
participants 
Users; representatives of different sectors or 
stakeholder groups (e.g. policy makers, funders, 
civil society, private sector): 
• have knowledge needs; 
• have information to exchange (or to input 
into ‘flows’), particularly on what 
challenges society is/decision makers are 
facing; 
• might have existing knowledge and 
experience to be considered and respected. 
Cognitive, epistemic participants (whether 
scientists, policy makers, practitioners, decision-
makers, local communities, others): 
• have valid knowledge and experience to offer; 
• have agency; 
• all have normative commitments and 
assumptions (including scientists). 
 
Private sector and policy stakeholders: 
• have interests and biases that might threaten 
the objectivity of the research; 
• might prevent the researcher from pursuing 
particular lines of enquiry; 
• may twist the research results or misrepresent 
them. 
Role of 
research and 
researchers 
Lead and guide the co-production process; 
provide the knowledge (with input from all 
concerned); responsible for methodologies; 
provide policy options and policy-relevant (not 
prescriptive) knowledge (knowledge broker). 
Facilitate reflexivity; question own and others’ 
positionality and assumptions; draw out 
marginalised knowledges, perspectives so they can 
be recognised by all; pursue or advocate particular 
normative agendas (activist). 
Avoid conflict of interest and preserve objectivity 
and/or independence of research. 
Science-
society 
relation 
Science and society are separate but come 
together (or enter each other’s spaces) in the 
process of co-design/co-production. 
Science is part of society and the process of co-
design and co-production enables the deliberation 
of worldviews and future visions. 
Science and society are separate and should remain 
so, particularly in the middle of the scientific 
process. 
Ontology/ 
epistemology 
Realist/positivist Constructivist Realist/positivist 
Imaginary Near-term impact Deliberative Republic of science 
Public value 
of science 
As a service, provides (exchangeable) 
knowledge of use to stakeholders; and/or as a 
non-rivalrous public good 
As an object and site of democratic deliberation In its ability to produce independent, objective, 
value-free knowledge; as an unpredictable public 
good 
Model of 
democracy 
Representative: politics is a negotiation of the 
different views/interests of society, represented 
by interest groups/organisations; scientific 
knowledge is an instrumental resource that can 
be struggled over, but is not political itself. 
Deliberative: all aspects of social life are political; 
democratic deliberation should be extended to 
knowledge production; the source of democratic 
legitimacy is process of preference formation 
through debate/deliberation. 
Representative. 
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While these models are not as distinct as the matrix suggests, they are broad ‘types’ 
that can be seen in Future Earth (and beyond). The first and third of these models are 
perhaps more standard, traditional modes of research policy or ways of viewing 
science. The second could be seen as a means of mediating between or attempting to 
steer the more established modes in new directions, through processes that 
acknowledge the contingency of existing understandings and arrangements and 
highlight the possibility of alternatives. Each of these views exists in the research 
community as a whole (beyond Future Earth). However, there could be space for 
each model (rather than one dominant model, as is often the case) if an experimental 
approach is adopted, allowing difference to co-exist. 
 
While established models seem to be reproduced, Future Earth is venturing into new 
territory for an international science initiative of this scale and ambition: territory in 
which conversations have started about who the stakeholders of research are, how 
they can be represented and involved in research governance and projects, and what 
sorts of issues will arise along the way. These conversations give rise to difficult 
questions, but in their asking, new possibilities open to rethink established practices 
and procedures. The next chapter explores how this has played out in the ways that 
the implementation of co-production in Future Earth has been imagined and 
undertaken. 
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Chapter 7: How is co-production implemented?  
 
The previous two chapters explored meanings of co-production and related concepts 
in Future Earth, why they are advocated and adopted, and who might be involved. 
The analysis of the documents, interviews, focus groups and observation data found 
that co-production and related terms are ambiguous and contested in Future Earth, 
with varying definitions, extents to which they are considered appropriate, and 
rationales for increased (or, indeed, limited) involvement of non-academic 
stakeholders in research design and process (from ensuring relevance to 
democratising expertise to preserving scientific objectivity and independence). 
Furthermore, there are varying ideas about who should be involved. All of these 
views are underpinned by and co-constitutive of diverse conceptualisations of the 
proper roles and relationship between science, politics and their stakeholders. 
Particular notions of the public value of science/research – as a service, as an 
object/site of democratic deliberation, as a public good – are tied to particular notions 
of legitimate scientific stakeholders and their appropriate representation and 
involvement in the initiative; reproducing, or co-producing, and perhaps challenging, 
established democratic (and scientific) models.  
 
Having explored (visions of) the what, why, and who of Future Earth’s co-
production, this chapter turns to the “how”. It explores how implementation of co-
design, co-production and engagement is discussed and imagined in the documents, 
interviews, focus groups and during the observation of the committee meetings, and 
how the understandings of co-’s described in Chapters 5 and 6 shaped (potential) 
implementation. 
  
It is clear from the documents and interviews that work at the time of the study had 
focused primarily on establishing institutional structures (appointing the Science 
Committee, Interim Engagement Committee, Interim Secretariat, and ongoing work 
towards appointing the full Engagement Committee and Secretariat), closing the 
existing programmes (IGBP, IHDP, DIVERSITAS) and transitioning their core 
projects into Future Earth. Several participants noted the relatively early stage in 
Future Earth’s development (or at least in the term of the newly appointed 
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committees) and suggested that co-design, co-production and engagement had not yet 
started in earnest. In addition to (and perhaps in part due to) this feeling of it being 
early days for the initiative, throughout the data there is a sense that Future Earth is 
experimenting in co-design and co-production: that these concepts/practices are 
(relatively) unknown, unused and novel in this context (although they are seen as 
more common in other fields of research) and that establishing them within Future 
Earth will be a tentative process of trial and error, learning, and negotiation – 
including between the committee members. Indeed these negotiations actively played 
out during the observed committee meetings and the focus groups. 
 
In analysing the data, several elements came to the fore when considering 
implementation. These comprised temporal, institutional, scalar and substantive 
aspects: when co-design/co-production might happen, at which institutional and 
geographical levels or scales, in which organisational configuration, around which 
problems. The following sections explore the key (interlinked) aspects of the Future 
Earth experiment in co-’s. Section 7.1 focuses on temporality and institutional levels, 
that is, when co-design/co-production happens and at which institutional level. 
Section 7.2 explores organisational structure and process, considering how different 
models of co-production influenced the organisational shape and processes of Future 
Earth. Section 7.3 explores tensions between establishing principles and developing 
co-production in practice. Section 7.4 outlines the interconnections between spatial 
(geographical) scale and the substance of the problems or challenges Future Earth 
seeks to address. Section 7.5 discusses evaluation, monitoring and iterative learning, 
and 7.6 concludes by considering how these elements relate to the broader theme of 
experimentality.  
 
7.1 Temporality and institutional levels 
 
In institutionalising co-design in Future Earth, questions of when co-design (should) 
occur(s), and at which (institutional, geographical, semantic) level, are linked to the 
different understandings of co-production outlined in Chapters 5 and 6; in particular, 
representative-utilitarian co-production and deliberative-reflexive co-production. 
Ambiguities about whether co-design should happen from ‘the start’, about whether 
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‘the start’ comprises governance, and about whether co-design is already happening 
are also underpinned by (differing) assumptions about the linear temporal (and 
hierarchical institutional) relationship between governance and research.  
 
How co-design should be implemented is of course deeply linked to the question of 
what it is: what sort of activities, interactions or relations it might comprise, which 
actors are or should be involved, and where this might take place. These aspects are 
intertwined with when it should happen, whether it is already happening, and 
where/in which part(s) of Future Earth it should happen. This section focuses on how 
these questions manifested and were handled, focusing in particular on several key 
issues or tensions: whether co-design should happen within governance or research or 
both; within the governing committees, the projects and/or in between; and whether it 
happens from the beginning and throughout, at other particular stages or whether it is 
always happening anyway. The distinction between co-design and co-production 
sometimes emerged as key to these considerations. 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, there is a tension between aspirations for co-design and co-
production to occur throughout Future Earth from the outset, and a degree of 
ambiguity around what ‘the outset’ and ‘throughout’ might comprise (in addition to 
the real-time organisational constraints of setting up such an ambitious and far-
reaching initiative). The Design Report notes the emphasis in STS and science policy 
literature on ‘the critical need to engage stakeholders from the very beginning of the 
research process to and beyond its conclusion’, and lists as one of the key principles 
that should underpin Future Earth stakeholder and engagement strategy: ‘an 
understanding that co-design commences at the outset and stakeholders are partners 
in knowledge production throughout’ (Future Earth, 2013b: 34). However, it is 
unclear whether governance is considered to be part of the ‘research process’ (more 
likely not), and therefore whether or not the temporal markers of ‘at the outset’ and 
‘throughout’ comprise the establishment and ongoing activity of the governing 
bodies.  
 
On the other hand, the Design Report also suggests that (by design) the governance 
structure inherently ‘embraces the concepts of co-design and co-production’ (Future 
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Earth, 2013b: 14) (or engagement is ‘part of the DNA of the whole programme’, as 
one participant put it), while the Transition Team before it was considered to be 
‘selected in the spirit of co-design of a new research agenda, and thus included 
researchers, funders and private and public sector stakeholders from many different 
countries and disciplines’ (Future Earth, 2013b: 5). While not explicitly stating that 
these governing bodies are doing co-design/co-production, the implication is that 
these committees embody or at least play a very significant part in co-design/co-
production. This type of institutional or administrative co-design (the participation of 
multiple stakeholders – primarily from different sectors/organisations, and, to a lesser 
extent from different disciplines and countries – in the initiative’s design and 
governance committees) most closely aligns with the representative-utilitarian model 
of co-’s, in which co-design/co-production means the collaboration of stakeholders 
representing different sectors.  
 
Certainly some participants argued that co-design should occur at the level of the 
committees: one participant thought that ‘there’s a very good case to be made for 
high level strategic directions to be set with a pretty strong involvement of co-
design’, but that ‘co-implementation’ of strategy at that level would not be necessary. 
Later, in personal email correspondence, the same participant suggested that the 
multi-stakeholder members of the Alliance (now assuming the role of Governing 
Council) ‘indicate some […] efforts at co-design at that level’, a view shared by 
participant 5: 
 
Well I think [co-design, co-production and transdisciplinarity] has to happen 
at all levels, it has to happen at the research performance level within projects 
and we have to accept that transdisciplinarity is not… might not always be 
appropriate or relevant, that projects need to think it through; it needs to 
happen at the level of programmatic design and priority setting.  Erm… you 
know so that is why we want a multi-stakeholder governing council, that is 
why we have an engagement committee so that at your programmatic level it 
is a sense in which you’re not just, you’re opening this up to non-academics 
to shape what is happening at the research performance level and it has to 
happen at the international policy making level like at the Alliance, we need 
to have these discussions in global fora of funders so at all levels. 
         
(Interview 5) 
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For the most part, there was strong insistence on the need for co-design in the sense 
of opening up Future Earth strategy and governance to be shaped by (discussions 
with) non-academic stakeholders (whereas co-design, and particularly co-production, 
might not always be needed in all projects). However, when asked about current 
efforts towards co-design and co-production, few participants explicitly identified the 
current work of the committees as an instance of co-design: in general these concepts 
(co-production in particular) were considered in relation to the research work that 
will take place within Future Earth, whether encouraging the existing projects and 
new initiatives to adopt these approaches, or thinking in more general hypothetical or 
abstract terms.  
 
This could suggest that the activities of the committees would not be considered to be 
co-design or co-production until the permanent Engagement Committee had been 
appointed (participant 7 suggested – before the Beijing committee meetings, when 
the IEC had only met face-to-face once – that the IEC ‘[hadn’t] done very much yet I 
mean they have been an interim holding committee, they haven’t really got to work 
in thinking about these things’, and participant 10 – one of the IEC members – said 
the IEC was ‘still very much acting very interimly’); or that the committee structure 
is seen as a gesture or step towards co-’s, which then happen elsewhere in Future 
Earth, rather than the committee structure itself comprising these processes/activities. 
This potentially implies a distinction between ‘high level’ strategy, priority setting, 
design work that takes place within the committees, and the ‘actual work’ of 
research/science that would be conducted by the projects or other elements of the 
initiative. This is perhaps also accompanied by a temporal assumption that 
governance (should) happen(s) first before research, and a hierarchical assumption 
that governance happens at a higher level than research (rather than governance and 
research being deeply intertwined and/or distributed, for example, as characterised in 
notions of distributed or decentred governance (Irwin, 2008)).43  
 
                                                 
43 However, even if the ideal would be to co-design and co-produce (in whichever way) from the very 
outset of Future Earth (if it would be possible to identify that moment), there are considerable 
practical, institutional, epistemological (and other) challenges in doing so. 
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When asked about the current state of co-’s in Future Earth, several interviewees 
suggested that co-’s had not really started in earnest yet, as existing efforts had 
focused on establishing the institutional structure of the initiative: 
 
Researcher: So in terms of what’s currently happening, what’s happened to 
date, do you feel that the current co-production processes or engagement 
mechanisms and processes are working well, or do you think there’s room for 
improvement? 
 
Participant 7: I mean it’s still very, very early days, slightly frustratingly so. 
Big umbrellas take a long time to get up and running. I mean there hasn’t 
really been so far any of what I would call science or engagement that’s 
happened yet under the Future Earth umbrella – what we’ve been principally 
busy with is setting up the committees and their ways of working, moving 
towards those permanent committees, raising funds so there were these calls 
out now for fast-track and cluster initiatives, and the really key process of 
bringing the existing core GEC projects under the Future Earth umbrella. 
      
The metaphorical ‘umbrella’ (that takes time to set up and get running) (see also 
Chapter 4) could represent Future Earth as a whole (as in umbrella organisation), 
comprising all projects, people and activities adopting the ‘Future Earth’ label. Or it 
could represent, more specifically, the overarching institutional (governance) 
structure, comprising the committees, funding and other organisational apparatus.44 A 
distinction is made between a) what the participant would consider to be science and 
engagement, and b) the processes of putting in place the committees, fundraising, and 
transitioning the existing core projects into Future Earth. The science/engagement 
work of the existing programmes is not yet considered to be part of Future Earth 
(presumably because the projects are not yet formally affiliated), and getting the 
‘umbrella’ ‘up and running’ has been a priority before moving forward on co-’s and 
the many other aspects of the initiative. If the umbrella is the institutional/governance 
structure, a distinction is made between that structure (where, by implication, science 
and engagement do not happen) and the science and engagement that happens under 
it. 
 
                                                 
44 This ambiguity around what is and is not ‘part’ of Future Earth could be symptomatic of the early 
stage in the development of the initiative’s structure and identity: in the data, ‘Future Earth’ is often 
used to refer to the Future Earth Secretariat, the Future Earth Science and/or Engagement Committees, 
or the Future Earth governance structure more generally; this could be read as synecdoche totum pro 
parte, or just an accurate reflection of what ‘Future Earth’ comprised at that point in time. 
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The view that co-’s had not yet fully started was shared by other participants: 
Researcher: So, to date do you feel that Future Earth has managed to do any 
successful stakeholder engagement or co-production or co-design – is that 
already happening within the Future Earth umbrella? 
 
Participant 8: I think it’s just starting up, so we have a link now to the SDG 
[UN Sustainable Development Goals] process, we’re following that, we’re 
trying to put into that, I can’t say that is really yet a “co-” you know, I mean 
we’re talking to them. Um, we… you know… have an Interim Engagement 
Committee an active group of people who are helping us think through these 
things… In the Strategic Research Agenda process that we have right now we 
are consulting with stakeholders at a global level in business and in cities and 
so on, so we’re doing some of that but I can’t, no, I wouldn’t be able to claim 
that we’ve done a lot of this so far, I mean the limitation of this is only nine 
months in so I think we’re still in the process of building the building and 
we’ve got some activities but I’m not sure we’ve got lots y’know to boast 
about yet. 
 
          
Here a distinction is made between, on the one hand, the early stages of connecting 
with and ‘talking to’ people involved in the SDG process (also ‘think[ing] through 
these things’ with the Interim Engagement Committee, and ‘consulting with 
stakeholders’) and, on the other hand, the presumably more developed relationships 
and practices involved in ‘a “co-”’. From this participant’s perspective, talking, 
thinking and consulting with stakeholders do not in themselves constitute co-design 
and co-production: something more is needed, whether that is imagined to be a 
longer-term, more involved, or balanced process or relationship with equality of 
responsibility and investment between those taking part, or whether it is imagined to 
be the involvement of non-academic actors in formally defined steps of the research 
process. If co-’s are considered to be a form of engagement, these activities were not 
deep enough to count; if co-’s are considered to be a form of research, these activities 
were not part of an identifiable ‘research process’.  
 
Activities considered by this participant to be efforts towards ‘doing some of that’ 
(i.e. co-design, co-production, engagement) comprise global level governance (the 
IEC), agenda-setting (the SRA process) and policy-interface activities (SDGs), but 
similar to the previous participant’s (slightly mixed) metaphor of getting the 
‘umbrella’ ‘up and running’, this participant talks about still being in the process of 
‘building the building’: in both extracts there is the sense that it has been necessary to 
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establish institutional structure before moving on to focus on co-design, co-
production, engagement, etc. within that, rather than the umbrella or building itself 
consisting of these concepts/practices; again temporal and institutional distinctions 
are made between what does and does not count as co-design/co-production (and, 
perhaps, by implication, what does and does not count as science and/or 
engagement).  
 
Having already argued that it might be possible to distinguish between co-design as 
‘focusing on those principles of […] shaping and funding […] initiatives of 
knowledge creation’, and co-production as ‘the more ongoing iterative process of 
how knowledge is made and continually changed in any process of conversation, 
dialogue, exchange’, one participant (interviewee 6) highlighted the difficulties in 
and perhaps also inadequacies of thinking in terms of institutional levels or scale and 
temporal orders in this way: 
[…] I suppose you could […] use this distinction I’ve made between co-
design and co-production you could say that at strategic levels it’s actually 
more about co-design, whereas when you come down to the execution of 
specific pieces of research then it’s the co-production that becomes a little bit 
more important although that’s probably not an adequate way of thinking 
about these scalar issues.  
 
The participant moved on to describe an alternative view: 
  
I think I’ve sort of heard [SC member] … er… […] defending [her/his] 
involvement […] in Future Earth as saying well actually you know [it’s] an 
opportunity for me to […] influence and change the culture of the institution 
to be a culture that is more… open and aware of and sensitive to some of 
these principles of co-production that [she/he] would want to promote.  
 
The participant then summarised: 
 
So at one level you could say maybe it’s specific decisions at the top level, 
maybe it’s specific practices of co-production at the project level, but also you 
could say it’s something about […] is the culture of that institution… one that 
shares a certain tacit or more explicit commitment to certain principles, […] 
which is another way of thinking about how co-production might work in 
institutional settings. 
 
        (Interview 6) 
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While ‘specific decisions at the top level’ and ‘specific practices at the project level’ 
seem to be more in line with a vision of co-’s as collaboration or participation, the 
institutional culture in which certain principles are tacitly or explicitly shared seems 
to evoke the deliberative-reflexive model (as discussed in the preceding chapters), in 
which co-’s are a site or object of democratic deliberation – or a means of adopting 
and promoting particular normative principles (whether that be towards 
democratising science or something else). The idea that co-’s operate at different 
semantic or communicative levels as well as at different organisational and 
geographical levels or scales, demonstrates that making distinctions between 
governance and research, global and local, is perhaps an inadequate way of 
accounting for ‘co-’ concepts and practices (particularly without a thorough 
consideration of what constitutes Future Earth governance, research, global, local, 
etc.).  
 
The view that co-’s might already be happening (tacitly) within the committees also 
arose during the first focus group (conducted on day one of the joint Science and 
Interim Engagement Committee meeting), in which one participant proposed an STS-
informed definition of co-design and co-production, and another quickly adopted this 
idea, suggesting that the Science and Interim Engagement Committees had earlier 
that day partaken in implicit co-design in defining the issues to be addressed within 
Future Earth’s 2025 Vision and research priorities:  
FGP5: I’m going to throw out a devil’s advocate issue here which would be 
to say isn’t actually all science co-designed and co-produced, even if we 
don’t always recognise it.  To what extent there may be some… there may be 
a few pure curiosity driven areas of science which could be outside of this but 
isn’t the vast majority of all the science that’s done actually driven by – and 
people’s curiosity is driven by – their position in society  
 
FGP3: [Oh yeah.] 
 
FGP5: [or their] interest in societal issues?  And therefore to some extent co-
designed, even if one can’t identify always who the stakeholder is, it’s more 
the kind of process that Sheila Jasanoff writes about in her ideas about co-
production of science and social order or indeed that Brian Wynne wrote 
about kind of back in the 1980s and the early days of the climate change 
debates about the ways that the mutual construction of science and policy 
domains led to certain kinds of folky and climate science and others not being 
taken on at that point to focus on mitigation and weather modelling as 
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opposed to adaptation.  Perhaps another way of looking at this whole issue is 
to become more explicit about the implicit bits of co-design that are going on 
all the time, and begin to ask some more strategic questions about how we 
direct those co-design processes [laughs] in ways that are going to be 
productive for particular normative agendas. 
 
This direct translation of Jasanoff’s co-production (as latent or implicit) is then taken 
up by the other focus group participants:  
 
FGP3: - I think that’s actually an interesting point… is the scientists’ view 
of… say for example when we put up the ten issues, you know what did I 
look at and [SC member] and all any of us?  We looked at what were the big 
international debates  
 
FGP5: exactly! [yeah] 
 
FGP3: so there is… I like what you’ve said, 
 
FGP5: [yeah, yeah] 
 
FGP3: there is an implicit co-design  
 
FGP5: [yeah] 
 
FGP3: but it is our scientific interpretation and so it is the next level down 
[where you]…[a- a-] 
 
FGP5: [Next level down,] you then go again to a different [kind of co-design 
and say let’s get stakeholders together to design the questions]… 
 
FGP3: [Absolutely, absolutely I think that is a very good one so] there is a lot 
of implicit co-design and there are some parts that need to be a bit more 
explicit, interesting way of looking at it. 
          
Here, in a moment that enacts the type of reflexivity (or ‘becoming more explicit’) 
proposed by FGP5, FGP3 notes that the committee members’ ‘scientific 
interpretation’ of ‘the big international debates’ informed which issues were put up 
on a slide during an exercise to define Future Earth’s 2025 vision and research 
priorities; so that agenda was indeed driven by ‘[people’s] position in society’ or 
‘their interests in societal issues’: a type of co-design that operates at a different 
(higher and more implicit) level from (as specified by FGP5) the kind of co-design in 
which stakeholders are brought together to design the questions. This former type of 
co-design is something that is already (always) happening to produce and maintain 
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particular norms; the role of institutions such as Future Earth as envisaged by FGP5 
would be to steer such processes, although this might not necessarily look like co-
design as imagined by the majority in Future Earth (i.e. participation or 
collaboration). This is evocative of Jasanoff’s ‘constitutive co-production’ in 
particular (2004b: 22-28), which draws on Foucauldian notions of embedded and 
productive power, and suggests it is necessary to challenge the notion of status quo as 
neutral or apolitical.  
 
In fact, this type of reflexivity was apparent during the discussions regarding the 
development of the Future Earth 2025 vision earlier that day, with some participants 
questioning the use of particular SDG-like global challenges to frame the vision, 
making the distinction between a) these visions of ‘the world we would want to see’ 
and b) visions of success for Future Earth as a programme, suggesting that it is not 
Future Earth’s role to decide on which global challenges are the most important but 
rather to define the type of research outputs, research culture or capacity building it 
might undertake. One participant asked where the co-design was in the process of 
defining the 2025 vision, if broader constituencies (beyond the committees) had not 
been consulted. Furthermore, other instances of reflexivity occurred throughout the 
meetings, for example in terms of questioning the ‘Sutherland’ workshop process 
(Sutherland et al., 2006), which was used to winnow down a long list of research 
questions/priorities that had been collected through various means (including online 
consultation), ready to then be further narrowed down by the SC and IEC to form the 
Strategic Research Agenda. Participants were concerned about the criteria for 
inclusion (of both questions and workshop participants) and the (disciplinary and 
regional) diversity of the workshop participants undertaking that initial sorting.  
 
So, to conclude this section, there was ambiguity around whether co-’s should 
happen (explicitly) from the ‘start’ of Future Earth, whether the ‘start’ comprises 
governance (and governing committees) or just research (and research projects), and 
furthermore whether co-design/co-production is always happening anyway – 
‘implicitly’ – and therefore whether Future Earth could become reflexive about 
implicit premises and consider the possibility of working with different assumptions. 
These ambiguities and the different understandings of co-design underlying them 
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have implications for implementation. While the participatory/collaborative form of 
co-’s is far from straightforward in implementation and raises multiple questions 
around when, where, how and with whom it should take place, it is perhaps easier to 
translate into action once these details have been settled (or indeed, before they are 
settled, by muddling through).  
 
Co-’s as institutional culture and tacit (or even explicit) shared principles, or an 
existing process that might be steered in alternative directions, raises further difficult 
questions for implementation. Institutional culture is not necessarily amenable to 
intentional shaping by (a minority, or even a majority, of) actors involved, and even 
without the extreme heterogeneity and scope of Future Earth, shared principles are 
difficult to settle and maintain. If the norms implicit in existing inherent co-
design/co-production are to be made explicit and redirected, entry points are needed. 
How and when might these processes be interrupted; which points of intervention are 
possible? Once the co-production of research and normative agendas has been made 
explicit, what does it mean to intervene and steer these?  
 
The following section explores how the different ambiguities and understandings 
outlined above played out in more detail in the design and implementation of Future 
Earth’s organisational (governing committee) structure and processes.  
 
7.2 Organisational structure and process  
 
While Future Earth’s committee structure is seen by those involved as an innovation, 
whether or not the Science Committee and Engagement Committee should remain 
separate was a matter of debate, with varying concerns raised, some underpinned by 
the representative-utilitarian co-production model and others by the co-production as 
threat model; in both cases assumptions are made about the separation of science and 
society. How the Engagement Committee should be populated was also raised as an 
issue, with advocates of the representative-utilitarian model pushing for stakeholder 
representation on the committee and adherents of reflexive-deliberative model 
emphasising the importance of processes of doing, leading and governing co-’s 
(rather than solely who sits on the committee). These different understandings have 
219 
 
implications for how the committees are designed and work together, and what they 
and their work represents and means, although of course the design and work of the 
committees are also informed (and sometimes constrained) by practical and strategic 
considerations. 
 
Not least of the challenges in implementing co-design is the existing architecture and 
legacy of the GEC programmes: in dismantling the existing programmes, building an 
institutional structure into which the core projects could transition was key, and the 
Transition Team’s design for this to some extent took its cues from existing 
governance formats, establishing a set of overarching committees that would lead on 
strategy and decision making and a Secretariat that would lead on execution and 
implementation, with affiliated research projects ‘on the ground’ (as well as regional 
and national committees and centres to coordinate and link between levels). Much of 
the activity to establish this structure was informed by awareness of the political 
sensitivities involved in institutional change, particularly when it involves closing 
down large-scale programmes and their executive and administrative support teams. 
However, Future Earth can be seen (and is seen by some involved) as an experiment 
and/or innovation at the institutional level, and despite the need for authoritative – 
and cohesive – structure and leadership, several notable divergences have been made 
from the standard set up of the international programmes: notably the shift from a 
sole Science Committee to the dual Science Committee and Engagement Committee 
format (as well as the overarching ‘multi-stakeholder’ Governing Council, aka the 
Alliance, and the multi-hub structure of the global Secretariat).  
 
The appointment of both a Science Committee and Engagement Committee was 
noted as a ‘statement of intent’ by one participant peripherally involved in Future 
Earth: 
 
Participant 1: I mean, we know they have a Science Committee and an 
Engagement Committee, which is an interesting move in its- y’know that’s a 
statement of intent of a kind – we know who’s on the Engagement Committee 
we know they’re discussing co-production and what it means – at some point 
a document will emerge which is the negotiated, agreed, more detailed rubric, 
protocol, strategy, whatever it is about, what- how they will implement the 
intention to have co-production but I don’t know what it’s going to say. 
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Researcher: So when you say that there are these two committees and that’s a 
kind of a statement of intent, what exactly do you mean by that? 
 
Participant 1: Well I think the one is I mean the- it’s a departure from what 
you more typically find which would be there’d be a research committee and 
as an appendage a communications or engagement function and this […] it’s 
clear if you look at the structure they’re intended to have equal weight in the 
governance of Future Earth. 
         (Interview 1) 
 
The introduction of an Engagement Committee alongside the more usual Science 
Committee is seen to signify Future Earth’s commitment and aspiration to co-design: 
the equal division of authority or responsibility implicit in some understandings of 
co-design and co-production comes to the fore. In addition to the committee structure 
reflecting Future Earth’s aspiration towards co-production, the committees are seen 
as playing a significant role in developing Future Earth’s co-production strategy and 
issuing a statement on Future Earth’s position.  
 
Tensions between the three models of co-production and associated worldviews 
outlined in Chapters 5 and 6 (representative-utilitarian co-production, deliberative-
reflexive co-production, and co-production as threat) were very present in discussions 
and decision-making around the (implementation of the) governance structure of the 
initiative.  
 
The issue of whether the Science Committee and Engagement Committee could have 
been or should be merged into one committee arose in the Science Committee 
teleconference recordings and minutes. When asked about this during interview, one 
participant (interviewee 9) suggested that: ‘if you’re going to have true co-design you 
have to have those sorts of committees working closely together. I’ll say my own 
personal view was that you probably could’ve tried to design a single committee 
really […]’. This view implies that the committee(s) would embody co-design and 
co-production in their structure and working practices, in line with the representative- 
utilitarian vision of the documents as explored in the previous section.  
 
However, some participants identified logistical and strategic reasons for establishing 
separate committees. One participant (interviewee 3), who had been involved in the 
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Transition Team since the early stages of the development of Future Earth suggested 
that having a combined committee was not considered early on, emphasising the 
experimental nature of Future Earth’s governance design:  
 
[…] the engagement committee is an innovation in the structure and so I don’t 
think it was initially a discussion about whether to have an engagement 
committee and you know to have a science committee all merged.  It was you 
know a new point that they were suggesting […].   
 
Having suggested that having a joint committee was not initially considered as an 
option as the Engagement Committee was seen as building on existing arrangements, 
the participant moved on to identify the issue of stakeholder time limitations and 
potential to be bored by the Science Committee’s discussions (and vice versa): 
 
I think a number of us had experience of this that whilst the research 
community is often willing to give up you know considerable time because 
they see it as part of their career roles to come to meetings like this, it can be 
harder for stakeholders to devote that much time.  And that if the full set of 
stakeholders were exposed to the full set of discussions that the scientific 
committee had to have, we have seen experiences before where people have 
got very bored and I think the opposite is true as well, and I think that was at 
least part of the drive for separating the groups, recognising that they should 
[…] come together often […] 
       (Interview 3) 
 
The issue of time commitment was flagged by participant 9 as well, who suggested 
that more influential, ‘active people from industry, from government’ would be able 
to devote much less time to committee meetings than ‘science bureaucrats’ who 
would have more time to offer. 
 
Another participant (interviewee 5) suggested that in addition to avoiding the 
Engagement Committee feeling bored or overwhelmed, keeping the committees 
separate was seen as a way of curating a ‘safe space’ in which stakeholders could 
raise their concerns on an equal footing in comparison with the Science Committee: 
 
I think [the committees were designed to be separate] partially because they 
[members of the Transition Team] felt that co-design and co-production was 
so out there, that you needed to allow stakeholders to have an equal advisory 
role and not be out-manoeuvred and out-spoken by scientists so that there is a 
danger if you put them in the same group that they will just feel overwhelmed 
or they will feel disinterested or you know what I mean?  
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[…] 
 
You need to curate a kind of safe and secure space for them to raise their 
concerns but yes I am not very convinced by that. 
        (Interview 5) 
 
Here, there is an implication that Transition Team members believed that the Science 
Committee might not easily accept, welcome or adapt to collaborating with 
stakeholders, given the novelty of co-design and co-production in this field (it being 
‘so out there’), although participant 5 did not agree with that view. Another 
participant (interviewee 8) also suggested that it would be necessary to have a 
protected space to enable the learning process around engagement: 
 
Well, there was apparently an intense debate in the Transition Team about 
whether there should be one or two committees. I think… there are a number 
of reasons why they’re separate […] one is that we’re learning how to do 
engagement and therefore it’s good to you know have a really focused group 
that is just helping us with engagement […] and reflecting on that and 
keeping that for the moment separate from you know from the scientific 
agenda-setting but of course these committees will work very closely 
together.  
 
The implication is that the Engagement Committee will not be learning about co-
design of scientific agendas by doing it at the global governance level (in the sense of 
collaborating with the Science Committee on scientific agenda setting); but rather 
that engagement and scientific agenda-setting are two distinct activities that initially 
need to occur separately (rather than the togetherness implied by “co-”) (although in 
practice this agenda-setting was – at least in part – done by the two committees 
together). The participant went on to talk about ‘inoculation’: 
 
The second argument which I think relates to […] the question about the risk 
of the whole project becoming dominated by particular… interest groups 
from business or policy… erm or NGOs for that matter - and people wanted 
to guard against that so it was seen as a kind of inoculation from that risk 
partially to keep the two things separate.  
 
         (Interview 8) 
 
This second argument resonates with the ‘co-production as threat’ model discussed in 
the previous chapters, in which societal interests might damage the impartiality or 
objectivity of science. The decision to establish separate committees seems to have 
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been at least partly made on the basis of assumptions about the separation of science 
and society (evoking deficit and linear model assumptions as well). Tensions 
between this view of science-society relations and a more constructivist approach 
were flagged by participant 7: 
 
Researcher: […]  in some of the documents the fact that the SC and the EC 
are separate has been questioned, I wonder what you think about that? 
 
Participant 2: Yeah. Um, no, indeed it has been questioned and there’s also 
been a set of justifications from the Transition Team for preserving that 
separation to preserve the credibility and legitimacy of science and scientific 
evidence as something pure. I’m with those that see this separation as 
somewhat false. […] I mean the other aspect though is that the Science 
Committee to my mind needs to be thinking more like an engagement 
committee and the Engagement Committee needs to be thinking like a science 
committee, so if you’re going to keep them separate you’ve nevertheless got 
to have some sort of some common understandings of these things like co-
design and co-production embedded into each and each has to take a view 
that their perspectives are positioned and partial, whether they’re scientists 
or stakeholders. 
 
Again, here the co-production as threat model is echoed in the idea that science and 
scientific evidence would no longer be pure, credible or legitimate if the Engagement 
Committee members (i.e. stakeholders) were to work on the same committee as the 
Science Committee members (i.e. scientists/researchers). However, given that this 
participant sees all committee members’ perspectives as positioned and partial and 
does not afford objective or impartial status to the Science Committee members and 
their knowledge, she/he sees this separation as ‘false’. The implication is that the 
shared, common understandings of co-design and co-production would (or at least 
should) entail an acknowledgement of the positionality of scientists (as well as non-
scientists), in line with the deliberative-reflexive model of co-production. 
 
In practice, the Science Committee and (Interim) Engagement Committee have 
remained as separate entities nominally but mostly meet together, and also members 
from each committee work together in sub-committees and sub-groups on particular 
tasks and areas of work. 
 
All of the discussion and negotiation around whether the committees should stay 
separate or merge and how they should work together shows those involved in Future 
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Earth trying to work out the status and role of the committees, as well as what co-’s 
might mean in Future Earth and in the process of establishing a new institutional 
model for Future Earth. Do the committees embody co-’s by default in that they are 
composed of different disciplinary (Science Committee) and sectoral (Engagement 
Committee) representatives, or is something more needed? Different ideas about 
what co-’s are (participation, reflexivity, other) and how it should be done run 
throughout these discussions. Of course, the committees’ role is about more than the 
co-’s, as this is not the only principle or ambition of Future Earth; so design decisions 
have been made on that basis too (as outlined in Chapter 4, for example, integrating 
knowledge and integrating the programmes, building the authority of this type of 
research, etc.). However, this institutional structure seems to be key to implementing 
co-’s, whether it is seen to be actively undertaking co-’s in itself, whether it is seen to 
represent co-’s or a commitment to co-’s, or whether it is seen to be in the position to 
bring about co-’s elsewhere in Future Earth.  
 
Beyond whether the Science and Engagement Committees should be merged or 
separate, participant 7 also raised the issue of membership of the Engagement 
Committee:  
 
The other factor in this, I think there’s been a certain amount of debate about 
whether the Engagement Committee should consist of stakeholders, in other 
words the people and groups with whom scientists should be engaging, who 
can then be representative and feed ideas and questions in and out to their 
respective kind of constituencies, or whether it should also include within it 
people who are as it were experts in engagement, so people who have thought 
about or researched or have experience to bear around science and public 
engagement, science communication, research-policy interactions, science 
and technology studies, co-production perspectives and so on. And I’ve felt it 
would be very useful to have some of the latter, some people who can think 
through some of the processes rather than simply stakeholders […] 
 
Researcher: And how do you feel that’s played out in the Interim Engagement 
Committee? 
 
Participant 7: The Interim Engagement Committee is very largely 
stakeholders, and that’s the view that that dominates it, […] this is very much 
a collaboration view. […] the way the Interim Engagement Committee has 
been constituted, there are one or two people who have a kind of journalistic 
role […], but mostly it’s kind of stakeholder groups […]  
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The participant sets in opposition EC members as representative of different 
stakeholder sectors or constituencies versus EC members as experts in engagement, 
although argues that both are needed. Interestingly, the former is seen as both an 
embodiment or enactment of the representative-utilitarian (collaborative/ 
participatory) form of co-’s, and the members of that committee are also seen to hold 
the view that co-’s equals collaboration. The mention of representativeness and 
representation links back to questions discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
The strategic reasons for adopting sectoral representatives (such as their access to 
broad networks), as well as the ambiguities of the language of representation are 
highlighted by participant 8: 
 
Well if you read the call for the [permanent] Engagement Committee we 
specify nine sectors I think. So it’s going to be quite a puzzle. I think we are 
sensitive to the idea that there ought to be some possibly some people on the 
committee who are expert in engagement but in general we’re interested in 
having stakeholders who represent some sector in society who are well-
networked, but who also are regionally representative, there’s got to be a 
gender balance, so we’ve got all these kind of decision criteria that we to 
meet which is gonna be quite a tricky thing to do- 
 
[…] 
 
So […] I think the stakeholder committee will -or the Engagement Committee 
will represent stakeholder -I don’t- we need again- it’s sort of term- about 
framing and language but will represent certain, will be representative of 
different sectors in society so we’ll have people representing in some way or 
although in their own capacity they’ll be representing that voice anyway in 
the [committee]. 
        (Interview 8) 
 
In this quote the issue of representation and its ambiguity is apparent: this participant 
feels that it is about ensuring that particular (sectoral) voices (as well as regions and 
genders) are present on the committee, rather than the members representing 
(speaking on behalf of, as spokespeople for) a broader constituency to whom they 
would be accountable. While the EC is recruited to ensure that particular sectoral 
experience is present in the committee (as can be seen in the list of stakeholder 
groups/sectors required), the 2014 call explicitly states that ‘Members of the 
Engagement Committee should serve in an individual capacity and will be chosen on 
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the basis of their expertise and experience. They will not represent an organization, 
sector of activity or particular vested interests.’ (doc 31). 
 
The important strategic role of the committee members in connecting Future Earth to 
particular networks was also mentioned by participant 3: 
 
So I think where we’ve come to is yes we didn’t want to make it a theoretical 
group about engagement, we wanted to make it a group… which maybe had 
some of that capacity but we’re partly populated by people that had access to 
large networks who could help to bring them y’know to involve them in the 
programme and I think that is where we have alighted.   
        (Interview 3) 
 
This view of the committee members as links to broader or different communities 
suggests that beyond ensuring that particular views are present in the committee’s 
discussions, the members are seen as important bridges or links between Future Earth 
and particular networks, perhaps increasing the inclusivity of the initiative (at least 
towards chosen sectors). However, the contrast between experts comprising a 
theoretical group about engagement and stakeholders bringing new communities on 
board – and by implication actually doing engagement in practice rather than talking 
about it in theory – suggests that certain assumptions are made about the nature of 
expertise in engagement and the roles that stakeholder members of the committee 
might be able and expected to play. It seems that having a range of stakeholders 
present (in this case on the committee) is half the battle won towards implementing 
co-’s; however, this view of co-’s as embodied in the members (and what/whom they 
represent) is challenged by participant 7: 
 
But it’s not I think only about who – I mean the Engagement Committee will 
also have to work on process it’s not just […] about representing 
constituencies, so I think […] what I hope is that Committee will include 
people who’ve got experience or interest in engagement processes […] that’s 
what I’d like to see. Um and that through interacting with the Science 
Committee we can begin to sort of invent some common principles and 
practices. 
        (Interview 7) 
 
Representation is seen as one possible but not the only role of the committee, and less 
important than its role in developing process. So experts in engagement would not 
only work on theory (although common principles would be devised), they would 
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also work on process and practice. Here, engagement is seen as something enacted in 
processes and practices rather than solely embodied in the range of people present: 
this distinction reveals one of the differences between the representative-utilitarian 
mode of co-production and the deliberative-reflexive mode of co-production 
(although, of course, this distinction is not clear cut, as, of course, from the 
representative-utilitarian perspective, the issue of what the stakeholders do once they 
have been brought together remains).  
  
Similarly, participant 5 felt that more attention should be paid to designing and 
facilitating processes:  
 
I actually think that what we’ve underestimated and what most people 
underestimate is the extent to which co-design and co-production is not about 
the committees you set up or about how many stakeholders you bring on 
board, it is about how you… it is about the processes we design and how you 
facilitate and run those processes so I believe if you had one committee 
which was mixed, that could work or not depending on whether leading that 
process are people who have the right skills and process design skills, we 
always underestimate that you know? […] 
        
The participant went on to express frustration at the amount of time and resources 
that had been spent designing what she/he considered to be an overly cumbersome 
governance structure:  
 
[…] if I think now about the selection of the permanent Engagement 
Committee, when you think about how long in effect it is going to take us to 
have a permanent Engagement Committee, the fact that we had to have an 
interim… you know, how much time and energy and resources go in to this?  
So and then you think well actually why didn’t we just have one committee, 
one Future Earth committee that had the right people on it and that can 
eventually organically you could have said OK what do we need?  You 
know?  Do we need to have a separate working group that looks at 
engagement issues?  […] But instead we spend two years designing a 
complex governance structure that is going to take us another year or two to 
set it up, and then we’re four years down the line you know?  That is a bit 
frustrating and I know… it is really important to get those processes right 
because of transparency and global representivity [sic] and all of that but if 
we had designed something leaner and meaner I am sure that that wouldn’t 
have been a worse way to go, I think it would have been better […] 
         
(Interview 5)  
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The participant feels that it would have been better to establish one smaller 
committee ‘with the right people’ than to spend time designing and appointing the 
complex governance structure. However, she/he notes that the reason it was 
important to get the design and appointment processes right, and thus to take time 
over their design, was ‘transparency’ and global representativeness. When asked why 
the establishment of the governance structure occurred in this way, the participant 
suggested that it was partly because this has never been done before at the global 
level so they did not know better, again stressing the need for transparency:  
I think it is… it really is because we don’t know better, it is the first time we 
have done this at the global level, and many, many voices and many people 
were involved in the Transition Team and its recommendations and in the 
Alliance and so the complex architecture that we see now, governance 
structure, is a result of complex processes and I think they offer a compromise 
and make everybody happy, they are transparent because they have been 
round the block, there have been consultations on them etcetera and it is the 
first time we are doing it so we don’t have a better alternative.  
         (Interview 5) 
Transparency is considered necessary due to the political sensitivities in dismantling 
the former programmes and bringing their projects into Future Earth; this participant 
perhaps believes that this stood in the way of more imaginative or pragmatic thinking 
regarding the initiative’s governance apparatus. However, compromise probably 
would be necessary whatever the existing programmes’ legacy, given that this is an 
experiment in organisational structure to stimulate and enact co-production at the 
global level. The participant’s comments indicate frustration with the representative-
utilitarian model of co-’s in which committee (and stakeholder) recruitment 
potentially becomes a tick-box exercise to ensure that particular sectors (as well as 
geographical regions, genders, and career stages) are represented rather than thinking 
beyond recruitment towards the actual processes and practices carried out. 
 
However, despite this discontent with the pace of development and the nature of the 
governance structure established, others saw work to date as an achievement, given 
hurdles encountered along the way:  
 
[…] I think we have come on so far, you know, when I took on this role we 
had no Design Report, the programmes were all trying to kill each other and 
kill Future Earth, you know there was no concept of how the Secretariat was 
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going to be formed and great strides have been taken on all of those but each 
time you unpeel the level of the onion, you know the next challenges come 
[…] but if I look back over the last two and a half years, […] I think we have 
made amazing structural progress and we’re starting on the research path 
now, recognising of course that the existing programmes have continued to 
deliver throughout this time.  
        (Interview 3)  
 
The intensity of the controversy around the establishment of Future Earth among the 
existing programmes is apparent here (as well as the feeling shared by many involved 
that it was necessary to acknowledge that great work had been and continued to be 
done by the existing programmes). The sensitivities and complexity of this situation 
necessitated  care and time for the processes of bringing about institutional change 
(including performative attempts to affirm or assert the need for change and the 
legitimacy of the new arrangements). 
 
Building on this exploration of how these political sensitivities (around institutional 
change) and various tensions (between governance and research, between different 
models of co-production, and between structure – linked to the representative model 
– and process – linked to the deliberative model) played out in the negotiations 
around how the committees should be populated and work, the following section 
explores another aspect of the implementation of co-design: the relationship between 
principles and practice. 
 
7.3 Principles and practice 
 
During the period of the fieldwork, a White Paper on engagement drafted by a sub-
group of Secretariat, Science Committee and Interim Engagement Committee 
members was seen to reveal some of the tensions between different understandings of 
co-’s. It was also considered to play a key role in resolving these different 
understandings, and associated challenges and tensions, by setting down agreed 
principles to guide practice.  However, the extent to which it might be possible to 
resolve these differences on paper was questioned by some, suggesting that it might 
only be possible to do so in practice, that is, in a sense, experimentally, through trial 
and error.   
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Many participants discussed the White Paper on engagement as key to setting out 
engagement, co-design and co-production definitions, principles and strategy, and a 
common Future Earth position on these concepts, including articulating who will be 
responsible for making decisions about when these kinds of working are appropriate 
or necessary. However several participants noted that working on the paper revealed 
differences in understanding of these terms within the IEC/SC, for example between 
constructivist and more instrumental understandings of the terms:  
 
[….] at the moment several members of the SC are engaged in writing what’s 
being called a White Paper on co-production – […] there was an initial note 
[…] which sort of laid out some of these views a little bit and actually 
revealed some of the gulfs, because there was one kind of view […] as one 
would expect from a very particular kind of scientific organisation that had 
worked in collaboration with stakeholders, and then I think that [others] from 
a different more constructivist social science tradition were bringing a rather 
different view, so that I think was exposed a bit in that note. So I think this 
White Paper process is an attempt to kind of develop the beginnings of a 
position.  
         
(Interview 7) 
 
Here a tension has been identified between representative-utilitarian and deliberative-
reflexive co-production. As seen earlier (in section 7.2), developing a common 
understanding of (and commitment to) co-’s is seen by some as key to moving 
beyond ‘rhetoric’ to implementation, as also voiced by participant 5: 
 
[…] despite the fact that there are many people passionate about co-design 
and co-production, there are a lot of people in Future Earth and I don’t just 
mean the committees and the Secretariat but in the wider family that still 
don’t share a common understanding of what this means and even if you 
clarify the meaning that they really don’t think that this is necessarily the way 
for science to go.  So I think there is still a lot of… it’s opened debate clearly 
this paper that is being drafted at the moment, is an attempt and a reflection 
of the degree to which we’re not all on the same page on these issues.   
[…] 
 
[…] I think the will is there, the talk is there but it is a little bit at the level of 
rhetoric still and the reality of implementing it is tough because we don’t 
share a common understanding of what it means and we don’t share a 
common conviction of whether this is the way to go.   
       (Interview 5) 
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Other participants saw the paper as having a role in trying to find a balance between 
arguing that a) everything should be co-designed/co-produced and b) nothing should 
be (because some are nervous about involvement of industry): 
 
[…] this leads us down a whole interesting area of what do we mean by co-
design and co-production and how much – how much is appropriate for 
different sorts of purposes um I think there’s a bit of rhetoric around Future 
Earth which on the one side suggests that everything should be fully co-
designed and fully co-produced and everything else, or on the other hand has 
people extremely nervous and mistrustful of having industry involved in 
research and things like that and I think the truth is somewhere in between 
and I think that the White Paper that we’re developing on engagement will try 
and articulate this […] 
        (Interview 9) 
 
Here the model of co-production as threat is again apparent in the perceived 
nervousness and mistrust about involving industry in research, prompting the need 
for such guidelines. This participant further expanded on the potential role of the 
White Paper later in the interview:  
 
There’s quite a bit of thinking about [how to do co-production] in 
development research and in agricultural research […] I think we’re trying to 
ask parallel questions in a in a pretty novel domain at this sort of global level. 
[…] I think we’re feeling our way to […] to actually answer the question of 
how much engagement is appropriate in different circumstances at this level 
[…] the Science Committee and the Engagement Committee together drawing 
on thoughts from the community more broadly need to actually […] produce 
a bit of a White Paper about these issues which can become part of the 
discussion and I hope things like your research will feed into this as well. 
Such that over the next few years we gradually develop a – well hopefully 
within a year we produce some sort of position paper on this but we don’t 
imagine for a moment that it’s the perfect final answer, but that we start to 
actually work in a in a reflective sense using it and testing whether these sort 
of ideas that we think might be right there are in fact correct. So I hope that 
this White Paper will actually produce a table which actually says something 
about how much engagement we think might be appropriate in different 
circumstances at different stages of research or in different stages of the 
process and that that itself becomes a testable hypothesis. 
(Interview 9) 
 
Here engagement in Future Earth is seen as an experiment in the sense of testable 
hypothesis and improvisation as those involved ‘feel their way’. The White Paper is 
intended to provide a structure to guide practice; however, this is not seen as a 
prescriptive one-size-fits-all policy, nor a ‘perfect final answer’: there is expected to 
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be a spectrum of options for engagement in different circumstances, and there should 
also be flexibility regarding the development of the paper itself and the framework it 
presents. This is perhaps an attempt to both deal with the contestation around these 
concepts and also operationalise their multiplicity. This is (temporarily) crystallised 
in the engagement paper drafts, all of which suggest variation according to 
circumstances, including (the need to develop) a menu of possible options. 
 
Flexibility, a spectrum of options for engagement, and the degree of prescriptiveness 
was also noted as important during the second focus group: 
 
FGP2: I was going to say I agree very much with [FGP3’s] perspective on 
that not all of it is necessarily appropriate for that, sometimes critical research 
doesn’t get buy in because you are coming in or things, but I think what we’re 
saying is there’s kind of the spectrum too and if Future Earth makes this very 
rigid and just makes it co-produced, not co-produced or something then we 
probably would lose out a lot because it can be relevant in different projects 
and different cases to different degrees. 
 
Another participant in the same focus group referred to the need for a ‘basket of 
possibilities’ for co-production. As discussed in Chapter 5 and explored further in 
section 7.4 below, some participants suggested that these concepts would be 
interpreted in different ways in different contexts, so despite efforts to define and 
provide principles and guidelines at the ‘global’ governance level, any such 
frameworks developed are not intended to be entirely prescriptive.  
 
While participant 7 saw the need for common and agreed understandings to promote 
co-’s as reflexivity (section 7.2), others saw such principles as necessary to avoid 
conflict of interest and ensure that vested interests of stakeholders do not undermine 
research results, bringing the deliberative-reflexive co-production and co-production 
as threat models into contrast. In the latter case, generally there is a view that such 
principles should be prescriptive ‘rules’ to deal with the threat of stakeholder 
interests twisting or misrepresenting results with potentially devastating outcomes (as 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6):  
 
I don’t think these concerns [about conflict of interest and threats to the 
objectivity of research] can be dismissed and just glossed over as if they are 
irrelevant, they are real and a very large number and large fraction of 
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scientists have those concerns and pride themselves on trying to keep those 
conflicts of interest off of their research and I think Future Earth needs to deal 
with them in a much more direct and transparent way. I do believe that can 
be navigated but I think we need some very erm… well defined rules of 
engagement first and foremost in the scientific process. 
        (Interview 2) 
 
The view that transparency and ‘well-defined rules of engagement […] in the 
scientific process’ are needed to manage (critiques about) conflict of interest was 
shared by other participants. This is seen as particularly urgent in engaging with the 
private sector: 
 
I do think that particularly when it comes to private sector engagement and 
funding of research… we just need to have clearly defined principles for these 
kind of public private partnerships so you know under what conditions is it 
OK for us as a research community to work on problems identified by private 
sector and take resources from the private sector?  But for the rest I feel very 
strongly that unless we are able to find acceptable principles for such 
partnerships and therefore are able to work with private sector and its 
interests, we will never really shift in the direction that we need to shift, so 
getting that right, finding ways of working with the private sector, of working 
on issues that the private sector also find important, erm… in ways that the 
research community feels maintains its autonomy and integrity when it comes 
to issues of data… open access etcetera we just have to get that right and that 
is I think one of our biggest challenges in Future Earth.  It is fine you know 
we are kind of used to now working with policy makers and practitioners, 
NGOs can be difficult especially if they are activists, but private sector I think 
we are way behind. 
        (Interview 5) 
 
Here the concerns about working with the private sector are linked to the autonomy 
and integrity of the research community, particularly around issues such as 
intellectual property. Others expressed worries about how working with private 
sector stakeholders might prevent the pursuit of particular normative research 
agendas. During the second focus group, one participant suggested that it might be 
possible to build accountability into the research framework by insisting that 
questions of inequality be addressed when co-designing with private sector 
organisations:  
 
FGP3: I suppose you know we were talking actually at lunch with… was it 
[Alliance member] who was there, you know co-designing with business, I 
mean suppose you had… which company did you say?   
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FGP1: I just said big oil, I didn’t mention any specific company. 
 
FGP3: [Big oil, yes or or] a big seed company whatever, you co-design with 
them […] it still means that which side are you on is implicit so you… if 
you’re co-design and they’re willing to do it – is that you ask the hard 
questions.  Please tell us um you know… um how is it going to impact X or Y 
what are the distribution consequences of it?  So that you build in possible 
implications for inequalities and you insist on that. That could be one way 
out. 
 
[…] 
 
[…] we could co-design with [those] who we feel could… may not have 
distributional or inequ… er issues of the poor etcetera in their minds but if 
they are willing to co-design we insist that those questions be put as part of 
the framework of the research so it is possible to build in some issues of 
accountability right there.  Now how far that would go is an interesting ha 
[laughs] question you know? 
 
FGP1: Yes I guess what came up very clearly for me in terms of yesterday’s 
discussion was there probably is some need for us to work on some principles 
and procedures 
 
FGP3: [Mm] 
 
FGP1: [of] co-design and so it is very clear there are ground rules,  
 
FGP3: [Yes] 
 
FGP1: [there’re] parameters and things they that you know must be 
undertaken,  […] I mean have you tried your utmost in terms of reasonable 
effort to get a cross section of truly representative sample in terms of who you 
have spoken to?  But the question then becomes how far do you go to get to 
certain elements you know exist but who haven’t come to you naturally or 
haven’t responded to the call for co-design or co-production, do you have to 
really go to where they are and force them to speak to you?  I don’t know, I 
think we need… those are really quite fundamental questions I think we 
probably need to do some soul searching on and put down on to paper as 
agreed principles. Otherwise it is going to be quite hard to really get to grips 
with what is I think a very amorphous concept, you know it’s hard to really 
describe what you mean by it because it could be huge. 
 
FGP3 argues that (given that co-design with powerful actors as opposed to less 
powerful actors entails an implicit value judgement as to ‘which side you are on’), 
Future Earth could insist that questions of inequality and distribution are asked ‘as 
part of the framework of the research so it is possible to build in some issues of 
accountability right there’. FGP1 follows up on this by suggesting there is a need for 
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agreed principles, procedures and ground rules to reign in the scope of potential co-
design, for example in relation to how far to go in recruiting particular actors. While 
this could be interpreted as closing down FGP3’s concerns about how inequality will 
be addressed (by defining them away through procedure), it could also be seen as 
support for developing Future Earth specifications for the types of questions and 
issues of accountability that need to be addressed in projects. 
 
In this way, introducing the ‘co-’ concepts can be seen to open up questions that 
might not previously have been asked. Simply starting conversations about why and 
how to co-produce research has the potential to introduce unfamiliar questions and 
perhaps reflexivity: 
 
I mean, one really good thing is even having discussions about [power 
relations], because in somewhere like the IGBP Science Committee I can 
assure you the notion of talking about power would never have come up 
[laughs].  
(Interview 9)  
Whether this change extends beyond the governing committees of Future Earth, and 
the extent and nature of its further effects, is a question for future research. 
 
However, despite many participants arguing for defined principles and ground rules 
(whether to ensure reflexivity, to prevent conflict of interest, to ensure that 
accountability and questions of inequality are built into the research, or to ensure 
shared understanding of how far to go to reach particular stakeholders), and citing the 
White Paper as an arena for clarifying Future Earth’s stance on co-design and co-
production, the difficulties of doing this were mentioned several times, for example, 
by this IEC member:  
 
[…] I wish that we had come to this meeting with a much more… with a 
signed off and agreed and completed, engagement strategy or engagement 
White Paper, something that we could say specifically with science 
community but I guess maybe that is impossible in the sense that if we don’t 
maybe know what the science committee is planning on doing, specifically, 
how can we complete our work about saying how we will engage?  […] 
 
        (Interview 10) 
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While this statement perhaps reflects linear and deficit model assumptions, the lack 
of familiarity between the committees and each other’s work was an important issue 
at this early stage of Future Earth’s development (the interview took place before the 
two committees met together face-to-face for the first time), just as the lack of 
agreement and shared understanding within the committees is seen as an issue. (This 
is presumably one of the reasons some participants felt that it would be important to 
have a joint committee or for the committees to work closely together.) 
 
When asked how differences in understandings of co-’s might play out, participant 7 
suggested that deliberative-reflexive co-production is perhaps impossible to 
implement through abstract discussion: 
 
Researcher: […] as FE moves forward, how might that kind of reflexivity be 
implemented or how might those two different understandings of co-
production be implemented or play out?  
 
I7: Yeah I mean I wonder whether they’re really so opposed. I think what we 
probably need to work with is a kind of gradual coming together. […] So I 
think that [the White Paper] will get a discussion going that I hope we can 
take forward in the Beijing meeting. But it’s not very easy to do in a 
theoretical sense because a lot of this cuts at the heart of what scientists feel is 
the objective nature of what they do and a particular view of stakeholders as 
stakeholders with a kind of preformed interests. So I think there may be a bit 
of a sort of set of conceptual bridges to be crossed which are not very easy to 
do in theory – in my experience the best way to try and get people thinking in 
this -get to work with scientists and policy makers and try to get them 
thinking in this slightly more reflexive way- actually comes through quite 
tangible field level or problem-focused engagement. 
 
The participant moves on to discuss examples of this in her/his own research work, 
noting that what encourages people to think differently and reflexively is to expose 
them to different findings enabling them to recognise, make explicit and question 
their own assumptions during ‘real field engagements around a problem’. Here the 
participant argues that it is only really possible to achieve the deliberative-reflexive 
form of co-production (on the ground) around a particular problem: 
 
[…] where I’ve found in my work […] it’s proved most successful in actually 
encouraging scientists and policy makers to think differently has been around 
things like exposing policy people to these very different findings about 
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[research topic]45 so that they begin then to question their own assumptions 
and so they begin actually to ask new questions about “ok so what was this 
science saying if it’s actually contradicted so starkly by something else?” So 
facing people with contradictions and discussing them or real field 
engagements around a problem […] if you want to try and integrate 
participatory modelling, mathematical modelling, environmental modelling, it 
isn’t just a question of taking different techniques and integrating them to 
create a fuller picture, you also have to realise that each of those modelling 
approaches comes with a set of assumptions, with a set of particular questions 
that you’re asking, things you’re black-boxing, things that you are interested 
in, and those assumptions are also conditioned by the politics that you bring 
shaped by who you as a scientist might be and bringing some of those hav-
talking through some of those encounters in real field situations […] where 
the values as well as the ecological expertise of […] scientists versus social 
scientists becomes very clear and very stark around a particular problem I 
think begins to get some of this more reflexive interaction going. 
 
So, while firm principles are seen to be required by those that view co-’s as a threat 
to objectivity and independence, and common understandings and principles are also 
seen to be needed by those who see co-’s as deliberative-reflexive, the possibility of 
creating such shared principles is possibly challenged by the incommensurability of 
these approaches. Deliberative-reflexive co-production is seen as something that is 
best achieved in practice, at project level, around concrete problems, rather than 
conceptually or in theory (cf. Marres, 2007). 
 
7.4 Scale and substance 
 
Linked to the issue of implementing co-’s in practice around concrete problems is the 
question of scale, which runs throughout Future Earth, given its ambition to operate 
at multiple scales from global to local. Co-’s are not only seen as relevant to different 
institutional levels (as seen in section 7.1), but are also considered to operate at 
different geographical scales. Indeed, these two different types of scale are 
interlinked: the governing committees might be considered to be operating at the 
global or international level, the projects operating in a more ‘localised’ way (still 
international but presumably to some extent more explicitly ‘grounded’ in particular 
– local, national or regional – empirical contexts), with regional and national 
                                                 
45 Ironically (given the participant’s argument about the importance of specific empirical contexts and 
problems), the details of the research discussed have been removed to increase the chances of 
preservation of anonymity. 
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committees and centres and global Secretariat hubs bridging these institutional and 
geographical levels.  
 
Scale is considered particularly important in Future Earth due to the nature of the 
problems of GEC and sustainability the initiative intends to explore and address, 
which are often conceptualised (and governed) globally but manifest in different 
ways at different levels and in different contexts, as expressed by one focus group 
participant: 
 
FGP3: The other thing you’ve heard here is we need to look beyond global to 
regional, to sub-regional so if you ask yourself the question about food 
security or food water energy too, the challenges in sub-Saharan Africa are 
totally different from the challenges in the UK or the US, Europe or Latin 
America and therefore we can talk about global food security but one has to 
understand what the real issues are so it is not a science and technology issue 
in sub-Saharan Africa, it’s distorted trade policies, it is lack of empowerment 
of women, lack of infrastructure get food to markets, lack of micro-financing 
for better seeds etcetera it is a major governance rural development issue in 
many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, um, so you could easily increase food 
production factors by two or three with today’s knowledge, those… but 
there’s some big governance issues there.  Big food waste issue in Europe so 
dissecting how do we become food secure has got lots of different elements to 
it which again talking to end users, one gets one can get a better… and on an 
issue like that it is region by region so global is an issue too big to… global 
commons mitigation of climate change is global commons, global concern is 
we have got food security issues around the world but they vary from – and 
water - from one place to another place. 
 
Beyond this, participants suggested that co-design and co-production might face 
more or fewer hurdles depending on the sector (for example co-production might be 
easier in disaster risk management than in agriculture, or easier in agriculture than in 
technology development). It was also suggested that co-design might be easier to 
manage at the international level than at regional or local levels, but also that 
connecting the local and the global/international poses issues of representation again: 
 
FGP3: I mean again I am biased here, I think doing [co-design] at the 
international level is straightforward.  Working with the assessment bodies, 
working with the conventions, working with all the science-policy interfaces 
and the UN agencies I think that’s… I think we can do that fairly easily, 
whether it is actually members of the Engagement Committee, members of 
the Science Committee or of this final Secretariat I think that’s going to be 
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quite straightforward and there’ll be challenges but I think it is quite doable, 
it’s an extension… it’s really an evolution of what has been going on.  I think 
it’s when you come down those next levels and which is where I think these 
national committees and regional committees are going to be unbelievably 
important, because so many of these issues are national, regional, sub-
regional and national,  
 
FGP6: [This should be different from region to region yes.] 
 
FGP3: [so the global one I don’t think is a big challenge], I think it is those 
levels below. 
 
FGP5: I would say that OK the international may not be such a challenge and 
the very local is not a challenge and maybe we could argue that this isn’t so 
relevant to global change research but there are certainly strong traditions of 
co-design, co-production and participatory research in very local levels, in 
cities, in towns, in villages.  I think the biggest challenge is connecting up the 
local and the global and the way it’s been done to date in most international 
assessments has been through representation mechanisms so you have an 
indigenous person  
 
FGP3: [yeah] 
 
FGP5: [or…] and so on being part of your CBD [UN Convention on 
Biodiversity] process and so on. And that runs in to all sorts of problems of 
who represents who and who can speak for who 
 
FGP3: [yes]        
 
FGP5: [and] so on. And we have seen similar processes in the World Bank 
around voices of the poor and so on and there are representation problems and 
also problems of instrumentalising local voice to serve global agendas.  I am 
wondering if we can get to some different modes of linking local and global 
which perhaps try and work with and through some of the existing network 
processes through which local, vibrant local forms of action and knowledge 
are already linking up through networks, then through processes of 
institutionalisation, through activism, through movements and connecting up 
across the world and putting pressure on governments, on international 
agencies etc. And I think there aren’t very many examples yet of how science 
connects with local to global activism but it would be very exciting to explore 
these as ways forward. 
 
Here FGP3 implies that representative-utilitarian co-design is straightforward at the 
international/global level (where one ‘only’ has to deal with established agencies, 
conventions and so on), but FGP5 challenges this assumption, particularly in relation 
to how local voices (and voices of activists) can or should be represented in global 
processes (earlier, during the plenary discussion on engagement, similar suggestions 
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were raised in terms of engaging with spontaneous activism and initiatives beyond 
invited forms of participation, such as Transition Towns, Slum and Shack Dwellers 
International, peasant movements around food sovereignty).  
 
Later on, assumptions about scale and hierarchies of power were also challenged:  
 
FGP2: [Can I add a point to this] in connecting it with what [FGP3] said 
which is the issue that you know we have a pretty much a clear idea of where 
to focus our work at an international level.  I think it was this morning or 
yesterday when [IEC member] said you know at the same time we have a big 
shift going on 
 
FGP3: [mm] 
 
FGP2: where you know the ultimate decisions get made somewhere else so 
you know if we still function from this sort of hierarchical model of the top 
will somehow determine what the rest of us will do, 
 
FGP5: [yeah, yep] 
 
FGP2: then that might be the right model to focus our energy on the few 
places… but what if that is not the right model  
 
FGP3: [yeah, sure] 
 
FGP2: [of how to think about it?]  Then you know… then how do we think 
about capacity building?  Then how do we think about networking in ways  
 
FGP4: [exactly] 
 
FGP2: [or even] a selection of the few priority areas in ways that really, really 
matter,  
 
FGP5: [indeed] 
 
FGP2: you know I think we haven’t fully thought that one through. But to me 
that’s really important. 
 
This question challenges the authority or efficacy of top-down governance models, 
and suggests that despite their best efforts to steer what happens within the projects 
and beyond, the Future Earth committees might not be the locus of power those that 
designed it might have hoped. So, more is needed than top-down governance, 
principles and mechanisms. As argued by Irwin (2008: 594), ‘once we move beyond 
the modernist paradigm of science and technology as being amenable to centralised, 
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rational control, scientific governance is revealed as a much more challenging, but 
also more intellectually intriguing process.’  
 
Relating to the issue of top-down governance is the question of whether ideas about 
co-’s developed in a particular ‘global’ context will work in the range of contexts that 
might be involved in a ‘global’ initiative. As already discussed, there was awareness 
within the committees of a need to adapt according to context. For example, the draft 
engagement Green Paper noted: 
 
The drive for participation in engagement reflects a specific set of political 
assumptions that may not be universally shared, or even practicable 
(Engagement in Norway likely to be very different than in Iran, and likely to 
be different in getting an oil major involved in decarbonisation than in giving 
advice to IPBES). 
         (Doc 79) 
 
Aspects of a discord between ‘globally’ articulated visions for co-’s and the way in 
which they might play out at a national/local level were perhaps apparent at the one-
day symposium convened by the Chinese National Committee for Future Earth 
(CNC-FE) on 3 June 2014 in Beijing, before the joint SC and IEC meetings on 4-6 
June. The symposium was primarily an opportunity for the CNC-FE to share its 
progress and to showcase Chinese science. 
 
The notion of institutionally embedding co-design through participation of 
representatives of stakeholder groups (in committee membership and other aspects of 
the initiative), in line with the representative-utilitarian model, was the primary way 
in which the co-’s were taken up in this context. A presentation on the formation and 
ambitions of the CNC-FE outlined its goal to adopt a ‘new mode of communications 
and engagement, i.e., co-design, co-produce and co-deliver’ by including funding 
agencies and media representatives in addition to natural scientists, social scientists 
and engineers in its 40-member committee. In addition, a ‘Co-design framework of 
Future Earth in China’ would be developed through a project funded by the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences between 2014 and 2016, during which the implementation plan 
of Future Earth in China would also be co-designed with stakeholders, policy makers, 
funding agencies and the public. The meaning of ‘co-design, co-production and co-
delivery’ was not explicitly discussed, although it was linked to another objective, 
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which echoed the ‘gap bridging’ metaphors discussed in Chapter 5: ‘bridging the 
gaps between natural science and social science, between science and policy 
making’.  
 
In the substantive presentations and discussions intended to showcase existing 
research in China (organised into three sessions on air pollution, urbanisation, and 
transformations to sustainability), co-design and co-production were rarely 
mentioned. Policy makers and publics were predominantly constructed as audiences 
of research, whether to be influenced (policy makers), or who are in need of 
information, whose attitudes and behaviours might constrain decision making and 
effective practices, and who are ‘impatient to see how research can contribute to 
making their lives better’ (the public and ‘people on the ground’). 
 
During the symposium and at the closed committee meetings the following day, 
Future Earth leaders heralded the CNC-FE’s work on co-design as exemplary. 
However, points of concern were also raised by both SC and CNC-FE members 
themselves regarding the lack of social scientists on the CNC-FE and at the 
symposium (suggested to be a result of the lack of social science capacity and lack of 
existing connections between natural and social scientists within the Chinese research 
community more broadly), lack of stakeholder presenters (although each thematic 
panel was supposed to include one stakeholder, the presenters were mostly 
academic), and the very small proportion of female symposium presenters and 
participants. Further concerns were raised in relation to an emphasis on technocratic 
and market-based solutions rather than critical approaches to politics, social justice, 
fairness and institutions. 
 
So, while CNC-FE had substantial plans to develop a framework for co-design, the 
research presented at the symposium had not yet incorporated co-design, and current 
worldviews (of the relationship between science, policy and publics, and the needs 
and interests of non-scientific stakeholders) and hierarchies (of discipline or gender) 
may not be conducive to enacting co-’s in the ways envisioned by some Future Earth 
actors (i.e. beyond science communication and the deficit and linear models, towards 
multi-directional dialogue and/or epistemic equality). Some of the “global” meanings 
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were reproduced: inclusion of non-academic participants in institutional structure, the 
emphasis on interdisciplinarity and co-design/co-production as associated steps, and 
the view of co-’s as a new form or mode of communication or engagement with 
stakeholders. However, these ambitions were (or might potentially be) challenged in 
practice by local contextual factors.  
 
The symposium offered a snapshot of the complexities of bringing together new 
(“global”) frameworks and outlooks with existing – and highly diverse – national and 
local structures, cultures and practices (Knorr Cetina, 1999; Jasanoff, 2005; Miller, 
2008).  
 
The following section explores another key element of implementation of (co-
production in) Future Earth: efforts to evaluate and learn from the ongoing 
experimentation (or from existing examples). 
 
7.5 Evaluation, monitoring, and iterative learning  
 
Throughout the preceding chapters it is clear that many of those involved in 
developing and governing Future Earth experienced uncertainty around whether co-
design/co-production is the right or the best approach, method or path to take and/or 
about how it can and should be done, and therefore treat it as an experiment, whether 
in terms of testing hypotheses or in terms of improvising and trying things out given 
the aforementioned uncertainty. Several participants stressed the importance of 
ongoing monitoring and evaluation:  
 
[…] I think what is really critical therefore is that any initiative that tries to 
promote and resource and support this new approach or this kind of approach, 
needs to also carefully monitor and evaluate its outcomes.  We’re not sure 
whether transdisciplinarity will allow us to come up with more effective 
solutions from this side of science. We need to test that. 
         (Interview 5) 
 
This was frequently considered in terms of methodology and evidence, whether 
looking forward to future evaluation: 
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[…] I think we also need to have been able to show that we have helped 
introduce new ways of working, […] and that we need to test the extent to 
which we think those have been helpful or not.  You know so has the concept 
that this is a good thing to do, has it been… do we have any evidence that 
actually it was or would we have done better to you know stick to particle 
physics […] 
         (Interview 3) 
 
Or questioning whether it is the right approach to adopt now: 
 
FGP3: Well it- I think that the boot should be on the other foot, you give a 
justification for co-designing and so on, you don’t give a justification for not 
doing so. Otherwise you already set the gold standard. You’re saying 
everything should be co-designed and you justify it if you’re not going to do 
it but there is no… I don’t think there’s a body of evidence enough for us to 
say that only co-designed research has major benefits for society. I mean 
where is the evidence for that, that you insist on something, on a methodology 
which is far from proven and already I know across the tables we have a… we 
have er quite a divide. 
        (Focus group 2) 
 
This might include learning from the engagement experiences of the existing 
projects, or from other fields that have already adopted participatory approaches, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Others spoke in terms of an iterative learning process 
regarding Future Earth’s own processes: 
 
FGP2: I think we’re going to have to have […] a learning process in Future 
Earth also that we might… start with co-design and then realise wait, this is a 
little bit problematic, step back, let’s re-think what we’re doing and how 
we’re doing it and then go again and again so I see it as almost if we’re 
talking about transforming science over the next ten years it’s probably… 
probably have a lot of learning and lessons to learn about erm… you know, 
implementation. 
        (Focus group 2) 
 
Some framed co-production as an ‘evolving concept’ or ‘evolving methodology’, 
noting the importance of accepting the possibility of failure and discomfort:  
 
FGP1: Yes. Um, I agree and I think that you know it’s… it’s part of… it’s 
one of our sort of ten year, 2025 objectives and it’s by no means we are going 
to get it right and apply it throughout the next ten years, I think it is going to 
take us ten years and after ten years we may if we’re lucky, have a reasonable 
methodology of how to do it […] it’s not going to be something that we can 
crack in the next couple of months and then all Future Earth projects will just 
apply it, I think it’s going to take us a long time and it is an evolving concept 
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and even more so it’s going to be an evolving methodology of how to do this 
and I think people need to be patient with that as well and expect potentially 
to get it wrong sometimes and therefore even potentially upset some people 
so… 
(Focus group 2) 
 
However, a tension between mission orientation and possibility of failure was 
identified by another participant in the same focus group, as discussed in Chapter 6: 
 
FGP4: […] So in many of these cases whether it’s improving agricultural 
yield or coming up with a better battery design, if you are adverse to failure, 
which is – a big chunk of science is about failure, you know you want to sort 
of test ideas, proving the negatives you know just as invaluable as proving 
your concept and erm if you end up with an aversion to failure then you’re 
cutting off areas of enquiry that might actually be the place where you want 
the breakthrough.  So that’s part of the tension in applied science and that is a 
lot of what we’re talking about here because science for sustainability is 
mission oriented but it may be the thing that’s over there in the dark corner 
that no one’s thinking about, that actually would be the break through that 
could be important and it’s a real… and there’s tension there always. 
 
As suggested by this participant, perhaps one way of dealing with this tension – also 
the tension between putting structures in place whilst maintaining experimentality 
and flexibility – might be to focus on characteristics rather than goals: 
 
FGP4: […]  To me it’s much more important to focus less on those bullet 
points, the research points now and to focus on the architecture of this tool for 
facilitating those cross disciplinary, end-user friendly relationships. It comes 
down to- I’ve been describing recently, focusing on characteristics more than 
goals. In a world of a lot of uncertainty and change, whether you are looking 
at society generally or it’s some… or a child of yours, you want them to 
develop to be adaptable, innovative, you can look at your kid and say ‘I want 
you to be a doctor’ you know ‘and earn $300,000 when you’re 30’ or you can 
lead your kid and say ‘what qualities would I want you to give you the best 
chance of navigating a turbulent,  
 
FGP3: [right] 
 
FGP4: [complicated] century’ and they are qualities, they are traits, they’re 
characteristics of that system, that young person that you can nurture and with 
for Future Earth so I would focus more on qualities you know interactivity, 
making sure that when there’s a proposal that comes in the door, it goes in all 
directions, so people are thinking about the different vantage points.  [And 
then… and you know actually]  
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FGP3: [yeah that’s a very good way to put it yeah.] 
 
FGP4: being a little less focused on proving a positive result because that’s 
already [tweaking] […] towards your known solution that you think is the 
right thing to do then you’re going to miss your… you could actually be 
distorting the process in ways that you would regret later and again that is 
why I think there is a lot of potential in something like this, as long as it has 
certain qualities. 
 
FG4 is arguing that during times of uncertainty and change, it would be better to aim 
to develop characteristics such as interactivity and enabling multiple perspectives, 
rather than aiming for particular pre-defined solutions. The other participants seemed 
to agree with this approach, also suggesting that co-production could be phased in 
gradually as a characteristic of the science that Future Earth does: 
 
[…] 
 
FGP1: […] it’s a phased approach, we’re not saying that hard-line from now 
on everything needs to be co-design and co-production, we need to slowly 
bring it in and introduce it as a characteristic which characterises the type of 
[science…] 
 
FGP4: [I mean it is part of the…] 
 
FGP1: But it characterises the type of science that Future Earth does do. 
 
FGP3: [Or could do.] 
 
 
Thinking of co-production as a characteristic, or composed of particular 
characteristics, is perhaps reminiscent of the notion of bringing about a particular 
ethos within Future Earth discussed earlier. Perhaps these tendencies towards 
viewing Future Earth and co-’s as an experiment, and the approach of viewing co-’s 
as a characteristic or quality, or composed of particular characteristics, might enable 
a way forward in which some of the differences in understanding of these concepts 
and how to implement them might be bridged and productively made to work 
together. This may however bring with it its own problems of assessment and 
evaluation in an institutional context. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored how the implementation of co-’s in Future Earth was 
imagined, discussed and rolled out. There are several elements of this experiment, 
which emerged as themes running through the qualitative data: temporality and 
institutional levels; organisational structure and process; principles and practice; scale 
and substance; and evaluation and learning. These elements comprise key questions 
that are (or will need to be) negotiated in the implementation of co-’s in Future Earth: 
when co-design/co-production might happen; in which institutional configuration; at 
which institutional, geographical and communicative scales and levels; and around 
and through which processes, principles, practices and problems. These interlinked 
elements are underpinned and shaped by the models of co-production identified in 
Chapters 5 and 6 (representative-utilitarian co-production, deliberative-reflexive co-
production, and co-production as threat), which influence (views on the appropriate) 
implementation of co-design and co-production through Future Earth’s organisational 
structure, processes and practices, across the range of different scales and levels 
detailed above.  
 
Due to the novelty of attempting intentional co-production at/from the global level in 
the GEC and sustainability domain, Future Earth actors are experimenting, 
improvising, and compromising because this has not been done before (or if it has, 
those involved have not done it before). Their suggestions about iterative learning 
and the tentative nature of the existing and potential activities are manifestations of 
the experimental setting. While on the one hand the importance and primacy of the 
organisational/institutional structure and frameworks (including but not limited to the 
governance committees and their outputs such as the engagement White Paper) is 
stressed, on the other hand, these structures potentially (but do not necessarily) place 
limits on the ways of working. Others were more keen to see co-’s play out in 
practice in a problem-focused context, learning from existing or own practices, and 
imitating other fields with greater experience of stakeholder engagement. However, 
the interplay and balance between these different levels and models is key: global 
level strategy and structures are themselves composed of locally enacted practices, 
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and local-level co-design and co-production often relies on broader frameworks of 
meaning.  
 
In Chapter 2, the distinction was made between improvisation as ‘the action or fact of 
doing anything spontaneously, without preparation, or on the spur of the moment’ 
and improvisation as ‘the action of responding to circumstances or making do with 
what is available’. In Future Earth’s experimentality, the latter understanding is more 
apt, whereby tentativeness, responsiveness and flexibility might be coupled with an 
acknowledgement that it is not possible to know (and therefore prepare for) 
everything before acting (or in some cases, ever). However, it should be noted that 
experimentation and improvisation – analytically and in practice – do not (in this 
context) mean that ‘anything goes’. There is still purpose, order and structure, and 
there is still a need to steer efforts in practice. The question then is how and, more 
importantly, for which purpose. Those involved in Future Earth are grappling with 
serious issues, and viewing the initiative or co-’s within it as an experiment should 
not undermine that. Similarly, acknowledging that publics (including stakeholders), 
issues/objects, practices, norms, etc. are emergent should not remove the 
commitment to establishing better, fairer systems of science and democracy.  
 
However, institutionalising experimentality faces significant challenges – indeed 
‘institutionalising experimentality’ might be regarded as an oxymoron: how can a 
top-down organisation allow for open-ended bottom up input, experimentation, and 
reflexivity? In establishing the structures, procedures and principles (along with the 
identities, discourses, representations) necessary for institutional, community and 
epistemic cohesion, how can closure, settlement and stabilisation be balanced with 
openness, flexibility and responsiveness? This and other questions are considered in 
the final, concluding chapter.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Since 2012, Future Earth, a major international research initiative on global 
environmental change (GEC) and sustainability, has set out to transform GEC 
research by various means, including through co-design and co-production. This 
thesis has taken Future Earth as a case study and used this unique opportunity to 
investigate the meanings, implementation of and experimentation with co-design and 
co-production in global research governance.  
 
While existing research on co-production and related concepts or approaches has 
mainly focused on the involvement of non-academic stakeholders in research design 
and process on the ground in local, national and regional contexts, little work to date 
has explored what co-production might mean in research governance, particularly at 
the international level and for global institutions. This study therefore aimed to 
contribute towards knowledge on co-production as an intentional principle, practice 
or framework for research governance and conduct, and explore the translation of co-
production as an analytical concept originating in STS into a notion or practice of 
knowing actors.  
 
Future Earth has been, in some regards, an ideal site to study what co-production 
might mean in an international and institutional research governance setting. As an 
evolving, young institution at the time of study, it also can be seen as an ideal site to 
explore the reworking of established categories and configurations of knowledge and 
social order, or the emergence of new ones; the co-constitution of the epistemic and 
the normative. However, this opportunity is simultaneously a challenge, as the 
quickly shifting and sometimes nebulous nature of an emerging initiative, particularly 
at the scale of ambition of Future Earth, can be hugely complex and difficult to ‘pin 
down’ for long enough to make sense of it and make meaningful claims. Of course, 
from the perspective adopted in this study, which views all efforts towards science 
governance (whether institutional, collective, individual, or otherwise) as constantly 
in-the-making, this is a challenge whatever the focus of study, but I would argue that 
this is particularly the case here, given the complexity and ambition of the Future 
Earth endeavour. The findings of the research reflect that complexity, presenting a 
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partial picture of some aspects of (the activities comprising) Future Earth at a 
particular moment in its development. 
 
The overall research aim has been to investigate attempts to transform global 
environmental change (GEC) research systems, communities, cultures and practices 
through the adoption and institutionalisation of co-design and co-production, using 
Future Earth as a case study. This overarching aim was operationalised through the 
following research questions: 
 
1. What is Future Earth? What are the visions of its identity and remit? 
2. What do co-design and co-production mean in the context of Future 
Earth? Why are they advocated and adopted; what are the rationales 
underpinning these concepts? 
3. Who is imagined or expected to be involved in co-design and co-
production? What are the underlying models or imaginaries of science and 
society? 
4. How are these ideas being – and how will they be – implemented in 
practice to govern, coordinate and conduct research?  
5. So what? How can findings from this case contribute to the literatures on 
co-production and international research governance, on experiments in 
science and democracy, and what are the implications for research 
governance in practice?  
 
To answer these questions I have used qualitative methods and sources of data: 
documents around Future Earth’s emergence and development between 2010 and 
early 2015, ten semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in or aware of 
Future Earth, two focus groups with Future Earth committee members conducted in 
the context of the joint Science Committee and Interim Engagement Committee 
meetings in Beijing, June 2014, and participant observation at that same meeting. 
This body of data was analysed thematically and interpretively, exploring emerging 
meanings and themes and drawing on theoretical concepts from existing literature 
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(e.g. political imaginaries of science, experiments in science and democracy) to 
further inform the analysis and relate it to the broader context and theory 
development. 
 
Overview of findings, argument and response to research aim 
 
Overall, the analysis and findings suggest that visions of Future Earth’s identity, 
function and remit were ambitious, diverse and sometimes ambiguous, evoking two 
potential institutional forms: a centralised, unified and cohesive ‘flagship’, or a ‘rich 
tapestry’ of varied initiatives. Aspects of the tensions between these visions revealed 
themselves in how co-production and related concepts were understood in Future 
Earth. These terms were ambiguous and contested, with varying definitions 
underpinned by different rationales for increased (or, indeed, limited) involvement of 
non-academic stakeholders in research governance, design and process (from 
ensuring relevance to democratising expertise to preserving the objectivity or 
independence of science). These different notions of appropriate engagement and 
legitimate stakeholders were underpinned by disparate conceptions of the value of 
research – as a service to society, site of democratic deliberation, or public good. 
Such science-society imaginaries reproduce – and potentially challenge – established 
models of science and democracy, shaping how the implementation of co-production 
was imagined and undertaken. 
 
I argue that, while this diversity and ambiguity in visions of (co-production in) Future 
Earth can provoke tensions, it can also be seen as an opportunity if we move beyond 
an evaluative stance to consider Future Earth – and co-production – as an ongoing 
(series of) experiment(s). From an experimental perspective, ambiguity can make 
space for openness and flexibility, enabling differences to co-exist. As implied 
throughout the preceding chapters, and as will be argued in this chapter, this might 
require new (and maybe radical) thinking about how to organise, conduct and value 
research and its outcomes, with an increased emphasis on fostering, appreciating and 
productively working with diversity and institutional indeterminacy. 
In relation to the research aim, while Future Earth can be seen as an attempt to 
transform GEC institutions, communities, cultures and practices, as well as broader 
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research systems, through the adoption of principles including co-design and co-
production (also institutional and knowledge integration, greater involvement of 
social science, etc.) these goals are variously understood, expressed and are not 
necessarily shared by all involved. On top of the sensitivities inherent in large-scale 
organisational change when long-standing structures (and jobs) will be disbanded or 
reconfigured, the introduction of these ideas in this context was not straightforward, 
in some instances creating controversy and contestation (for example, as manifested 
in resistance to co-production when it is considered to be a threat to objective or 
independent research).  
Introducing these concepts has also led to substantial challenges, many of which 
confirm findings in the literature in other contexts and at other scales, but some of 
which are new due to Future Earth’s ambition to operate at a global scale across a 
huge range of topics, sectors and disciplines. The problems of GEC and sustainability 
that the initiative intends to address are often conceptualised (and governed) globally 
but manifest themselves in different ways at different levels and in different contexts. 
Furthermore, operating at the global scale poses challenges for representation, and for 
the authority or efficacy of top-down governance models.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to conclude whether the ambition to 
transform GEC research has worked (that would require a longer-term study, and 
investigation into other parts of Future Earth, its broader networks and interactions 
with its partners, as well as the environmental and sustainability research field 
beyond Future Earth) – and while the study has explicitly avoided assessing Future 
Earth’s successes and failures against pre-determined ideal ways of doing co-
production (or science-democracy relations) – it is clear that co-production in this 
context has had and will continue to have constitutive and performative effects (even 
if not the ones intended by all of its proponents). These are solidified in new 
institutional arrangements, such as the multi-stakeholder Engagement Committee and 
multi-disciplinary Science Committee and their joint working groups, distributed 
global Secretariat hubs and centres, and thematic, challenge-centric (rather than 
disciplinary) organisation of research, as in the more recently established 
Knowledge-Action Networks (on Transformations, Ocean, Health, etc.) (Future 
Earth, n.d.-f). These developments signal clear departures from the existing GEC 
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programmes, with the potential to effect further change to well-established social and 
epistemic orders. 
Introducing these concepts has also had less tangible effects, particularly in making 
space for discussions about the role of (GEC and sustainability) science in relation to 
society. Simply starting conversations about why and how to co-produce research has 
the potential to introduce unfamiliar questions and perhaps reflexivity to existing 
communities and projects (as explored in Chapter 7). Whether this change extends 
beyond the governing committees of Future Earth, and the extent and nature of its 
further effects, is a question for future research.  
 
In terms of the institutional models discussed in Chapter 4, Future Earth might best 
be considered to be a tapestry (rather than a flagship), in which a broad range of 
diverse efforts and initiatives are grouped under its symbolic institutional umbrella 
without the requirement of conceptual or epistemological harmonisation or 
integration. The formative stages of Future Earth entailed potentially homogenising 
language and ambitions – in part due to the struggles in carving out an identity and 
support for the initiative – and there will perhaps always be some element of this in a 
single institution (however distributed and networked) attempting to lead, coordinate 
or operate at the ‘global’ level. However, as acknowledged by some Future Earth 
actors, co-design and co-production will likely always be interpreted in a range of 
different ways. An appreciation of this diversity was already apparent within the 
Science and Interim Engagement Committees at the time of the fieldwork, and they 
demonstrated a high degree of reflexive capacity. Although the experimental nature 
of Future Earth was not always foregrounded, the need for (organisational) learning 
and flexibility was emphasised.  
 
During and since the period of study there are many signs of sophistication and 
subtlety in Future Earth’s construction. For example, the Engagement Principles and 
Practice published in 2016 (after the data collection for this study was complete) 
leave considerable space for flexibility, experimentation and learning. The second 
principle is ‘Engagement needs to be flexible’ (Future Earth, 2016b: 5) and the 
publication itself is introduced as ‘a living document that will build on the 
experiences of Future Earth engagement activities’, that ‘will be updated based on 
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new learning and periodic review processes’ (Future Earth, 2016b: 2). It presents a 
vision of Future Earth that evokes the rich tapestry model, in which a broad range of 
efforts are grouped under its symbolic institutional umbrella, united by a commitment 
to engagement (perhaps without the requirement of conceptual or epistemological 
harmonisation or integration):  
Future Earth provides an umbrella under which projects funded separately by 
a number of agencies are united by a shared philosophy – one which 
recognises the importance of engagement (which includes transdisciplinarity, 
co-design and co-production). 
Many in the Future Earth research community are already working in this 
way and through the Committees and Secretariat, Future Earth provides 
leadership, and secretariat support for knowledge sharing, facilitating and 
guiding participants in a journey which can develop organically over time.  
       (Future Earth, 2016b: 6) 
Future Earth might yet provide the space and legitimacy for new thinking about how 
to organise, conduct and value research and its outcomes, with an increased emphasis 
on fostering, appreciating and productively working with diversity and institutional 
indeterminacy.  
The following section (8.1) recaps the thesis findings in more detail. Section 8.2: 
Overarching contribution links the findings to the broader context and literatures 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2 by addressing the final research question: How can 
findings from this case contribute to the literatures on co-production and international 
research governance, on experiments in science and democracy, and what are the 
implications for research governance in practice? Section 8.3 then discusses the 
limitations of the research, and section 8.4 presents a forward look to potential future 
research. 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
 
The following sections summarise the key findings emerging from the analysis in 
response to research questions 1-4 (as presented in Chapters 4-7).  
8.1.1 What is Future Earth? What are the visions of its identity and remit? 
 
Chapter 4 presented background on the emergence of Future Earth, followed by an 
analysis of tensions in visions of the initiative’s identity, remit and function. Future 
255 
 
Earth emerged from a complex institutional landscape of existing GEC research 
programmes, its development driven by ambitions for a unified framework for GEC 
research and an increased impact in policy and practice. Integration and co-design (of 
both institutions and knowledge) emerged as key principles of Future Earth to 
address some of the perceived issues with the existing programmes. Despite the 
alignment of institutional efforts and interests on the part of the co-sponsors of the 
existing GEC programmes (international research councils, funders, and UN 
agencies), the development of the new initiative – Future Earth – has not been 
simple. During the period of study, visions of Future Earth’s definition and purpose 
were diverse, ambitious and sometimes ambiguous. Lack of clarity in Future Earth’s 
identity and remit was occasionally seen as problematic by both those inside Future 
Earth and those commenting on it from the outside, who called for less vague 
definitions of the initiative, its goals and what it would deliver, and/or a less 
ambitious mandate. The committees were working to resolve these concerns and 
questions.  
 
The analysis demonstrated that, at the time of study, Future Earth was mainly 
conceptualised in two broad ways. Some of the visions that were extracted from 
documents, interviews and focus groups, evoke a ‘flagship’ model, in which there is 
a focus on unification and harmonisation. By contrast, others suggest a ‘rich tapestry’ 
model, which would bring together diverse initiatives, allowing for multiplicity. 
Future Earth’s different definitions and designations were accompanied and informed 
by a diverse range of imagined roles and functions. However, there were potential 
tensions between different ambitions for Future Earth, some of which align with the 
flagship model (for example, Future Earth as a platform to deliver solutions-oriented 
knowledge, with a focus on consensus and integration, setting standards and limits on 
participation, taking a directive approach), while others align with the tapestry model 
(for example, Future Earth as a hub or arena for debate, focusing on plurality and 
multiplicity, being inclusive and responsive). Some of the tensions did not map 
clearly onto one model or the other: for example, whether Future Earth should give 
prominence to existing ways of doing science or promote new ways, and whether it 
should promote demand-driven or curiosity-driven research. 
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I suggested that such tensions and ambiguities are perhaps inevitable in the early 
stages of a new initiative or new institutional arrangement, and we might expect that 
some points of stabilisation may develop in due course, even if these are temporary. 
This might be, for example, in institutional design or infrastructural architecture, such 
as the Future Earth Open Network online tool, to which anyone can sign up. Despite 
points of (temporary) stabilisation such as this, as the Future Earth network is further 
developed and extends, the Future Earth model will also be extended, adapted and 
interpreted in a diverse range of regional, national and local contexts; there the same 
and further tensions and ambiguities may emerge. 
 
Future Earth can therefore be seen as an experiment (or a series of ongoing 
experiments) in transforming research and its institutions. The ambiguities, tensions 
and uncertainties enable ontological variability: Future Earth may now be or may yet 
become a flagship, a tapestry or both (or indeed something completely different). 
What eventually emerges also depends on how co-design and co-production are 
imagined, used – and, of course, how the ‘words and concepts with which we 
describe society’ and, in this case a global institution, ‘become part of the self-
conscious apparatus of reflection’ (Jasanoff in Turney, 2014). 
 
Given this inevitable multiplicity, perhaps a rigid subscription to the flagship model 
with its accompanying centralisation and unification cannot capture the diversity 
necessary in an initiative such as Future Earth. Therefore, for now it might best be 
considered to be a tapestry, in which a broad range of diverse efforts and initiatives 
are grouped under its symbolic institutional umbrella without the requirement of 
conceptual or epistemological harmonisation or integration. This conceptualisation 
and associated formation could be more conducive to flexibility and experimentation.  
 
8.1.2 What do co-design and co-production mean in Future Earth? What are the 
underlying rationales for advocating and adopting them? 
 
Chapter 5 set out to explore meanings of co-design and co-production in Future Earth 
and the reasons for adopting them. The analysis revealed that while co-production is 
a key principle or strategy of Future Earth, linked to a range of broader ambitions for 
the initiative, what it might mean in this context is not straightforward. During the 
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time of the study, the meanings of these terms were multiple, ambiguous and 
contested. This was (at least partly) driven by varying rationales for advocating the 
co-’s and differing levels of subscription to the idea that they should be required 
elements of Future Earth research. The discussions and activity around the co-’s was 
messy in the sense that there was little consensus on these terms. However, it is 
possible to identify common themes and features that coalesce around particular 
(anticipatory and performative) views on what these terms are or should be about. 
While one core (not entirely unambiguous) view emerged (co-’s as participation of 
stakeholders for relevance, acceptance and utility), a minority understanding was also 
present (co-’s as reflexivity for democratisation). A third view of co-’s also emerged, 
often formulated in response or resistance to the first two models: the idea that the 
co-’s might be a threat to scientific ideals and norms such as objectivity, 
independence and academic freedom.  
 
These different visions reveal different ideas about the relationship between science 
and society and the source and role of the normative in research. The core view 
(adopted by a range of actors and prevalent in the official documents) suggests that 
involving stakeholders in research through co-design and co-production will make 
knowledge more relevant, acceptable, and therefore it will be used more and have 
greater impact. In this view, co-’s are seen as a means to close a gap between 
research and policy/practice, where science and society are seen as spatially separate, 
but would come together in the process of co-design and co-production. Values and 
the normative are seen as the concerns or expertise of societal stakeholders, and 
(scientific) knowledge and skills are seen as the expertise of researchers. The role of 
the researcher (or research more broadly) is seen as that of the knowledge broker, 
offering policy options and scenarios but not being policy prescriptive.  
 
The second view (primarily voiced by those with backgrounds in or affinities for 
social science/humanities) suggests that co-’s are a process of deliberation or 
reflexivity, enabling the (partial) knowledge and commitments of multiple parties to 
be debated, and democratised. It sees science as part of society; all parties, including 
scientists, are driven by social commitments and norms, and co-design and co-
production is a means of making these explicit. The role of the researcher might 
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come closer to that of an advocate or ‘activist’, not only identifying and making 
explicit the implicit normative aspects of research, but also taking steps to pursue 
particular normative agendas in policy or action.  
 
Finally, the third view (held by a range of actors including natural and social 
scientists) sees science and society as separate and believes that they should remain 
separate, society having interests and biases that might contaminate or limit 
science/research in detrimental ways.  
 
These different views echo some of the tensions in Future Earth’s identity and remit 
explored in Chapter 4: for example, co-’s as reflexivity for democratisation 
emphasises multiplicity, diversity and debate, while co-’s as participation for 
relevance, acceptance and utility might suggest a greater focus on consensus, 
integration and solutions; finally, co-’s are seen by some as a threat to curiosity 
driven research by shifting the focus to demand. 
 
To counter the resistance to co-’s expressed partly through the third view, and to deal 
with some of the ambiguities and challenges of the co-’s, Future Earth actors 
proposed that it might be necessary to develop a continuum or spectrum of co-’s, 
meaning different things (or at least different extents of engagement) in different 
contexts (not yet fully specified). Co-’s were seen as innovative and experimental, as 
they have not been attempted in this field at the global level before (although they are 
seen as common in other fields, such as medicine, agricultural and development 
studies), and Future Earth actors are ‘feeling their way’ to work out how to 
implement this. The concept of co-production therefore creates an experimental 
condition in Future Earth, although this is not foregrounded in the actors’ accounts. 
However, it potentially could be a very useful lens or approach: experimenting might 
be the only way to proceed given the differences in understanding of what co-’s are 
and what they are for. 
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8.1.3 Who is imagined or expected to be involved in co-design and co-production? 
What are the underlying models or imaginaries of science and society? 
 
While Chapter 5 examined visions and meanings of various concepts of and related 
to co-production, Chapter 6 homed in in more detail on visions of who should be 
involved in these processes. Although involving societal stakeholders is key to all 
understandings of the co-’s in Future Earth, who these stakeholders might be is not 
always clear, and what this might mean in practice is not often expounded. This 
chapter presented an analysis of who is imagined or expected to be involved in 
Future Earth  and what this can reveal about the underlying science-society 
imaginaries and models (e.g. of democracy, of the value of research) that inform the 
different views of co-production explored in the previous chapter. These latent 
imaginaries impact on how co-production can be performed, particularly through 
their expression in different participatory models, a topic further explored in Chapter 
7.  
 
‘Society’, ‘users’ and ‘partners’ were predominantly constructed as beneficiaries, 
recipients and/or aids to agenda-setting, while a minority saw them as active 
participants in knowledge construction (although this may depend on whether co-
design or co-production is being considered). ‘Stakeholders’ were mostly 
characterised as societal sectors or organised groups to be represented in Future 
Earth, and ‘the public’ was predominantly imagined as an audience of 
communication/ education or subsumed into/represented by other societal groups. 
This is indicative of the challenges in defining stakeholders on a global scale in the 
context of GEC as a global issue and Future Earth as a global organisation, but also 
suggests that Future Earth is primarily aiming to inform policy (across various 
sectors) rather than other spheres of social activity. 
 
There are varying ideas about who should (or should not) be involved, and these 
views (including views on what co-design and co-production mean more broadly, as 
outlined in the previous chapter) are underpinned by and co-constitutive of diverse 
conceptualisations (political imaginaries) of the ideal or proper roles and relationship 
between science, politics and their stakeholders. Particular notions of the public value 
of science/research – as a service, as a public good, as an object/site of democratic 
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deliberation – are tied to particular notions of legitimate scientific stakeholders and 
their appropriate representation and involvement in the initiative; reproducing, or 
potentially challenging, established democratic and scientific models.  
 
These comprise, firstly, the representative-utilitarian model in which an epistemic 
deficit and/or gap between research and action on GEC/sustainability can be 
addressed by inviting societal stakeholders to help define research questions and 
participate in the research process. Society/stakeholders are imagined as 
recipients/beneficiaries of knowledge primarily produced by science, and as members 
of – and represented in Future Earth by – particular societal sectors or organised 
groups (e.g. business, government, civil society).  The value of science is as a public 
good or service/product to meet societal need (partially in line with a ‘neoliberal’ 
political imaginary (Nowotny, 2014), in which short term impact and immediate 
translatability of research into action is of most value, but in this case the economic 
focus of that imaginary is absent). 
 
Secondly, a deliberative-reflexive model was apparent, in which a democratic deficit 
in science (and perhaps more broadly) is addressed by recognising all knowledge as 
partial, admitting plural perspectives into knowledge making processes, and 
reflecting on tacit assumptions embedded in existing framings. Stakeholders 
(including scientists) are imagined as active contributors to knowledge creation, with 
rights and social/political commitments. The value of science is in making a 
difference (in relation to e.g. social justice), and as a site/object of democratic 
deliberation (in line with a deliberative political imaginary (Nowotny, 2014)). All 
versions of co-production have the aim of meeting societal need or concerns, but the 
deliberative view enables questions about what this means, whose need is met, etc. 
whereas this is not always specified or differentiated in the representative-utilitarian 
view. 
 
Thirdly, a more traditional republic of science (Polanyi, 1962) model emerged, in 
which co-production poses a threat to curiosity-driven research, academic freedom, 
and the scientific ideals of objectivity, independence and autonomy (Nowotny, 2014). 
Stakeholders (e.g. private companies, policy makers) are imagined as having interests 
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and biases that endanger the public value of science in its ability to produce 
objective, independent, value-free knowledge.  
 
The first and third of these models are perhaps more standard, traditional modes of 
research policy or ways of viewing science. The second could be seen as a means of 
mediating between or attempting to steer the more established modes in new 
directions, through processes that acknowledge the contingency of existing 
understandings and arrangements and highlight the possibility of alternatives. Each of 
these views exists in the research community as a whole (beyond Future Earth). 
However, there could be space for each model (rather than one dominant model, as is 
often the case) if an experimental approach is adopted, allowing difference to co-
exist.  
 
8.1.4 How will these ideas be – and how are they being – implemented in practice 
to govern, coordinate and conduct research?  
 
Having explored understandings of co-production, related visions of who should be 
involved and the underpinning science-society imaginaries, in Chapters 5 and 6, 
Chapter 7 explored how the implementation of co-’s was imagined in Future Earth, 
and how the early efforts towards co-design and co-production played out during the 
period of study. It found that the three (sometimes competing) modes of co-
production outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, influenced the (potential) implementation of 
(co-production in) Future Earth across and within several key aspects of the 
initiative: institutional and temporal levels, organisational structure and process, 
principles and practice, scale and substance, and evaluation and learning. 
Ambiguities about whether co-design and/or co-production should happen within 
governance or research or both; within the governing committees, the projects or in 
between; whether it happens from the beginning or throughout, at other particular 
stages; or whether it is always happening anyway, were also underpinned by 
(differing) assumptions about the linear temporal (and hierarchical institutional) 
relationship between governance and research. When considering whether co-
production may already be happening, STS understandings of this term (i.e. co-
constitution of science and social order) were discussed, leading to the suggestion 
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that Future Earth’s work could comprise making explicit – then redirecting – implicit 
social ordering or normative framings of research agendas.  
 
Tensions between the three views of co-production (representative-utilitarian co-
production, deliberative-reflexive co-production, and co-production as threat) were 
very much present in discussions around the (implementation of the) 
organisational/governance structure of the initiative, including the way in which the 
committees should be populated (e.g. advocates of the representative-utilitarian 
model pushed for stakeholder representation on the EC and adherents of reflexive-
deliberative model emphasised the importance of processes of doing, leading and 
governing co-design, rather than solely who sits on the committee).  
 
A paper on Engagement drafted by a sub-group of Secretariat, Science Committee 
and Interim Engagement Committee members was intended to play a key role in 
resolving these different understandings, and associated challenges and tensions, by 
setting down agreed principles to guide practice. However, the extent to which it 
might be possible to resolve these differences on paper was questioned by some, 
suggesting that it might only be possible to do so in practice. While firm principles 
and ground rules were seen to be required by those that view co-’s as a threat, and 
common understandings and principles were also seen to be needed by those who see 
co-’s as deliberative-reflexive, the possibility of creating such shared principles is 
possibly challenged by the incommensurability of (or at least the differences 
between) these approaches. Deliberative-reflexive co-production is seen as something 
that is best achieved in practice, at project level, around concrete problems, rather 
than conceptually or in theory (cf. Marres, 2007). 
 
Linked to the issue of implementing co-’s in practice around concrete problems is the 
question of scale. Co-’s are not only seen as relevant to different institutional levels 
but are also considered to operate at different geographical scales; in fact, these two 
different types of scale are interlinked: the governing committees might be 
considered to be operating at the global or international level, the projects operating 
in a more ‘localised’ way (still international but presumably to some extent more 
explicitly ‘grounded’ in particular – local, national or regional – empirical contexts), 
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with regional and national committees and centres and global Secretariat hubs 
bridging these institutional and geographical levels. Scale is considered particularly 
important in Future Earth due to the nature of the problems of GEC and sustainability 
the initiative intends to explore and address, which are often conceptualised (and 
governed) globally but manifest themselves in different ways at different levels and 
in different contexts. However, operating at the global scale poses challenges for 
representation, and one focus group questioned assumptions about the authority or 
efficacy of top-down governance models (this argument, if applied to Future Earth, 
suggests that the committees might not be the locus of power those that designed 
them might have hoped). More might be needed than top-down governance, 
principles and mechanisms. This was illustrated by the ways in which notions of  
co-’s developed at the ‘global’ level might face challenges when applied in particular 
national contexts, as seen at the symposium of the Chinese National Committee for 
Future Earth.  
 
Seeing Future Earth and co-’s as an experiment might enable a way forward in which 
some of the differences in understanding of these concepts and how to implement 
them might be bridged and productively made to work together. Indeed, during one 
focus group the idea of viewing co-’s as a characteristic or quality (or composed of 
particular characteristics) arose; this could be extended to view experimentality as an 
important characteristic. As identified throughout, many of those involved in 
developing and governing Future Earth experienced uncertainty around whether co-
design is the right or the best approach or method to take and/or about how it can and 
should be done, and therefore treated or described it as an experiment (whether in 
terms of testing hypotheses and truth claims or in terms of improvisation). Several 
participants stressed the importance of ongoing monitoring and evaluation. However, 
any ‘experiment’ founded in principles of openness to the unexpected and new 
productivities may bring with it its own problems of assessment and evaluation in an 
institutional context. Furthermore, institutionalisation (including establishing rules, 
structures, legitimacy and reputation – and importantly, securing and maintaining 
funding) is not necessarily conducive to experimentality.  
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Having revisited the answers to the research questions, I now turn to the final 
question: How can findings from this case contribute to the literatures on co-
production and international research governance, on experiments in science and 
democracy, and what are the implications for research governance in practice?  
 
8.2 Overarching contribution to the literature and practice 
 
This section addresses the contribution of this study, first to the literature on co-
production and scientific governance (8.2.1), then to the literature on experiments in 
science and democracy (8.2.2), and finally it outlines the implications for Future 
Earth (and by association for research governance and practice more broadly), listing 
some tentative suggestions for future development (8.2.3). 
 
8.2.1 Literatures on co-production  
 
In my review of the existing literature on co-production in Chapter 2, I found that the 
majority of work has focused on intentional, collaborative methods or practices at 
local, national or regional levels, and in individual projects and organisations, or has 
adopted the analytical idiom of co-production to explore the broader processes of co-
constitution of science and social order in a range of contexts. However, few of these 
studies have explored co-design and co-production in research governance, nor how 
this relates to the translation of co-production as an analytical STS concept into a 
notion or practice of knowing actors.  
 
In order to address this gap, the preceding chapters have explored how co-design, co-
production and related concepts are understood, imagined, and implemented in 
Future Earth, how they relate to visions of institutional identity and remit, and to 
broader social and natural orders, particularly as expressed in imaginaries and models 
of science-society relations.  
 
Governance of co-production in international contexts 
 
As noted above, few studies have examined co-production as an intentional principle 
and practice in a research governance and coordination context. This study therefore 
265 
 
outlines what co-production might mean and some of the challenges faced in its 
governance at the ‘global level’. In Future Earth, that imperative is interpreted in a 
range of ways, including the co-design and co-production of Future Earth as an 
initiative or institution (through the appointment of a multi-disciplinary, multi-
stakeholder Transition Team, then Science and (Interim) Engagement Committees); 
co-design of ‘global’ level strategy, such as the Strategic Research Agenda; and the 
promotion of co-design and co-production within Future Earth research projects and 
activities. The extent to which the activities of the Committees were acknowledged to 
be co-design or co-production in the moment of their undertaking was variable. 
 
Visions of co-production in these different settings, and institutional design and 
implementation decisions (e.g. the composition of the Engagement Committee) were 
shaped by different understandings of co-production and its importance, primarily a 
representative-utilitarian model, a deliberative-reflexive model and the notion of co-
production as threat (the representative-utilitarian might be better suited to a flagship 
institutional model, and the deliberative-reflexive model to a rich tapestry 
institutional model, although this binary view is questionable). Between these 
different understandings and settings, co-production can occur in many different 
ways: across institutional and temporal levels, between organisational structure and 
process, in principle and practice, and around particular problems at particular scales. 
It is a multiple and ambiguous concept and practice, particularly in this international, 
multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral context. However, it is also a productive and 
generative concept: attempting to do it has opened up conversations and connections 
that would not otherwise have happened. 
 
Future Earth faced (and will face) many challenges in trying to institutionalise co-
production (e.g. resistance on the part of those that feel it threatens the objectivity or 
independence of research), and these challenges are perhaps even more significant 
and complex than those identified in the existing literature due to the complexity and 
global ambition of the initiative. Institutions and individuals face familiar challenges 
when co-design and co-production are considered as a means to involve stakeholders 
in research design and process; questions of representation and representativeness 
arise, all the more so due to the ambition to be a global initiative with reach across all 
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world regions (Blue & Medlock, 2014). How to decide with whom to co-produce, 
and what role those involved would assume (Pohl et al., 2010) came to the fore as 
significant and charged questions with no easy answers, particularly when discussed 
hypothetically without reference to particular project details. This confirms findings 
and arguments in the existing STS literature about the mobilisation or formation of 
publics (or stakeholders) around concrete issues (Marres, 2007; Felt & Fochler, 
2010), and the difficulties of finding (or taking the time to develop) a consistent 
source of legitimacy for particular democratic models for participation (Lövbrand et 
al., 2011).  
 
Further difficulties emerge when attempting to develop guidelines or models of co-
design and co-production at the ‘global level’ to be applied in a diverse range of 
international, regional, national and potentially also local contexts. The symposium 
hosted by the Chinese National Committee for Future Earth hinted towards a range of 
potential intercultural dissonances between particular visions of co-design/co-
production developed by the central committees and context-specific conditions that 
might challenge the implementation of those visions in the ways imagined, as might 
be expected on the basis of STS research into the situated and context-specific nature 
of ways of organising, generating, legitimising and using knowledge, characterised 
by concepts such as epistemic cultures and civic epistemologies (Knorr Cetina, 1999; 
Jasanoff, 2005; Miller, 2008). 
 
The study also takes seriously Nowotny’s (2014) call to pay more attention to 
political imaginaries of science: here several familiar political imaginaries of science 
can be seen to circulate and shape the understandings and design decisions as 
described above. Two standard political imaginaries of science and its value – the 
service-delivery mode of the representative-utilitarian model, and the public good 
mode of the republic of science model – can potentially be challenged or mediated by 
the deliberative-reflexive model, which draws more attention to the contingency of 
current arrangements, potential problem framings, and knowledge politics. However, 
it will be important to pay attention to the basis for the legitimacy of this approach, as 
stressed by Lövbrand et al. (2011). The presence of these imaginaries within the early 
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stages of the initiative proffers hope for continued co-existence, perhaps moving 
towards innovative ways of combining these understandings and approaches.  
 
Translation of analytical co-production into research policy 
 
The deliberative-reflexive understanding of co-production in Future Earth can be 
seen to be informed by STS and related ideas about knowledge politics, and a similar 
(if not the same) ‘democratic impulse’. While there were moments of reflexivity 
during the meetings (for example, in questioning the legitimacy of participatory 
approaches or in recognising the normative elements of agenda-setting), this did not 
happen in a systematic, organised or consistent way. However, recent developments 
suggest that these voices have shaped the central visions as crystallised in Future 
Earth documents, such as the Engagement Principles and Practice (2016). 
 
In terms of translation into research policy, this might be seen to be very challenging. 
While the representative-utilitarian form of co-production as envisaged in Future 
Earth (and beyond) faces many challenges in implementation (in terms of 
representation, competing interests, etc.), it is perhaps more straightforward (in some 
ways) than deliberative-reflexive co-production as envisaged in Future Earth (and 
beyond). In order to take seriously the notion that the normative aspects of particular 
knowledge agendas or pathways should be made explicit and consciously steered in 
particular directions, time, space, and skills are required for such reflexivity, and 
entry points for steering would be required. How to identify these moments remains 
to be seen. 
 
It could be harder to adopt this approach due to the current framing of the problem as 
requiring immediate action: the representative-utilitarian model of co-production is 
bolstered by the wider resonance with notions of impact and the sense of urgency of 
GEC problems as they are currently framed in this (and many) context(s). Other 
scholars have noted the potential dangers of focusing too restrictively on instrumental 
or utilitarian understandings of co-production (or of Future Earth’s purpose more 
generally) (Lövbrand et al., 2015; Castree, 2016). The space required to undertake 
more deliberative and reflexive forms of co-production (and perhaps to develop other 
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understandings of co-production), enabling questions to be asked about how 
problems and solutions are defined, could be facilitated by an experimental approach 
as explored in section 8.2.3 below, encouraging ‘slow’(er) forms of science 
(Stengers, 2017).  
 
However, existing dominant political imaginaries and models of democracy are 
driven by and associated with deeply entrenched power relations. Whether or not the 
moment of collaboration or participation is too late – or the best means – to challenge 
these existing orders is open to question. Yet, in considering new approaches and 
encouraging others to do so, Future Earth holds the potential to develop more subtle 
understandings of co-production and of the possible active roles actors and 
institutions might take in addressing pathologies of current epistemic and social 
orders. Co-production as variously imagined in Future Earth might not be the 
‘solution’ (to any or all of the problems it and others have identified), but from an 
experimental perspective, perhaps starting somewhere is better than not acting at all. 
 
8.2.2 Literatures on experiments in science and democracy 
 
The adoption of an ‘experimental’ approach, in which Future Earth and/or co-
production are viewed as an experiment (or series of nested or linked experiments) 
was adopted as an analytical lens to move beyond the stance of much STS and public 
engagement work in which engagement practices are critiqued for failing to adhere to 
particular normative ideals, such as particular notions of (deliberative) democracy. 
This enables a greater focus on the multiple meanings, understandings and practices 
of these concepts and their constitutive effects. Drawing on Irwin (2006) amongst 
others, Chilvers and Kearnes (2016a) (and others working in this vein, e.g. Pallett, 
2015a; Laurent, 2016) adopt this approach in relation to public participation, seeing 
participation exercises as emergent social experiments. This implies that rather than 
(or as well as) aiming for a fixed ideal form of intervention, the intervention itself is 
constitutive of such norms and ideals. Here the significant element of ‘experiment’ is 
the (unknown in advance and ontologically variable) constitutive effect of the 
intervention, and the emergent nature of the actors, objects, concerns and norms 
(including standards of legitimacy) involved.  
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The present study builds on that work by adopting the ‘experimental’ lens in a new 
setting: international research governance in the field of GEC and sustainability. 
Much of the existing work on experiments in science and democracy focuses on 
instances or forms of public participation. In this thesis I have extended it to another 
relevant context at the science-policy or science-democracy interface, less explicitly 
focused on public or citizen participation (in the sense of e.g. ‘ordinary’ or ‘lay’ 
publics), but still concerned with the public or societal use and value of science and 
knowledge (and which is still, for the most part, supported by public funding from 
national governments).  
 
Experimentality is a particularly productive analytical lens in the context of a young 
and emerging initiative, enabling a generous and fair approach rather than an overly 
critical evaluative stance. From this perspective, Future Earth did not ‘succeed’ or 
‘fail’ in its scientific or engagement activities during the period of study; what is 
more interesting is what introducing the idea of co-production opened up or made 
possible: its generative, productive or performative power. Simply starting 
conversations about why and how to co-produce research has opened up questions 
and practices that might not otherwise have been considered at this level in relation to 
this type of research. Institutional developments – such as the introduction of an 
Engagement Committee in addition to the standard Scientific Committee, and 
thematic rather than disciplinary organisation of research communities – have the 
potential to effect further change to well-established social and epistemic orders. 
Here we can see that Future Earth is productive in a broad range of ways, for 
example in generating (or consisting of) dynamic epistemic assemblage(s) or 
collective(s) of researchers, policymakers, and other professionals who are juggling 
diverse and sometimes conflicting agendas, and in (re)producing (and sometimes 
challenging) different political imaginaries and models of democracy in its various 
structures and activities. 
 
Across these chapters it is evident that the uncertainty and ambiguity around 
understandings of co-’s (and other aspects of Future Earth) have been acknowledged 
by many of the actors involved. At various points co-’s have been conceptualised as 
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an experiment, or experimental, and Future Earth more broadly has been seen as 
stepping into the unknown and/or to be attempting something that has not been 
attempted before (i.e. co-production at a global scale, and/or large-scale coordination 
of a broad range of knowledge communities and domains). From this perspective, co-
production creates an experimental condition in (or of) Future Earth, and the tensions 
and ambiguities within Future Earth are not necessarily problematic, as ambiguity 
can make space for openness and flexibility (Nerlich & Clarke, 2001). Viewing, 
indeed acknowledging, co-production in Future Earth as an experiment and adopting 
experimental approaches may hold the potential to overcome problems posed and 
impasses reached by conflicting views of what Future Earth is, what co-design/co-
production is, and what they are for. Notions of experiments in science and 
democracy allow us to make sense of and make the most of institutional and semantic 
multiplicity and indeterminacy: this study contributes to that field in beginning to 
explore how that might work in the case of international GEC research governance. 
 
8.2.3 Implications for research governance in practice  
 
If, as I have argued, Future Earth is better understood as a ‘tapestry’ rather than a 
‘flagship’, it could be productive to foreground experimentality in Future Earth’s 
thinking and framing. Experimentality potentially presents an opportunity for co-
existence, finding a way to live with difference (and make it work) rather than trying 
to stamp it out. This raises the question of whether Future Earth’s institutional 
structure and accreditation/affiliation processes are open and flexible enough to 
enable such multiple meanings and practices. Future Earth aims to institutionalise a 
new type of science, or a different approach to science from that of the existing GEC 
programmes. However, institutionalisation is not necessarily conducive to 
improvisation, responsiveness or flexibility. So, how can experimentality, flexibility 
and openness be maintained in contexts where some degree of (institutional) closure 
is desirable (or necessary) (for example in putting policy and structures in place, in 
building and maintaining legitimacy and authority, and where the initial hope was to 
reduce institutional complexity)? How can a balance be found between 
institutionalisation and experimentality?  
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Experimentality invites us to think about what the alternatives to existing 
arrangements might be. This might require new (and potentially) radical thinking 
about how to organise, conduct and value research and its outcomes, in order to 
accommodate the co-existence – or ‘alongsideness’ (Latimer, 2013) – of different 
views of how research should work, what it is for, and the impacts it might have. 
Ways of accounting for and valuing intangible or unexpected processes and outcomes 
may need to be developed, and it may be necessary to remain open-minded about 
where and how results, impact, influence, solutions and outcomes are found and 
defined. While in some cases the use of tools and knowledge developed in Future 
Earth within policy or decision-making contexts might be the intended and desirable 
outcome, in other cases, starting conversations between different stakeholders (some 
of whom would not normally have a seat at the table) could be seen as a significant 
result (which may in turn lead to small changes in perspective or development of 
skills or capacities of (some of) those involved).  
 
However, Future Earth and its partners may need to take some risks in adopting this 
approach, particularly given increasing cultures of short-term quantifiable ‘impact’ 
(Strathern, 2000; RCUK, n.d.-b)46, particularly on the part of funders who are under 
increasing pressure to demonstrate (instrumental) “value” for taxpayers’ and 
investors’ money (Nowotny, 2014). Finding ways to value process, learning and 
unanticipated outcomes (rather than – or in addition to – direct and quantifiable 
impact or utility) would enable – and be enabled by – a more open-ended 
experimental agenda. One option may be to shift the focus from solutions-orientation 
towards ‘clumsy solutions’: 
 
[an escape] from the idea that, when faced with contradictory definitions of 
problems and solutions, only one definition must be chosen and all others 
rejected. Clumsiness allows for several or all such contradictory goals to be 
simultaneously pursued.  
(Hulme, 2009: 338) 
 
This creates greater space for and maybe acceptance of improvisation in times of 
uncertainty. More importantly, it does not require an overhaul of Future Earth’s 
                                                 
46 For example, it was recently announced that impact now makes up 25% of the UK Research 
Excellence Framework (rather than 20% as previously) (HEFCE, 2017).  
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existing (sometimes contradictory) framings and goals. Indeed, as argued by others, it 
may be possible to adapt the predominant frameworks in these contexts, for example, 
to diffract the conceptual holism implicit in notions of the Anthropocene (Lövbrand 
et al., 2015); or to broaden the service-delivery mode of the new social contract 
between science and society to incorporate a richer understanding of accountability 
and democracy (Castree, 2016). This would achieve more space for diversity and 
difference: moving towards co-existence. Attention must now be paid to the 
conditions under which this would be possible. 
 
Tentative suggestions for Future Earth and others 
 
In order to foreground experimentality and productively work with some of the 
tensions and ambiguities discussed in this thesis, the following steps (Table 4 below) 
could be adopted (and are already being adopted47) in Future Earth and similar 
initiatives. It should be noted that Future Earth has developed a great deal since the 
fieldwork for this project was completed, so rather than recommendations, these 
points are put forward as tentative suggestions to perhaps prompt discussion or 
thought. 
  
                                                 
47 In addition to Future Earth’s own evaluation and monitoring processes, at least one independent 
research project is currently underway at the time of writing (September 2017) aiming to further 
explore co-production and transdisciplinary practices in Future Earth.  
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Table 4: Tentative suggestions for Future Earth and others 
Foregrounding experimentality 
a. Facilitate learning from existing projects where experimentality has been 
foregrounded, for example in the ISSC Transformations Programme. Explore 
what conditions are conducive to open, diverse, flexible and inclusive 
approaches. 
b. Facilitate risk-taking and openness to the unexpected within projects and 
activities (e.g. by promoting open-ended frameworks of impact and outcome). 
c. Alongside standard monitoring and evaluation, consider qualitative, interpretive 
approaches to explore emergent features of co-production work, and unexpected 
productivities, unanticipated impacts and outcomes. 
d. Consider how to value unconventional aspects of research, including, for 
example, valuing process over outputs. 
e. Consider a range of experimental methodologies in designing participatory 
work, including those informed by social psychology (e.g. Bellamy et al., 
2017); action research (Levin & Greenwood, 2011); and experimental, 
participatory arts practice (e.g. Horst, 2011).  
f. A focus on solutions-orientation might be enriched and opened up by 
foregrounding the potential for ‘clumsy’ solutions and improvisation.  
Encouraging reflexivity and learning 
g. Alongside standard monitoring and evaluation, consider sourcing and providing 
the means for all affiliated projects and activities to involve a researcher with 
expertise in knowledge politics (e.g. anthropologist or sociologist of science, 
expert in engagement) in every project to study the ongoing dynamics and 
facilitate reflexivity. 
h. Establish a regular workshop or conference to review and share experiences on 
how co-production is done, integrated, perceived, transformed, adapted in the 
projects and other activities, including in the governing committees. 
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8.3 Limitations of the research  
 
As outlined in the thesis introduction, this study took up the opportunity to 
investigate Future Earth as an empirical case unique in its ambition to adopt and 
institutionalise co-design and co-production as principles for research and its 
governance at the global level, but also emblematic of current shifts and trends in 
research governance and conduct towards openness, accountability and participation. 
The study focused on a particular moment in the early emergence of the initiative, 
and for the most part on the governing structure of the organisation rather than on its 
projects and broader networks. 
 
Beyond the standard limitations of qualitative research, the focus of the study on the 
emergence of Future Earth through its global committees limits the extent to which it 
is possible to speak to the broader ‘ecologies’ of participation within and beyond 
Future Earth. In accordance with a decentred or distributed approach to governance, 
the central committees of Future Earth are not the only locus of power, and a richer, 
perhaps more comprehensive picture could be drawn by exploring other parts of the 
initiative and the broader networks that it constitutes and in which it is embedded. 
Further attention could be paid to broader institutional, political and cultural orders 
and change. 
 
In addition to this limitation of spread, the study also faced temporal restrictions: 
according to some of the actors involved, co-production was not yet happening in 
practice, particularly on the ground in research projects (and in some instances it was 
not possible to gain access to funding bids or Memoranda of Understanding that 
might have provided an insight into project activities and framings). Furthermore, I 
did not have the financial or personal capacity to interview project team members. 
However, all research in some way or other places artificial boundaries around its 
‘object of study’. So while acknowledging the present study as a partial and 
artificially bounded view of a particular moment in Future Earth’s development, I 
hope that in exploring the political imaginaries and participatory/science-society 
models reproduced and performed in Future Earth, this study contributes a snapshot 
of one part of a broader ecology of participation and reflects wider trends in science-
society relations. 
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The distinction between the analytical idiom of co-production (in the sense of co-
constitution of science/knowledge and social/political order) and more strategic or 
instrumental uses of the term (in the sense of making something together) structures 
the analysis in that both meanings are adopted by various actors in Future Earth (as 
explored in Chapters 5-7), but also in that the ontology and epistemology implied in 
the constructivist STS on which the co-productive idiom is founded informs the 
conceptual and methodological background for this thesis. However, it should be 
noted that this study is not strictly speaking a study of constitutive co-production in 
the sense intended by Jasanoff and colleagues (2004c; Hilgartner et al., 2015); it does 
not explore constitutional change or state-making, for example, nor does it affiliate 
with either the interactionist or the constitutive strands of this literature; rather it 
explores some of the smaller steps that might contribute to (or be considered 
symptomatic of) broader processes of co-constitution of science and social order. 
These can be seen to comprise the reproduction or performance of established (or 
even new) political imaginaries of science through particular understandings of co-
production and associated institutional and participatory mechanisms. 
 
Finally, while I did not set out to evaluate Future Earth’s co-production practices 
against pre-determined criteria or norms (e.g. standards of a particular type of 
democratic engagement), this could be seen as a limitation of the study. The research 
does not present useful or readily portable guidelines on what does and does not work 
well and the implications for future co-production practice. Furthermore, based on 
the data collected and generated for the study, it is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions about the difference that Future Earth made to research governance and 
practice more broadly: its influence and impacts. This is partly due to the formative 
stage in Future Earth’s development under consideration (as detailed above), but also 
because this was not the intention of the study: rather than exploring whether 
transformation occurred, it explores how different visions and practices of co-
production entail particular imaginaries of science-society relations, and how these 
meanings and visions influence implementation. While I am not able to answer the 
question as to whether Future Earth will enable shifts in knowledge and politics that 
allow Earth’s futures to be imagined and produced by the many rather than the few, I 
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hope that in exploring what is envisaged for and implemented in the name of Future 
Earth, this study opens up a partial but different perspective on some familiar issues 
in a new and still emerging context.  
 
8.4 Future research 
 
There are several particular avenues that could provide an interesting basis for future 
research on Future Earth, on co-production, and on transformations in research 
institutions, cultures and communities.  
 
Given the limitation noted above in relation to the specific focus on the governing 
structure of Future Earth, with greater resources it would be possible to explore how 
co-production is conceptualised and practiced in other parts of Future Earth and its 
wider networks, including its affiliated projects, building up a broader and more 
detailed picture of Future Earth’s ecology of co-production and the broader ecologies 
of participation, systems of science-society relations and epistemic/political regimes 
that it shapes and is shaped by (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016). One approach would be 
to follow some of the forms and technologies of participation used in this context (for 
example, Sutherland workshops, committee memberships) for a more thorough and 
systematic exploration of where these methods originate, how they translate in this 
context (Soneryd, 2016), and perhaps how they are carried forward into the many 
national and local contexts comprising Future Earth’s networks. 
 
There are other potential topics of interest that could be explored within Future Earth, 
particularly with resources to examine work at the project level. For example, more 
attention could be paid to global North/South relations and what it means to bring 
together natural science, social science and ‘local’ knowledge (particularly in relation 
to the epistemological challenges outlined in section 2.2 of the literature review 
(Rayner & Malone, 1998)). 
 
To broaden the research scope to Future Earth’s wider networks and ecologies, it 
might be interesting to compare Future Earth with other international knowledge 
institutions, whether assessments that synthesise knowledge (IPCC, IPBES) (De 
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Pryck & Wanneau, 2017), or perhaps comparable programmes or schemes in other 
fields (for example in health or in agriculture through bodies such as the CGIAR – 
formerly the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research – now ‘a 
global research partnership for a food-secure future’ (CGIAR, n.d.)), and the ways in 
which these institutions intersect with decision making (and other spaces of 
acknowledged or unacknowledged knowledge production) at a range of scales in a 
range of sectors and contexts. 
 
To further extend the project of the ‘experimental’ approach, it would be attractive to 
explore whether there are empirical examples where experimentality has been 
foregrounded in an institutional context, what conditions enabled this, and how others 
might learn from it. How can experimentality be maintained while policy and 
structures are being put in place? How can a balance be achieved between bringing 
institutions into being – and maintaining them – while also allowing space for 
development, new and multiple perspectives, and bottom-up initiative? (How) can 
intangible processes and outcomes of research be valued in a culture of solutions-
orientation, policy relevance and increasing quantification and audit (Strathern, 
2000)? How can tensions between openness and closure be negotiated? 
 
Other scholars have suggested that humility, institutional reflexivity and 
organisational learning are key to ensuring ongoing space for plurality, flexibility, 
diversity and capacity-building (S. Beck et al., 2014; Felt & Wynne, 2007; Jasanoff, 
2003; Pallett & Chilvers, 2015). There are strong indications that Future Earth aspires 
to achieve this type of practice, whether through a reflexive form of co-production, 
through monitoring and evaluating its own processes and outcomes, or in 
acknowledging and encouraging ongoing learning. Future research could (care-fully 
and generously) explore whether and, more importantly, how Future Earth is – or 
indeed other institutions and actors are – managing to achieve this within and beyond 
their ever-expanding and complex structures and networks. While the problems 
facing us are seemingly intractable and multiple, to see people collaborating and 
striving for better future worlds provides many reasons to be hopeful.
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Documents 
 
Publications (external documents in the public domain)  
 
Ref Year Month (of 
publication) 
Type of document Publication title 
Doc
1 
2010 August Key document: 
report 
What does it take to meet the Belmont 
Challenge? 
Doc
2 
2010 Oct Key document: 
report 
Earth System Science for Global 
Sustainability: the Grand Challenges 
Doc
3 
2010 11 Nov Press release Scientific Grand Challenges identified to 
address global sustainability 
Doc
4 
2011 after 11 Feb Meeting summary Summary of the 3rd Earth System Visioning 
meeting 
Doc
5 
2011 March Key document: 
White Paper 
Belmont Forum White Paper 
Doc
6 
2011 May Key document: 
statement of intent 
Towards a 10 year Earth System Research 
initiative for Global Sustainability: A joint 
statement of intent from the Belmont Forum, 
ICSU and the ISSC 
Doc
7 
2011 After 23 
June 
Meeting summary Earth System Sustainability Initiative: 
Summary of the first Transition Team meeting 
Doc
8 
2011 29 Jun Key document: 
conceptual paper 
Earth System Research for Global 
Sustainability: A New 10-Year Research 
Initiative 
Final version: 29 June 2011 
Doc
9 
2011 29 Jun Operational 
document 
Establishment of a Transition Team 
Terms of Reference 
Doc
10 
2011 Unknown – 
July/Oct? 
Operational 
document 
Earth System Sustainability Initiative 
Transition Team Working Group 1: Draft 
Terms of Reference 
Doc
11 
2011 07 Jul Operational 
document 
Earth System Sustainability Initiative 
Transition Team Working Group 2: Draft 
Terms of Reference 
Doc
12 
2011 Unknown – 
July/Oct? 
Operational 
document 
Earth System Sustainability Initiative 
Transition Team Working Group 3: Draft 
Terms of Reference 
Doc
13 
2011 28 Sep Press release Research solutions for sustainability in a 
rapidly changing world 
Doc
14 
2012 16 Jan Meeting summary Future Earth (Earth System Sustainability 
Initiative) 
Summary of the 2nd Transition Team meeting 
Doc
15 
2012 Feb Key document: 
framework 
document 
Future Earth: Research for global 
sustainability 
A framework document 
by the Future Earth Transition Team 
Doc
16 
2012 27 Mar Press release Future Earth: New global platform for 
sustainability research presented at Planet 
Under Pressure 
Doc
17 
2012 14 Jun Press release Future Earth: New global platform for 
sustainability research launched at Rio+20 
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Doc
18 
2012 Oct Newsletter Future Earth Newsletter - October 2012 
Doc
19 
2013 14 Jan Newsletter Future Earth Newsletter - January 2013 
Doc
20 
2013 17 Apr Key document: 
design report 
Draft initial design report. 17th April 2013 
Doc
21 
2013 26 Apr Newsletter Future Earth Newsletter - April 2013 
Doc
22 
2013 18 Jun Newsletter Future Earth Science Committee announced 
Doc
23 
2013 1 Jul Press release Professor Frans Berkhout named Interim 
Director of Future Earth 
Doc
24 
2013 3 Jul Newsletter Future Earth Interim Director announced 
Doc
25 
2013 Jul Operational 
document 
Process to establish the permanent secretariat 
of Future Earth. Call for expressions of 
interest 
Doc
26 
2013 23 Oct Newsletter Future Earth Newsletter - October 2013 
Doc
27 
2013 4 Nov Key document: 
design report 
Future Earth Initial Design  
Doc
28 
2013 17 Dec Operational 
document 
Process to establish the permanent Secretariat 
of Future Earth. Call for full bids 
Doc
29 
2013 23 Dec Newsletter Future Earth Newsletter – December 2013 
Doc
30 
2014 7 Jan Key document: 
design report 
executive summary 
Initial Design Executive Summary 
Doc
31 
2014 10 Jan Operational 
document 
Future Earth Engagement Committee. Call for 
applications 
Doc
32 
2014 14 Feb Newsletter Call for applications: Future Earth 
Engagement Committee 
Doc
33 
2014 23 Apr Newsletter News from Future Earth: Online Consultation 
on Strategic Research Agenda, Calls for 
Funding Proposals & New Website 
Doc
34 
2014 7 Aug Newsletter New initiatives to accelerate global 
sustainable development 
Doc
35 
2014 2 Jul Newsletter Future Earth Permanent Secretariat 
Announced 
Doc
36 
2014 15 Sep Newsletter Future Earth Executive Director: Vacancy 
Announcement 
Doc
37 
2014 4 Nov Key document: 
Vision 
Future Earth 2025 Vision 
Doc
38 
2014 18 Nov Newsletter Engagement Committee announced, 2025 
Vision published, 2015 conference for early 
career scientists 
Doc
39 
2014 4 Dec Key document: 
Strategic Research 
Agenda 
Strategic Research Agenda 2014 
Doc
40 
2015 23 Jan Newsletter Call for Transformative Knowledge Networks, 
Strategic Research Agenda published, 
Vacancies 
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Internal documents 
 
Science Committee & Interim Engagement Committee minutes & papers 
 
Ref Document name Notes 
Doc41 SC1_20130710_minutes Teleconference 
Doc42 SC2 03_09_2013 agenda  
Doc43 SC2 papers: Draft_ToR_Future Earth SC  
Doc44 SC2 papers: Future Earth IEC ToR  
Doc45 SC2 papers: GECHH  
Doc46 SC2 papers: mou_v4  
Doc47 SC2 papers:  Program project summary_v3  
Doc48 SC2 papers:  workstreams  
Doc49 SC2_20130903_minutes Teleconference 
Doc50 SC3 01_10_2013 agenda   
Doc51 SC3_20131001_minutes Teleconference 
Doc52 SC4 05_11_2013 agenda  
Doc53 SC4 papers: Future Earth - engagement v3 
011113 
Early draft paper on Engagement 
Doc54 SC4_20131105_minutes Teleconference 
Doc55 SC5 papers_November 2013  
Doc56 SC5_20131119_minutes Teleconference 
Doc57 SC6 20131203 agenda  
Doc58 SC6 papers: 2025_comments  
Doc59 SC6 papers: Future Earth 10-year 2013-11-30  
Doc60 SC6_20131203_minutes Teleconference 
Doc61 SC7 20140204 agenda  
Doc62 SC7 papers: Secretariat activities_Feb2014  
Doc63 SC7 papers: medium-term RP_process  
Doc64 SC7 papers: RP_info to core projects  
Doc65 SC7 papers: project_transition_review  
Doc66 SC7_20140204_minutes Teleconference 
Doc67 SC8_20140304_minutes Teleconference 
Doc68 SC9_20140401 minutes Teleconference 
Doc69 SC10_20140506 minutes  Teleconference 
Doc70 SC11EC3 Beijing papers_v4_correct 
bookmarks 
Includes draft Engagement White 
Paper 
Doc71 SC11EC3_reporting Complete set of Interim Secretariat notes 
& presentations  
Doc72 SC11EC3_ 20140604_minutes_general  First joint face-to-face meeting of the SC 
& IEC, Beijing, China 
Doc73 SCEC12 20140708 minutes Teleconference  
Doc74 SCEC13 20140805 minutes_general Teleconference  
Doc75 SCEC14 20140902 minutes Teleconference  
Doc76 SCEC15 20141007 minutes Teleconference 
Doc77 SCEC16 20141104 minutes Teleconference 
Doc78 SCEC17 20141201 minutes_general First joint face-to-face meeting of the SC 
& full EC, Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Doc79 SCEC18_papers & reporting Complete set of meeting papers & 
Interim Secretariat notes. Includes draft 
Engagement Green Paper 
Doc80 SCEC18 20150203 minutes Teleconference 
Doc81 SCEC19 20150303 minutes Teleconference 
Doc82 EC Terms of Reference_FINAL 2014-09  
Doc83 IEC 19_11_2013 minutes Teleconference 
Doc84 iEC NY Meeting Minutes_Final First face-to-face meeting of the IEC 
Doc85 Selection Committee Members Operational doc 
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Projects webinars minutes & papers 
 
Ref Document name Notes 
Doc86 Webinar I - agenda and practical 
information_final 
 
Doc87 Webinar I GEC projects - report_17-07-2013  
Doc88 agenda Sep 23 2013  
Doc89 minutes Sep 23 2013  
Doc90 agenda 12 Nov 2013  
Doc91 minutes 12 Nov 2013  
Doc92 agenda 10 Dec 2013  
Doc93 minutes 10 Dec 2013  
Doc94 agenda 14 Jan 2014  
Doc95 minutes 14 Jan 2013  
Doc96 agenda_day1-2  
Doc97 agenda_day3  
Doc98 FTIs and Clusters_v2  
Doc99 Mid-term priorities_v5  
Doc100 uncork_output Includes feedback on risks and 
opportunities of co-’-s 
Doc101 report_day1_2 Face-to-face meeting, January 2014 
Doc102 report_day3 Face-to-face meeting, January 2014 
Doc103 agenda 18 Feb 2014  
Doc104 task forces  
Doc105 webinar6_20140218  
Doc106 webinar8_20140408  
Doc107 webinar8_comms_presentation  
 
ICSU web pages 
 
Ref Page name 
Web1 About  
Web2 AGU Town Hall  
Web3 Biographies of members  
Web4 Cape Town workshop  
Web5 Events  
Web6 Food Futures Young Scientists Networking Conference  
Web7 Future Earth  
Web8 Future Earth Event  
Web9 Future Earth in the Media  
Web10 Future Earth launch event  
Web11 Future Earth meeting London  
Web12 Future Earth Newsletter  
Web13 Future Earth North America Webinar  
Web14 Future Earth North America Webinar 1  
Web15 Future Earth regional workshop for Europe  
Web16 Future Earth side event at RioCentro  
Web17 Future Earth symposium at the AAAS annual meeting  
Web18 Future Earth Town Hall at EGU General Assembly  
Web19 Future Earth Workshop for Middle East and North Africa  
Web20 GEC Community Workshop  
Web21 Governance Structure  
Web22 Interim Engagement Committee  
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Web23 Kuala Lumpur Workshop  
Web24 Mexico City Workshop  
Web25 News  
Web26 Photos  
Web27 Press Releases  
Web28 Publications  
Web29 Resources  
Web30 Science Committee  
Web31 Transition Team  
Web32 Videos  
Web33 Working Groups  
 
Future Earth blog posts (until 20 March 2014) 
 
Ref Page name 
Web34 About us  
Web35 Q&A with Bob Watson, Why Future Earth needs an Engagement Committee  
Web36 Q&A with Frans Berkhout, Interim Future Earth Director  
Web37 
 
Q&A with Mark Stafford Smith, Science Committee Chair  
 
Future Earth web pages and blog posts (from 20 March 2014) 
 
Ref Page name 
Web38 About us  
Web39 Deconstructing the Anthropocene  
Web40 Dynamic Planet  
Web41 
 
Get involved  
Web42 
 
Global Development  
Web43 
 
History  
Web44 
 
Home  
Web45 
 
Impact  
Web46 
 
Interim Engagement Committee  
Web47 
 
Multimedia  
Web48 
 
Research Projects  
Web49 
 
Science Committee  
Web50 
 
Secretariat  
Web51 
 
Structure and Governance  
Web52 
 
The Alliance  
Web53 
 
The next big thing for global transformation  
Web54 
 
Transformations towards sustainability  
Web55 
 
What should the Future of Global Change Research look like? 
Web56 Who we are  
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Appendix 2: Example information sheet (interviews) 
 
The New Co-Production of Knowledge? 
Challenges and Opportunities of 
Transforming Global Environmental 
Change Research Systems  
 
Information for Participants  
 
Who is carrying out the research?   
Eleanor Hadley Kershaw, Doctoral Researcher, Institute for Science and Society, 
University of Nottingham, UK. The PhD project is part of the broader ‘Making 
Science Public’ research programme, funded by the Leverhulme Trust.48  
 
What is the study about?  
The study aims to investigate the challenges and opportunities associated with 
transforming research systems in response to global environmental change 
(GEC), using Future Earth as a case study. In particular, it aims to examine 
notions and practices of transdisciplinarity and co-production, focusing on the 
roles envisioned for various disciplines and stakeholder groups (e.g. natural 
sciences, social sciences, non-academic actors), as well as the factors shaping 
their capacity to contribute to the framing, conduct and use of GEC research and 
associated sustainability solutions. 
 
What type of research questions will the project address?  
Using qualitative methods, the project will address questions such as: What do 
transdisciplinarity and co-production mean in Future Earth? What roles are 
envisioned for different stakeholders? How will these ideas be implemented at 
research governance and research production levels? What drives these 
developments? What factors shape the capacity of stakeholders to contribute to 
or influence Future Earth governance and research? What sorts of challenges and 
opportunities arise from this? 
 
What will participation involve?  
A mutually convenient date, time and location will be arranged for a face-to-face, 
telephone or Skype interview. The interview will last from minimum 30 minutes to 
maximum 90 minutes, depending on your availability. The interview questions will 
cover your thoughts on and experiences of Future Earth’s development and 
implementation, as well as your perspective on transdisciplinarity and co-
production more broadly. The researcher may also observe select Future Earth 
committee meetings and/or events. Notice of observation will be given to 
attendees in advance of as well as during meetings/events. 
 
What are the benefits of participating in the study?  
This study will engage reflexively with Future Earth, making space for the 
consideration of the challenges and opportunities it faces in relation to 
transdisciplinarity and co-production. The results of the data analysis overall will 
generate recommendations for the further implementation of the initiative and 
perhaps for similar initiatives in the future. By participating you will be helping to 
broaden the range of sources of data, increasing the chances of outputs being 
useful and relevant to Future Earth committees and stakeholders, and to the 
broader research and research policy communities.  
                                                 
48 The Leverhulme Trust is one of the largest all-subject providers of research funding in the UK. For 
more information on the Making Science Public Programme, please see: 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/makingsciencepublic  
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Are there any foreseeable risks to the individual if they participate in the 
research?  
Every effort will be made to ensure anonymity (unless explicit permission is given 
otherwise). In some cases, participants may occupy unique roles that would make 
quotes identifiable to those within the Future Earth community. In such cases, the 
researcher will discuss this with the individual participant(s) concerned and reach 
an agreement on whether further permission is required for the use of quotes 
and/or descriptors in research outputs.  
 
Are there any costs or inducements to taking part in the research?  
No. 
 
What should you do if you do not want to participate?  
Participation is voluntary and consent can be withdrawn any time by contacting 
the researcher. Please contact the researcher about any queries or concerns you 
have. 
 
What happens to the collected information?  
All data generated through this study will be analysed according to the research 
questions above. Recordings and anonymised transcripts will be stored and then 
destroyed in accordance with University policy. Anonymous quotes may be used 
in research outputs, unless explicit permission is given for quotes to be attributed. 
The data collected may be used in other research projects that have ethics 
approval, but your name and contact information will be removed before it is 
made available to other researchers. Confidentiality and anonymity cannot be 
guaranteed in the case of disclosure or evidence of illegal activity or significant 
harm, abuse, or neglect to participants or to others. 
 
What are the research outputs?  
An executive summary of research findings and any resulting recommendations 
will be shared with all research participants. Other primary outputs will include a 
doctoral thesis, and research publications in the form of journal articles. 
Additional outputs may include blog posts and other materials for audiences 
beyond the research community.  
 
Who else is being asked to take part and how are they being selected?  
Interviews will be undertaken with key stakeholders: 1) those involved in past 
and current Future Earth governance and implementation; 2) those involved in 
Future Earth research programmes/projects; 3) participants in consultation 
exercises and initial Future Earth activities; 4) those not currently involved in 
Future Earth but whose work is relevant to transdisciplinary global environmental 
change research. Interviewees will be selected with consideration of the balanced 
representation of gender, geographical location, and sectoral, institutional, and 
disciplinary affiliation.  
 
Contact details 
 
Researcher:  
 
Eleanor Hadley Kershaw     E: lqxecha@nottingham.ac.uk 
Institute for Science and Society     T: +44 (0)115 846 6560     
School of Sociology and Social Policy   
Law and Social Sciences Building 
University of Nottingham, University Park 
Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom 
http://nottingham.ac.uk/sociology/people/lqxecha  
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Supervisors:  
 
Brigitte Nerlich (above address)  Dr Sujatha Raman (above address) 
Professor of Science, Language & Society Lecturer, Science & Technology Studies 
Director, Making Science Public  Deputy Director, Making Science Public  
E: brigitte.nerlich@nottingham.ac.uk  E: sujatha.raman@nottingham.ac.uk 
T: +44 (0)115 846 7065   T: +44 (0)115 846 7039 
 
Making Science Public Programme: www.nottingham.ac.uk/makingsciencepublic 
 
 
Complaint procedure 
If you wish to complain about the way in which the research is being conducted or 
have any concerns about the research then in the first instance please contact the 
researcher or the supervisors (contact details above).  If this does not resolve the 
matter to your satisfaction then please contact the School’s Research Ethics 
Officer, Dr Simon Roberts (T: +44 (0)115 846 7767; E: 
simon.roberts@nottingham.ac.uk).    
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Appendix 3: Example consent form (interviews) 
 
Institute for Science and Society, School of Sociology and Social 
Policy, University of Nottingham 
 
Participant Consent Form: The New Co-Production of Knowledge? 
Challenges and Opportunities of Transforming Global 
Environmental Change Research Systems  
 
In signing this consent form I confirm that: 
 
I have read and understand the Participant Information 
Sheet. I have had the opportunity to ask questions, which 
have been answered satisfactorily. 
Yes  No  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I may 
withdraw from the research project at any stage, without 
having to give any reason. 
Yes  No  
I understand that while information gained during the study 
may be published, any information I provide is confidential 
(with the exception of disclosure or evidence of illegal activity 
or significant harm, abuse, or neglect to participants or to 
others, in which case confidentiality may be violated). I 
understand that every effort will be made to maximise the 
anonymity of participants. In cases where there is a chance 
that I may be identifiable to Future Earth colleagues (or 
others) from the use of quotes or descriptors in 
reports/publications, the researcher has discussed this with 
me and will seek further permission where required.  
Yes  No  
I agree that extracts from the interview may be anonymously 
quoted in any report or publication arising from the research. 
Yes  No  
I understand that the interview will be recorded using 
electronic voice recorder.  
Yes  No  
I understand that data will be securely stored. Yes 
 
 No  
I understand that the information provided can be used in 
other research projects which have ethics approval, but that 
my name and contact information will be removed before it is 
made available to other researchers.  
Yes  No  
I agree to take part in the above research project.   
 
Yes  No  
 
 
 
     
Participant’s name (BLOCK 
CAPITAL) 
 Participant’s signature  Date 
 
 
     
Researcher’s name (BLOCK 
CAPITAL) 
 Researcher’s signature  Date 
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Appendix 4: Example interview schedule 
 
1. Could you tell me briefly about your work and your institutional/ disciplinary 
affiliations?  
Future Earth: what it is & involvement 
2. Could you tell me a bit about Future Earth? What is it?  
3. Why is it needed? 
4. What role have you played so far in Future Earth?  
Future Earth: stakeholders, governance & activities 
5. Who is involved in Future Earth and how? Who might be involved in the 
future?  
6. How are/should they be involved? Why? 
7. How might these different parties relate to each other in Future Earth?  
8. How is Future Earth governed or how will it be?  
9. What type of activities are happening or will happen within Future Earth? 
Who is or will be involved in those? 
Future Earth implementation & impacts 
10. How are these activities playing out so far? 
11. Do you think that Future Earth could lead to significant transformations in the 
way that research is governed, conducted or used? How? 
Challenges and opportunities 
12. What do you consider to be the major challenges in achieving the vision of 
Future Earth? 
13. And the major opportunities? 
14. Are there any exemplars that you have been able to draw on in developing 
Future Earth? 
15. Do you feel that there is currently anything missing from Future Earth, or that 
needs further thought or attention?  
Co-production and closing questions 
16. [Prompt if hasn’t arisen in response to other questions: “Co-production” 
seems to be a significant feature of Future Earth. What does this mean? 
How is it novel? How will it work in practice? How will it contribute to the 
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broader aims of Future Earth? (Also transdisciplinarity, integration, 
interdisciplinarity, engagement.)]  
17. Where did you first come across the concept of co-production? Have you 
worked on other projects or programmes featuring co-production? 
18. Is there anything else that you would like to share about your experience 
working on/with Future Earth?  
